[Cites 1, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Staff Selection Commission & Anr vs Yashpal Singh on 16 March, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 25.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 16.03.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 16.03.2026
+ W.P.(C) 3884/2025
STAFF SELECTION COMMISSION & ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rohan Jaitley, CGSC with
Mr. Akshay Sharma, Mr. Varun
Pratap Singh, Mr. Dev Pratap
Shahi and Mr. Yogya Bhatia,
Advs.
versus
YASHPAL SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Anil Singhal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1. Through the present Petition, the Petitioners assail the
correctness of the Order dated 20.08.2024 [hereinafter referred to as
the 'Impugned Order'] passed by the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as 'the
Tribunal'], in O.A. No.1547/2024, whereby the Original Application
('OA') preferred by the Respondent came to be allowed and the
Petitioners were directed to subject the Respondent to a fresh medical
examination by a newly constituted Medical Board.
2. By way of the said OA, the Respondent had challenged the
decision of the authorities declaring him medically unfit in the course
of the recruitment process conducted by the Staff Selection
Commission ('SSC') for appointment to the post of Constable
(Executive), pursuant to which the Respondent had been declared
medically unfit both in the Detailed Medical Examination [hereinafter
referred to as 'DME'] as well as in the Review Medical Examination
[hereinafter referred to as 'RME'].
3. Thus, the limited question which arises for consideration before
this Court is whether the Tribunal committed any error in directing a
fresh medical examination of the Respondent despite the Respondent
having been declared medically unfit in both the DME and the RME
conducted in accordance with the governing recruitment rules.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
4. In order to appreciate the controversy in its proper perspective,
it is necessary to notice the relevant facts.
5. The Respondent had participated in the recruitment process
conducted by the SSC for appointment to the post of Constable
(Executive). Upon successfully clearing the earlier stages of the
selection process, the Respondent became eligible to undergo medical
examination in accordance with the prescribed recruitment rules and
medical standards governing the said post.
6. Pursuant thereto, the Respondent was subjected to a DME on
25.01.2024. During the course of the said examination, the Medical
Board found the Respondent to be suffering from Varicose Veins in
the left leg and, on that basis, declared him medically unfit for
appointment to the post in question.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid finding, the Respondent exercised
the option available under the recruitment process and preferred a
request for RME. The Respondent was thereafter subjected to the
RME on 31.01.2024. The Review Medical Board, upon conducting an
independent examination, concurred with the findings recorded in the
DME and once again declared the Respondent medically unfitfor
appointment to the post of Constable (Executive).
8. Subsequently, the Respondent relied upon a medical certificate
dated 30.03.2024 issued by a Government Hospital, wherein it was
stated that the Respondent was medically fit to participate in
competitive or non-competitive examinations. Relying upon the said
certificate, the Respondent contended that the findings recorded in the
DME as well as the RME were erroneous.
9. Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondent approached the
Tribunal by filing the aforesaid OA, inter alia, contending that the
medical opinion of the recruitment authorities was incorrect and that
the medical certificate issued by the Government Hospital
demonstrated that he was medically fit for appointment.
10. The Tribunal, while allowing the OA, placed reliance upon its
earlier decision rendered in similar circumstances and observed that
where a candidate produces a medical certificate from a Government
Hospital contradicting the findings recorded in the DME and the
RME, the candidate ought to be afforded an opportunity of being
examined by a fresh Medical Board.
11. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Tribunal vide the Impugned
Order dated 20.08.2024 allowed the OA and directed the Petitioners to
subject the Respondent to a fresh medical examination by a newly
constituted Medical Board within the stipulated time.
12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid directions issued by the Tribunal,
the Petitioners have preferred the present Petition.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
14. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners submits as under:
i. The Impugned Order passed by the Tribunal ignores the
governing framework of the recruitment process, namely the
Advertisement dated 01.09.2023, the Standing Order dated
08.06.2022, and the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment)
Rules, 1980 [hereinafter referred to as '1980 Recruitment Rules'],
particularly Rule 24(2) which provides that a candidate suffering from
a condition likely to interfere with the efficient performance of duties
cannot be declared medically fit. These provisions were never under
challenge before the Tribunal.
ii. The Respondent participated in the recruitment process with
full knowledge of the prescribed terms and conditions. Having
undergone the process, it was not open to him to seek a deviation from
the same after being declared medically unfit.
iii. The medical certificate dated 30.03.2024, relied upon by the
Respondent, is a general certificate stating that he is fit to participate
in competitive or non-competitive examinations. It does not certify
that he is fit for the post of Constable (Executive), whereas the DME
and RME were conducted by Medical Boards constituted specifically
to assess fitness for that post.
iv. Opinions of private, or even government, hospitals, obtained by
the concerned candidate, cannot constitute a legitimate basis for
referring the case for re-examination. Reliance is placed upon the
judgment of the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in Staff Selection
Commission & Ors. v. Aman Singh1.
v. The scope of judicial review in matters of medical fitness is
limited. Reliance is placed on Indian Council of Agricultural
Research & Ors. v. Shashi Gupta2 to submit that courts ought not to
substitute the opinion of expert Medical Boards constituted for the
recruitment process.
15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent
supports the Impugned Order and submits as under:
i. Reliance is placed on the medical certificate dated 30.03.2024
issued by a Government Hospital, which records that he is medically
fit. It is contended that the said certificate raises doubt about the
correctness of the findings recorded in the DME and the RME.
ii. In cases where conflicting medical opinions exist, the candidate
ought to be afforded an opportunity of being examined by a fresh
Medical Board.Reliance in this regard has been placed on the
2024 SSC OnLine Del 7600
AIR 1994 SC 1241
judgment of this Court inVijay v. Union of India & Ors.3 as well as
the decision of the Tribunal in Teekaram Singh Meena v. SSC &
Ors.4, to contend that in appropriate cases courts have directed fresh
medical examination to ensure fairness in the recruitment process.
16. No other submissions have been made on behalf of the parties.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
17. At the outset, it would be apposite to note the settled legal
position governing judicial review in matters relating to medical
fitness in recruitment to disciplined services. Courts have consistently
held that the determination of medical fitness is primarily a matter
falling within the domain of expert Medical Boards constituted for the
specific purpose of assessing suitability for the post in question. The
scope of judicial review in such matters is therefore limited and
ordinarily does not extend to substituting the opinion of the Court for
that of duly constituted medical experts.
18. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Shashi Gupta(supra) has
emphasized that where the opinion of a competent Medical Board has
been rendered in accordance with the prescribed procedure, courts
ought to exercise restraint and should not lightly interfere with such
findings unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary,
mala fide or in violation of the governing rules.
19. Keeping in view the aforesaid limited scope of judicial review,
the direction issued by the Tribunal for constituting a fresh Special
W.P.(C) 3387/2023
Medical Board must also be examined with due restraint. This Court,
while exercising writ jurisdiction, does not sit in Appeal over the
medical opinion rendered by expert bodies. Interference would be
warranted only where the process adopted by the Medical Board is
shown to be arbitrary, procedurally irregular, or contrary to the
governing rules. In the absence of such circumstances, directing
repeated medical examinations would amount to unsettling the scheme
of the recruitment process itself.
20. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to advert to the governing
framework of the recruitment process. The Advertisement dated
01.09.2023, the Standing Order dated 08.06.2022, as well as the 1980
Recruitment Rules prescribe the medical standards required for
appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) and continue to hold
the field. The said framework requires that a candidate be of sound
health and free from any defect, deformity or disease which may
interfere with the efficient performance of duties attached to the post.
21. In this regard, Rule 24(2) of the 1980 Recruitment Rules
provides that the Medical Officer conducting the examination shall
assess, inter alia, the candidate's eyesight, speech, hearing and
freedom from physical defects or diseases. The Rule further
contemplates that a candidate may be rejected if found to be suffering
from any disease or defect which is likely to render him unfit for
police service or interfere with the efficient discharge of duties.
22. Significantly, the aforesaid Advertisement, Standing Order and
the Recruitment Rules were never challenged by the Respondent
before the Tribunal. The Respondent had participated in the
recruitment process with full knowledge of the governing standards
and had expressly accepted the terms and conditions contained in the
Advertisement. It is well settled that a candidate who participates in a
selection process subject to prescribed rules cannot, after having failed
in the process, seek a deviation from those very standards.
23. In a similar context, a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in
Aman Singh(supra)has delineated the principles that apply in the case
of recruitment to disciplined Forces, such as Police. The relevant
extracts are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
10.38 In our considered opinion, the following principles would
apply:
(i) The principles that apply in the case of recruitment to
disciplined Forces, involved with safety and security, internal and
external, such as the Armed and Paramilitary Forces, or the
Police, are distinct and different from those which apply to normal
civilian recruitment. The standards of fitness, and the rigour of
the examination to be conducted, are undoubtedly higher and
stricter.
(ii) There is no absolute proscription against judicial review of, or
of judicial interference with, decisions of Medical Boards or
Review Medical Boards. In appropriate cases, the Court can
interfere.
(iii) The general principle is, however, undoubtedly one of
circumspection. The Court is to remain mindful of the fact that it
is not peopled either with persons having intricate medical
knowledge, or were aware of the needs of the Force to which the
concerned candidate seeks entry. There is an irrebuttable
presumption that judges are not medical men or persons
conversant with the intricacies of medicine, therapeutics or
medical conditions. They must, therefore, defer to the decisions of
the authorities in that regard, specifically of the Medical Boards
which may have assessed the candidate. The function of the Court
can only, therefore, be to examine whether the manner in which
the candidate was assessed by the Medical Boards, and the
conclusion which the Medical Boards have arrived, inspires
confidence, or transgresses any established norm of law,
procedure or fair play. If it does not, the Court cannot itself
examine the material on record to come to a conclusion as to
whether the candidate does, or does not, suffer from the concerned
ailment, as that would amount to sitting in appeal over the decision
of the Medical Boards, which is not permissible in law.
(iv) The situations in which a Court can legitimately interfere with
the final outcome of the examination of the candidate by the
Medical Board or the Review Medical Board are limited, but well-
defined. Some of these may be enumerated as under:
(a) A breach of the prescribed procedure that is required to be
followed during examination constitutes a legitimate ground
for interference. If the examination of the candidate has not
taken place in the manner in which the applicable Guidelines
or prescribed procedure requires it to be undertaken, the
examination, and its results, would ipso facto stand vitiated.
(b) If there is a notable discrepancy between the findings of the
DME and the RME, or the Appellate Medical Board,
interference may be justified. In this, the Court has to be
conscious of what constitutes a "discrepancy". A situation in
which, for example, the DME finds the candidate to be
suffering from three medical conditions, whereas the RME, or
the Appellate Medical Board, finds the candidate to be
suffering only from one of the said three conditions, would not
constitute a discrepancy, so long as the candidate is
disqualified because of the presence of the condition
concurrently found by the DME and the RME or the Appellate
Medical Board. This is because, insofar as the existence of the
said condition is concerned, there is concurrence and
uniformity of opinion between the DME and the RME, or the
Appellate Medical Board. In such a circumstance, the Court
would ordinarily accept that the candidate suffered from the
said condition. Thereafter, as the issue of whether the said
condition is sufficient to justify exclusion of the candidate from
the Force is not an aspect which would concern the Court, the
candidate's petition would have to be rejected.
(c) If the condition is one which requires a specialist opinion,
and there is no specialist on the Boards which have examined
the candidate, a case for interference is made out. In this,
however, the Court must be satisfied that the condition is one
which requires examination by a specialist. One may
differentiate, for example, the existence of a haemorrhoid or a
skin lesion which is apparent to any doctor who sees the
candidate, with an internal orthopaedic deformity, which may
require radiographic examination and analysis, or an
ophthalmological impairment. Where the existence of a
medical condition which ordinarily would require a specialist
for assessment is certified only by Medical Boards which do
not include any such specialist, the Court would be justified in
directing a fresh examination of the candidate by a specialist,
or a Board which includes a specialist. This would be all the
more so if the candidate has himself contacted a specialist who
has opined in his favour.
(d) Where the Medical Board, be it the DME or the RME or the
Appellate Medical Board, itself refers the candidate to a
specialist or to another hospital or doctor for opinion, even if
the said opinion is not binding, the Medical Board is to provide
reasons for disregarding the opinion and holding contrary to
it. If, therefore, on the aspect of whether the candidate does, or
does not, suffer from a particular ailment, the respondents
themselves refer the candidate to another doctor or hospital,
and the opinion of the said doctor or hospital is in the
candidate's favour, then, if the Medical Board, without
providing any reasons for not accepting the verdict of the said
doctor or hospital, nonetheless disqualifies the candidate, a
case for interference is made out.
(e) Similarly, if the Medical Board requisitions specialist
investigations such as radiographic or ultrasonological tests,
the results of the said tests cannot be ignored by the Medical
Board. If it does so, a case for interference is made out.
(f) If there are applicable Guidelines, Rules or Regulations
governing the manner in which Medical Examination of the
candidate is required to be conducted, then, if the DME or the
RME breaches the stipulated protocol, a clear case for
interference is made out.
(v) Opinions of private, or even government, hospitals, obtained
by the concerned candidate, cannot constitute a legitimate basis
for referring the case for re-examination. At the same time, if the
condition is such as require a specialist's view, and the Medical
Board and Review Medical Board do not include such specialists,
then the Court may be justified in directing the candidate to be re-
examined by a specialist or by a Medical Board which includes a
specialist. In passing such a direction, the Court may legitimately
place reliance on the opinion of such a specialist, even if privately
obtained by the candidate. It is reiterated, however, that, if the
Medical Board or the Review Medical Board consists of doctors
who are sufficiently equipped and qualified to pronounce on the
candidate's condition, then an outside medical opinion obtained by
the candidate of his own volition, even if favourable to him and
contrary to the findings of the DME or the RME, would not justify
referring the candidate for a fresh medical examination.
(vi) The aspect of "curability" assumes significance in many cases.
Certain medical conditions may be curable. The Court has to be
cautious in dealing with such cases. If the condition is itself
specified, in the applicable Rules or Guidelines, as one which, by
its very existence, renders the candidate unfit, the Court may
discredit the aspect of curability. If there is no such stipulation,
and the condition is curable with treatment, then, depending on the
facts of the case, the Court may opine that the Review Medical
Board ought to have given the candidate a chance to have his
condition treated and cured. That cannot, however, be undertaken
by the Court of its own volition, as a Court cannot hazard a
medical opinion regarding curability, or the advisability of
allowing the candidate a chance to cure the ailment. Such a
decision can be taken only if there is authoritative medical
opinion, from a source to which the respondents themselves have
sought opinion or referred the candidate, that the condition is
curable with treatment. In such a case, if there is no binding time
frame within which the Review Medical Board is to pronounce its
decision on the candidate's fitness, the Court may, in a given case,
direct a fresh examination of the candidate after she, or he, has
been afforded an opportunity to remedy her, or his, condition. It
has to be remembered that the provision for a Review Medical
Board is not envisaged as a chance for unfit candidates to make
themselves fit, but only to verify the correctness of the decision of
the initial Medical Board which assessed the candidate.
(vii) The extent of judicial review has, at all times, to be restricted
to the medical examination of the candidate concerned. The Court
is completely proscribed even from observing, much less opining,
that the medical disability from which the candidate may be
suffering is not such as would interfere with the discharge, by her,
or him, of her, or his, duties as a member of the concerned Force.
The suitability of the candidates to function as a member of the
Force, given the medical condition from which the candidate
suffers, has to be entirely left to the members of the Force to
assess the candidate, as they alone are aware of the nature of the
work that the candidate, if appointed, would have to undertake,
and the capacity of the candidates to undertake the said work. In
other words, once the Court finds that the decision that the
candidate concerned suffers from a particular ailment does not
merit judicial interference, the matter must rest there. The Court
cannot proceed one step further and examine whether the ailment
is such as would render the candidate unfit for appointment as a
member of the concerned Force."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. The hereinabove reproduced principles, laid down in Aman
Singh (supra), clearly demonstrate that interference with the opinion
of the Medical Board or the Review Medical Board is permissible
only in narrowly circumscribed situations, such as where there is a
breach of the prescribed procedure, a demonstrable discrepancy
between the findings of the DME and the RME, or where the
condition in question requires examination by a specialist who was not
part of the Board. Equally, the judgment cautions that medical
opinions procured independently by a candidate from private or other
hospitals cannot, by themselves, constitute a valid ground for directing
a fresh medical examination.
25. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid principles, the facts of the
present case do not disclose any circumstance warranting such
interference. The Respondent was first subjected to the DME on
25.01.2024, wherein the Medical Board recorded that he was suffering
from Varicose Veins in the left leg and was consequently medically
unfit for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive). Upon the
Respondent seeking a review, he was thereafter examined by the
Review Medical Board on 31.01.2024, which independently assessed
his condition and concurred with the findings recorded during the
DME.
26. Thus, there exists a clear concurrence of medical opinion
between the DME and the RME regarding the medical condition of
the Respondent. The case is not one where the findings of the two
Medical Boards are inconsistent or contradictory so as to give rise to
any legitimate doubt regarding the correctness of the assessment. On
the contrary, both Boards have uniformly found the Respondent to be
suffering from the same medical condition which renders him unfit for
appointment in accordance with the applicable recruitment standards.
27. The only material relied upon by the Respondent to question the
findings of the Medical Boards is a certificate dated 30.03.2024 issued
by a Government Hospital stating that the Respondent is medically fit
to participate in competitive or non-competitive examinations.
However, as noticed earlier, the said certificate is in the nature of a
general fitness certificate and does not specifically certify that the
Respondent is fit for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive)
in the Delhi Police. More importantly, the said certificate was
obtained by the Respondent on his own volition and not pursuant to
any reference made by the Medical Boards during the recruitment
process.
28. In such circumstances, permitting a candidate to rely upon
independently obtained medical certificates to seek repeated medical
examinations would undermine the certainty and finality of the
recruitment process. As observed in Aman Singh (supra), once the
Medical Boards constituted under the recruitment framework have
recorded concurrent findings regarding the existence of a particular
medical condition, courts ought not to unsettle those findings merely
on the basis of contrary opinions obtained subsequently by the
candidate.
29. At the same time, it is not for this Court to determine whether
the existence of Varicose Veins would, in itself, constitute a sufficient
ground to deny appointment to the Respondent in the Delhi Police.
The question whether a particular medical condition renders a
candidate unsuitable for appointment to a disciplined force is
essentially a matter falling within the domain of the recruiting
authorities and the expert Medical Boards constituted for that purpose.
The assessment of the impact of such a condition on the discharge of
duties attached to the post is therefore a matter on which this Court
must defer to the considered opinion of the competent authorities.
30. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the
considered view that the Tribunal was not justified in directing the
constitution of a fresh Medical Board solely on the basis of the
certificate dated 30.03.2024 produced by the Respondent. Such a
direction, in effect, amounts to permitting the Respondent to reopen
the medical assessment despite the existence of concurrent findings of
two duly constituted Medical Boards.
31. Further, the reliance placed by the Respondent on the decisions
in Vijay (supra) and Teekaram Singh Meena (supra) is misplaced. In
the said matters, the direction for a fresh medical examination was
issued in the peculiar facts of the case where the medical record
disclosed circumstances warranting further scrutiny. The Courts
considered the material on record and found that the nature of the
medical condition or the surrounding medical evidence justified a re-
examination.
32. The present case stands on a different footing. In the absence of
any discrepancy between the two examinations or any procedural
irregularity in their conduct, the subsequent certificate dated
30.03.2024, obtained independently by the Respondent, could not
have furnished a valid basis for directing a fresh medical examination.
33. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in directing the constitution of
a fresh Medical Board despite the Respondent having already
undergone both the DME and the RME in accordance with the
governing recruitment framework.
34. The Impugned Order thus amounts to an unwarranted
interference with the considered opinion of duly constituted expert
Medical Boards and travels beyond the permissible limits of judicial
review in matters relating to medical fitness in recruitment to
disciplined services.
CONCLUSION:
35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in directing a
fresh medical examination of the Respondent solely on the basis of the
certificate dated 30.03.2024 produced by him.
36. The Impugned Order dated 20.08.2024 passed by the Tribunal
in O.A. No.1547/2024 is accordingly set aside and the present Petition
is allowed.
37. The Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
MARCH 16, 2026
sp/shah
