[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Preeti Gupta vs Madan Mohan Pahwa on 9 March, 2026
Author: Amit Sharma
Bench: Amit Sharma
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 27th February, 2026
Pronounced on: 9th March, 2026
+ RC.REV. 306/2023
PREETI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mandeep Kumar Sharma, Adv.
versus
MADAN MOHAN PAHWA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shubham Budhiraja, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 308/2023
PREETI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mandeep Kumar Sharma, Adv.
versus
RAJ KUMAR BHATIA .....Respondent
Through: None.
+ RC.REV. 310/2023
PREETI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mandeep Kumar Sharma, Adv.
versus
SUDHARSHAN KUMARI PAHWA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Shubham Budhiraja, Adv.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHASKAR RC.REV. 306/2023 & conn. Page 1 of 17
SINGH RAWAT
Signing Date:10.03.2026
09.37
+ RC.REV. 311/2023
PREETI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mandeep Kumar Sharma, Adv.
versus
GOVIND RAM (SINCE
DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LR .....Respondent
Through: None.
+ RC.REV. 318/2023
PREETI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mandeep Kumar Sharma, Adv.
versus
DARSHAN LAL KAINTH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH
HIS LEGAL HEIR SH. MANOJ KAINTH .....Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA
AMIT SHARMA, J.
1. These petitions have been taken up for hearing and are being disposed
of by way of present common judgment as the issue arisen in the impugned
orders is same. The present petitions under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, (for short, 'DRCA') have been filed assailing the
impugned orders of even date 28.04.2023 passed by learned SCJ-cum-RC,
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in eviction petitions filed on behalf of the
petitioner-landlord against the respondents-tenants with respect to their
respective tenanted premises which are stated to have been owned by the
petitioner herein.
2. In the eviction petitions, it was stated by the petitioner that the
erstwhile owner of the property was Smt. Raj Kumari Verma, who had
executed GPA and Gift Deed in favour of her son, Ashok Kumar Verma vide
document dated 16.08.1995. Thereafter, said Ashok Kumar Verma executed a
Will dated 28.01.2005 along with other relevant documents in favour of Anil
Gupta, husband of the petitioner. Ashok Kumar Verma passed away on
27.10.2021 and after his demise, Anil Gupta become absolute owner of the
entire property situated and located at 3379-81, Hakim Bawa Street, Hauz
Qazi, Delhi-110006, comprising of basement, ground floor, first floor, and
second floor with terrace, where the tenanted premises are situated.
Subsequent thereto, the subject property was gifted by Anil Gupta in favour
of the petitioner, Preeti Gupta, by way of a registered Gift Deed dated
18.07.2022.
3. The subject eviction petitions were filed by the petitioner on the ground
of bonafide requirement. It was stated that the family of the petitioner
comprises of her two daughters, and petitioner herself, who is partially
paralyzed and handicapped from left side. Husband of the petitioner, Anil
Gupta, is stated to have passed away. It has been averred that the petitioner is
running a business of Electrical Maintenance and Contractor work in
Faridabad, Haryana, under the name and style of 'Preety Electricals'. The
elder daughter of petitioner has completed "Aerospace Engineering" and
younger daughter is an architect by profession and both of them are
unmarried. Now, the petitioner wants to start her business in Delhi and her
daughters want to start their respective professional work and in view of the
same, she requires the entire premises and they have no other alternate
suitable accommodation to meet their requirement.
4. Vide the impugned orders dated 28.04.2023, learned RC, after hearing
arguments on the maintainability of the case, had dismissed the eviction
petitions under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA instituted by the petitioner
against the respondents on the ground that same are not maintainable in view
of the bar by law under Section 14(6) of the DRCA. Perusal of the impugned
orders show that the contents of the same are similar. Thus, for completeness,
the impugned order dated 28.04.2023 in RC.REV. 306/2023 has been
reproduced as under: -
"The present petition is an eviction petition filed by the petitioner u/s
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act whereby the petitioner is seeking the eviction
of the tenanted property i.e. 3379/5, Hakim Baqa Street, Hauz Qazi,
Delhi-110006 on the ground of bonafide need stating that the
petitioner is the lawful and absolute owner of the tenanted premises
having it obtained/acquired by way of registered gift deed dated
18.07.2022 executed by the previous owner/her husband Sh. Anil
Gupta, who had acquired the same by way of Will dt. 28.01.2005
executed by one Ashok Kumar Verma in his favour.
On the other hand, the ld. counsel for the respondent has raised
an objection with respect to the maintainability of the present petition
u/s 14(6)DRC Act.
Submissions are heard on the maintainability of the present
petition from both the sides.
Thus, as is apparent from the petition of the petitioner the
petitioner is seeking the possession of the tenanted premises
contending that she is absolute owner of the tenanted premises on the
basis of registered gift Deed dt. 18.07.2022 and the tenanted premises
is bonafidely required by the petitioner as the petitioner and her
daughter want to start their business work from the tenanted premises
and that they have no other suitable alternate accommodation to meet
their bonafide requirement. It is also clear from the record that the
Gift Deed dt. 18.07.2022 has been executed in favour of the petitioner
by her husband Sh. Anil Gupta, who had the authority to execute such
gift deed on the basis of his rights derived in the tenanted premises by
virtue of Will dt. 28.01.2005 executed by the previous owner namely
sh. Ashok Kumar Verma in his favour. Thus, the judicial record
makes it amply clear that the property in question has been acquired
by the petitioner by way of registered gift deed w.e.f. 18.07.2022
only.
It is relevant to note that during arguments on the maintainability of
petition, though, the ld. counsel for the petitioner had argued that
since prior to the execution of the registered gift deed dt. 18.07.2022,
the husband of the petitioner only was the lawful owner of the
tenanted premises and the petitioner also had rights over the tenanted
premises being his wife, the ownership of the petitioner shall also
relate back to 28.01.2005 when the Will dt. 28.01.2005 was ' executed
by Sh. Ashok Kumar Verma in favour of her husband and as such,
Section 14(6) DRC Act has no application to the present petition and
the same is very much maintainable. Reliance is also placed upon
'J.C. Mehra vs. Kusum Gupta', 2003 SCC Online Del 505 of Hon'ble
High Court of Delhi.
However, the court does not find any merit in the above said
contention of ld. counsel for the petitioner and the authority relied
upon by the ld. counsel for the petitioner also has no application to the
present case. In the case relied upon by the petitioner, the
maintainability of eviction petition was challenged u/s 14(6) DRC Act
on the ground that the respondent landlord had purchased the suit
property initially on the basis of power of attorney dt. 12.08.1993 and,
thereafter, a formal conveyance deed was executed in his favour on
10.03.1995 and the contention of the petitioner/tenant to the
maintainability of the petition was that the five years period as
provided u/s 14(6) DRC Act should be calculated from the date when
the conveyance deed was executed in favour of respondent/landlord
and not from the date when power of attorney sale was made.
Rejecting the said contention and relying upon 'Sushil Kanta
Chakravorty Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar, 85(2000) DLT 197 it was held
by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that the perusal of the documents
relied upon by the respondent/landlord shows that the power of
attorney was for consideration within the meaning of Sec. 202 of the
Indian Contract Act and interest was thus created in favour of
respondent landlord was created in the year 1993. Possession was also
handed over so was the right to recover rent. Thus, the respondent
acquired the premises by transfer. in part performance of agreement to
sell and got notional possession of the premises, which continued to
be in possession of the tenant, for all intent and purposes. Execution
of the conveyance deed is a subsequent event after the acquisition of
the premises by the respondent by virtue of power of attorney sale.
The respondent, thus, became a landlord on the date when agreement
to sell was executed and he got symbolic possession of the suit
premises. Sec. 14 (6) DRC Act will not stand in the way of the
respondent in asking of recovery of possession on the basis of power
of attorney sale because the period has to be reckoned not from the
date of the conveyance but from the date of power of attorney sale
was made.
However, in the present case the petitioner has based his claim
of ownership on the basis of registered gift deed dt. 18.07.2022. Thus,
the case relied upon by the petitioner has no application to the facts of
the present case.
At this stage, it is relevant to note that as per Section 14(6) of
DRC Act where a landlord acquires any premises by transfer, no
application for recovery of the possession of such premises shall lie
u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act unless a period of five years has elapsed
from the date of acquisition/purchase.
Thus, since in the presence case also after the acquisition of the
tenanted premises by the petitioner on 18.07.2022 by way of
registered gift deed, a period of five years is yet to be lapsed, the
petition of the petitioner is clearly premature and barred in view of
Section 14(6) of DRC Act.
The petition of the petitioner accordingly stands rejected being
non-maintainable and barred by law.
Further, since the petition in hand is itself dismissed, the
application filed by the applicant Ms. Savitri Verma u/o 1 Rule 10
CPC has also become infructuous and accordingly disposed off.
Copy of order be given dasti on request.
File be consigned to Record Room as per rules."
5. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that notice was issued in all the
aforesaid petitions on 22.04.2024. Report with regard to the said notice shows
that respondents in all the petitions have been served; however, in RC.REV.
308/2023, RC.REV. 311/2023, and RC.REV. 318/2023, none has entered
appearance on behalf of the said respondents.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that the latter is a
widow. She is stated to be partially paralyzed and handicapped from left side
and requires the tenanted premises on account of bonafide requirement for
running the business of electrical maintenance in Delhi as also for the
professional business of her daughters. It is submitted that title of the subject
property wherein the tenanted premises are situated has devolved to her by
way of a Gift Deed dated 18.07.2022 executed by her husband in her favour
and the same would not fall within the meaning of 'transfer' as provided
under Section 14(6) of the DRCA. It is further submitted that the husband of
the petitioner was the lawful owner of the subject premises and the petitioner
being his wife had legal right over the same as the ownership of the husband
over the said property relates back to the Will dated 28.01.2005 by which the
subject property was inherited by him from Ashok Kumar Verma. It is further
submitted that such transfer by way of inheritance would not be barred under
Section 14(6) as the same was enacted to curb the voluntary act of transfer by
the landlords and not by inheritance. It is further submitted that even
otherwise, the petitioner being legal representative and legal heir of her
husband, Anil Gupta, could have filed or continued the eviction proceedings,
if the same would have been instituted by him. Therefore, the bar under
Section 14(6) for institution of eviction proceedings would not be applicable
to the present case. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Coordinate
Benche of this Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Rajeshwari Pandey1, in
support of the case of the petitioner.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-tenants has submitted
that the petitioner has received the entire property by way of a registered Gift
Deed dated 18.07.2022 and this conveyance by virtue of its nature would
come within the purview of 'transfer' under Section 14(6) of the DRCA. It is
submitted that the husband of the petitioner had received the subject property
by Will dated 28.01.2005 from Ashok Kumar Verma, who was not his
relative. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in V.N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai & Anr.2, in support of their case.
8. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the records.
9. Section 14(6) of the DRCA reads as under: -
"14. Protection of tenant against eviction.--
**** **** ****
(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no
application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie
under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso
1998 SCC OnLine Del 594: (1998) 75 DLT 238
1965 SCC OnLine SC 301: AIR 1966 SC 432
thereto, unless a period of five years have elapsed from the date of the
acquisition."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.N. Sarin (supra), while examining
the legislative intent of provisions of Section 14(6) of the DRCA in case of
landlord acquiring the property by way of a partition of undivided Hindu
family property, had observed and held as under: -
"8. That takes us to Section 14(6). It provides that where a landlord has
acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of
possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) on the ground
specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years
has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. It is obvious that if this
clause applies to the claim made by Respondent 1 for evicting the
appellant, his application would be barred, because a period of five years
had not elapsed from the date of the acquisition when the present
application was made. The High Court has, however, held that where
property originally belonging to an undivided Hindu family is allotted to
the share of one of the coparceners as a result of partition, it cannot be
said that the said property has been acquired by such person by transfer;
and so, Section 14(6) cannot be invoked by the appellant. The question
which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether this view of the
High Court is right.
9. Before construing Section 14(6), it may be permissible to enquire
what may be the policy underlying the section and the object intended to
be achieved by it. It seems plain that the object which this provision is
intended to achieve is to prevent transfers by landlords as a device to
enable the purchasers to evict the tenants from the premises let out
to them. If a landlord was unable to make out a case for evicting his
tenant under Section 14(1)(e), it was not unlikely that he may think of
transferring the premises to a purchaser who would be able to make out
such a case on his own behalf; and the legislature thought that if such a
course was allowed to be adopted, it would defeat the purpose of Section
14(1). In other words, where the right to evict a tenant could not be
claimed by a landlord under Section 14(1)(e), the legislature thought
that the landlord should not be permitted to create such a right by
adopting the device of transferring the premises to a purchaser who
may be able to prove his own individual case under Section 14(1)(e).
It is possible that this provision may, in some cases, work hardship,
because if a transfer is made by a landlord who could have proved his
case under Section 14(1)(e), the transferee would be precluded from
making a claim for the eviction of the tenant within five years even
though he, in his turn, would also have proved his case under Section
14(1)(e). Apparently the legislature thought that the possible mischief
which may be caused to the tenants by transfers made by landlords to
circumvent the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) required that an
unqualified and absolute provision should be made as prescribed by
Section 14(6). That, in our opinion, appears to be the object intended to
be achieved by this provision and the policy underlying it.
**** **** ****
13. In dealing with the present appeal, we propose to confine our
decision to the narrow question which arises before us and that relates to
the construction of Section 14(6). What Section 14(6) provides is that
the purchaser should acquire the premises by transfer and that
necessarily assumes that the title to the property which the
purchaser acquires by transfer did not vest in him prior to such
transfer. Having regard to the object intended to be achieved by this
provision, we are not inclined to hold that a person who acquired
property by partition can fall within the scope of its provision even
though the property which he acquired by partition did in a sense
belong to him before such transfer. Where a property belongs to an
undivided Hindu family and on partition it falls to the share of one of the
coparceners of the family, there is no doubt a change of the landlord of
the said premises, but the said change is not of the same character as the
change which is effected by transfer of premises to which Section 14(6)
refers. In regard to cases falling under Section 14(6), a person who
had no title to the premises and in that sense, was a stranger,
becomes a landlord by virtue of the transfer. In regard to a partition,
the position is entirely different. When the appellant was inducted into
the premises, the premises belonged to the undivided Hindu family
consisting of Respondent 1, his father and his brother. After partition,
instead of the undivided Hindu family, Respondent 1 alone had become
landlord of the premises, We are satisfied that it would be unreasonable
to hold that allotment of one parcel of property belonging to an
undivided Hindu family to an individual coparcener as a result of
partition is an acquisition of the said property by transfer by the said
coparcener within the meaning of Section 14(6). In our opinion, the High
Court was right in coming to the conclusion that Section 14(6) did not
create a bar against the institution of the application by Respondent 1 for
evicting the appellant."
11. In Ashok Kumar & Anr. v. Ram Avtar Gupta3, learned Single Judge
of this Court, while dealing with situation where the eviction petition was
filed by landlord on the basis of a relinquishment deed of a share in the shop
in tenancy to the exclusive use of the landlord/petitioner, which did not come
in his share on demise of their father, had observed and held as under: -
"14. Once the father of the respondent/landlord under his Will
bequeathed separate portions of his property to the respondent/landlord
and his brother, the respondent/landlord and his brother, on demise of
their father, became exclusive owners of the respective portions
bequeathed to them and would not in law be joint owners of the entire
property. Such separate property could be transferred to the other or to
any other person, only by sale or gift and both of which would be
"transfer" within the meaning of Section 14(6) supra.
15. Undoubtedly acquiring property by inheritance, even if under a
Will, does not fall within the meaning of "transfer" in Section 14(6)
but the respondent/landlord, owing to the Will pleaded of the father,
did not inherit the shop in the tenancy of petitioner/tenants.
16. Though the respondent/landlord in the petition for eviction as
well as in the relinquishment deed, has described himself and his
brother as „co-owners‟, but once separate portions of the property
had been willed to them, it cannot be said that the
respondent/landlord had any share in the portion bequeathed to his
brother and vice versa.
17. I may mention, a relinquishment deed on a stamp paper of Rs.100/-
can be executed and registered only when both parties have a share in the
same property and when share of one is being surrendered and other
being enlarged. That, as aforesaid, is not the case. The
respondent/landlord, on demise of the father, did not acquire any share in
the shop in tenancy of petitioners/tenants, for the same to be enlarged to
2017 SCC Online Del 9150: (2018) 2 RCR (Rent) 198
exclusive share by his brother surrendering his share in favour of the
respondent / landlord. Even otherwise, when the true character of the
deed, though titled as a Deed of Release or Relinquishment, is of transfer
or conveyance of the property in favour of one who prior thereto had no
share in the property conveyed, it would amount to a transfer /
conveyance notwithstanding the nomenclature given thereto. Reference
in this regard may be made to Kuppuswamy Chettiar Vs. A.S.P.A.
Arumugam Chettiar AIR 1967 SC 1395. Reference may also be made to
Srichand Badlani Vs. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi 2013 SCC Online Del
5128.
18. The respondent/landlord as per his own admission did not
become owner/landlord of the shop in tenancy of the
petitioners/tenants on the death of his father but became so only on
execution of relinquishment deed on 25th July, 2014.
19. In view of the aforesaid admitted position, the respondent/landlord
cannot file a petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act till
expiry of five years from 25th July, 2014.
20. The purport of Section of Section 14(6) is to prevent abuse of Section
14(1)(e), by owners/landlords to whom ground of eviction under Section
14(1)(e) is not available, transferring their properties in favour of persons
who can invoke the same. The possibility of the brother of
respondent/landlord transferring shop in tenancy of
petitioners/tenants to the respondent/landlord, being unable to
invoke Section 14(1)(e) himself, cannot be ruled out."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In an order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in Ajay
Kumar Gupta v. Prakash Chand Gupta & Ors.4, in similar circumstances
as in the present case while dealing with the case of the landlord who had
acquired the property, by way of a gift deed, had observed and held as under:
-
In RC Rev. 397/2024 order dated 02.12.2025
"8. The aforesaid reflects that the subject premises fell into the hands of
the landlords after members of the same family initiated certain steps
inter se themselves. Also, that they all had been/ were co-owners of the
subject premises at some point of time. Thus, the said steps were of a
nature akin to a family settlement. The learned ARC has rendered his
findings proceeding on the said basis, and in line with the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. N. Sarin vs. Major Ajit Kumar
Poplai 1966 SCR (1) 349 on the scope and intent of Section 14(6) of the
DRC Act.
9. This Court is in complete agreement with the aforesaid findings of the
learned ARC. In the considered opinion of this Court, the bar under
Section 14(6) of the DRC Act comes into play only when "... ...a
landlord has acquired any premises by transfer... ...", and where, in the
present case, the landlords were not rank outsiders/ third parties, were,
admittedly, owners of the subject premise before through lineage, and all
subsequent documents were executed inter se members of the same
family, it cannot be held that there was an acquisition by transfer as
envisaged in Section 14(6) of the DRC Act. Even otherwise, the tenant
was unable to show as to how the said Gift Deed dated 24.12.2021 would
come under the ambit of the bar under Section 14(6) of the DRC Act.
This gives no reason for this Court to disagree with the findings rendered
by the learned ARC qua the above."
13. Similarly, in Dr. R.C. Sakhuja & Ors. v. R.P. Kholi & Anr.5, it was
observed and held that the devolution of property in the normal way by
succession, whether testamentary or non-testamentary, was not intended to be
covered by the expression "acquired ... by transfer" within the meaning of
Section 14(6) of the DRCA. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads
thus: -
"3. In this Court, the main argument pressed by Shri Avadh Behari
on behalf of the appellants is that a will is a transfer and, Therefore, is
covered by section 14(6) of the Act, I am wholly unable to sustain this
submission. A will really means the legal declaration of the intention of a
S.A.O. No.82 of 1968 decided vide judgment dated 25.07.1969: 1970 Rent Control Reporter 44
testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into
effect after his death. It regulates the devolution of property of the
testator on his death. It is in my opinion not a transfer as is contemplated
by Section 14(6). This sub-section appears to me to have been placed on
the statute-book with the object of discouraging or making ineffective
mala fide transfer of premises for the purpose of evicting tenants on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section
14. It is for this purpose that a transferee from a landlord is debarred
from maintaining an application for ejectment for the period specified in
sub- section (6). The devolution of property in the normal way by
succession, whether testamentary or non-testamentary, is in my opinion,
not intended to be covered by the expression "acquired... by transfer", as
used in the sub-section in question. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Ollala Ambiah Vs. Avdhnula Mallanna in my opinion,
does not help us in construing the word "transfer" as used in section
14(6) of the Act. In this connection, it may be remembered that the
purpose and object of a legislative enactment has always to be looked at
for guiding the meaning of the words used therein, when those words are
capable of both narrow and wide meaning. It is true that the decision of
the Punjab High Court in V.N.Sarin Vs. A.K.Poplai and the judgment of
the Supreme Court on appeal in the same case reported as V.N.Sarin Vs.
A.K.Poplai cited on behalf of the respondents, does not directly deal with
the case of a will, as it is concerned with the partition of joint Hindu
family, but the devolution of property by operation of law, such as on
death cannot in my opinion be assumed to have been intended the
Parliament to be covered by the word "transfer" as used in the sub-
section in question. It was the mischief sought to be done to the tenants
by the landlords by utilising by transfer intervolves some other person
better circumstanced for the purpose of evicting the tenant, which was
intended to be remedied Bald literal meaning, divorced from the purpose,
object and scheme of the statutory provision, is likely to be misleading in
the present case. The intention of the Legislature is best gathered by
construing the word "transfer" in the background of the legislative
purpose. No persuasive argument of any cogency has been addressed
at the Bar to persuade me to hold that devolution of property by a
will could have been intended by the Parliament to fall within the
purview of section 14(6). No principle has been relied upon in support
of the appellants' submission and of course no precedent has been cited.
The argument is, therefore, repelled."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In view of the legislative intention as explained by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in V.N. Sarin (supra) and other judgments/orders passed by
learned Benches of this Court, the 'Gift Deed' in favour of the petitioner by
her late husband, in the considered opinion of this Court would not be covered
within the meaning of expression "transfer" as used in Section 14(6) of the
DRCA.
15. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner herein acquired the
property by way of a registered gift deed dated 18.07.2022 from her husband.
It is also a matter of record that the petitioner has two daughters. Petitioner
and her daughters are Class I legal heirs of deceased Anil Gupta, husband of
the petitioner. In these circumstances, the petitioner cannot be considered as a
person, who would have no title to the premises and was a complete stranger
to the property as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.N. Sarin (supra).
16. Learned counsel for the respondent had argued that the petitioner is, in
fact, a stranger inasmuch as the subject premises were acquired by her
husband from Ashok Kumar Verma, who was not supposedly the owner of
the property. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that this issue has not been
dealt with by learned ARC and the petition was dismissed only on the ground
that the same is not maintainable in view of the bar by law under Section
14(6) of the DRC Act. Thus, this Court will only examine the issue arising in
these petitions from the said aspect.
17. The registered Gift Deed was executed on 18.07.2022 by the husband
of the petitioner and the present eviction petitions were filed by the petitioner
on her husband's demise on 30.11.2022, after a period of 3 years. It is not the
case of the respondents, at this stage, that the husband of the petitioner could
not have filed the petition, and therefore, by way of a gift deed, the right to
file the present petition was assigned to the petitioner herein. Even otherwise,
had there been no gift deed and the husband of the petitioner would have died
intestate or by leaving a Will in favour of the petitioner then, by way of
inheritance, there was already a right subsisting in the property, and therefore,
the petitioner cannot be considered to be a stranger, insofar as the title of the
property is concerned.
18. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, although the
subject property was acquired by the petitioner by way of a gift deed executed
by her husband, the fact that she has vested legal right as a Class I heir of her
husband even prior to the execution of the said 'Gift Deed' cannot be
denied/disputed.
19. In the considered opinion of this Court, provisions of Section 14(6) of
the DRCA, keeping in mind the legislative intent, would not bring within its
purview the acquiring of subject property by the petitioner by way of 'Gift
Deed'.
20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order(s) dated
28.04.2023 is set aside. The present petitions are restored and remanded back
to the learned SCJ-cum-RC, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, for deciding
the same afresh after hearing the contentions raised on behalf of the parties in
accordance with law.
21. The present petitions are allowed and disposed of accordingly.
22. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.
23. Copy of the judgment be sent to the concerned learned SCJ-cum-RC,
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, for necessary information and compliance.
24. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.
AMIT SHARMA
(JUDGE)
MARCH 09, 2026/nk/ns
