[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Union Of India vs M/S Vishwa-Bvsr Jv on 11 February, 2026
$~22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 11.02.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 375/2024, I.A. 38279/2024 (Stay) & I.A.
38285/2024 (Delay of 59 days in Re-filing the petition)
UNION OF INDIA .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Nidhi Raman CGSC with
Mr. Zubin Singh, Mr. Arnav
Mittal & Mr. Akash Mishra
Advs. with Ms. Archana
Chhibber, legal consultant
MEA
versus
M/S VISHWA-BVSR JV .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Kartik Yadav, Mr. Sidhant
Kaushik, Mr. Sankalp Singh .&
Ms. Mokshha Sharma, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
I.A. 38278/2024 (Delay of 28 days in filing the petition)
1. This objection Petition being O.M.P. (COMM) 375/2024, under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, has been
filed impugning the Amended Arbitral Award dated 30.12.2023
passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the case titled "M/S Vishwa-
Act
BVSR JV v. Union Of India".
2. The present Petition is also accompanied by an Application
being I.A. 38278/2024 seeking condonation of delay in filing in filing
the said Petition.
3. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent would raise a
preliminary objection to the present Petition, stating that the same is
barred by limitation since it exceeds a statutory period of three months
and 30 days as provided for in the Act, more specifically Section
34(3).
4. In the present matter, the log information has been filed by the
Registry, which indicates that the Petition came to be filed on
30.04.2024 at 10:52 PM.
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further submits that
as per the Delhi High Court (Original-Side Rules), 2018, read with the
Practice Directions for Electronic Filing, any filing done after 4:00
p.m. is considered to be filed on the next working day
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent submits
that on the basis of an Application under Section 33 of the Act, the
arbitration proceedings came to be disposed of vide Order dated
30.12.2023, and it is from this date that the limitation will have to
commence.
7. He submits that on the basis of the said date on which limitation
commences, the filing of the present Petition on the 30.04.2024 would
be beyond the period of limitation as provided for under the Act as the
period of three months and 30 days expired on 29.04.2024.
8. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to advert to the
relevant Section, being Section 34(3) of the Act, which reads as
follows:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.--
****
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
...."
9. Brevitatis causa, the relevant dates for the purpose of
calculating the delay are tabulated herein below:
S.NO. PARTICULARS DATE
1. Date of Amended Arbitral 30.12.2023
Award
2. Expiry of 3 months 30.03.2024
3. Expiry of condonable 30 29.04.2024
days
4. Date of filing of present 30.04.2024 at
Petition 10:52 PM
10. A perusal of the above tabular statement shows that the present
Petition has been filed 2 days beyond the 30-day condonable period as
provided for under Section 34 of the Act. This Court further takes note
that the Application seeking condonation of delay fails to provide any
sufficient cause justifying the said delay. In fact, the application
seeking the condonation of delay shows that the Petitioner herein has
miscalculated the statutory period within which a Section 34 Petition
is to be preferred and states that the present Petition has been filed
within the 30-day condonable period.
11. This Court is also guided by the the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav2,
and the Judgement of a Division Bench of this Court in Tefcil
Breweries Ltd. v. Alfa Laval India (P) Ltd3., wherein it is has been
stated that for the purpose of computing the limitation period under
Section 34 of the Act, where a party has filed an application
under Section 33 for correction or an additional award, the three-
month limitation period begins from the date on which the Section 33
application is formally disposed of by the arbitral tribunal and not
from the date on which a corrected or signed award is received by the
party.
12. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would not controvert the
dates as put forth by the learned counsel for the Respondent.
13. In view of the fact that there is a clear delay of two (02) days in
the filing of the present Petition.
14. At this stage, this Court also takes into account the aspect of
applicability of Delhi High Court (Original-Side Rules), 2018, read
with the Practice Directions for Electronic Filing, even dehors the
applicability of the said rules in the present factual scenario, the
present Petition is found to be beyond the statutory mandate under
Section 34(3) of the Act.
15. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the present
application is found to be devoid of merit and hence is dismissed as
such.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811
2025 SCC OnLine Del 6366
O.M.P. (COMM) 375/2024, I.A. 38279/2024 (Stay) & I.A.
38285/2024 (Delay of 59 days in Re-filing the petition)
16. In view of the foregoing, the present Petition, along with
pending application(s), if any, is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 11, 2026/ v/va
