[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Meenakshi Gautam vs State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 15 April, 2026
Author: Swarana Kanta Sharma
Bench: Swarana Kanta Sharma
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 10.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 15.04.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 15.04.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 2325/2026 & & CRL.M.A. 9469/2026
MEENAKSHI GAUTAM .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sahay with Mr.
Archit Rajput, Advocates.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar,
APP for the State with Ms.
Puja Mann, Advocate and with
SI Chitra, P.S. Prashant Vihar.
Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, Ms.
Saumya Tiwari and Mr.
Bishnu Prasad Tiwari,
Advocates for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1. The present petition has been filed seeking setting aside of the
order dated 11.03.2026 [hereafter „impugned order‟] passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate-01, Mahila Court, Rohini District Court,
New Delhi [hereafter „Trial Court‟] in Criminal Case No.
12832/2025 titled 'State vs. Sanjay Gautam', to the extent that the
petitioner was not permitted to be recalled for further examination-in-
chief and was allowed to be recalled only for the purpose of cross-
examination.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case, as put forth by the
petitioner, are that the marriage between the petitioner and
respondent no. 2 was solemnized on 22.04.2004 in Delhi according to
Hindu rites and customs. Out of the said wedlock, a girl child „K‟
was born on 22.10.2005. It is alleged that on 26.12.2006 the
petitioner was severely beaten by respondent no. 2, following which
the police had reached the spot, rescued the petitioner and had taken
her to the hospital. On the same day, the petitioner had lodged a
complaint against respondent no. 2 and his family members, pursuant
to which FIR No. 312/2006, for commission of offence under
Sections 498A/323/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter
„IPC‟] was registered at Police Station Mahadevpura, Bangalore. It is
further stated that upon learning about the incident, the petitioner‟s
father, Sh. K.K. Gautam, and her brother Amit Gautam had reached
Bangalore on 27.12.2006. Their statements were recorded by the
police; however, according to the petitioner, no effective
investigation was carried out thereafter. Since the petitioner had no
place to stay in Bangalore and was apprehensive of residing with her
in-laws, she left Bangalore along with her minor daughter after
informing the police.
3. The petitioner thereafter filed a complaint on 13.03.2007
before the CAW Cell, Nanakpura, New Delhi, narrating the incidents
of cruelty and harassment allegedly committed by respondent no. 2
and his family members. However, the said complaint was closed on
21.03.2007 on the ground that an FIR regarding the same incident
had already been registered at P.S. Mahadevpura, Bangalore. It is
further the case of the petitioner that in January, 2008 the
Investigating Officer at Bangalore filed a chargesheet under Sections
498A/323/506 of the IPC against respondent no. 2 and his family
members without conducting proper investigation. According to the
petitioner, her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. was not
recorded and several incidents relating to cruelty, harassment and
dowry demands were omitted from the chargesheet.
4. The petitioner states that on 12.04.2012, her examination-in-
chief was recorded before the Court of the learned 10th Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore [hereafter „ACMM,
Bangalore‟]. It is alleged that the statement was recorded in Kannada
language, which the petitioner did not understand, and several
material facts and incidents were not properly recorded. Her
examination was thereafter conducted on 24.05.2014 also in
Kannada. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application under
Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter
„Cr.P.C.‟] on 13.08.2014 seeking further investigation with respect to
the incidents of cruelty which, according to her, had been omitted
from the chargesheet. The said application was dismissed by the
learned ACMM, Bangalore on 30.07.2015. Aggrieved by the same,
the petitioner had approached the High Court of Karnataka, which by
order dated 09.08.2016 set aside the order dated 30.07.2015 and
directed the Investigating Officer to collect additional evidence based
on the petitioner‟s statement and conduct further investigation.
Thereafter, respondent no. 2 and his family members challenged the
said order before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India by way of
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7968/2016. The Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, by order dated 28.01.2025, set aside the order of the
High Court of Karnataka; however, granted liberty to the petitioner to
move an application under Section 311 or Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
for redressal of her grievance, if any.
5. Pursuant thereto, an application under Section 311 of the
Cr.P.C. was filed by the learned Public Prosecutor before the learned
ACMM, Bangalore on 13.08.2025. In the meantime, respondent no. 2
also filed Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 628/2025 before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court seeking transfer of the case from Bangalore
to Delhi. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, by order dated 24.09.2025,
transferred the Criminal Case No. 22068/2008 from the learned
ACMM, Bangalore to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
North District, Rohini Courts, New Delhi, and directed that the trial
be concluded as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six
months.
6. After transfer of the case to Delhi, the learned Trial Court
adjudicated the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. on
11.03.2026 and partially allowed the same. However, the learned
Trial Court permitted the petitioner to be recalled only for the
purpose of cross-examination and not for further examination-in-
chief.
7. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this
Court by way of the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the
learned Trial Court has erred in not permitting the petitioner to
depose further in her examination-in-chief while deciding the
application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. It is contended that
several incidents of cruelty and domestic violence allegedly suffered
by the petitioner at the hands of respondent no. 2 were neither
properly investigated nor recorded in her earlier examination-in-chief
before the learned ACMM, Bangalore, and therefore it was necessary
to allow the petitioner to depose regarding those facts. It is further
submitted that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while granting liberty to
the petitioner, had not restricted such liberty only to cross-
examination, but had expressly permitted the filing of an application
under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. so that the petitioner could place on
record the incidents and circumstances which had not been recorded
earlier. According to the learned counsel, the learned Trial Court
failed to appreciate that such additional deposition was essential for
bringing on record the complete facts relating to the alleged acts of
cruelty and harassment.
9. The learned counsel further contends that the investigation in
the present case was not conducted properly and several incidents
relating to cruelty and dowry demands were not investigated or
incorporated in the chargesheet. It is argued that the petitioner had
already been prejudiced due to the incomplete investigation and the
limited recording of her testimony earlier, and therefore denial of an
opportunity to further depose in examination-in-chief would deprive
her of placing the true and complete facts before the Court. It is also
submitted that the petitioner, being the victim in the present case,
cannot be made to suffer on account of lapses on the part of the
prosecution or the manner in which the investigation was conducted.
The learned counsel also states that the application under Section 311
of the Cr.P.C. had itself been moved by the prosecution, and
therefore the learned Trial Court ought to have permitted the
petitioner to be recalled for further examination-in-chief instead of
restricting the recall only to the purpose of cross-examination.
10. Conversely, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2
argues that there is no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the
learned Trial Court. It is submitted that the examination-in-chief of
the petitioner had already been recorded at length on 12.04.2012 and
she was again examined on 24.03.2014, after which the matter was
adjourned for her cross-examination. However, thereafter the
petitioner did not appear before the learned ACMM, Bangalore for
the purpose of cross-examination and was eventually dropped as a
witness on 31.07.2025. It is contended that permitting the petitioner
to be recalled for further examination-in-chief at this stage would
cause serious prejudice to the accused, since her examination-in-chief
has already been recorded on two occasions. According to the learned
counsel, if the petitioner is to be recalled, it should only be for the
purpose of cross-examination, particularly when on 24.03.2014 the
matter had been specifically adjourned for cross-examination but the
petitioner failed to secure her presence before the Court.
11. It is further contended that the petitioner seeks to have her
further examination-in-chief recorded only with a view to level fresh
and false allegations against her father-in-law and brother-in-law,
which she had not stated in her examination-in-chief recorded earlier
in the years 2012 and 2014. The learned counsel further draws the
attention of this Court to the order dated 28.01.2025 passed by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and submits that the conduct of the petitioner
has also been commented upon in the said order, wherein certain
prima facie observations were made against her. It is also pointed out
that the trial in the present case is required to be concluded within a
short time, in terms of the directions issued by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court. It is therefore prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
12. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
petitioner as well as the respondent no. 2, and has pursued the
material placed on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
13. In the present case, some relevant dates and events to be taken
note of are that the examination-in-chief of the petitioner was
recorded before the learned ACMM, Bangalore on 12.04.2012 and
she was again examined on 24.03.2014, after which the matter was
adjourned for her cross-examination. In the meantime, the petitioner
filed an application under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. seeking
further investigation, which was dismissed by the learned Trial Court
on 30.07.2015. The said order was challenged before the High Court
of Karnataka, which vide order dated 09.08.2016 had directed the
Investigating Officer to collect additional evidence on the basis of the
petitioner‟s statement and to carry out further investigation.
However, the said order of the High Court of Karnataka was
challenged before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, which vide order
dated 28.01.2025 set aside the order of the High Court. However, the
petitioner did not thereafter appear before the learned ACMM,
Bangalore for the purpose of cross-examination and was eventually
dropped as a witness on 31.07.2025. The prosecution had thereafter
filed an application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. before the
learned ACMM, Bangalore on 13.08.2025, which eventually stood
transferred to the learned Trial Court in Delhi.
14. In above background, the impugned order dated 11.03.2026,
passed by the learned Trial Court, partially allowing the application
under Section 311 of Cr.P.C., reads as under:
"1. Vide this order, I shall decide the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C filed
on behalf of the prosecution to examine PW-1, CW-4 to CW-6.
2. Arguments on the same have been heard earlier.
Arguments advanced by the Ld. APP
3. It was argued by the Ld. APP that PW-1 is the complainant of the
present case and on account of her repeated non appearance she was
dropped from the array of witnesses on 31.07.2025. Further, on the
said day itself CW-4 to CW-6 were dropped as a report of the
witness not found was received. It was argued that the dropping of
PW-1 from the list of witnesses would have an effect that her
evidence which has already been recorded at length on two occasions
would not be read in evidence while she is the complainant of the
present case and she is the most crucial witness of the prosecution. It
was argued that CW-4 to CW-6 are also the witnesses whose
testimony is not of formal nature and they have been dropped on
account of the report not found, thus, the said witnesses be also
afforded an opportunity to appear and to depose as they are material
witnesses.
Arguments advanced by the Ld. Defence Counsel
4. It was argued on behalf of the defence that on 12.04.2012 the
complainant/PW-1 was examined in chief at length, subsequently on
24.03.2014 she was again examined in chief at length and the matter
was adjourned for the cross examination. Thereafter, the complainant
did not appear before the court concerned and she was dropped on
31.07.2025. Also, CW-4 to CW-6 were dropped on account of the
report of not being found. It was argued that recalling of PW-1
would cause grave prejudice to the accused as her examination in
chief has already been recorded at length on two occasions and her
recall maybe permitted only for the purpose of cross examination as
on 24.03.2014 when PW-l was examined in chief, the matter was
adjourned for the cross examination of witness but she did not secure
her appearance before the court and was ultimately dropped.
Arguments advanced by the Complainant
5. It was argued on behalf of the complainant that she be allowed to
depose and to conclude her testimony as she is the material witness
of the prosecution. Further, it was argued that CW-4 to CW-6 are
also material witnesses and their testimony is of importance, thus,
they be also recalled for examination.
6. Arguments advanced have been considered. The record has been
thoroughly perused.
7. Perusal of the record reflects that on 12.04.2012 and on
24.03.2014 PW-1 was examined in chief and the matter was posted
for the cross examination of PW-1. Subsequently, in July 2025, PW-
1 was dropped by the Ld. Transferor Court. Now, the present
application has been filed by the prosecution U/s 311 CrPC. The
essence of the provision is that evidence which appears to be
essential for the just decision of the case is to be duly considered.
Now, PW-1 is the complainant of the present case and the case of
prosecution is completely based upon the complainant who has been
dropped from the list of witnesses. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case titled as Mohan Lal Shamji Soni Vs. Union of India 1521 (SC)
1991 has held that any person can be summoned as witness or
recalled or reexamined at any stage of proceeding where essential.
Thus, drawing strength from the same, the court is of the view that
PW-l being the complainant of the present case is a material witness
whose testimony is important for the just decision of the case.
Accordingly, PW-1 is hereby recalled for her cross examination for
the NDOH. It is also clarified that she is recalled for the cross
examination only as after recording of the chief examination on
24.03.2014, the matter was adjourned for the cross examination of
the complainant but subsequently on account of her absence she was
dropped.
So far as the question of CW-4 to CW-6 is concerned, then it is a
matter of fact that the 'said witnesses have not stepped in the witness
box till date and the process issued was returned with the report „not
found‟. The said witnesses are not formal witnesses and are
witnesses of an independent in nature, thereby being the material
witnesses their testimony becomes crucial. Accordingly, one more
opportunity is afforded to the prosecution to examine CW-4 to CW-
6. Hence, with the said observations, the application filed U/s 311
CrPC is hereby allowed.
8. Now to come up for cross examination of PW-1 13.03.2026 at
01:00 PM. Simultaneously, let summons be issued to the CW-4 to
CW-6 for NDOH through all modes."
15. From a reading of the impugned order, following aspects can
be inferred:
(i) The application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. was
preferred by the prosecution;
(ii) The application was filed on the ground that the
complainant/PW-1, who is the most material witness in the
present case, had been dropped from the list of witnesses on
account of her repeated non-appearance, and that if she was
not recalled, the evidence already recorded by her would not
be read in evidence; it was also stated that CW-4 to CW-6
were material witnesses who had earlier been dropped on
account of the report of „not found‟, and therefore they also
deserved one more opportunity to be examined;
(iii) The complainant (petitioner herein) had argued that she
ought to be permitted to depose and complete her testimony as
she was the principal witness in the prosecution case, and that
CW-4 to CW-6 were also material witnesses whose
testimonies were important for proper adjudication of the case;
and
(iv) The learned Trial Court formed an opinion that the
testimony of the complainant was essential for a just decision
of the case and therefore she deserved to be recalled; however,
since her examination-in-chief had already been recorded
earlier and the matter had been adjourned only for cross-
examination in the year 2014, the learned Trial Court permitted
her recall only for the purpose of cross-examination.
16. The petitioner now contends that the learned Trial Court erred
in restricting her recall only for the purpose of cross-examination and
in not permitting her to further depose in examination-in-chief, since
the investigation in the present case had not been conducted properly
and several incidents of cruelty allegedly suffered by the petitioner
were neither investigated nor brought on record by the police, and
also could not be deposed about before the learned ACMM,
Bangalore earlier, and thus, in view of the liberty granted by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court to move an application under Section 311 of
the Cr.P.C., the petitioner ought to have been permitted to place the
complete facts before the Court by way of further examination-in-
chief.
17. The respondent no. 2, on the other hand, asserts that the
examination-in-chief of the petitioner had already been recorded at
length on two occasions and the matter had thereafter been adjourned
for her cross-examination, and further that neither in the FIR nor in
the examination-in-chief recorded earlier were any allegations
levelled against the father-in-law or brother-in-law of the petitioner,
and that the present attempt to seek further examination-in-chief is
only to introduce fresh and false allegations against them at a belated
stage, as also noted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
18. To appreciate the rival contentions, it shall be apposite to
carefully consider the observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
order dated 28.01.2025 (reported as Rampal Gautam v. State: 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1231), which are set out below for reference:
"3. The appellants herein are the father-in-law, mother-in-law,
brother-in-law, and sister-in-law respectively of respondent No. 2-
complainant. The marriage between the complainant and Sanjay
Gautam, son of the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 was solemnized on 22nd
April, 2004. The spouses started living together in Bangalore from
8th May, 2004. The complainant filed a complaint against her
husband Sanjay Gautam at the Police Station Mahadevpura,
Bangalore on 26th December, 2006 alleging inter alia that her
husband had gone somewhere on 24th December, 2006 without
informing her. He returned home on 26th December, 2006 and
started assaulting her by giving blows on face and causing her
injuries. In the morning, he also tried to beat their daughter and
demanded that the complainant should bring money from her
parents. He went away from the house after beating the complainant
and threatening her not to move out without his permission.
4. Based on this report, Crime No. 312 of 2006 came to be registered
at Police Station, Mahadevpura for the offences punishable under
Sections 498A, 323 and 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 6 and
investigation was commenced. The statement of various witnesses
including that of the complainant and her father Shri K.K. Gautam,
were recorded by the Investigation Officer. So far as the appellants
are concerned, neither in the FIR nor in the statements of the
complainant or her father K.K. Gautam, was a whisper made
regarding any act of harassment in connection with demand of dowry
or otherwise, as against them.
5. Be that as it may, complainant claims to have returned to Delhi
where she submitted a typed complaint to the In-charge of Crime
Against Women Cell, Nanakpura, New Delhi on 13th March, 2007,
wherein, allegations of physical and mental torture were levelled
against her husband and the appellants Rampal Gautam(father-in-
law), Rajini Gautam(mother-in-law), Smt. Vandana Sharma(sister-
in-law), and Sameer Gautam(brother-in-law), owing to dowry
demand. However, the police officers of the CAW Cell were
apprised of the fact that an FIR had already been registered for the
offences punishable under Section 498A, 323 and 506, IPC at Police
Station, Mahadevapura, Bengaluru and thus, no further action was
required to be taken on the complaint filed by the complainant. It
would be relevant to mention here that the complainant took no
further steps to prosecute the complaint lodged by her at the CAW
Cell.
6. In the meantime, the investigation was continued in Crime No.
312 of 2006, and a charge sheet came to be filed against the husband
Sanjay Gautam in the Court of 10th Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bangalore who, vide order dated 21st February, 2011,
framed charges against the said accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 498A, 323 and 506, IPC.
7. The prosecution evidence commenced, and the initial
examination-in-chief of the complainant was recorded on 12th April,
2012, wherein, she did not utter a single word regarding the role of
the accused appellants in harassing or humiliating her. Further,
examination-in-chief of the complainant was recorded on 24th
March, 2014 wherein, she reiterated her earlier allegations and added
that her mother-in-law(appellant No. 2) and sister-in-law(appellant
No. 4) had also been harassing her, imputing that if her husband
Sanjay had been married to someone else, they would have gotten
more dowry.
8. Even in this improved version recorded nearly eight years after the
lodging of the FIR, not a whisper of an allegation was made by the
complainant against Rampal Gautam(father-in-law) and Sameer
Gautam(brother-in-law). After the examination-in-chief of the
complainant was completed, she filed an application before the trial
Court, seeking a direction for further investigation of the case by
resorting to the procedure provided under Section 173(8) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973.
9. In the prayer clause (c) of this application, the complainant prayed
that a de novo investigation be carried out in respect of the averments
of cruelty inflicted upon her by the accused appellants with reference
to three documents i.e., the complaint dated 13th March, 2007 and
written statements filed by her, in the two divorce cases filed by her
husband bearing HMA No. 337/08/07 and HMA No. 402 of 2011,
before the Family Court, Delhi. Thus, primarily, the prayer of the
complainant in this application was for a de novo or reinvestigation.
10. Learned Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated
30th July, 2015 holding that there was absolutely no ground
whatsoever to direct further/fresh investigation sought for by the
complainant. The order passed by the Magistrate was assailed by the
complainant by filing a criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC
before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru which came to be
allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide order
dated 9th August, 2016 directing that further investigation be carried
out in the matter in terms of the application filed by the complainant.
The said order is assailed in this appeal by special leave filed at the
instance of the appellants herein.
11. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties at bar and have gone through the
material placed on record.
12. At the outset, we may record that a direction to conduct further
investigation even after filing of the chargesheet and commencement
of the trial is permissible in law as has been held by a catena of
judgments of this Court. Reference in this regard may be made to
Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat wherein, this Court
observed that the prime consideration for directing further
investigation is to arrive at the truth and to do real substantial justice.
The Court further observed that further investigation and
reinvestigation stand altogether on a different footing. Even de hors
any direction from the Court, it is open to the police to conduct a
proper investigation notwithstanding the fact that the Court has
already taken cognizance on the strength of a police report submitted
earlier. However, a caveat was added that before directing such
investigation, the Court or the concerned police officer has to apply
mind to the material available on record and arrive at a satisfaction
that investigation of such allegations is necessary for the just
decision of the case.
13. On going through the material placed on record, we find that in
the present case, the High Court grossly erred and transgressed its
jurisdiction, while directing fresh investigation into the matter,
totally ignoring the fact that the application filed under section
173(8) CrPC was highly belated. At the cost of repetition, it is to be
noted that the complainant had already testified at the pending trial
against her husband Sanjay Gautam and in the deposition made on
12 th April, 2012, no allegation whatsoever has been levelled against
the appellants. Even in the deferred examination-in-chief recorded on
24th March, 2014, absolutely vague allegations were levelled against
appellant No. 2.
14. Undeniably, the complainant had the liberty to set out her entire
case/grievances in her examination-in-chief and make a prayer to the
trial Court that the remaining family members who had been left out,
should also be proceeded against by summoning them under Section
319 CrPC. If, at all, certain facts were left out from being narrated in
the deposition of the complainant, an application under Section
311CrPC could have been filed for recalling her and for conducting
the further examination. In any event, there was no justification
whatsoever for the High Court to have directed further investigation
into the case at such a belated stage and that too, for the purpose of
giving a handle to the complainant to improve upon her initial
version so as to implicate her father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-
law and brother-in-law, who were admittedly living separately
whereas, the spouses, i.e., the complainant and her husband were
residing together at Bangalore, where the alleged acts of cruelty took
place.
15. As an upshot of the above discussion, we are of the firm view
that the impugned order dated 9thAugust, 2016 passed by the High
Court is unsustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed
and set aside.
16. The complainant is left at liberty to take recourse of the suitable
remedy for ventilating her grievances which would include filing of
an application under Section 311 CrPC and/or an application under
Section 319 CrPC, as may be desired.
17. Resultantly, the impugned order is quashed and the appeal is
allowed."
19. It is important to note that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
setting aside the order of the High Court of Karnataka directing
further investigation in the case, has made several prima facie
observations regarding the conduct of the complainant, who is the
petitioner before this Court.
20. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, after examining the record of the
case, specifically noted that in the FIR as well as in the statements
recorded during investigation, including the statement of the
complainant and that of her father, no allegation had been levelled
against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-
law. It was further observed that when the complainant had entered
the witness box during trial, her examination-in-chief recorded on
12.04.2012 did not contain even a single allegation regarding
harassment by the in-laws. It was only in the subsequent
examination-in-chief recorded on 24.03.2014 that certain allegations
were made against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law. Even these
allegations were described by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as „vague‟.
Significantly, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court noted that even in this
improved version, not a single allegation had been made against the
father-in-law and brother-in-law.
21. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court also took note of the fact that
after returning to Delhi, the complainant had submitted a typed
complaint dated 13.03.2007 before the CAW Cell, Nanakpura, New
Delhi, wherein allegations of physical and mental cruelty were
levelled not only against her husband (respondent no. 2 herein) but
also against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and
brother-in-law in relation to dowry demands. However, admittedly,
no further action was taken on the said complaint since an FIR
regarding the same incident had already been registered at Police
Station Mahadevpura, Bangalore. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court also
observed that the complainant had taken no further steps to pursue
the complaint lodged before the CAW Cell.
22. Another significant aspect noted by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court was that the application under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.,
seeking further investigation, had been filed at a very belated stage
after commencement of the trial. The Supreme Court specifically
held that the High Court had erred in directing further investigation in
such circumstances and observed that such a direction would
effectively give a handle to the complainant to improve upon her
initial version so as to implicate the other members of the family; and
that the in-laws were admittedly residing separately, whereas the
complainant and her husband were living together in Bangalore
where the alleged acts of cruelty had taken place. These observations
formed part of the reasoning of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
setting aside the order of the High Court directing further
investigation in the case.
23. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that she should be
permitted to be recalled for recording of further examination-in-chief
has to be adjudged in the above-noted backdrop.
24. This Court is of the view that permitting further examination-
in-chief at this stage would effectively mean reopening testimony that
was recorded more than a decade earlier, i.e., in the years 2012 and
2014. Such reopening of evidence, particularly when the petitioner
had already entered the witness box and her examination-in-chief had
been recorded on two occasions, cannot ordinarily be permitted
unless compelling circumstances are shown.
25. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that her
earlier deposition had been recorded in Kannada and that she was
unable to understand the proceedings is also not convincing. The
record reflects that the petitioner had appeared before the Court and
had deposed on two separate occasions. At no point during the
intervening years did she challenge the correctness of the deposition
recorded by the learned ACMM, Bangalore on the ground that the
language of the proceedings had caused any prejudice to her. The
issue is being raised only at this belated stage, after the passage of
several years.
26. It is also relevant to note that while the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court set aside the order directing further investigation, it granted
liberty to the complainant to take recourse to appropriate remedies,
including filing an application under Section 311 or Section 319 of
the Cr.P.C., if so advised. However, such liberty cannot be construed
as a direction that further examination-in-chief must necessarily be
permitted. Any application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is
required to be considered by the Court in accordance with the well-
settled parameters governing the exercise of powers under the said
provision. Similarly, reliance placed by the petitioner on the
observations contained in paragraph 14 of the order of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, wherein it was noted that - if certain facts were left
out from being narrated in the deposition of the complainant an
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. could have been filed for
recalling her for further examination - cannot be read to mean that
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had directed that such an application
should necessarily be allowed. In this Court‟s opinion, the said
observation only highlights that the complainant had the option of
invoking the remedy under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. at the appropriate
stage, instead of seeking a direction for fresh investigation, which she
did not opt for.
27. Another relevant circumstance which cannot be ignored is that
the complainant herself did not avail the liberty of filing an
application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. in terms of the order of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court. In fact, the record reveals that the
complainant did not appear before the concerned Court for the
purpose of her cross-examination and she eventually had to be
dropped as a witness on 31.07.2025. It was only thereafter that the
prosecution (not the petitioner) moved the application under Section
311 of the Cr.P.C. seeking recall of the petitioner, primarily because
if the main witness i.e. petitioner/complainant was dropped, the
testimony already recorded would not have been read in evidence.
28. Thus, the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. was not
filed by the petitioner in pursuance of the liberty granted by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, but was moved by the prosecution owing to
the fact that the complainant had not appeared for cross-examination.
In these circumstances, the learned Trial Court has adopted a
balanced approach by permitting the complainant to be recalled for
the purpose of cross-examination, which was the stage at which the
matter had remained pending earlier.
29. In the opinion of this Court, the learned Trial Court has
exercised its discretion under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. in a
judicious manner. By permitting recall of the complainant for cross-
examination, the learned Trial Court has ensured that the testimony
already recorded does not go out of consideration, while at the same
time safeguarding the rights of the accused. On the other hand,
permitting a fresh or further examination-in-chief at this stage would
amount to reopening the prosecution case and allowing the petitioner
to introduce allegations which were not part of the FIR or earlier
testimony recorded on two occasions in the past.
30. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no infirmity
or illegality in the impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the
learned Trial Court.
31. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Pending
application, if any, also stands disposed of.
32. Nothing contained in this order shall affect the merits of the
case during the trial.
33. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
APRIL 15, 2026/zp
T.D.
