[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Urvashi Aggarwal vs Inder Paul Aggarwal on 13 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 13.01.2026
Pronounced on: 13.04.2026
+ MAT.APP. 6/2012, CM APPL. 3834/2020, CM APPL.
2452/2021, CM APPL. 3722/2021, CM APPL. 23260/2017
URVASHI AGGARWAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal and Mr. Parth
Mahajan, Advs.
Versus
INDER PAUL AGGARWAL .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Archit Mishra, Mr. Ayush
Anand, Mr. Giriraj Singhal,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "HMA") against the
judgment and decree dated 28.11.2011 passed by the learned Judge-
01, Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
"Family Court") in HMA No. 147/2010 and HMA No. 390/2010,
whereby, the petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section
13(1)(ia) was allowed and the petition filed by the appellant-wife
under Section 9 of the HMA was dismissed.
2. In the present appeal, the appellant has only sought to set aside
the impugned judgment only qua the grant of divorce decree, claiming
the following relief:
"In the circumstances it is therefore prayed
that judgment and decree dated 28.11.2011
passed by the Court of Shri Dilbagh Singh
Judge Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi in
H.M.A. No. 147/2010 (Old No. 57/2006) and
H.M.A. No. 390/2010 (old No. 109/2008) be
set aside & the present appeal be allowed and
the petition filed by the respondent for divorce
be dismissed with cost. Any other order which
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the case may
also be passed in favour of the appellant and
against the Respondent."
3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the appeal are that the
marriage between the parties was solemnized on 11.11.1997. Out of
the said wedlock, a girl child was born to the parties on 10.11.1998,
however, on the same date, she was declared dead. Thereafter, the
parties were blessed with two children who were born on 14.08.2000
and 14.08.2002, respectively. However, owing to various differences
and acrimonies between the parties, the couple started residing
separately from 11.04.2004. As a result, thereof, the
respondent/husband, while raising certain allegations of cruelty, filed
a petition on 19.01.2006 under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA seeking
a divorce. Subsequently on 08.08.2008, the appellant/wife preferred
an application under Section 9 of the HMA seeking restitution of
conjugal rights.
4. After hearing the parties at length, the issues were framed by
the learned Family Court and vide common judgment dated
28.11.2011, the divorce petition filed by the respondent was allowed
while the application seeking restitution of conjugal rights filed by the
appellant was dismissed.
5. Being aggrieved thereof, the present appeal has been filed by
the appellant, seeking setting aside of the impugned judgment.
6. It is the plea of the appellant before us that the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Family Court suffers from various
conjectures and surmises as the respondent has failed to prove the
instances of cruelty suffered by him and thus, it is submitted that the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
7. To substantiate his arguments, the learned counsel for the
appellant referred to the incident dated 05.07.2005 which, according
to the appellant, has been falsely narrated by the respondent. He
submitted that the learned Family Court has erroneously relied upon
the medical documents being RW1/4 i.e., the MLC and causality slip
of the mother of the respondent to arrive at its finding that the
respondent was beaten up by the family members of the appellant,
however, neither any witnesses from AIIMS were summoned nor any
police report was ever produced on record to corroborate the
allegations of the aforesaid incident.
8. It is argued that the aforesaid MLC does not indicate that there
were any fractures suffered by the respondent. Further, the ECG does
not show that the respondent‟s mother suffered from any bodily
disorder. It is therefore submitted that the incidents of physical cruelty
committed upon the respondent is nothing but his own twisted
narration of facts as neither the medical documents prove the incidents
nor did he produce his parents in the witness box to state as to how
they reached AIIMS and why.
9. It is further submitted that the learned Family Court failed to
take into consideration that the X-Ray report of the private clinic
namely Anand X-Ray Clinic, has never been proved on record and no
word has been stated by the respondent as to whether he took
treatment from any other hospital other than AIIMS. It is submitted
that allegedly, the respondent also remained hospitalized for one
week, however, no records of such hospital has been placed on record
to show that he was admitted.
10. It is submitted that due to this manipulation of data and records,
the learned Family Court erred in holding that the respondent was
subjected to cruelty at the hands of the family members of the
appellant whereas, the incidents were not proved in accordance with
the law of evidence and no witnesses were called to prove the
documents relied upon by the respondent.
11. It is also submitted that one of the grounds of cruelty considered
by the learned Family Court is that the appellant remained
uninterested in sexual activities with the respondent and purposely
kept taking anti-pregnancy tablets. To refute this particular allegation,
it is submitted that the respondent, in his cross-examination, was
unable to name the alleged pills, and admittedly, the parties share two
children from the consummation of their marriage which makes this
allegation untenable, impractical and baseless.
12. It is further submitted that the respondent has failed to make out
a case of physical or mental cruelty in the absence of any incidents of
aggressive or dominating behavior of the appellant. Learned counsel
for the appellant submitted that that the learned Family Court has
erroneously placed reliance on mere narration of the respondent‟s
false stories who has failed to lead any other evidence by bringing on
record relatives of the parties in the witness box to prove his case.
13. It is submitted that no one can be a master of his own case, and
the learned Family Court has committed a grave error in believing the
testimonies of the respondent with regard to the incidents without it
being corroborated by any other substantial evidences like testimonies
of the AIIMS staff, the common relatives, or by bringing on record
any police call recordings of his complaints.
14. It is also submitted that the learned Family Court erroneously
shifted the burden of proof on the appellant and has arrived at an
adverse inference against her on the basis of the fact that the appellant
failed to produce any neighbors or witnesses to disprove the incident
of 05.07.2005, whereas, it is the respondent who bore the burden of
proving his claims of cruelty. Furthermore, it is submitted that the
learned Family Court failed to acknowledge that it was the respondent
who visited the appellant‟s residence on the evening of 05.07.2005,
after separation of almost one year and two months and therefore, the
conclusion arrived at by the learned Family Court with regard to
cruelty committed on 05.07.2005 is misconceived.
15. It is further stated that the allegations of the respondent that the
appellant tried to burn him and the children is also unsubstantiated by
any cogent proof as there is no iota of evidence to prove that incident
including no medical evidence, police call records, investigation
reports, or neighbor‟s testimonies.
16. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is stated that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Family Court granting
divorce to the respondent be set aside and the present appeal be
allowed.
17. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent submitted to the effect that the learned Family Court has
meticulously perused the facts and circumstances as well as the
evidences placed on record before passing the well-reasoned
impugned judgment.
18. It is submitted that the respondent was successful in proving all
the instances of cruelty inflicted upon him by the appellant and it is
the settled position of law that even one instance of cruelty is
sufficient to dissolve a marriage between the parties.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned
Family Court has carefully dealt with the evidence placed before it
including the medical records issued by AIIMS which could not have
been manipulated by the respondent. The learned Family Court has
also taken into consideration the incident whereby, the appellant tried
to burn the respondent and his children which duly prove that the
respondent was subjected to mental and physical cruelty.
20. It is contended that the learned Family Court has rightfully
drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for not providing the
medical records of her brother and father who allegedly sustained
injuries. It is submitted that the appellant purposely concealed such
evidence as her version is concocted and the said medical documents
would have gone against her.
21. It is further submitted that another crucial piece of evidence
showing cruelty which has been taken into consideration by the
learned Family Court is Ex. RW1/1 which is a paper/slip containing
hand written conditions imposed by the appellant upon the respondent.
It is submitted that the learned Family Court, in exercise of its powers
vested under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, (hereinafter
referred to as "Evidence Act") asked the appellant to write some lines
for proper comparison of the handwriting in the aforesaid alleged slip
and after categorically perusing both the documents, the learned
Family Court arrived at its findings that the paper/slip containing
illegal demands were written by none other than the appellant herself.
22. It is argued that keeping in view of the appellant‟s hesitant
conduct in handing over her handwriting to be matched with the
handwriting in the alleged slip containing demands, the learned
Family Court also derived at the conclusive proof that the testimony
of the appellant as a witness was not trust-worthy.
23. It is the plea of the respondent that the learned Family Court
carefully dealt with all incidents of cruelty separately while
meticulously examining the evidence before it and thus, found force in
the claims of the respondent who has proved the cruelty inflicted upon
him beyond reasonable doubt.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent further stated that after the
expiry of statutory period of limitation of 30 days in filing an appeal
under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which gave the
divorce decree in favour of the respondent finality, the respondent re-
married on 22.01.2012, and out of his second wedlock, he has also
been blessed with a child on 13.11.2013. In view of the same, it is
submitted that the present appeal may be dismissed as being devoid of
merit and for being infructuous.
25. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused
the material placed on record.
26. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to the
definition of cruelty. As per the provision of Section 13(1)(ia) of the
HMA, cruelty can be physical or mental. It is further opined that
instances of cruelty, as per settled position of law, is to be considered
in a cumulative effect rather than in isolation. The Supreme Court has
time and again justified as to what attributes as cruelty in a number of
decisions such as in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2
SCC 326; V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337; Parveen
Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706 and in A. Jayachandra v.
Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22.
27. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (Supra), the Supreme Court
held as follows:
"12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct
complained of should be "grave and weighty"
so as to come to the conclusion that the
petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably
expected to live with the other spouse. It must
be something more serious than "ordinary
wear and tear of married life". The conduct,
taking into consideration the circumstances
and background has to be examined to reach
the conclusion whether the conduct
complained of amounts to cruelty in the
matrimonial law. Conduct has to be
considered, as noted above, in the background
of several factors such as social status of
parties, their education, physical and mental
conditions, customs and traditions. It is
difficult to lay down a precise definition or to
give exhaustive description of the
circumstances, which would constitute cruelty.
It must be of the type as to satisfy the
conscience of the court that the relationship
between the parties had deteriorated to such
an extent due to the conduct of the other
spouse that it would be impossible for them to
live together without mental agony, torture or
distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to
secure divorce. Physical violence is not
absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a
consistent course of conduct inflicting
immeasurable mental agony and torture may
well constitute cruelty within the meaning of
Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may
consist of verbal abuses and insults by using
filthy and abusive language leading to
constant disturbance of mental peace of the
other party.
13. The court dealing with the petition for
divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in
mind that the problems before it are those of
human beings and the psychological changes
in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind
before disposing of the petition for divorce.
However insignificant or trifling, such conduct
may cause pain in the mind of another. But
before the conduct can be called cruelty, it
must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for
the court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen
whether the conduct was such that no
reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to
be considered whether the complainant should
be called upon to endure as a part of normal
human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which
may cause annoyance to the other, may not
amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations,
quarrels between spouses, which happen in
day-to-day married life, may also not amount
to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be
of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or
brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere
silence, violent or non-violent."
28. In the case of Gurbax Singh v. Harminder Kaur 2010 SCC
OnLine SC 1162, the Supreme Court clarified that for establishing a
case of cruelty, the married life of a party is required to be assessed as
whole wherein ill conduct of a spouse has persisted for a fairly lengthy
period making the relationship so sour, to an extent that the other
spouse finds it impossible to reside together.
29. The above referred judicial dicta culminate in the fact that
though there is no single definition of cruelty, the limits of cruelty
should be at such an extent that it makes it fairly impossible for the
aggrieved spouse to live with the offending spouse. The ambit of
cruelty covers such ill-conduct which is constant and must be present
for a lengthy amount of period.
30. The facts alleging cruelty hinges upon three incidents mainly.
First incident is dated 11.05.2003, second is dated 11.04.2004 and the
third incident is dated 05.07.2005. A bare perusal of the impugned
judgment indicates that the learned Family Court has taken a note of
the incident dated 11.05.2003 and had given much credence to this
incident on the ground that the same took place when the parties had
not filed any case against each other. On the said date of incident, it
has been alleged that the appellant tried to set the house ablaze by
burning the respondent along with the children with the help of
cooking gas. It is contented in the respondent‟s version that the
appellant was prevented from doing the same by the respondent with
the help of neighbors. It is also noted that the respondent suffered
injuries on his right hand in the aforesaid process of preventing the
mishap.
31. We find that the respondent failed to examine those neighbors
nor there is any medical records to substantiate his claims of the
incident dated 11.05.2003, nor there is any complaint regarding the
alleged serious allegations. Except his self serving statement, there is
no material to corroborate the statement of the respondent qua that
incident. The respondent withheld the independent best evidence of
neighbors available with him to prove his allegations of cruelty.
Therefore, in the absence of relevant testimonies and medical data on
record, this Court is not influenced by the reasoning extended by the
learned Court below qua this particular incident.
32. Another incident taken into consideration by the learned
Family Court is dated 11.04.2004. It is recorded in the impugned
judgment that the appellant had allegedly thrown a paper/slip in the
matrimonial house which contained a list of whimsical demands that
she had asked from the respondent. The appellant has categorically
denied writing of any such letter.
33. As indicated from the Trial Court Record, the learned Family
Court, in order to compare the handwriting of the appellant on the said
document, directed both the parties to write a few lines on a piece of
paper and then on the basis of his own comparison on the said paper
with the said lines, the learned Family Court inferred that the
handwritten list of conditions was written by the appellant. From the
judgment, it seems that the learned Family Court is swayed against the
appellant in view of her reluctance to give her handwriting which is
revealed from the following observations in the impugned judgment,
the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
"211. On 19.11.11, I had asked Smt. Urvashi
to write some lines. She gave about 8 lines in
her hand. I have exercised my powers of
comparision u/s 73 of Evidence Act, and have
compared the writing dated 19.11.11 and Ex.
RW1/1 (filed on 27.08.10). I have no hitch to
observe that Ex. RW1/1 and writing dated
19.11.11 have been written by one and the
same person. I deem it pertinent to mention
that when the final arguments were concluded,
I became of the opinion that comparison of Ex
RW1/1 with the admitted handwriting of Smt
Urvashi will give an additional ground about
truthfulness/falseness of respective stands. So
that the parties do not come to know about the
real intention of mine, I asked the parties to
give some lines in writing about children. Sh.
Inder Paul gave in writing without any
hesitation. Smt. Urvashi on the other hand
gave it very hesitatingly. She even demanded
it back on the ground that she had consulted
some senior Advocate of the Supreme Court
and she can not be asked to give anything in
writing. during the course of proceedings
also, Srñt. Urvashi has avoided giving
anything in writing in Hindi."
(emphasis supplied)
34. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to Section 73 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as, „Evidence Act‟), which
provides for comparison of the signature, writing or seal with others
admitted or proved. The same is reproduced hereinbelow:
"73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal
with others admitted or proved.--In order to
ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal
is that of the person by whom it purports to
have been written or made, any signature,
writing, or seal admitted or proved to the
satisfaction of the Court to have been written
or made by that person may be compared with
the one which is to be proved, although that
signature, writing, or seal has not been
produced or proved for any other purpose. The
Court may direct any person present in Court
to write any words or figures for the purpose
of enabling the Court to compare the words or
figures so written with any words or figures
alleged to have been written by such person. 1
[This section applies also, with any necessary
modifications, to finger-impressions.]"
35. On the aforementioned aspect, this Court finds that in the Order,
the learned Family Court had nowhere mentioned to the parties before
taking their handwriting that the order is being passed in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 73 of the Evidence Act nor the
learned Court below disclosed the reason behind asking the parties for
their handwriting. In this scenario, we find that the hesitant behavior
of the appellant in handing over her handwritten note is fairly natural
and nor the said reluctance, in the absence of expert opinion, be
sufficient to conclude that she had written the words in the paper/slip
containing the list of demands.
36. In view of the same, we are of the view that the learned Family
Court‟s approach was critically flawed and against the principles of
natural justice. The exercise of this provision requires awareness of
the parties as a pre-requisite for the reasons of procedural fairness.
The comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act is required to
be undertaken sparingly, especially since the document in this regard
is of substantial consequence. Furthermore, the Court is always at
liberty to supplement its finding on comparison with an expert
opinion. In the present case, the learned Family Court overlooked
these essential details which were crucial in proper adjudication of the
claims of cruelty qua this particular incident.
37. Though we are conscious of the fact that a Family Court is
empowered to devise its own procedure for doing justice between the
parties but the procedure should always meet the principle of natural
justice. Such power is to be exercised by the Court to fairly reach the
truth, rather than to give support to the view taken by the Court.
Moreover, in the present case, the respondent did not take any steps to
prove said document by providing any expert report. Thus, the
conduct of the Court, at the end of hearing, to exercise power under
Section 73 of the Evidence Act, without informing the parties and
giving them an opportunity of assistance of experts is more an attempt
to support the view taken by the Court, instead of a fair procedure
being adopted. Further, raising an adverse inference against a party, on
account of her resistance for giving her handwriting, without
informing her that the same will be used by the Court for comparison
purposes, is against the principles of natural and fair justice and
cannot be sustained.
38. The impugned judgment further indicates that the learned
Family Court has placed significant reliance on the version of the
respondent spouse based on his testimonies and medical records. With
regard to the incident dated 05.07.2005, the learned Family Court,
relying upon the medical documents such as the MLC of respondent
and the ECG of the mother of the respondent, being Ex. RW1/4 and
Ex. RW1/5, respectively, found that the injuries sustained by the
respondent were at the hands of the family members of the appellant
wherein the appellant had played an active role, thereby, finding force
in the claims of cruelty upon him.
39. This Court has perused the aforementioned medical records
which have been annexed as Annexure A-8 (Colly) in the present
appeal. A perusal of the said medical records indicate that the
respondent was found having chest pain in his left clavicle region and
had a history of assault about one and a half hours before being
examined.
40. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the MLC issued
by the AIIMS, is silent on how he was assaulted and by whom. The
report fails to substantiate the claims of the respondent and there is no
evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the injuries sustained by the
respondent were due to assault inflicted upon him by the appellant or
her family. The learned Family Court overlooked the relevance of any
police call records/police reports of the incident. The alleged
altercation, if any, on 05.07.2005 between the parties, does not prove
the commission of assault by the appellant wife, especially in the
backdrop of the fact that it was the respondent who visited her place of
residence in evening after they had been living separately for almost
more than a year.
41. This Court is of the view that the medical reports alone cannot
act as definitive proof of cruelty being inflicted upon him by the
appellant wife. The medical records at best, show that the respondent
had suffered injuries due to an assault at a preceding period, but they
fail to elaborate on who assaulted him and why. The only thing
supporting his version of narration was his testimony. In the absence
of any police investigation reports or police call records of the incident
dated 05.07.2005, or independent witness, his statement alone cannot
be the sole reliance and this incident in isolation does not tantamount
to cruelty under HMA.
42. The learned Family Court, in our opinion, failed to adjudicate
upon these relevant factors and found the version of the respondent to
be true and reliable solely on the basis of his testimony and the
medical document placed on record. Therefore, this Court finds that
the reasoning of the learned Family Court qua the aforementioned
incident is improper and inadequate as the allegations are unattributed
and unsupported by any other credible evidence.
43. Further perusal of the impugned judgment denotes that the
learned Family Court has repeatedly derived at the conclusion that the
appellant has failed to examine her family members and her
neighbors. It is also stated that she has failed to produce relevant
evidence on record including the medical records of her father and
brother which indicates that her narration of the incident is tainted.
44. In matrimonial claims of cruelty, the settled position of law is
that the burden of proof lies on the petitioner who has leveled
allegations of cruelty and not on the party against whom the
allegations are made.
45. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Roopa Soni v. Kamalnarayan Soni, (2023) 16 SCC
615 wherein, it was held as follows:
"10. On the question of burden in a petition
for divorce, burden of proof lies on the
petitioner. However, the degree of probability
is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but of
preponderance."
46. Furthermore, this Court vide judgment dated 01.07.2025,
delivered in Deepti Khatana v. Rahul Khatana, 2025 SCC OnLine
Del 6336, categorically held that in matrimonial cases, the burden of
proving allegations of cruelty lies upon the petitioner who alleges the
same. Relevant extract of the aforesaid judicial dictum is reproduced
hereinbelow:
"28. In cases of cruelty, the entire case of a
petitioner hinges upon the allegations of
cruelty and proof of the same. The burden of
proof undoubtedly lies on a petitioner who
alleges the same and the standard of proof
required is preponderance of probability. It is
imperative to appreciate the cumulative effect
of the conduct of the parties and the
happenings that occurred over a period of
time in their matrimonial life to ascertain the
ground of cruelty. It is required to be assessed
that the conduct complained of must be serious
and that it would be more tragic for the
petitioner to live with the respondent. It is
always dependent upon the social strata or the
milieu to which the parties belong, their ways
of life, relationship, temperaments and
emotions that have been conditioned by their
social status."
(Emphasis Supplied)
47. The duty of first proving the incidents undoubtedly was on the
respondent herein which was required to be assessed cautiously. In
the present case however, we find that the learned Family Court has,
without any compelling reasons, placed this burden on the appellant
wife and has drawn adverse inference against her on various accounts.
48. Insofar as the claim of the respondent that the appellant was
disinterested in engaging in sexual activities with him is concerned,
the learned Family Court chose not to delve into it holding that since
such allegation, even if true, could not have been proved by the
respondent for it being a closed-door matter.
49. In the present case, the marriage between the parties was clearly
consummated and within 11 months of their marriage, a child was
born to them on 11.10.1998, who unfortunately passed away on the
same date. The parties were thereafter, blessed with two children, one
boy who was born on 14.10.2000 and a girl child who was born on
14.10.2002. Keeping in view the above-stated facts, this Court accedes
to the argument made on behalf of the appellant that the allegation of
cruelty alleging that the appellant kept avoiding sexual intercourse and
kept anti-pregnancy pills with her, without naming the pills, is without
any substance.
50. The learned Family Court has disregarded these material facts
and legal principles. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view
that the impugned judgment fails to address several crucial aspects
and the reasoning adopted by the learned Family Court also lacks
support of other cogent evidence which ought to have been considered
by it during the adjudication of the divorce petition.
51. As per the catena of judgments with regard to cruelty passed in
Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (Supra); V. Bhagat v. D.
Bhagat, (Supra); Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (Supra) and in A.
Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (Supra), we are of the opinion that
instances of cruelty in terms of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, is
required to be considered as a cumulative effect on the marriage as
there is no straitjacket formula to consider the claims of cruelty. Mere
small trivial irritations and small quarrels in a married life are normal
wear and tear of married life and the same cannot be considered
adequate for grant of divorce under the HMA. We do not find any
other grave allegations which led the Family Court to come to the
conclusion that the appellant treated the respondent with such a
cruelty that it becomes impossible for him to live with the appellant.
52. The learned counsel for the respondent has informed this Court
during arguments that the respondent has re-married. However, as we
have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment has been
passed erroneously, without correctly appreciating the evidence on
record, the fact that the respondent has re-married would not deter us
from passing an order in this appeal and setting aside the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Family Court.
53. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment and Decree of Divorce dated 28.11.2011 passed by the
learned Judge-01, Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi are hereby set
aside.
54. Further, it is noted that no reliefs have been sought for setting
aside of the findings qua the disposal of petition of the appellant filed
under Section 9 of the HMA.
55. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
RENU BHATNAGAR, J.
APRIL 13, 2026/p/sm/kp
