[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
M/S Scl-Crc21B Jv vs Rail Vikas Nigam Limited on 13 March, 2026
$~45
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 13.03.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 103/2025, I.A. 5454/2025 (For Exemption) &
I.A. 5455/2025 (For Stay)
M/S SCL-CRC21B JV .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Amit George, Mr. Rishabh
Dheer, Ms. Aishwarya Singh,
Ms. Medhavi Bhatia, Mr.
Sarthak Bhardwaj, Ms.
Adhishwar Suri, Ms. Rupam
Jha, Mr. Dushyant Kaul, Mr.
Brighu Pamidighantam, Mr.
Vaibhav Gandhi, Mr. Kartikey
Puneesh and Mr. Prateek
Srivastava, Advocates.
versus
RAIL VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Singh, Ms.
Shivpriya and Ms. Harshita
Singh, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking to set aside what
has been termed as an "Interim Award" dated 26.11.2024.
2. The relevant portion of the impugned Interim Award, which is
Act
sought to be challenged, reads as follows:-
" 14. The Arbitral Tribunal heard the arguments of both
Claimants and the Respondents on 11.11.2024 (online) and
26.11.2024 (physical). The Tribunal decided on the objections
raised in the Respondent Application dated 24.10.2024 with
regard to C-93 to C-96 as follows:
a) Ex. C-93. This is regarding Certificate of CA dated
10.10.2024 submitted by the Claimant‟s witness, as this
document has been created on 10.10.2024 as evident from the
date of Certificate by the CA. The pleadings in this case were
completed by 13.09.2024 and admission/ denial was over by
28.09.2024. Hence in opinion of the Tribunal it is a new
document which came into existence only after completion of
admission/ denial, so it cannot be taken on record.
b) Ex. C-94: This is regarding documents of deliberation of a
"committee for amicable solution...." dated 18.11.2021 in some
another Contract. Respondent argued that the documents
submitted with the affidavit are different from the document
submitted in the pleadings 8 pages are common and 4 pages are
different and one page is new. This document is not a policy
circular but a recommendation of the Committee in regard to the
specific contract and not applicable in general Arbitral Tribunal
is of the view that this is an additional document. Hence it is not
taken on record."
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner contends
that the present Petition under Section 34 of the Act is maintainable as
the learned Arbitral Tribunal has entered into a discussion on the
merits of the matter. It is further submitted that while refusing to take
the said documents on record, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has
rendered certain findings which would enter into the realm of merits
of the various claims as raised by the Petitioner.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner seeks to
rely upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Aptec
Advanced Protective Technologies AG v. Union of India2, to support
his contention that observations on the merits of the claim have been
made and thereby rendering making the impugned order an Interim
Award which can be subjected to challenge under Section 34 of the
Act.
5. He further seeks to substantiate the same by relying upon the
Claim No. 3 raised in its Statement of Claims as well as Rejoinder.
While doing so, the learned counsel submits that in respect of the
refusal of exhibit C-94, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has entered into
the merits of the said claim by holding that the said document would
not be relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the said claim.
6. He also submits that such observation by the learned Tribunal is
at variance with the stand taken by the Petitioner in both the Statement
of Claim as well as in the Rejoinder, as therein reliance has been made
upon the said document to canvass that the formula that is to be used
for the purpose of calculating the prolongation cost is set out in the
said document.
7. Per Contra, Mr. Jitendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel who
appears on behalf of the Respondent, submits that the present Petition
is not maintainable since the Order that has been sought to be
challenged is not in the nature of an Interim Award. For the said
purpose, he relies upon the various judgments of this Court, inter alia,
the judgment of this Court in H.S. Nag and Ors v Asian Hotel
(North) Ltd3 and, in particular Para 108 thereof.
8. He further seeks to rely upon the Judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Fortuna Skill Management Pvt. Ltd. (formerly
known as Iqor Global Services India Pvt. Ltd.) v Jaina Marketing &
2025 SCC OnLine Del 92
2026:DHC:1396
Associates4, to contend that at such a belated stage, the documents
could not have been sought to be introduced by the Petitioner. He, in
particular, relies on Para 16, 17, 37 and 41 thereof.
9. This Court has heard the submissions of the parties and, with
their able assistance, perused the material on record.
10. This Court, recently, in H.S. Nag and Ors vs. Asian Hotel
(North) Ltd5, had occasion to examine the nature and characteristics
of an interim award under the Act. After considering the relevant
provisions of the Act and the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products6, along with various precedents of
this Court, a detailed discussion was undertaken regarding the scope
of interference under Section 34 of the Act concerning an award
including interim award, the distinction between a procedural order
and an interim award, and the governing test for determining what
constitutes an interim award. The relevant portion of the judgment of
H.S. Nag and Ors (supra) reads as under:
"54. The Respondent asserts that the Impugned Orders are in the
nature of procedural directions, which do not attract the
interference of this Court under Section 34 of the Act. The
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that though coloured as
procedural, the Impugned Orders operate with finality, affecting
their substantial rights, thereby assuming the character of interim
awards.
55. In this backdrop, before embarking upon an examination of the
merits, this Court deems it apposite to first address the preliminary
objection as to the maintainability, since the adjudication upon the
merits of the present Petitions necessarily hinges upon whether the
Impugned Orders are amenable to challenge under Section 34 of
the Act.
56. In view of the apparent divergence in approach, discernible
from various precedents and the consequent uncertainty
surrounding the question as to what constitutes an "interim award",
2024:DHC:4991
2026:DHC:1396
(2018) 2 SCC 534
this Court deems it apposite to examine the statutory scheme, the
governing jurisprudence as established by various judicial
precedents, with some degree of clarity.
57. Accordingly, the discussion that follows is organised along
three distinct yet interrelated facets, viz., first, the scope and limits
of judicial interference permissible under Section 34 of the Act vis-
à-vis an Order passed in the course of arbitral proceedings; second,
the legal contours and attributes of what constitutes an "Interim
Award"; and third, whether the Impugned Orders, when examined
on the touchstone of the settled principles, satisfy the parameters so
as to fall within the ambit of an "Interim Award" amenable to
challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
Interference under Section 34 of the Act extends to an Arbitral
Award, including an „Interim Award‟
58. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act
is neither appellate nor supervisory in the conventional sense. The
Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitral
Tribunal, nor does it re-appreciate evidence or correct errors of fact
or law, save where such errors fall within the narrowly tailored
grounds statutorily prescribed. The provision thus reflects a
conscious legislative departure from expansive judicial review and
is rooted in the principle of party autonomy and finality of arbitral
adjudication.
*****
60. Further, Section 2(1)(c) of the Act defines the expression
"Arbitral award", which expressly includes interim awards. Section
2 of the Act is reproduced herein under for the sake of clarity:
"2. Definitions. -- (1) In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires, --
(c) "arbitral award" includes an interim award;"
61. A conjoint reading of Section 2(1)(c) and Section 34 of the Act
makes it abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 34 extends to the setting aside of an interim award as well,
provided such interim award satisfies the statutory requirements
and falls within the limited grounds expressly enumerated under
Section 34 of the Act and their consistent interpretations by the
Courts.
62. To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 31(6) of the Act is
also material. It empowers an Arbitral Tribunal to render an interim
award at any stage of the arbitral proceedings, prior to the
pronouncement of the final award, in respect of any matter on
which it may make a final determination. The same is reproduced
herein under for the sake of completeness:
"31. Form and contents of arbitral award. --
*****
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the
arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on
any matter with respect to which it may make a final
arbitral award."
63. A holistic reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions leads to
two clear and inescapable conclusions. First, that an Arbitral
Tribunal is vested with the authority to render an interim award
during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, prior to the
culmination of final adjudication. Second, that such interim awards,
being statutorily subsumed within the definition of an arbitral
award, are amenable to judicial scrutiny under Section 34 of the
Act, subject to the same limited and well-settled grounds on which
a final arbitral award may be interfered with.
64. At the same time, it must be underscored that though the statute
includes an "interim award" within the ambit of an arbitral award,
it does not follow that every interlocutory or procedural order
passed during arbitral proceedings partakes such character.
65. However, this statutory inclusion does not efface the
fundamental distinction between a determination that conclusively
adjudicates an issue and, a direction that merely regulates the
conduct of proceedings. It is this nuanced yet decisive distinction
that now warrants closer judicial scrutiny.
Distinction between a Procedural Order and an Interim Award
passed by an Arbitral Tribunal
66. Having thus established that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 34 of the Act extends, in principle, to an interim arbitral
award, the enquiry must now turn to the equally significant
question, namely, what, in law, qualifies as an "interim award".
67. Further, since the Act does not expressly define what
constitutes an "interim award", this Court deems it necessary to
advert to the judicially evolved principles which illuminate its
nature, attributes and legal contours. The classification of an order
cannot depend upon nomenclature alone but must be determined by
its substance and legal effect.
68. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in IFFCO (supra), while
authoritatively interpreting the expression "interim award", held
that an Arbitral Tribunal is empowered under Section 31(6) of the
Act to render an interim award on any matter in respect of which it
is competent to make a final award. The Court clarified that the
expression "any matter" is of wide import and encompasses any
point of dispute between the parties that calls for a definitive
adjudication.
69. At the same time, the decision underscores that such a
determination must possess the element of finality in respect of the
issue decided, so as to qualify as an interim award within the
statutory framework. The relevant observations of IFFCO (supra)
are extracted herein under for ready reference:
"8. The language of Section 31(6) is advisedly wide in
nature. A reading of the said sub-section makes it clear
that the jurisdiction to make an interim arbitral award is
left to the good sense of the arbitral tribunal, and that it
extends to "any matter" with respect to which it may make
a final arbitral award. The expression "matter" is wide in
nature, and subsumes issues at which the parties are in
dispute. It is clear, therefore, that any point of dispute
between the parties which has to be answered by the
arbitral tribunal can be the subject matter of an interim
arbitral award. However, it is important to add a note of
caution. In an appropriate case, the issue of more than one
award may be necessitated on the facts of that case.
However, by dealing with the matter in a piecemeal
fashion, what must be borne in mind is that the resolution
of the dispute as a whole will be delayed and parties will
be put to additional expense. The arbitral tribunal should,
therefore, consider whether there is any real advantage in
delivering interim awards or in proceeding with the matter
as a whole and delivering one final award, bearing in mind
the avoidance of delay and additional expense. Ultimately,
a fair means for resolution of all disputes should be
uppermost in the mind of the arbitral tribunal.
9. To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 32(1) is
also material. This section goes on to state that the arbitral
proceedings would be terminated only by the final arbitral
award, as opposed to an interim award, thus making it
clear that there can be one or more interim awards, prior to
a final award, which conclusively determine some of the
issues between the parties, culminating in a final arbitral
award which ultimately decides all remaining issues
between the parties."
70. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgment,
underscored that although arbitral proceedings culminate only upon
the pronouncement of the final award, the statutory scheme
unmistakably contemplates rendering of one or more interim
awards during their pendency. Such interim awards are not mere
procedural directions, rather they are determinations that finally
and conclusively adjudicate specific issues or claims between the
parties. The interim orders decisively settle the discrete facets of
the dispute, and thus, progressively narrow the field of controversy
and pave the way toward the final award.
*****
75. The common thread running through the aforesaid decisions is
that the twin pillars of „finality‟ and „substantive issue
determination‟ form the bedrock of the test. An order that merely
regulates procedure, even if it affects a valuable right, does not
cross the statutory threshold unless it conclusively determines a
substantive component of the arbitral reference.
76. In view of the foregoing discussion, it stands well settled that
an interim award must bear the hallmark of finality in respect of the
issue it addresses. The determinative consideration is whether the
arbitral tribunal has conclusively adjudicated a substantive
component of the dispute and rendered itself functus officio qua
that issue. If nothing further remains to be decided on that aspect
within the arbitral proceedings, such a determination would fall
within the ambit of an interim award and would be amenable to
challenge under Section 34 of the Act, notwithstanding that the
arbitration continues in respect of other matters.
77. Therefore, the question as to whether an order constitutes an
"interim award" is no longer res integra. The determination does
not hinge upon the nomenclature employed by the Arbitral
Tribunal, but upon the substance, effect, and legal consequences of
the order in question. The Court must examine whether the order
conclusively adjudicates a substantive issue between the parties at
an intermediate stage of the proceedings, thereby leaving nothing
further to be decided on that issue.
Nature of the Impugned Orders: Procedural or Interim Award
78. Having delineated the statutory framework and crystallised the
principles as to what constitutes an "interim award" within the
meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the Act, this Court now
proceeds to examine whether the Impugned Orders, in substance
and effect, meet the settled parameters so as to attract the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the Act.
*****
104. The judicial precedents cited and analysed hereinabove yield a
clear and consistent position in law, i.e., an order disposing of an
application for amendment of pleadings does not, by that
circumstance alone, acquire the status of an interim award. The
determinative consideration is not the nature of the application, but
the legal effect of its rejection.
105. The position may thus be summarised as first, not every order
passed by an Arbitral Tribunal qualifies as an interim award;
second, there exists no straight-jacket rule that an order rejecting an
amendment application necessarily constitutes an interim award;
and third, it is the element of finality in respect of a substantive
issue, resulting in crystallisation of a right, that determines whether
an order crosses the threshold into the domain of an interim award.
Governing Test for determining what constitutes an "Interim
Award"
106. In light of the foregoing discussion and the judicial precedents
noticed hereinabove, the governing test for determining whether an
order qualifies as an "interim award" may now be articulated.
(a) Whether the Order finally adjudicates a substantive dispute or
claims between the parties;
(b) Whether such adjudication attains finality and has a binding
effect insofar as that issue is concerned; and
(c) Whether, upon such determination, the Arbitral Tribunal
becomes functus officio qua that issue and retains no further
adjudicatory discretion thereon.
107. Therefore, if an order answers to all the aforesaid three
elements in affirmative, the order transcends the realm of a mere
procedural order and assumes the character of an Interim Award
within the meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the Act, and
consequently becomes susceptible to scrutiny under Section 34,
subject to its limited and circumscribed scope.
108. Tested on this anvil, this Court is of the considered view that
the Impugned Orders do not satisfy the essential indicia of an
interim award. It would be observed as under:
(a). First, the rejection of the amendment applications does not
decide any substantive dispute or independent claim between
the parties, it merely preserves the pleadings in the form in
which they already stood.
(b). Second, the determination lacks finality in respect of any issue
forming part of the arbitral reference, inasmuch as the Points
of Determination framed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal
expressly leave open the questions of entitlement, quantum,
rate and period of compensation to be adjudicated on the basis
of evidence.
(c). Third, the Arbitral Tribunal has not rendered itself functus
officio in respect of any such issue, nor has it exhausted its
adjudicatory discretion thereon."
11. Thus, in the said judgment this Court held, inter alia, that the
governing test for determining whether an order qualifies as an
"interim award" is that whether the order finally adjudicates a
substantive dispute or claim between the parties; whether such
adjudication attains finality and has a binding effect insofar as that
issue is concerned; and whether, upon such determination, the Arbitral
Tribunal becomes functus officio qua that issue and retains no further
adjudicatory discretion thereon.
12. Applying the aforesaid tests to the Impugned Order dated
26.11.2024, this Court finds that the same does not satisfy the
requirements for it to be construed as an interim Award. The rejection
with respect to the said documents and the reasons given thereof do
not form a determination on the merits of the claims of the Petitioner.
Consequently, the Impugned Order dated 26.011.2024 does not
answer the governing tests laid down for an interim award.
13. Accordingly, in view of the test laid down and upon the perusal
of the reasoning of the learned Arbitral Tribunal while rejecting the
said documents, this Court is of the opinion that the Order as
impugned herein does not really enter into the realm of the merits of
any of the claims as raised by the Petitioner herein and adjudicate any
substantive dispute or claim.
14. Resultantly, there arises no scope for this Court to interfere with
the Order passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal and to entertain the
present Petition being filed under Section 34 of the Act.
15. Accordingly, the present petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
MARCH 13, 2026/nd/va
