[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Mayank Jain Proprietor Of Mahaveer ... vs Atulya Discs Pvt Ltd & Ors on 13 April, 2026
Author: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
Bench: V. Kameswar Rao, Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
$~22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : 13.04.2026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 CM APPL. 23776/2026 CM APPL.
23777/2026 CM APPL. 23778/2026 CM APPL. 23779/2026
CM APPL. 23780/2026
MAYANK JAIN PROPRIETOR OF MAHAVEER UDYOG
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. R. P. Yadav, Mr. Riju Mani
Talukdar and Mr. Divyanshu Yadav,
Advs.
versus
ATULYA DISCS PVT LTD & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J. (ORAL)
1. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 09.01.2026
['impugned order'] passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in I.A.
11309/2025 in CS (Comm) No. 412/2025 titled Mayank Jain, Proprietor
of Mahaveer Udyog v. M/s Atulya Discs Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
2. Appellant is a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of
manufacturing and trading of agricultural implements more specifically
harrows disc. It adopted the mark TIGER GOLD BRAND
['label'] ['Appellant's mark'] and has been using it for
its goods since 06.05.2010.
2.1. Appellant filed an application for registration of TIGER GOLD
BRAND (label) in Class 7 on 01.06.2022, which was registered by the
Registrar of Trademarks and the registration certificate was issued on
02.02.2023. In its application, the Appellant claimed user since 06.05.2010,
which was accepted.
3. Respondent No. 1 was incorporated on 26.11.2020. It applied for
registration of its mark TIGER PREMIUM BRAND
(Label) on 09.03.2022 ['impugned mark'], on a proposed to be used basis
which is currently pending registration.
4. Appellant issued a cease-and-desist notice dated 08.10.2024 to the
Respondents which was replied vide notice dated 28.10.2024 whereby the
Respondent denied any similarity between the two labels and refrained from
ceasing the use of the same.
5. In these facts, Appellant filed the suit on 16.04.2025 and prayed for
an interim injunction. The Appellant contends that the Appellant is the prior
user of its mark since 06.06.2010 and that there is overall similarity of the
marks between Appellant's mark and Respondent's impugned mark and
therefore raised a plea of passing of.
6. The ld. Single Judge has dismissed the injunction application held in
the impugned order as under: -
"7. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have contended that 'TIGER' cannot be
monopolized by the Plaintiff as 'TIGER' is common to the trade and
generic word. It is contended by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 that the
Mark 'TIGER' is commonly used for goods falling under Class 7
and the online record of the Trade Marks Office reflects that the
word 'TIGER' in standalone has no Trade Mark value and is not
capable of distinguishing the goods and services. The Plaintiff has
not been able to establish ownership over the Mark 'TIGER' in
absence of the registration of Word Mark 'TIGER' or any 'TIGER'
formative Marks, which is relevant for examining the deceptive
similarity of the Impugned Mark.
8. The Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' are generic in nature and
incapable of being registered as a Trade Mark. The Plaintiff does
not have exclusive right to use the Word Marks, 'TIGER' and
'BRAND'. There is a widespread use of the Mark 'TIGER' for
various goods and services across India. Hence, 'TIGER' is publici
juris and common to trade and is not uniquely identifiable with a
particular goods or services of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has also
not produced any material to show that the Mark 'TIGER' has
acquired secondary meaning. The Mark 'TIGER' does not have an
exclusive character and, therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to
claim exclusive right over the same.
Deceptive Similarity of the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned
Mark
9. The Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark are not deceptively
similar as the Impugned Mark has to be considered as a whole. The
Impugned Mark considered as a whole is wholly dissimilar to the
Plaintiff's Mark, the Impugned Mark is visually different to the
Plaintiff's Mark, even the 'TIGER' device in the rival Marks are
different. The colour scheme of the Impugned Mark is also
different from the colour scheme of the Plaintiff's Mark and the
Impugned Mark is not deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Mark.
Accordingly, considering the Impugned Mark as a whole there is no
deceptive similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned
Mark.
10. As 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' are found to be generic and common
to the trade, the Plaintiff cannot claim exclusive ownership over the
part of the Impugned Mark containing the Marks 'TIGER' and
'BRAND' as a part of them. As per Section 17 of the Act when a
Trade Mark consists of several matters, its registration shall confer
on the proprietor exclusive right to use of the Trade Mark taken as a
whole. Considering that the Appellant has no exclusive right over
the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND', there is no deceptive similarity
between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark. It is well
settled that the registration of Device Marks does not automatically
grant the exclusive right in respect of the word mentioned in the
Device Marks. Further, the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India
(supra) held that the rival marks must be compared as a whole, and
not by dissecting them into individual components, as consumers
perceive trademarks based on their overall impression, including
appearance, structure, and commercial impression.
11. The registration of the Device Mark is to be considered as a
whole and while determining the deceptive similarity with another
Trade Mark, both the Marks have to be examined as a whole by
applying 'anti-dissection rule' rather than breaking the Marks into
their component parts for comparison. To determine whether there
is any deceptive similarity between the two Marks, it is imperative
to decide if the similarity is likely to cause any confusion or
deceive. The test of deceptive similarity as laid down in Kaviraj
Pandit (supra) has not been satisfied in the present case. Even from
eyes of the consumers of the goods of the Plaintiff and Defendant
Nos. 1 to 3, i.e., the farmers, the Marks are visually different and
would not cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and
therefore the decision in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. (supra) will not
help the case of the Plaintiff.
12. In the present case, the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark
if considered as a whole cannot be held to be deceptively similar
and are able to be distinguished by the use of word 'PREMIUM'. In
addition, the descriptive nature of the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND'
commonly used in the hospitality industry shows that there is no
deceptive similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned
Mark. As the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark are not
deceptively similar the judgments in S. Syed Mohideen (supra) and
Laxmikant V. Patel (supra) will not help the case of the Plaintiff.
13. The rival Marks are not identical/deceptively similar, the
Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark comprises of generic
words, which cannot be monopolised by any party. Further, the
Plaintiff has not been able to make a case of misrepresentation by
the Defendant nor has it been able to prove damages incurred by
the Plaintiff due to the adoption of the Impugned Mark by the
Defendant.
14. Further, the Plaintiff has not been able to establish goodwill and
reputation and, therefore, prima facie, a case of passing off has not
been made out by the Plaintiff. There is no likelihood of confusion
amongst the class of consumers, which is likely to. harm the
reputation of the, Plaintiff and dilute the Plaintiff's Mark.
CONCLUSION
15. Having considered the averments in the pleadings and the
submissions made by the Parties, the Plaintiff has no exclusive right
over the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' as the same are generic in
nature and common to the trade.
16. Hence, the use of the Impugned Mark,
does not amount to infringement of Copyright in or passing off of
the Plaintiff's Mark, as there is no deceptive
similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark.
Accordingly, no case is made out for grant of interim injunction as
prayed for in this Application.
17. Accordingly, the present Application is dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. The Appellant has assailed the impugned order on the following
grounds: -
"I. Appellant is not claiming exclusive right over TIGER and
BRAND words per se and has nowhere pleaded the same in the
suit/ application.
II. The Act does not expressly place an embargo on monopoly in
respect of generic expressions.
III. TIGER is not publici juris and not common to trade and citing
of various marks existing in the Register of Trade Marks or existing
outside the Register is not sufficient to establish that Appellant's
registered trade mark is common to the trade within the meaning of
this Act.
IV. GOLD and PREMIUM suggest quality of goods associated
with the mark and suggest origin from same source and Extension
of Appellant's brand. Any prudent customer with average
intelligence would believe that the TIGER PREMIUM BRAND is
an extension of TIGER GOLD BRAND which is in market prior to
PREMIUM brand.
V. Respondent's adoption of impugned mark is dishonest,
deliberate, intentional and in bad faith which is evident from the
fact that the Respondent tried to show that they have been using the
mark since March 2021 only based on Udyam Registration date
without any documents.
VI. Appellant is the prior user of the TIGER GOLD BRAND
trademark since 06.06.2010 whereas the Respondent, which was
incorporated in October 2020 started using the mark in October
2024.
VII. Main feature of both the marks/logos are, TIGER GOLD
BRAND in the case of the Appellant and TIGER PREMIUM
BRAND in the case of the Respondent. The visual dissimilarity
between the logos cannot come to the aid of the Respondent.
VIII. TIGER does not describe the nature of the business or goods
of the Appellant and has no direct relation to their trademark and
TIGER GOLD BRAND has been coined by the Appellant and has
built its reputation over a period of 14.5 years.
IX. Infringement is not be assessed by placing the rival marks side-
by side whereas Ld. Single Judge has bifurcated the Appellant's
mark and compared it with the impugned mark.
X. Overall similarity of the marks of the Appellant and the
Respondent requires an assessment from the perspective of an
average consumer with imperfect recollection. The average
consumer in the present case are Farmers/villagers."
7.1. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the Respondent's
impugned mark TIGER PREMIUM BRAND suggests that it is the
extension of the Appellant's mark TIGER GOLD BRAND.
7.2. He states that the expression GOLD and PREMIUM suggest quality
of goods associated with the mark and origin from the same source.
7.3. He states that the word TIGER has nothing to do with the goods such
as agricultural implements and in this sense the use of the word TIGER by
the Appellant for the goods is unique thereby distinguishing Appellant's
goods from the goods of the others.
7.4. He states that even though there are other traders who are using the
TIGER mark in Class 7, however Appellant's mark has attained
distinctiveness over the period of use since May, 2010.
7.5. He states that a perusal of the register maintained by the Trademark
Registry shows that there is only one other registered mark in Class 7 in
respect of same goods with the word TIGER, however the said single
registration is not sufficient to show that the word TIGER is common to
trade.
7.6. He states therefore the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that
TIGER mark is common to the trade in publici juris and common to trade is
incorrect.
7.7. He reiterates that the Appellant is not claiming any exclusivity in the
words TIGER or BRAND.
7.8. He states, however, on a perusal of whole of the mark TIGER
PREMIUM BRAND with TIGER GOLD BRAND, he submits there is
phonetic similarity.
7.9. He further states that since the Appellant's mark and the impugned
mark are being applied to the same goods, the chances of confusion are
higher as the customer who in this case is a farmer(s) is likely to ask for the
goods by the name TIGER and given the imperfect recollection of a
consumer, he may not immediately recognise the distinction between the
labels.
7.10. He admits that the Appellant does not have a wordmark registration
for TIGER GOLD BRAND or a separate registration for its mark TIGER or
BRAND respectively.
7.11. He relies upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Chacha Saree
Bazar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Chacha Cloth House1 to contend that, in similar
facts, the Court held that the word 'CHACHA' though publici juris was not
common to the trade and therefore the plaintiff therein was entitled to raise a
plea of passing off when the defendant therein had adopted a similar mark.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the
record.
9. The scope of interference, while hearing appeal against the order
passed by a Commercial Court, in Intellectual Property matters, under Order
XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC stands settled by the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.2 The relevant paragraph
reads as under: -
"13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate
bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a
misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals
before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to
substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a
discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the
ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the
trademark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall
deal with these two separately.
14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is
said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess
the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial
court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate
court would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After
referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
2026: DHC:1296-DB
1990 Supp SCC 727
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph3:
"... These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v.
Jhanaton4 '...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an
order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well
established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the
application of well settled principles in an individual case'.
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this
principle. ...."
[Emphasis supplied]
10. In its recent decision in Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. Karanveer
Singh Chhabra5, the Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principles
at paragraph 19.8 which reads as under: -
"19.8. In Wander Ltd., this Court elaborated the principles
governing the grant or refusal of interim injunctions in trademark
infringement and passing off actions. It was underscored that
appellate courts ought to be circumspect in interfering with the
discretionary orders of lower courts in such matters. Interference is
warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled legal principles.
[Emphasis supplied]
11. Thus, as summarized by the coordinate Bench in Sanjay Gupta and
Vinay Gupta v. Vineet Jain, Proprietor of Vijaypal Vineet Kumar and
Co.6 an appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the Commercial
Court, the Appellate Court would not substitute its subjective view for the
view adopted by the Commercial Court. It is only if the Commercial Court
errs on principle that the Court would interfere; otherwise, factual and
AIR 1960 SC 1156
1942 AC 130
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701
2026:DHC: 1248-DB
discretionary evidence and findings of the Commercial Court are ordinarily
immune from interference in an appeal.
12. We have therefore examined the Appellant's submissions keeping
these principles in mind.
13. For reference, a comparative table of the Appellant's label mark and
the impugned label mark is reproduced hereunder: -
14. Learned Single Judge has in the impugned order7 on comparison of
the two labels as a whole, returned a categorical finding that there is no
deceptive similarity in the Appellant's label mark and the impugned label
mark. We find no ground for interfering in the view taken by the learned
Single Judge, as it is a plausible view, even if there could be a possible
alternate view.
15. The Appellant has challenged this finding of the learned Single Judge
on the plea that even when compared as a whole the impugned mark
'TIGER PREMIUM BRAND' is deceptively similar to the registered mark
'TIGER GOLD BRAND' and likely to cause confusion amongst the
consumers. The Appellant has sought to illustrate this confusion at Ground
at paragraph nos. 9 to 13
L of the appeal by alleging that customers refer to its product by the brand
name TIGER.
The fallacy in this submission of the Appellant is apparent. In its
illustration, the Appellant is emphasizing on the recall value of its trademark
by the customer as TIGER (wordmark) and not as TIGER PREMIUM
BRAND (label). The substance of the Appellant's argument is that the word
TIGER is exclusively associated with its goods and therefore any reference
to TIGER would be construed as a reference to Appellant's goods. However,
in contradiction the Appellant at Ground A has specifically pleaded that it is
not claiming any exclusive right over the word TIGER. It also concedes that
it has no registration for the word mark TIGER or BRAND or 'TIGER
GOLD BRAND'.
16. If this Court was to accept the aforesaid submissions on deceptive
similarity of the Appellant, we would have to necessarily hold that, the
Appellant herein has exclusivity in the wordmark 'TIGER' 'BRAND' for
these agricultural goods, which would be contrary to the admission of the
Appellant that it does not have any exclusive right to the words 'TIGER'
'BRAND'.
17. The Appellant is therefore raising contradictory pleas, inasmuch as
while conceding that it has no exclusive rights to the word 'TIGER' or
'BRAND', it is still urging the test of customer recall based on the phonetic
use of the word 'TIGER' 'BRAND'.
18. In view of the admitted fact that the Appellant does not have any
independent wordmark registration for the marks TIGER GOLD BRAND or
TIGER or BRAND, for the claim of infringement the comparison has to be
undertaken by the Court between the labels TIGER GOLD BRAND and
TIGER PREMIUM BRAND.
19. Learned Single Judge (at paragraph 9) has given a detailed reasons for
holding that the competing labels are distinct and visually dissimilar.
The Appellant in this appeal has also conceded at para VII8 that these
logos are visually dissimilar.
Therefore, the challenge to the finding of the learned Single Judge
holding that the two labels are not deceptively similar is not merited.
20. The Appellant has relied upon the judgment of Chacha Saree Bazar
Pvt. Ltd. (supra). However, in the facts of the said case, the plaintiff had
wordmark registration for its trademark 'Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.' It
also has registration for other formative marks wherein 'Chacha' was a
dominant mark. These facts were duly considered by the Division Bench
while granting injunction qua the impugned logo mark of the defendant
therein. However, in the facts of this case, there is no wordmark registration
in favour of the Appellant herein.
21. In the aforesaid judgment, the Division Bench also concluded that the
term 'Chacha' was not generic for the goods and services in question. In the
facts of this case, however, the learned Single Judge has opined that the
word 'TIGER' is commonly used for goods falling in relevant class 7 and
has concluded that the said word is publici juris and not uniquely
identifiable to the goods and services of the Appellant herein. The Appellant
in Ground F of the appeal has admitted that there are other traders who are
using the mark 'TIGER' in class 7, it is however contended that the said
mark has attained distinctiveness qua Appellant's goods, which has been
rejected by the learned Single Judge.
22. In this context, the learned Single Judge has expressly opined that the
Appellant/plaintiff has been unable to establish any misrepresentation, any
goodwill or reputation so as to establish passing off.
23. We have perused the plaint and have examined the advertisements
expenses, quoted in the plaint, which is as under: -
Financial Year Expenses in INR
01-Apr-10 to 31-Mar-11 43,200
01-Apr-11 to 31-Mar-12 57,500
01-Apr-12 to 31-Mar-13 1,25,850
01-Apr-13 to 31-Mar-14 38,500
01-Apr-14 to 31-Mar-15 68,500
01-Apr-15 to 31-Mar-16 4,200
01-Apr-16 to 31-Mar-17 1,97,590
01-Apr-17 to 31-Mar-18 1,73,740
01-Apr-18 to 31-Mar-19 1,17,783
01-Apr-19 to 31-Mar-20 3,30,741
01-Apr-20 to 31-Mar-21 1,17,492
01-Apr-21 to 31-Mar-22 1,10,819
01-Apr-22 to 31-Mar-23 2,27,244
01-Apr-23 to 31-Mar-24 1,07,616
01-Apr-24 to 28-Feb-25 4,20,924
Total 21,41,699
24. The Respondent was incorporated in the year 2020 and adopted this
mark in 2022. As is apparent from the above table, there is no substantial
Page 9 of the synopsis
expenditure incurred by the Appellant on advertisements of its products
bearing the Appellant's mark.
25. We have also examined the sales figures of the Appellant's products
bearing the Appellant's mark, provided in the plaint, at paragraph 18 which
reads as under: -
Financial Year Expenses in INR
01-Apr-10 to 31-Mar-11 52,85,106
01-Apr-11 to 31-Mar-12 93,96,876
01-Apr-12 to 31-Mar-13 99,45,171
01-Apr-13 to 31-Mar-14 1,12,01,977
01-Apr-14 to 31-Mar-15 14,28,180
01-Apr-15 to 31-Mar-16 29,29,780
01-Apr-16 to 31-Mar-17 20,46,32
01-Apr-17 to 31-Mar-18 53,94,468
01-Apr-18 to 31-Mar-19 33,36,160
01-Apr-19 to 31-Mar-20 70,84,405
01-Apr-20 to 31-Mar-21 24,64,599
01-Apr-21 to 31-Mar-22 2,34,841
01-Apr-22 to 31-Mar-23 1,06,38,229
01-Apr-23 to 31-Mar-24 2,28,50,978
01-Apr-24 to 31-Feb-25 1,97,27,199
Total 11,39,64,295
26. Having perused these figures, as well as considering the fact that the
Respondent adopted this mark in 2022 (when it applied for registration), it is
evident that there were no substantial sales recorded by the Respondent in
the said period and to this extent the findings of the learned Single Judge
also do not require any interference.
27. The advertisement expenditure and the sales revenue fail to show that
that the Appellant's mark has acquired such goodwill amongst its consumers
so as to associate the words 'TIGER' or 'TIGER BRAND' or TIGER
GOLD BRAND exclusively with the Appellant's goods, leading to
misrepresentation amongst the consumers and consequent damages to the
Appellant. We concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that
Appellant has failed to show that TIGER is associated exclusively with its
goods. In these facts, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the
learned Single Judge the mark TIGER has not attained distinctiveness qua
the goods of the Appellant.
28. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has applied the
correct principles and there is no error whatsoever in the findings holding
that no case of passing off is made out, which led to the dismissal of the
injunction application.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, the present appeal is dismissed.
30. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
APRIL 13, 2026/mt/IB
