* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 19th MARCH, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
I.A. 30090/2025 & I.A. 31798/2025
IN
+ CS(OS) 957/2024
ISHA FOUNDATION .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Simranjeet Singh, Ms.
Pushpaveni Kakkaje, Mr. Jagdish
Solanki, Mr. Rohan Jaitley, Ms.
Meherunnisa A. Jaitley, Mr. Areeb
Amanullah, Mr. Rishabh Pant, Mr.
Abhijeet Kr. Pandey and Ms. Apurbaa
Dutta, Advocates
versus
GOOGLE LLC & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Aditya Gupta and Mr. Rohith
Venkatesan and Ms. Vani Kaushik,
Advs. for D-1.
Mr. V. T. Perumal, Dr. Ram Sankar,
Ms. K Vaijayanthi, Ms. Shaarumathi,
Mr. Ashwin Sam and Mr. Nagender
Advs. for D-2 & 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1. The present Suit has been filed with the following prayers:
"a) Pass a decree of permanent & mandatory
injunction against Defendant Nos. 1-4 to immediately
delete/remove/take down the defamatory videos and
all the posts/publications/allegations emanating out of
the defamatory videos as listed in Paragraph 10 of
this Plaint, or any other videos/
posts/publications/allegations which are identical to,
or similar in content, on the internet through social
media platforms, websites, blogs, or any other media
such as the Metaverse, blockchain, any Artificial
Intelligence program, or any other media such a print,
audio-visual etc. which are defamatory with respect to
the Plaintiff, and;
b) Pass a decree of permanent injunction against the
Defendants No.1-4, their associates, servants, agents,
affiliates, assignees, substitutes, representatives, their
subscribers, employees and/or persons claiming
through them and/or under them and all other persons
from creating, publishing, uploading, sharing,
disseminating etc. the defamatory videos as listed in
Paragraph 10 of this Plaint, or any other videos
which are identical to, or similar in content, on the
internet through social media platforms, websites,
blogs, or any other media such as the Metaverse,
blockchain, any Artificial Intelligence program, or
any other media such a print, audio-visual etc. which
are defamatory with respect to the Plaintiff, and;
c) Pass a decree of damages to the tune of Rs.
3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crore Only) in favour of
the Plaintiff and against the Defendants No. 2 and 3,
and;
d) Pass an order for costs of the present proceedings,
and;
e) Pass such further orders as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances."
2. The Plaintiff describes itself as a registered Public Charitable Trust
vide Trust Deed dated 07.01.1992 bearing Document No. 6 of 1992 in Book
4 in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar-II, Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu. As per
the Plaint, the Plaintiff-Trust is dedicated to raising human consciousness
and attainment of global harmony, spreading awareness towards social
economic and ecological causes by undertaking National and International
movements.
3. The Plaint reveals that the Plaintiff-Trust was founded by Sadhguru
Jaggi Vasudev ["the Founder"], who is stated to be an internationally
renowned yogi, and often invited to speak at leading international forums. It
is stated that the Founder has received India's second highest civilian honor
i.e., the Padma Vibhushan in the year 2017. It is stated that the Plaintiff has
16 million followers, about 300 centers spread worldwide and owns and
operates a website called https://isha.sadhguru.org/in/en, wherein primarily
the videos and discourses of the Founder are disseminated. It is stated that
the Plaintiff is also certified by the Yoga Certification Board under the
Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India as a "Leading Yoga Institute" and
it is also recognized by the Department of Personnel Training, Government
of India for providing in-service training programs to the Government
Officers.
4. As for the Defendants, it is stated that the Defendant No. 1 owns and
operates various platforms and websites services, including YouTube which
is an online video-sharing and social media platform headquartered in
Mountain View, California, United States. YouTube is the second most-
visited website in the world, after Google Search. The Defendant No. 2 is a
weekly Tamil Magazine bearing the website link-
https://www.nakkheeran.in/, wherein content by way of several videos is
disseminated online. The Defendant No. 3 is an individual who is the
Publisher and Editor of Defendant No. 2 and is responsible for
dissemination of information through the said platform/website.
5. Grievance that has led to the filing of the present Suit is that the
Defendants No. 2 and 3 are creating and uploading ex-facie false, malicious
and per se defamatory content against the Plaintiff, and publishing and
circulating the same on YouTube, which is a video-streaming platform
owned by the Defendant No. 1, as well as on the website of the Defendant
No. 3. It is stated that the videos uploaded on YouTube are done through a
channel called „Nakkheeran TV‟, which is operated by the Defendants No. 2
and 3. It is also stated that the very videos uploaded on the channel
„Nakkheeran TV‟, are also uploaded on another YouTube channel called
„Nakkheeran Neo‟, wherein the videos are dubbed in English.
6. Reading of the Plaint indicates that the sum and substance of the
grievance of the Plaintiff-Trust lies in the 11 (eleven) videos, which as per
the Plaintiff, are gaining wide publicity day-by-day, from which the
Defendants No. 2 and 3 are earning massive revenues and which malign the
image of the Plaintiff-Trust, its Founder as well as its followers.
7. Summons in the instant Suit were issued on 02.12.2024. Written
Statement on behalf of the Defendant No. 1 stands filed. Since Replication
thereto was not filed by the Plaintiff within the prescribed time limit, its
right to file the same was closed vide Order dated 21.08.2025 passed by the
learned Joint Registrar. On the other hand, right of the Defendants No. 2 and
3 to file their written statement(s) along with affidavit(s) of admission/denial
of the Plaintiff‟s documents also stood closed vide Order dated 21.08.2025
passed by the learned Joint Registrar
8. By way of this Order, this Court shall dispose of two applications -
one being I.A. No. 31798/2025 filed by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ["CPC"], seeking
rejection of Plaint, and the other being I.A. No. 30090/2025 filed by the
Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC seeking ad-interim
injunction against the Defendants.
9. It is trite law that when a specific objection regarding jurisdiction is
raised by the defendant(s) in a suit, the same ought to be considered before
evaluating the merits of an interim injunction application [Ref: Asma Lateef
v. Shabbir Ahmad, (2024) 4 SCC 696]. Thus, this Court shall first examine
the averments raised by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 in I.A. No. 31798/2025
seeking rejection of the Plaint on the grounds that the Plaint fails to disclose
the cause of action arising in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the
Suit is instituted without the Plaintiff‟-Trust‟s authorization.
10. Learned Counsel for the Defendants No. 2 and 3 has submitted as
under:
(i) The Suit ought to have been instituted in the State of Tamil
Nadu, as the Defendants No. 2 and 3 having their office
headquarters at Chennai, Tamil Nadu, all the impugned videos
are in Tamil language and as such, most of the audience that
would have viewed the videos would be in situated in Tamil
Nadu. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Patel Roadways Limited v. Prasad Trading Company, (1991) 4
SCC 270, and of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Escorts
Limited v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7607.
(ii) Even though the Plaintiff has a choice to initiate proceedings
before this Court, the allegations contained in the Plaint cannot
be substantiated summarily, meaning that the examination of
witnesses and evidences would entail - most of this information
is available exclusively in the State of Tamil Nadu.
(iii) For instance, the impugned videos at Serial Nos. 1 to 9 as stated
in the Plaint, contain information which was received firsthand
from estranged followers of the Plaintiff-Trust and all such
people belong to towns in the Southern part of India. Moreover,
even police officials of the State of Tamil Nadu are involved in
certain investigations which are the subject-matter of some of
the impugned videos.
(iv) The Suit lacks proper authorization from the Plaintiff-Trust,
inasmuch as the Resolution passed by the Plaintiff-Trust to
appoint Ms. Lakshmi Jayaraman is not listed in the Suit
Documents. Since the production of a duly authorized
resolution by the Board of Trustees is indispensable to a suit
seeking damages, the present Plaint is liable to the rejected.
(v) The Resolution dated 13.11.2024 which is annexed to the
vakalatnama filed along with the Plaint, and not the Suit
Documents, is signed by one Mr. Pasupathy Sivasankar, whose
name is not included in the Trust Deed dated 07.01.1992 or the
Codicil dated 01.04.2005, both of which documents have been
included in the Suit Documents.
(vi) The issue of authorization also strikes at the root of Section 48
of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, which clearly states that where
there are more than one trustees, all of them must join in the
execution of such trust, except where the instrument of trust
otherwise provides. On this aspect, the Trust Deed dated
07.01.1992 in clear terms states that it is only the Board of
Trustees who have the power to represent the Plaintiff-Trust in
all courts - original or appellate - or before any other
authorities and departments of Government, Semi-Government
or local authority. Reliance in this regard is placed on the
Judgment passed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat
in Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin
& Anr., 1972 SCC OnLine Guj 10 and the Judgment passed by
a Single Judge Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in
Sachichidananda Banerjee v. Moly Gupta &Ors., 2014 SCC
OnLine 19412.
(vii) Lastly, it also submitted that two out of the eleven impugned
videos described in the Plaint at Serial Nos. 10 and 11 and
posted on YouTube on 07.03.2017 and 04.01.2023, respectively,
are liable to be excluded from the Plaint, as being barred by
limitation as per Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff,
opposing I.A. No. 31798/2025 has submitted as under:
(i) The examination or interpretation of the recitals contained in
the Trust Deed dated 07.01.1992 can only be done in trial. As
such, even if it is assumed that the present Suit has been
instituted without proper authorization, the same cannot be a
ground for rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC as
being barred by law, as the Trust Deed is not equivalent to
„law‟.
(ii) Be that as it may, the recitals of the Trust Deed indicate that the
Board of Trustees or even a Trustee has the general power to
further authorize a person, other than a Trustee, to institute a
suit on behalf of the Plaintiff-Trust in the name of the Plaintiff-
Trust.
(iii) In arguendo, even if this Court was to hold the Suit to have
been instituted improperly, the same would be a curable defect,
and not one that goes to the jurisdiction of the matter. Reliance
is placed on the Judgment passed by a Single Judge Bench of
the Madras High Court in K. Santhanam v. S. Kavitha, 2010
SCC OnLine Mad 6009, whereby it was held that a defect
which is curable in nature does not fall within the ambit of
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Reliance is also placed on the
Judgment passed by the Apex Court in Sankar Padam Thapa v.
Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2194.
(iv) Lastly, it is submitted that the two videos (at Serial Nos. 10 and
11), though having been uploaded more than 1 year prior to the
date of filing of the present Suit, would not be hit by Article 75
of the Limitation Act, 1963. The reason is that the contents
contained in these two videos are regurgitated in other full
length and short videos, with a view to re-engage audience to
the per se defamatory content.
12. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is an independent and
stand-alone special procedure, empowering the Court to summarily dismiss
a suit at the threshold without proceeding to record evidence or conduct a
trial, if any of the prescribed grounds are met. The objective of this
provision is to prevent unnecessary prolongation of litigation, abuse of
process, to reduce costs and to enable the judicial system to allocate it‟s time
to more deserving causes, once it is found that no valid cause of action exists
or the suit is barred by limitation or by other grounds envisaged therein.
13. The Supreme Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali,
(2020) 7 SCC 366summed up the law applicable for the rejection of a plaint,
and held that a plaint shall be rejected if it fails to disclose a cause of action,
is undervalued or insufficiently stamped despite Court directions, appears to
be barred by law, is not filed in duplicate, or if the plaintiff fails to comply
with procedural requirements. The rule also includes a proviso allowing the
Court to extend the time for compliance in exceptional circumstances to
prevent grave injustice. This principle was reaffirmed in the Apex Court
decision in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati
Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3844underscoring the necessity of curbing frivolous litigation to ensure
judicial efficiency.
14. The first objection raised by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 is that this
Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present Suit.
In this context, reference is bound to be made to Section 19 of the CPC,
under which the Plaintiff may, at its option, institute a suit either in the Court
where the wrong is done or where the defendant resides, carries on business,
or personally works for gain. Section 19 of the CPC is extracted below for
reference:
"19. Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or
movables.
Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to
the person or to movable property, if the wrong was
done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one
Court and the defendant resides, or carries on
business, or personally works for gain, within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the
suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in
either of the said Courts."
15. Reference is further apposite to be made to a decision rendered by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court in Escorts Ltd. v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, 2019
SCC OnLine Del 7607, in which case, the learned Single Judge observed as
under:
"31. The plaintiff herein also claims that wrong to the
plaintiff has been done by the defamatory tweets of
defendant, wherever the said tweets can be accessed
across the globe.
32. I have wondered, that if such is the plea, whether
a plaintiff in a suit for compensation for defamation
by publication on internet, has an option under
Section 19 of the CPC to sue the defendant anywhere
in India.
33. In my opinion, no. Section 19, while vesting an
option in plaintiff, only envisages, wrong done in
jurisdiction of one Court and defendant residing in
jurisdiction of another Court. Merely because, with
the advent of trade and commerce, wrong done to the
plaintiff can be across the country, cannot expand /
widen the option vested under Section 19 in the
plaintiff. Reading Section 19 so, would render it
arbitrary, vesting an unguided option, capable of
misuse in one of the parties to the lis i.e., the plaintiff
and lead to "court shopping" and "libel tourism".
There is thus a need to construe / apply Section 19, in
such situations, reasonably, so as not to put a plaintiff
in such a suit, in a position disadvantageous to the
defendant.
34. In my opinion, wrong by defamation, ordinarily
would be done to a natural person, at the place of his
residence, where he / she has a reputation and to an
artificial person as a corporation / company, at the
place of registered office of the corporation /
company. In such case, the Court of the place of which
a person is residence of or where the corporation /
company has its registered office, would be a natural
court which would have jurisdiction and, in a suit,
instituted at such place, averment of publication
without even a specific plea of "wrong done" with
particulars of the persons in whose esteem the
plaintiff has fallen may suffice. However, where a
plaintiff in a suit for defamation, chooses to invoke the
jurisdiction of an unnatural place i.e. a place of which
that person is not a resident of and / or ifa
corporation / company in which it does not have its
registered office, to invoke the jurisdiction of that
Court, the plaint has to necessarily contains pecific
pleas of wrong done within the jurisdiction of that
Court, by giving particulars of the persons in that
jurisdiction, in whose esteem the plaintiff claims to
have fallen and /or the loss or damage suffered."
16. The learned Single Judge in Escorts (Supra) has further described two
rules, aid of which may be taken to determine the territorial jurisdiction of a
court where the plaintiff may sue for defamation. The first rule is that of
there being done „maximum wrong‟ at the place where the plaintiff sues the
defendant, in comparison to the wrong done at another place. Relevant
portion of the Judgment dealing with the „maximum wrong‟ rule is extracted
below:
"43. I may further state that even in cases where the
wrong done by the defamation is spread out across
several jurisdictions, as would be the case with
respect to a natural person enjoying a public stature
and in the case of a company/corporation having
business interest across several jurisdictions, in my
opinion, the jurisdiction even then for institution of a
suit for defamation would be of a Court where the
maximum wrong is done and which generally in the
case of a company/corporation would be the place
where the registered office of the
company/corporation is, unless it is pleaded that at
the place of registered office wrong done is minuscule
in comparison to wrong done at another place where
the business interest largely is."
17. The second principle discussed in Escorts (Supra) was a situation
where there is a merger between the place where the wrong is done and
where the defendant resides, in which case the suit is to be filed at that
common place and at no place else. Relevant portion of the Judgment
dealing with this „merger rule‟ is extracted below:
"46. There is another aspect. Section 19 vests a
plaintiff in a suit for compensation for defamation
with an option to sue in either of the Courts i.e. where
the wrong is done or where the defendant
resides/carries on business, only when the two are
different. This is clear from use of the words ―....if
the wrong was done within the local limits of
jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or
carries on business, or personally works for gain,
within the local limits of jurisdiction of another Court
....". However this option would not be available to a
plaintiff, wrong to whom by defamation is done within
the jurisdiction of same Court within whose
jurisdiction the defendant resides. It will not be open
to such a plaintiff to contend that wrong has been
done to him/it, also within the jurisdiction of another
Court. I repeat, Section 19 vested option only in
plaintiff for a situation where no wrong is done where
defendant resides. If wrong is done where defendant
resides, there is no option but to sue where defendant
resides."
18. Keeping in mind the above observations, this Court shall turn to the
Plaint, to see whether specific pleas of wrong done within the jurisdiction of
this Court are incorporated in the Plaint.
19. At Paragraph No. 20 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff describes the
invocation of territorial jurisdiction of this Court for institution of the Suit.
Paragraph No. 20 of the Plaint is extracted below:
"20. The Plaintiff states that the cause of action has
arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
The content of the defamatory video
circulated/published/shared is being viewed by people
all over the country, including in New Delhi. The
impact of the wrongs of the Defendants is felt most
prominently in New Delhi. In fact, the Plaintiff has
inter-alia received several e-mails from its volunteers,
followers etc. (who belong to New Delhi & have long
been associated with the Plaintiff) wherein they write
that their years of faith and trust in the Plaintiff have
been shattered after watching the Impugned
Videos/Links of the defamatory content. Some
volunteers belonging to Delhi no longer wish to be
associated with the Plaintiff on account of the
defamatory videos/links forming the subject-matter of
the present Suit. Few emails of volunteers and
followers of the Plaintiff have been annexed with this
Plaint to highlight the incalculable nature of damage
and loss of reputation/goodwill suffered by the
Plaintiff at New Delhi alone on account of the
Defamatory Content. Moreover, the videos/links are
available and accessible all over India, including
through and in New Delhi. The Plaintiff's Centre also
operates in Delhi. Hence, a substantial cause of
action for filing the present suit has arisen in New
Delhi."
20. Reading of the entire Plaint and in particular Paragraph No. 20 which
is extracted above shows that the Plaintiff takes the aid of the „maximum
wrong‟ rule, by contending that the "...wrongs of the Defendants is felt most
prominently in New Delhi." This averment is further justified by stating that
the Plaintiff was in receipt of several e-mails from its followers, volunteers,
etc., who belonged to New Delhi and were long associated with the
Plaintiff-Trust, and in these e-mails, they stated to have lost faith in the
Plaintiff-Trust after watched the impugned videos published/uploaded by the
Defendants No. 2 and 3.
21. Since it is well-settled that the courts when dealing with an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are only required to look at
the averments in the Plaint as framed, this Court has no hesitation in
observing that the „maximum wrong‟ rule as discussed in the Judgment of
this Court in Escorts (Supra) would apply squarely to the facts of the present
case, which would mean that this Court would have the jurisdiction to the
entertain the Plaint.
22. The next objection raised by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 in the instant
Application, is that since the Plaint is liable to be rejected as the same has
been filed without proper authorization from the Plaintiff-Trust, inasmuch as
the Resolution passed by the Plaintiff-Trust to appoint Ms. Lakshmi
Jayaraman is not listed in the Suit Documents. It is further averred that the
Resolution dated 13.11.2024 which is annexed to the vakalatnama filed
along with the Plaint, and not the Suit Documents, is signed by one Mr.
Pasupathy Sivasankar, whose name is not included in the Trust Deed dated
07.01.1992 or the Codicil dated 01.04.2005, both of which have been
included in the Suit Documents. Lastly, learned Counsel for the Defendants
No. 2 and 3 has also argued that issue of authorization also strikes at the root
of Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, which has not been adhered to
by the Plaintiff before institution of the present Suit.
23. This Court is of the considered view that Section 48 of the Indian
Trusts Act, 1882, has no applicability to the instant Suit, for the reason that
the Plaintiff-Trust is a public charitable trust. The applicability of the Indian
Trusts Act, 1882, is limited only to private trusts and their trustees and as
such, this argument of the learned Counsel for the Defendants No. 2 and 3
has no force.
24. As to the contention of the Defendants No.2 and 3 that the recitals in
the Trust Deed dated 07.01.1992 clearly require the Suit to be instituted only
by the trustees enumerated in the said document, this Court shall first have a
cursory glance at the relevant clauses contained in the Trust Deed dated
07.01.1992, which is annexed to the Plaint.
25. Clause 6(f) of the Trust Deed states as under:
"(f) The Board of Trustees may delegate all or any of
the powers vested in them to such person/s for such
time as he/they may deem fit and may revoke, vary,
alter, rescind such powers so delegated."
26. Clause 7(e) of the Trust Deed reads as under:
"(e) To compromise, compound, abandon, submit to
arbitration or otherwise settle any actions, suits,
proceedings, debts, claims or things, whatsoever
arising out of the administration of the Trust fund or
any institutions maintained and for any of these
purposes to enter into, give, execute and do such
agreements, instruments or composition or
arrangements, releases and other things as may seem
expedient by any act or thing so done in good faith as
fully as if the Board of Trustees were absolutely
entitled to the Trust fund and the said institutions
without being answerable for any loss occasioned
thereby."
27. Clause 7(h) of the Trust Deed reads as under:
"(h) To represent the Trust in all Courts (Original and
Appellate) or before any authorities and departments
of the Government, Semi-Government or local
authority."
28. Clause 7(j) of the Trust Deed reads as under:
"(j) To sign and verify all pleadings, memorandum of
appeal, petitions and applications of all kinds, to
compromise, abandon or refer to arbitration the
whole or any part of the claim by or against the Trust,
to engage lawyers and to take all such other
necessary steps."
29. Clause 7(t) of the Trust Deed reads as under:
"(t) The Board of Trustees shall have power to
delegate all or any of the powers vested in them by
these presents to any other Trustee/s for the purpose
of conveniently managing and exercising such
powers."
30. Finally, Clause 7(v) of the Trust Deed reads as under:
"(v) The powers vested in the Board of Trustees shall
be exercised according to the decision of majority of
members of the Board of Trustees and by way of
resolution passed either by circulation or at the
meeting of the Board of Trustees."
31. At the very outset, this Court finds itself in agreement with the stand
taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff, that even if it is held
that the Suit is improperly instituted, the same would be a curable defect and
therefore, the dictum of the High Court of Madras in K. Santhanam (Supra)
appears to have some weight, which in turn relies on a judgment of the Apex
Court in Uday Shanker Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, 2006 (1) SCC
75. After appreciating the observations of the Apex Court in Uday Shanker
Triyar (Supra), which dictate the general principles regarding the
consequences of non-compliance with procedural requirements, the learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Madras came to a conclusion that a
defective presentation of a plaint cannot result in a rejection thereof under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
32. It is further necessary to note that the learned Counsel for the
Defendants No. 2 and 3 has failed to point out precisely which sub-Rule
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC would be attracted in the event that this
Court is persuaded by his arguments. Though reliance has been placed on
sub-Rule (d) under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC to state that the Plaint is
barred by law, there is no basis for this contention, as the Trust Deed is not
equivalent to the meaning of „law‟ under Article 13 of the Constitution of
India.
33. In view of the above, this Court does not find any force in the
argument of the learned Counsel for the Defendants No. 2 and 3 that the
Plaint ought to be rejected on the ground that the same purportedly lacks
proper authorization from the Plaintiff-Trust. Though, it is made clear, that
this observation shall not prevent this Court from framing an issue to this
extent and dealing with the same at an appropriate stage of trial.
34. The last limb of arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the
Defendants No. 2 and 3 under the instant Application, is that the impugned
videos at Serial Nos. 10 and 11 as mentioned in the Plaint, ought to be
removed from the Plaint as they are beyond the period of limitation
prescribed under Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
35. During the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the
Plaintiff fairly conceded to the above contention, stating that the said two
videos were originally uploaded more than a year prior to the filing of the
present Suit, however, contents of these two videos have been either
reiterated or regurgitated, either directly or indirectly in all the other videos.
It is submitted that this continuous reference of the two videos in the
consequent ones was done by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 with a view to re-
engage audience and deliberately redirect them to such content so that a
larger number of people are able to view the per se defamatory content.
36. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has referred to a judgment
rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Khawar Butt v. Asif Nazir
Mir &Ors., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4474, wherein the learned Single Judge
of this Court examined the „single publication‟ as well as the „multiple
publication‟ rules, by observing that though re-publication resorted to by the
defendant would rise to a fresh cause of action, application of the rule of
„single publication‟ would be more pragmatic.
37. Reliance by the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has also been
placed on another judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in IE
Online Media Services (P) Ltd. v. Nitin Bhatnagar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del
9281, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court held that since the
plaintiff therein had sought for reliefs other than simply that of
damages/compensation, the claim could not be held barred by limitation.
While relying on this Judgment, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff
submits that even in the present Suit, the Plaintiff seeks reliefs of permanent
and mandatory injunction against the Defendants, which is separate and
distinct from the relief of damages. He submits without prejudice that even
if this Court were to hold the relief of damages/compensation to be barred
by limitation, the relief of mandatory injunction would not be hit by Article
75 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
38. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff further relies on another
judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Samman Capital
Ltd. v. Bhupinder Singh Rana, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3287, wherein the
learned Single Judge while forming a prima facie view that the material
therein was defamatory, rejected the argument of the defendant therein that
several tweets were beyond the period of limitation, and further observed
that the incident of defamation formed part of a larger defamatory campaign
of the defendant therein, thereby ordering removal of the defamatory
content. He submits that similar to the facts involved in the said Judgment,
since the Defendants No. 2 and 3 herein have orchestrated a larger campaign
against the Plaintiff and its Founder, for collateral and malicious reasons, the
two videos ought not to be taken down.
39. Perusal of the assertions in the Plaint indicates that it is the case of the
Plaintiff that the Defendants No. 2 and 3 have attempted to orchestrate a
large-scale campaign against the Plaintiff-Trust as well as its Founder.
Further, though the Plaintiff claims that the two videos at Serial Nos. 10 and
11 have been reiterated in the later impugned videos as well as several
articles authored by the Defendants No. 2 and 3, this Court believes that a
proper analysis into this averment would require a deeper analysis of all the
impugned videos and articles, against which the Plaintiff has filed the
present Suit. This exercise cannot be carried out at the stage of examining an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
40. However, since the averments in the Plaint are that the Defendants
No. 2 and 3 have attempted to orchestrate a large-scale campaign against the
Plaintiff-Trust and its Founder, this Court believes that the observations of
the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Samman Capital Ltd. (Supra) would
find relevance in the instant case.
41. Additionally, if the case of „single publication‟ rule or „multiple
publication‟ rule are to apply or even that of hyperlinking, which has been
discussed in detail by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ruchi Kalra v.
Slowform Media (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1894, which was also
relied upon the Samman Capital Ltd. (Supra), this Court would be required
to carry out a detailed examination to ascertain whether each re-
publication/hyperlinking of the alleged per se defamatory content in videos
at Serial Nos. 10 and 11 would give rise to a new cause of action. This,
again, cannot be done by this Court at the stage of examining an application
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
42. In any event, since it is the pleaded case of the Plaintiff that a large-
scale campaign against the Plaintiff-Trust and its Founder, this Court finds
force in the argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the
Plaintiff.
43. With the above observations, this Court deems it fit to dismiss I.A.
No. 31798/2025.
44. It is made clear that the observations made by this Court hereinabove
would not prevent framing of issues inter alia relating to the
proper/improper authorization on behalf of the Plaintiff as well as the videos
at Serial Nos. 10 and 11 being beyond limitation.
45. Before delving into the merits of I.A. No. 30090/2025, being the
application filed by the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the
CPC seeking ad-interim injunction against the Defendants, this Court shall
remind itself of the law relating to grant of interlocutory or interim
injunctions in civil suits and its application to the cases of defamation.
46. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in Hazrat Surat
Shah Urdu Education Society v. Abdul Saheb, 1988 SCC OnLine SC 490,
wherein the following observations were made:
"3. ...No doubt the District Judge held that there was
no prima facie case in the respondents' favour but he
further recorded a positive finding that even if the
plaintiff-respondent had prima facie case there was no
balance of convenience in his favour and if any injury
was caused to him on account of the breach of
contract of service he could be compensated by way of
damages in terms of money therefore, he was not
entitled to any injunction. The High Court failed to
notice that even if a prima facie case was made out,
the balance of convenience and the irreparable injury
were necessary to exist. The question whether the
plaintiff could be compensated by way of damages in
terms of money for the injury which may be caused to
him on account of the breach of contract of service
was not considered by the High Court. No temporary
injunction should be issued unless the three essential
ingredients are made out, namely, (i) prima face case,
(ii) balance of convenience, (iii) irreparable injury
which could not be compensated in terms of money. If
a party fails to make out any of the three ingredients
he would not be entitled to the injunction and the
Court will be justified in declining to issue injunction.
In the instance case the respondent-plaintiff was
claiming to enforce the contract of service against the
management of the institution. The refusal of the
injunction could not cause any irreparable injury to
him as he could be compensated by way of damages in
terms of money in the event of his success in the suit.
The respondent was therefore, not entitled to any
injunction order. The District Judge in our opinion
rightly set aside the order of the trial court granting
injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The
High Court committed error in interfering with that
order."
47. While dealing with the provisions of Order XXXIX of the CPC, the
Apex Court in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, has
observed as under:
"4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary
injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is
proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the
defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or
otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to
any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by
order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such
act or make such other order for the purpose of
staying and preventing ... or dispossession of the
plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in
relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the
court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until
further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the
Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by
Section 86(i)(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with
effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there
was no express power except the inherent power
under Section 151 CPC to grant ad interim injunction
against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerned
with the preservation of the property in dispute till
legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial
process by which a party is required to do or to
refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the
nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent
future possible injury. In other words, the court, on
exercise of the power of granting ad interim
injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit
in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law
that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief.
The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying
that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried
in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the
court, there is probability of his being entitled to the
relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the
court's interference is necessary to protect the party
from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable
injury or damage would ensue before the legal right
would be established at trial; and (3) that the
comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience
which is likely to occur from withholding the
injunction will be greater than that would be likely to
arise from granting it."
48. Specific to the cases of the defamation, the landmark English case law
in Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch 269 comes into relevance, wherein the
House of Lords shed light on the public interest implicit in free speech and
observed that unless the alleged libel is proven untrue, no wrong is
committed. Thus, until the falsity of the alleged libel is established, no right
is deemed to have been infringed. It was held that a mere assertion of an
intention to justify the allegations in order to successfully resist an
interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of a libel was sufficient to
caution the Court in not granting injunctions. The aforesaid has come to be
known as the Bonnard principle.
49. The Bonnard principle was applied by the Apex Court in the case
Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited &Ors. v.
Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 426,
wherein it was observed as under:
"9. In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction
against the publication of an article may have severe
ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the
author and the public's right to know. An injunction,
particularly ex-parte, should not be granted without
establishing that the content sought to be restricted is
"malicious‟ or "palpably false‟. Granting interim
injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier
manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other
words, courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions
except in exceptional cases where the defence
advanced by the Plaintiff would undoubtedly fail at
trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the
publication of material should be granted only after a
full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases,
after the Plaintiff is given a chance to make their
submissions..."
50. This Court has perused the Impugned Videos and articles by which
the Plaintiff-Trust is aggrieved. Before opining on the contents of the
Impugned Videos and articles, this Court is of the prima facie opinion that
the manner in which the eleven Impugned Videos have been published, does
indicate an element of malice on part of the Defendants No. 2 and 3 against
the Plaintiff-Trust and its Founder. The titles of the Impugned Videos such
as "Hold tight. Will Jakki come out? Isha's veil is torn! The preacher's
empire is collapsing!" and "Jakki caught like Asaram Bapu. Cannot
Escape!" are click-bait titles, drafted in a way to lure audience, especially
when unfounded comparison of the Founder is being made in the title itself.
Similar is the nature of the titles of the impugned articles, for instance "Not
yoga, it's hypnotism! Cheating trickery!..." and "Will the Isha slaves be
rescued? Jaggi's mask is torn in the High Court."
51. Moreover, having gone through the transcripts of the Impugned
Videos, this Court has noted that certain harsh political statements have also
been made by the Defendant No. 3 against high-ranking government
officials and their alleged relation or otherwise with the Plaintiff-Trust or its
Founder. Another statement forthcoming from a video is, "...Jaggi of Isha
who operates violating all laws of the country - in a few days the central
government is going to give Padma Vibhushan award, thank you." Such
statements, in the opinion of this Court, imply that certain ulterior political
agenda is also afoot on part of the Defendants No. 2 and 3, with the aim to
malign and cause harm to the Plaintiff-Trust.
52. Attention of this Court is also drawn to the video at Serial No. 1,
which was uploaded on 22.10.2024. Reference to this impugned video was
specifically made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff, while
juxtaposing the same to an Order dated 18.10.2024 passed by the Apex
Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 13992/2024, which arose out of
a Judgment dated 30.09.2024 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Madras in a habeas corpus writ petition. The Apex Court, in its Order
dated 18.10.2024 disposed of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.
13992/2024, while observing that the individuals who were stated to be the
detenues before the High Court of Madras, had attained majority and
expressed their clear inclination to continue at the Coimbatore center of the
Plaintiff-Trust.
53. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that despite passing
of the Order dated 18.10.2024 by the Apex Court, the Defendants No. 2 and
3 go on to upload the Impugned Video at Serial No. 1, where the Defendant
No. 3 is seen making comments like, "Who has taught this? Jaggi, With
what should he be beaten? Should he be beaten or not?" In the opinion of
this Court, comments such as these, transcend the boundary of fair criticism
and ought to be injuncted as the online presence of such content certainly
harms the reputation of the Plaintiff-Trust.
54. Lastly, this Court has also seen the contents of the impugned video at
Serial No. 7, wherein the Defendants No. 2 and 3 are seen alleging that the
Plaintiff-Trust grabbed a forest land, blocked an elephant corridor and
grabbed 44 acres of tribal land. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff
urged that these allegations were answered in negative by way of a response
to applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005 ["RTI"] given by
the Forest Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, stating that there was no
elephant corridor in the Coimbatore Division, and the Plaintiff did not
encroach upon any forest land nor any tribal land. He further submits that in
complete contravention of the Closure Reports filed by the investigation
team, the Defendants No. 2 and 3 continue to air this impugned video, and
have made attempt to give any clarificatory statement regarding the
allegations. In the opinion of this Court, given that there is a clarification
from the Forest Department, the action of the Defendants No. 2 and 3
continuing to air the video which involves statements like "He will not come
into the scene because he is a big guy. Very big guy. He will not say
anything. But these small insects around him, that also, even those are inside
Isha will not answer," and "Isha is the main culprit; he is the captain," do
give a color of intent to defame the Plaintiff-Trust. In this context, this Court
also affirms the observations of the Judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Nitin Bhatnagar & Ors. (Supra), and believes that while
report of investigations may serve public interest at the relevant time, the
perpetual digital availability of such materials, even after the factual
foundation has ceased to exist, raises serious concerns of enduring
reputational harm and stigma.
55. In light of the above discussion, in the opinion of this Court, the
contents of the impugned videos are per se defamatory and the same directly
impinge upon the reputation of the Plaintiff-Trust in eyes of the general
public as it states that the Plaintiff follows certain practices which are not
accepted in the society.
56. It is well settled that reputation is an integral part of the dignity of
each individual and there is a need to balance between freedom of speech
and freedom of expression vis-a-vis the right to reputation which has been
considered as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
57. This Court is of the opinion that the eleven impugned videos as well
as the impugned articles do have a direct impact on the reputation of the
Founder. Admittedly, the 11 Impugned Videos, when combined have
garnered over 50 lakhs views and thousands of comments, wherein several
viewers have expressed their agreement to the contents of the Impugned
Videos. If the video is not taken down immediately, the Plaintiff-Trust will
suffer loss of reputation which cannot be compensated monetarily. Balance
of convenience also lies in restraining the Defendants No. 2 and 3 to upload
the very same impugned videos and articles at any of the social media
platforms and directing the Defendant Nos.1, 2, 3 & 4 to bring down the
impugned videos and articles which has been uploaded at the links as
mentioned in Para 10 and Paras 25 to 51 of the instant Application being
I.A. No. 30090/2025.
58. Accordingly, the Defendants No. 2 and 3, their associates, servants,
agents, affiliates, assignees, substitutes, representatives, their subscribers,
employees and/or persons claiming through them and/or under them from
creating publishing, uploading, sharing, disseminating etc. any such
defamatory content, articles, videos until the next date of hearing.
59. Defendants No. 1 and 3 are also directed to bring down the bring
down the impugned videos and articles which has been uploaded at the links
as mentioned in Para 10 and Paras 25 to 51 of the instant Application being
I.A. No. 30090/2025.
60. Any member of the public is also restrained from uploading the very
same video on any social media platforms till the next date of hearing.
61. With these directions and observations, I.A. No. 30090 is disposed of.
CS(OS) 957/2024
62. List before the Joint Registrar on 20.05.2026 for completion of
pleadings and admission/denial of documents.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
MARCH 19, 2026
Rahul/AP
