[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Manpar Icon Technologies vs Assistant Commissioner, Cgst Division ... on 13 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 13th March, 2026
Pronounced on: 13th April, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 1993/2026 & CM APPL. 9688/2026
MANPAR ICON TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH ITS PARTNER, SH. PARAG GARG,
HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT 1st FLOOR,
8/32, KIRTI NAGAR INDUSTRIAL AREA,
NEW DELHI-110015
....PETITIONER
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Mr. A.K.
Seth and Ms. Palak Mathur,
Advocates.
versus
1. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
CGST DIVISION KIRTI NAGAR, CGST DELHI
WEST COMMISSIONERATE,
1ST FLOOR, GST BHAWAN, NANGAL RAYA, JANAKPURI,
NEW DELHI - 110046
.....RESPONDENT NO.1
2. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, (A.E. - II),
CGST DELHI-WEST COMMISSIONERATE, 1ST FLOOR,
GST BHAWAN, NANGAL RAYA COMPLEX, NEAR POST
OFFICE, D-BLOCK,
JANAKPURI, NEW DELHI - 110046
.....RESPONDENT NO.2
Through: Ms. Monica Benjamin SSC with
Ms. Nancy Jain, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the show cause
notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 20171
dated 28.06.2025, the corrigendum thereto dated 22.12.2025 and the
order in original dated 29.12.2025, whereby a demand of ₹42,66,108/-
was confirmed.
Brief facts
2. The present proceedings find their genesis in an Alert Notice dated
09.06.2025 received from the Additional Commissioner (AE), CGST
Delhi South Commissionerate regarding fraudulent availment and
passing on ITC by a non-existent firm viz. M/S Advanta Sales. The
investigation pursuant to the said Alert Notice led to the issuance of the
show cause notice dated 28.06.2025 to the petitioner.
3. The show cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017
pertained to allegations of wrongful utilization of excess ITC from a non-
existent firm viz. M/S Advanta Sales, solely for the financial year 2018-
2019 amounting to ₹42,66,108/-.
4. In response thereto, the petitioner filed a reply before the proper
officer dated 10.11.2025 contending inter-alia that for the financial year
2018-2019, the petitioner had not availed any service of manpower
supply, and that there arose no question of availment of excess or
"CGST Act" hereinafter
wrongful ITC. Furthermore, in the personal hearing dated 19.11.2025,
the petitioner reiterated that they had only received supplies from M/S
Advanta Sales for the financial year 2019-2020, and not for the financial
year 2018-2019. Consequently, respondent no. 1 issued the impugned
corrigendum dated 22.12.2025 stating that the assessment period in the
impugned show cause notice may be read as 2018-2019 and 2019-2020.
5. Aggrieved by the corrigendum, the petitioner, through counsel,
appeared for the personal hearing dated 26.12.2025 and submitted their
additional reply vide email, contending that the impugned corrigendum is
ex-facie erroneous as the same has been issued after the commencement
of the adjudication process, and is time-barred.
6. Following the completion of pleadings, respondent no. 1 passed
the impugned order dated 29.12.2025 inter-alia confirming the demand
of ₹42,66,108/- and noted that the impugned corrigendum merely
rectified the error in mentioning the relevant financial years.
Furthermore, on merits, the impugned order notes that the supplier, M/S
Advanta Sales was found to be non-existent at the principal place of
business, and pushed goods-less invoices to pass off fraudulently availed
ITC.
Submissions of the petitioner
7. Mr. Chinmaya Seth, learned counsel for the petitioner, has assailed
the impugned order by challenging, inter-alia the corrigendum dated
22.12.2025 which allegedly enlarged the scope of the show cause notice
dated 28.06.2025 beyond permissible limits. Mr. Seth contends that the
respondent no. 1, in an underhanded manner, has traversed beyond the
legally permissible limits of rectification in a corrigendum, and has
sought to initiate fresh proceedings, under the guise of the corrigendum,
for the financial year of 2019-2020. That being so, Mr. Seth, contends
that the scope of rectification under Section 161 of the CGST Act, 2017
is narrow and is constrained to errors apparent on the face of the record.
8. Mr. Seth further contends that the legislative intent behind Section
161 of the CGST Act, 2017 is to rectify self-evident, arithmetic and
clerical errors which do not require any elaborate reasoning or
adjudication.
9. In the present case however, he submits that the inclusion of
financial year 2019-2020 creates a fresh liability on the assessee, as no
transaction had taken place between the petitioner and the supplier, M/S
Advanta Sales during Financial Year 2018-2019. Thus, the inclusion of
financial year 2019-2020 within the scope of the show cause notice is
tantamount to issuance of a fresh show cause notice for that year.
10. Mr. Seth, in order to buttress his submissions, places reliance on
the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Infeon
Technologies AG v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax & Anr.
bearing WP(C) No. 49458/2018, wherein, the Hon'ble court quashed the
corrigendum which sought to reopen assessment of financial years 2010-
2011 under the guise of correcting a procedural irregularity.
11. Thereafter, Mr. Seth has also vehemently contended that the
issuance of the corrigendum also shows the mala-fide intention of
respondent no. 1 to circumvent the statutory limitation for issuance of
show cause notice for the financial year 2019-2020. It has been
contended that the corrigendum dated 22.12.2025, seeking to include
financial years 2019-2020 within the fold of the show cause notice dated
28.06.2025 is hopelessly time barred as the same expired on 30.09.2025.
12. Once no valid and legal show cause notice had been served to the
petitioner for financial year 2019-2020, the proper officer becomes
functus officio and is thus divested of any jurisdiction to belatedly issue
the same. In view thereof, respondent no. 1 cannot belatedly add another
financial year, after the expiry of limitation on 30.09.2025 to circumvent
the limitation, and resurrect a dead cause of action.
13. Lastly, it has also been contended that the impugned corrigendum
seeks to amend the show cause notice, but does not amend the DRC-01,
thereby vitiating the entire proceedings. DRC-01 forms an integral part
of the statutory process as it contains a summary of the demand raised.
Any amendment to the demand, or the financial years therein, without
any proper amendment to the summary for the demand, whittles away at
the legality of the process. In order to substantiate his contentions
regarding the importance of the foundation of the show cause notice,
reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore v. Brindavan Beverages
(P) Ltd2.
2007 (213) E.L.T 487 (SC)
Submissions of the Respondent
14. Per contra, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Senior Standing Counsel for
the respondent, has raised a preliminary challenge to the maintainability
of the present writ petition contending that the petitioner has not
exhausted all his alternate remedy, in the form of an appeal under section
107 of the CGST Act, 2017. Drawing support from the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial
Steel Ltd. 3 , learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the
petitioner has not proven that their case falls in any of the following four
categories meriting exercise of Article 226, notwithstanding the existence
of alternative remedies - (i) a breach of fundamental rights, (ii) a
violation of principle of natural justice, (iii) an excess of jurisdiction or
(iv) a challenge to the vires of a statute or delegated legislation.
15. On merits, Ms. Benjamin has contended that the inclusion of
financial year 2019-2020 does not traverse the legally permissible limits
of rectification under Section 161 CGST Act, 2017, as the corrigendum
does not include any new transactions or fresh tax liability, and that the
intent in issuing the corrigendum was solely to correct the tax period
under adjudication.
16. Ms. Benjamin has also contended that the impugned corrigendum
cannot be equated to a fresh show cause notice since the alleged
transaction was already being investigated under the impugned show
(2022) 16 SCC 447
cause notice. Furthermore, post issuance of the show cause notice, the
petitioner has submitted his reply dated 10.11.2025 qua the alleged
transactions, and has been heard in the personal hearing dated 19.11.2025
Similarly, even after issuance of the impugned corrigendum, the
petitioner has duly been heard at the personal hearing dated 26.12.2025,
and has submitted his written submissions on the same day.
17. Since the impugned corrigendum doesn't constitute a fresh show
cause notice and merely corrects the typographical error regarding the
financial year, it cannot be said that the same is barred by limitation.
Admittedly, the show cause notice dated 28.06.2025 for financial year
2018-2019 is within time, accordingly, it stands to reason that any
correction of typographical error, even by way of a corrigendum, will not
be hit by limitation.
Analysis
18. From a conspectus of above, the following two principal issues are
raised -
I. whether the inclusion of the financial year 2019-2020 vide the
impugned corrigendum amounts to initiation of fresh proceedings,
and;
II. whether the corrigendum is time-barred.
However, having regard to the availability of an alternate statutory
remedy, it becomes important to delineate the scope of
interference of this court in the present matter.
19. It is well settled that notwithstanding the plenary nature of the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the writ
court would ordinarily refrain from entertaining a petition where an
efficacious alternate statutory remedy exists. The recognized exceptions
to this are limited, which stands settled in a catena of decisions of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, including Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar
of Trademarks, Mumbai4, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn Ltd5
and Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd. (supra) the
following four conditions have been enumerated to bypass the statutory
remedy -
I. a breach of fundamental rights,
II. a violation of principle of natural justice,
III. an excess of jurisdiction or
IV. a challenge to the vires of a statute or delegated legislation.
20. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v K.S
Radhakrishnan & Ors. 6 delineated scope of interference in a writ of
Certiorari to be those cases where there is a patent and apparent error of
law. This Court, in exercise of a writ of Certiorari is in a supervisory
jurisdiction, and not an appellate court. This difference is of vital
importance as this Court, thus, cannot enter into questions of
reappreciation of facts, which have been decided by trial courts/tribunals,
(1998) 8 SCC 1
(2003) 2 SCC 107
1963 SCC OnLine SC 24
etc. The jurisdiction of this Court in Certiorari is thus constrained to
those errors of law which are manifest from the record, and leave no
doubt regarding their conclusion.
21. The grievance of the petitioner is that the impugned corrigendum
has the effect of initiating fresh proceedings circumventing limitation and
is, therefore, impermissible. At this stage, it is sufficient to notice the
statutory framework. Section 160 of the CGST Act, 2017 provides that
no proceeding shall be invalid merely on account of any mistake, defect
or omission, if the same is otherwise in conformity with the intent and
purpose of the Act. Section 161 further enables the proper officer to
rectify any error apparent on the face of the record, including clerical or
arithmetical errors. The statute thus contemplates a limited power of
rectification.
22. However, having noted the statutory power to issue a
corrigendum, the contention of the petitioner that the corrigendum is bad
in law would require an examination of the nature of the correction and
the material on record. Such an exercise would involve the appreciation
of facts and is not to be undertaken in proceedings under Article 226,
particularly within the limited scope of certiorari jurisdiction.
23. It is also noticed that the aforesaid aspects have been dealt with by
the adjudicating authority in the impugned order. In case the petitioner is
aggrieved by the view so taken, the statute provides for an appellate
remedy. In such circumstances, mere disagreement with the conclusions
drawn by the adjudicating authority would not, by itself, be a ground to
bypass the statutory remedy and invoke the writ jurisdiction of this
Court.
24. In the present case, an efficacious alternative remedy is admittedly
available to the petitioner by way of an appeal under Section 107 of the
CGST Act read with Rule 109A of the CGST Rules. Section 107
expressly provides an appellate remedy to any person aggrieved by an
order passed by the adjudicating authority, and such remedy constitutes
the ordinary statutory recourse against an order passed under Section 74
of the CGST Act.
25. We, therefore, find no cause to interfere with the impugned order
in original and grant liberty to the petitioner to avail such remedies as
may be available to it in accordance with law.
26. This Court once again makes it clear that it has not examined or
expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
27. For all the aforesaid reasons, the present writ petition, along with
pending applications is dismissed.
AJAY DIGPAUL
(JUDGE)
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
(JUDGE)
APRIL 13, 2026/AS/sg
