State vs Santosh Choudhary
2026 Latest Caselaw 1073 Del

Delhi High Court

State vs Santosh Choudhary on 23 February, 2026

                          *      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                          %                                 Judgment Reserved on: 18.02.2026
                                                            Judgment pronounced on: 23.02.2026
                          +      CRL.A. 308/2017
                                 STATE                                                 .....Appellant
                                                   Through:      Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State with
                                                                 SI Shivam.

                                                   versus

                                 SANTOSH CHOUDHARY                                  .....Respondent
                                             Through:            Mr. Alok Sharma and Mr. Aditya
                                                                 Sharma, Advocates.

                          CORAM:
                          HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
                                                   JUDGMENT

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.

1. This appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the State

in Case No. 661/2012 on the file of Metropolitan Magistrate, North

East Delhi, assailing the judgment dated 14.10.2013 as per which

the sole accused has been acquitted of the offences under Sections

279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC), giving

him the benefit of doubt.

2. The prosecution case is that on 16.02.2002, at about

07:45 A.M., at T-point, GT Road, Delhi, the accused drove bus

bearing registration no. DL-1PA-7989 in a rash and negligent

manner so as to endanger human life. The accused lost control of

his vehicle and knocked down Shameem, the mother of PW3 and

PW4 and fled from the spot. Shameem thereafter succumbed to

injuries on the same date at 01:15P.M.Hence, as per the charge-

sheet/final report dated 03.04.2002, the accused was alleged to

have committed the offences punishable under Sections 279 and

304A IPC.

3. On the basis of Exhibit PW7/A FIS of Shameem, given

on 16.02.2002, Crime no. 39/2002, Seelampur Police Station, i.e.,

Exhibit PW8/B FIR was registered by PW8,Woman Sub-

Inspector. PW7, Sub Inspector (SI) was entrusted with the

investigation of the case. PW7 conducted investigation into the

crime and on completion of the same, filed the charge-sheet/final

report dated 03.04.2002alleging commission of the offences

punishable under the aforementioned sections.

4. On appearance before the trial magistrate, all the copies

of the prosecution records were furnished to him, as contemplated

under Section 207 Cr.P.C. On07.05.2003, the substance of the

accusation as contemplated under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was read

over and explained to him to which he pleaded not guilty.

5. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs. 1 to 10 were

examined and Exhibits PW7/A-J, PW8/A-D and PW9/B were

marked in support of the case.

6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused

persons were questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C.

regarding the incriminating circumstances appearing against himin

the evidence of the prosecution. The accused denied all those

circumstances and maintained his innocence.

7. On behalf of the accused, DW1 and DW2 were

examined. No documentary evidence was adduced by the accused.

8. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary

evidence on record, and after hearing both sides, the trial court,

vide the impugned judgement dated 14.10.2013,acquitted the

accused under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. of the offences punishable

under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. Aggrieved, the State has come

up in appeal.

9. It was submitted by the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor that the impugned judgment dated 14.10.2013 passed

by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is bad in law and liable to

be set aside. The trial court failed to appreciate that the respondent

was driving the offending bus in a rash and negligent manner, as a

result of which the accident occurred causing fatal injuries to the

deceased. The finding of acquittal is contrary to the materials

available on record and suffers from non-appreciation of the

evidence led by the prosecution.

10. Per contra, it was submitted by the learned counsel for

the respondent/accused that the impugned judgment is well-

reasoned, based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record

and settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, and does not

suffer from any infirmity calling for an interference by this Court.

The findings of the trial court are neither perverse nor contrary to

law, and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

11. Heard both sides and perused the records.

12. The only point that arises for consideration in the

present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned

judgement calling for an interference by this court.

13. I make a brief reference to the oral and documentary

evidence relied on by the prosecution in support of the

case.Exhibit PW7/A FIS of the deceased dated 16.02.2002 reads

thus:- "...Today, at around 7:45 AM, I was going to JPN Hospital.

When I reached a little ahead of the T-Point in Seelampur towards

Delhi, a bus, the number of which was noted by the PCR (Police)

as DL-1PA-7989, came from the front. The driver was driving

very fast, recklessly, and negligently. He hit me from the side,

causing me to fall on the ground and sustain injuries. The bus is

currently parked at the spot, but the driver has fled. The PCR

vehicle brought me to the hospital."

14. PW1 deposed that on 17.02.2002, he was posted in the

Department of Forensic Medicine, GTB Hospital, Delhi, and that

he had conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased.

The cause of death was "haemorrhagic shock due to ante mortem

fracture of the hip bone produced as a result of blunt force

impact". Exhibit PW1/A is the post mortem report.

15. PW5, Head Constable-in-Charge of PCR van, North

East Zone B-57, Delhi, deposed that on 16.02.2002 he along with

his PCR Van staff was standing at T-Point, Seelampur, GT Road,

when at about 7:45 AM, he saw a bus bearing No. DL-1PA-7989

coming from the side of Delhi, being driven in a rash and negligent

manner by its driver. The bus hit a pedestrian, who was walking

through the side of the road, as a result whereof she sustained

injuries. He immediately tried to apprehend the driver of the

aforesaid bus, however, the driver fled from the spot. Another PCR

Van, arrived at the spot at about 7:50 AM and its in-charge, an ASI

whose name he does not recollect, took the injured lady to GTB

Hospital. Police officials thereafter arrived at the spot and prepared

Mark-X site plan on his instance. He had asked four or five

passengers of the aforesaid bus to join the investigation, however,

none of them joined on one pretext or the other.

16. PW10, the owner of the bus bearing registration no.

DL-1PA-7989, deposed that the aforesaid bus was driven by the

accused on the date of accident, i.e. 16.02.2002. He denied the

suggestion that the bus was being driven by one Subhash. He

denied the suggestion that he had employed two drivers for his

bus. He further denied the suggestion that he had called the

accused on the pretext of getting the bus released as the original

driver Subhash fled from the scene. He further deposed that if at

all any conductor was employed, it was only for the accused to

disclose the details.

17. On behalf of the accused, DW2 wasexamined. The

accused offered himself as a witness and hence was examined as

DW1.DW1 deposed that on the date of the accident he was on rest

and at about 11:00 AM, PW10, the owner of the bus called him to

Seelampur Police Station and told him that an accident had been

caused by his bus. He was assured by PW10 that he would merely

be required to visit the Court and nothing material would ensue, as

it was driver Subhash who was driving the bus at the relevant time

and further assured him that he would take care of everything.

Thereafter, the instant case was instituted against him. PW10got

himself discharged as surety in the case, as a result of which he

had to remain in Tihar Jail for two days, until his family members

bailed him out.

17.1. DW1, in his cross examination, admitted that he was

arrested at about 11:00 AM on the date of the incident itself. He

further admitted that he had not lodged any complaint before any

authority regarding his false implication by PW10 and that he did

not have any proof to show that Subhash was also a driver of

PW10.

18. DW2, by occupation a driver, deposed that though he

does not remember the exact date, it was between 7:00 AM and

8:00 AM when he was working as a helper in bus No. DL-1PA-

7989 belonging to PW10. On being questioned by the trial court as

to who was driving the bus on the date of accident, DW2 deposed

that one Subhash was driving the bus at the relevant time, though

the accused also used to drive the said bus.

19. Section 279 IPC postulates that the accused must have

been driving the vehicle on a public way in a manner so rash or

negligent as to endanger human life or likely to cause hurt or

injury to any other person. Section 304A IPC requires proof that

the death of a person was caused by a rash or negligent act of the

accused, and that there existed a direct and proximate nexus

between such act and the death in question, the act being the

immediate and operative cause of death without the intervention of

any independent or supervening factor. The prosecution is,

therefore, required to establish: (i) the factum of death; (ii) that the

accused was driving the offending vehicle; and (iii) that such

driving was rash or negligent and directly resulted in the death. In

the present case, the factum of death stands proved through the

testimony of PW1. Thus, the first ingredient stands satisfied. The

prosecution has also been able to establish that the accident was

caused by the driver of the bus bearing registration No. DL-1PA-

7989.

20. Regarding the crucial ingredient pertaining to identity

of the driver and proof of rashness or negligence, the prosecution

has primarily relied on the testimony ofPW5, Head Constable, the

sole eye witness. A perusal of his testimony shows that he stated

that the bus was being driven "not in a proper way" and "in a rash

and negligent manner". Beyond this general assertion, there is no

elaboration as to the speed of the vehicle, the traffic conditions, the

portion of the road through which the deceased pedestrian was

walking, whether she suddenly crossed the road, or the precise act

or omission attributable to the driver. The testimony is bereft of

particulars that would enable the Court to objectively assess

culpable rashness or negligence. Mere use of the expressions

"rash" and "negligent" is, in law, insufficient unless supported by

concrete facts demonstrating the manner of driving. Further, the

presence of PW5 at the spot does not find corroboration in the

testimony of PW2, who had accompanied the Investigating Officer

to the scene. PW7, the Investigating Officer, has admitted that

when he initially reached the spot, no eye witness met him, and

that PW5 surfaced subsequently. This aspect casts a shadow on the

reliability of the sole ocular witness.

21. The prosecution has also relied upon the statement of

the injured recorded by PW7, which formed the basis of

registration of the crime. This brings the Court to the second aspect

requiring consideration, namely, whether Exhibit PW7/A FIS of

the deceased can be treated as a dying declaration in the absence of

any further statement before her death. Under Section 32(1) of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a statement made by a person as to the

cause of her death, or as to any of the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in her death, is relevant when the cause

of that person's death comes into question. The law does not

mandate that a dying declaration must necessarily be recorded by a

Magistrate, or that it must be in any particular format. A statement

given by an injured person, if subsequently she succumbs to the

injuries and the statement relates to the cause of her death, can be

treated as a dying declaration(See Damodar Prasad v. State of

U.P., AIR 1975 SC757 and Lalita v. Vishwanath and Ors. ,

2025 SCC OnlineSC 370). In the present case, PW7 has deposed

that he recorded the FIS of the injured at the hospital after she was

declared fit for statement by the doctor. The said statement, which

formed the basis of registering the crime, refers to the bus coming

at high speed and hitting her. Since the maker of the statement

expired due to injuries sustained in the accident, the statement is

admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and can be

treated as a dying declaration.

22. However, Exhibit PW7/A merely states that the bus

was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and that it hit her.

It does not disclose the identity of the driver. It does not describe

any specific act such as swerving, overtaking, ignoring traffic

signals, or mounting the footpath. The statement attributes the

accident to the bus but does not name or identify the respondent as

the driver. Thus, while the statement proves that the deceased

sustained injuries in an accident involving the said bus and that the

injuries ultimately led to her death, it does not establish the identity

of the accused as the person driving the vehicle at the relevant

time. The prosecution has sought to bridge this gap through the

testimony of PW10, the owner of the bus, who stated that the bus

was being driven by the accused on the date of the accident.

According to PW10, the accused was not his salaried employee.

On the other hand, he had entrusted the bus to the accused based

on a agreement like a lease. However, he admitted that there are no

documents to support the said case. The defence has set up a

specific plea that one Subhash was driving the bus on that day, and

DW2 has supported the said version, which version has not been

discredited. Therefore, the doubts arise regarding the identity of

the person who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time.

23. It is settled that where, upon appreciation of the

evidence on record, two views are reasonably possible, one

pointing towards the guilt of the accused and the other towards his

innocence, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.

24. Upon a consideration of the entire materials on record,

this Court is of the view that the trial court has correctly

appreciated the materials on record. The prosecution has proved

the occurrence of an accident and the resultant death. It has also

proved involvement of the bus. However, it has failed to establish

beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was the driver at the

relevant time and that he was driving the vehicle in a manner as

rash or negligent as to attract criminal liability under Sections 279

and 304A IPC.

25. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of

acquittal dated 14.10.2013 passed by the trial court is affirmed.

Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand closed.

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA (Judge) FEBRUARY 23, 2026/RN