[Cites 24, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Dinesh Dutt vs State Of Delhi on 6 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 01.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 06.04.2026
+ CRL.A. 625/2004
DINESH DUTT .....Appellant
Through: Mr. M.L. Yadav, Mr. Rambeer Sing
Kundu, Mr. Prashant and Mr. Piyush
Saini, Advocates
versus
STATE OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. This appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the sole accused
in C.C. No. 85/1998 on the file of the Court of Special Judge,
Delhi challenging the conviction entered and sentence passed
against him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (the PC act).
2. The prosecution case is that on 28.10.1997 at 02.15
p.m., the accused, while serving as Company Commander, Delhi
Home Guard, in discharge of his official duties, demanded and
accepted an amount of ₹100/- from PW3 as illegal gratification
for assigning him traffic duty in Patel Nagar Zone.
3. On 28.10.1997, PW3 lodged a complaint, that is, Ext.
PW3/A, with the Anti-Corruption Branch, New Delhi, based on
which, Crime No. 44/1997, Ext. PW11/B FIR was registered by
PW11, the Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) alleging commission of
the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13 of the PC Act.
4. PW7, Inspector, Anti-Corruption Branch, conducted
investigation into the crime and on completion of the same,
submitted the charge-sheet/ final report alleging commission of
the offences punishable under the abovementioned sections.
5. Ext. PW7/A Sanction Order for prosecuting the accused
was accorded by A.K. Singh, IPS, Director General, Home Guard
& Civil Defence, Delhi.
6. When the accused appeared on receipt of summons
before the trial court, the court after complying with the formality
contemplated under Section 207 Cr.P.C, on 21.09.1999, framed a
Charge under Section 7 and 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the PC
Act, which was read over and explained to the accused, to which
he pleaded not guilty.
7. On behalf of the prosecution, PW1 to PW11 were
examined and Ext. PW2A-C, Ext. PW3/A-F, PW3/DA, Ext.
PW4/A, Ext. PW6/A, Ext. PW7/A, Ext. PW7/DA, Ext. PW9/A-
B, Ext. PW9/B1-B7, Ext. PW11/A-B were marked in support of
the case.
8. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the
accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
regarding the incriminating circumstances appearing against him
in the evidence of the prosecution. The accused denied all those
circumstances and maintained his innocence. It was submitted
that he has been falsely implicated by PW3 in collusion with a
raiding party member. It was also submitted that at the time of the
trap, PW3 was not present at the spot and was instead on duty at
Natraj Cinema during the second shift from 3 PM to 9 PM, as
reflected in Ext. PW3/DA and Ext. PW7/DA. It was further
submitted that the accused was not in a position to extend any
favour to PW3 as alleged and that PW3 had duly attended his
duties from 25.10.1997 to 28.10.1997 and had received payment
for the said period. The accused also asserted that PW3 had taken
a loan from him and, in order to avoid repayment, has falsely
implicated him in the present case.
9. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the
accused.
10. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence
on record and after hearing both sides, the trial court, vide the
impugned judgment dated 11.08.2004, held the accused guilty of
the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Accordingly, the accused has
been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year and to pay a fine of ₹1,500/- on each count, and in
default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two months on each count. The
sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Aggrieved, the
accused has preferred the present appeal.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/
accused submitted that the amount of ₹100/- recovered from the
accused was not towards any illegal gratification, but only part
repayment of a loan. PW3 had taken a loan of ₹200/- from the
accused, which was to be repaid on 28.10.1987. In support of this
contention, reference was made to the testimony of PW4, the
panch/independent witness, who deposed that immediately upon
being apprehended, the accused stated that he had merely
received the amount repaid by PW3 towards the loan advanced by
him. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the
essential ingredient of demand for illegal gratification. It was
further pointed out that PW3 himself admitted in his testimony
that the accused never made any direct demand for money but
merely stated, "jo kaam maine bola tha wo kaam ho gaya."
Moreover, when PW3 initially offered him ₹50/-, the accused told
him to return home and bring the full amount of ₹100/-, which,
according to the learned counsel for the accused, supports the
version of repayment of a pre-existing loan rather than any
demand for bribe.
11.1. The learned counsel for the accused further highlighted
material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence concerning
the recovery of the alleged bribe amount. It was pointed out that
there exist significant contradictions as to the person who actually
effected the recovery during the raid. While PW3 and PW4
deposed in their testimony that PW5, the Trap Laying Officer
(TLO) had recovered the amount from the accused, whereas PW5
deposed that the recovery was effected by PW4, the
independent/panch witness. Such contradicting versions on a
crucial aspect of the trap proceedings cast serious doubt on the
credibility and reliability of the prosecution case. It was further
submitted that PW3 was not actually present for the entirety of
the raid as is evident from Ext. PW3D/A letter written by PW3
stating he was on traffic duty at Natraj Cinema from 3:00 PM to
9:00 PM on 28.10.1997, the day of the trap. It was further
submitted that the accused did not possess the authority or power
to mark or regulate the attendance of PW3 and in the absence of
such authority, the case of the prosecution regarding motive
stands vitiated, thereby rendering the allegation of demand
improbable. Reliance was placed on the dictum laid down in B.
Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55 and
Surjeet Singh Choudhary Vs. State (CRL.A. 788/2002).
12. Per Contra, it was submitted by the Additional
Public Prosecutor appearing for the State that the impugned
judgment does not suffer from any infirmity warranting
interference by this court as the trial court has duly considered
each and every ground raised in the present appeal and, upon an
overall appreciation of the materials on record, adjudicated the
matter on merits.
12.1. It was submitted that the defence taken by the
accused is self-contradictory and lacks consistency. On the one
hand, the accused has admitted to the acceptance of money at the
spot by contending that the amount was a repayment of a loan.
On the other hand, the accused has attempted to dispute the very
presence of PW3at the spot. The accused has submitted in his
Section 313 Cr.P.C., examination, that PW3 was not present at
the spot at all. But this assertion is in direct contradiction to the
testimony of PW3, which records the admission of the accused
regarding receipt of money towards repayment of a loan. The
learned APP has also relied upon the testimony of PW3, wherein
it has been specifically deposed that the raiding party along with
the accused left the spot at approximately 02:45 p.m., thereby
leaving sufficient time for PW3 to report for his duty scheduled at
03:00 p.m.
12.2. The learned APP further submitted that, as
contemplated under Section 20 of the PC Act, once the
acceptance of money by the accused is admitted, which
constitutes gratification other than legal remuneration, a statutory
presumption arises that the same was accepted as illegal
gratification and in such circumstances, the burden shifts upon the
accused to rebut the said presumption by leading credible
evidence to the contrary. It was further contended that the
accused has failed to discharge this burden as the defence has not
produced any cogent or reliable evidence to substantiate the plea
that the amount of ₹100/- formed part of repayment of a loan of
₹200/-allegedly advanced earlier. No defence witnesses have
been examined to corroborate the existence of such loan, nor has
any documentary evidence, such as receipts or records, been
placed on record.
13. Heard both sides and perused the materials on
record.
14. The only point that arises for consideration in the
present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
15. I shall first briefly refer to the evidence on record
relied on by the prosecution in support of the case. The initial
demand in this case is alleged to have taken place on 25.10.1997
and the trap laid on 28.10.1997. PW3 submitted a written
complaint, that is, Ext. PW3/A on 28.10.1997 in the office of the
Anti-Corruption Branch in which he has stated thus:-"...I am
employed as a constable in the Delhi Home Guards, and
currently, my duty is in the Patel Nagar circle. Our Company
Commander is Mr. Dinesh Kumar Sharma. He demands ₹100/-
per month from me as bribe and threatens that if I do not give the
money, I will not be taken on duty. When I reported for duty on
25/10/97, Company Commander Dinesh Kumar Sharma started
saying that I must first give him ₹100/-, and only then would I be
taken on duty. I pleaded with him a lot, explaining that I am a
poor man and it is very difficult for me to make a living, and
asked from where I could give him that much money. However, he
did not agree. Yesterday, on 27/10/97, Dinesh Kumar Sharma met
me on duty in the evening and asked whether I would give the
money or if he should mark me absent. I made many requests, but
he still did not agree. Out of helplessness, I said yes, telling him
that I did not have the money right then but would give it later.
Upon hearing this, he said that if I wanted to be on duty the next
day, I must bring ₹100/- with me as bribe. My duty today is from
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. in the evening. He has asked me to come
by 2:00 p.m. today, stating that he, Mr. Dinesh Kumar Sharma,
would also be there at 2:00 p.m. I have no enmity with Company
Commander Dinesh Kumar Sharma. I am strictly against taking
and giving bribes, but I have agreed to his demand out of
compulsion. Legal action should be taken against Mr. Dinesh
Kumar Sharma. I have brought the bribe amount of ₹100/- with
me..."
16. PW3, when examined before the trial court stood
by his case in Ext.PW3/A Complaint.PW3 further deposed about
the pre-trap proceedings. According to PW3,he was instructed to
hand over the money to the accused only on specific demand and
that PW4 was directed to overhear the conversation and give a
prearranged signal on acceptance of the bribe by the accused.
PW3 further deposed that the raiding party, consisting of about
12-14 members including himself, left the ACB office at about
01:00 pm and reached Police Station Patel Nagar. He along with
PW4 proceeded to the Traffic Office situated on the first floor,
while other members of the raiding party took their respective
positions. PW3 deposed that upon entering the room of accused,
the latter greeted him and enquired whether the work asked by
him had been done (Jo kam maine bola tha kya who kaam ho
gaya). PW3 expressed his inability to arrange the amount and
requested the accused to accept ₹50/-, but the accused refused and
asked him to return only when he had ₹100/-.Thereafter he took
out ₹100/- and extended it to the accused, who accepted the same
with his left hand and kept it in the left side front pocket of his
shirt, whereupon PW4 gave the prearranged signal and upon
receipt of the same, members of the raiding party along with PW5
entered the room and apprehended the accused. The tainted
currency note was recovered by PW5 from the left side pocket of
the shirt of the accused. PW3 deposed that the left hand of the
accused was washed in a solution which turned pink and the wash
of the left side pocket of the shirt of the accused was also taken in
a separate solution which similarly turned pink. Both the hand
wash and pocket wash were transferred into bottles and were
sealed. PW3 further deposed that the personal search of the
accused was conducted vide Ext. PW3/D memo and that pre raid
and post raid proceedings were reduced into writing as Ext.
PW3/E and Ext. PW3/F.
16.1. PW3 in his cross examination deposed that his
attendance for the dates 25.10.1997 to 27.10.1997 had been
marked by the accused prior to the trap and that his attendance for
28.10.1997 was also marked after lodging Ext. PW3/A complaint.
PW3 admitted his signatures in Ext. PW3/DA wherein it is stated
that he was on duty at Natraj Cinema on 28.10.1997 from 03:00
p.m. to 09:00 p.m. PW3 also deposed that he could not recollect
whether PW4 was already present in Anti-Corruption branch
prior to his arrival or he came thereafter. He further deposed that
he had known the accused for about 3 to 4 years prior to the date
of the trap and had not taken any loan or credit from the
accused.PW3 denied the suggestion that he had taken a sum of
₹200/- from the accused and that the said amount was to be repaid
on 28.10.1997. He further deposed that in his presence the
accused had not stated toPW5 that the amount in question was
being returned as repayment of any such loan. He deposed that
they remained at the place of trap for about half an hour and
thereafter returned to the Anti-Corruption Branch. They left the
spot at about 02.45 pm along with the accused and members of
the raiding party. PW3 further deposed that the distance between
Police station Patel Nagar and Natraj Cinema is about 3 km and it
takes approximately half an hour to reach there and that on the
date of the trap, he had not performed any duty. PW3 expressed
inability to recollect how the duty timing from 03:00 pm to 09:00
pm on 28.10.1997 was reflected in Ex. PW3/DA. He denied the
suggestion that he was not present at the spot after the raid or that
he had left the spot at about 2.30 pm. According to him, he
remained part of the raiding party till the end and returned to the
Anti-Corruption Branch at about 04:00 pm and remained there till
about 05:30 pm.
17. PW4, an independent witness, when examined,
supported the prosecution case in all material particulars. He also
deposed that when the accused was challenged by the Inspector
and asked as to whether he had accepted the bribe from PW3, the
former answered that the latter had returned ₹100/- which had
earlier been taken as loan. During his examination-in-chief, the
prosecutor is seen to have sought the permission of the Court to
'cross examine' PW4. The request is seen allowed by the trial
court. On being further examined by the prosecutor, PW4
deposed that he was unable to recollect whether he had stated to
the police that upon being challenged, the accused had told PW5
that he had received ₹ 100/- from PW3, which had earlier been
given as a loan to PW3.
17.1. PW4 in his cross examination deposed that Ext.
PW3/A complaint was written in his presence and that he had
signed the same after going through its contents. PW4 initially
deposed that PW5 had recovered the tainted note from the pocket
of the accused, but thereafter deposed that he was unable to recall
the name of the person who had recovered the money. PW4
denied the suggestion that PW3 was not present at the time of the
raid proceedings or that he had left the spot to join duty.PW4
denied the suggestion that the accused had neither demanded nor
accepted any bribe or that he was deposing falsely at the instance
of the police or out of fear of any departmental action.
18. PW5, the TLO, fully supported the prosecution
case. In his cross examination, PW5 corrected his version in his
examination-in-chief that it was he who had recovered the money
from the pocket of the accused. According to him, it was PW4
who had recovered the note from the pocket of the accused.
19. PW9, Inspector, Anti-Corruption branch, who
conducted the initial investigation and PW7, the Officer who
thereafter took over the investigation, deposed regarding the
various steps taken during the investigation.
20. The testimony of the aforesaid witnesses is
mainly relied on by the prosecution to prove the demand and
acceptance of the bribe by the accused/ appellant herein. The
prosecution case is that the accused demanded the bribe for
assigning traffic duty to PW3. Vide order dated 21.09.1999, the
trial court framed a charge against the accused for the offences
punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the
PC Act. However, the trial court in para 25 of the impugned
judgment concluded thus- "In the result, I hold accused Dinesh
Dutt Sharma guilty of the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and he is convicted accordingly". No
argument was advanced on this aspect. Going by the prosecution
case, the offences committed would come under Section 7(a)
and Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act. In order to
bring home the guilt of the accused under the aforesaid
provisions of the PC Act, the prosecution is required to establish,
beyond reasonable doubt, the twin requirements of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification. Mere recovery of tainted
money is not sufficient unless it is preceded by a proven
demand. According to PW3, the accused, his Company
Commander, told him that the latter would not permit him to
mark his attendance until he gave him ₹100/- every month. He
has further deposed that on the day of trap, the accused reiterated
the demand by enquiring whether the work, as earlier directed,
had been done ("jo kaam maine bola tha wo kaam ho gaya").
The testimony of PW3 further demonstrated that when he
offered ₹50/-the accused refused to accept the same and insisted
upon the full amount of ₹100/-. This part of the testimony of
PW3 clearly establishes a specific and conscious demand made
by the accused. The version of PW3 gets material corroboration
from the testimony of PW4, the independent/panch witness who
has deposed that the accused questioned PW3 regarding the
earlier demand and expressed disappointment when a lesser
amount was offered. The presence of PW4 at the time of
transaction and his reiteration of the conversation that took place
between PW3 and the accused affirms the version of PW3 and
the prosecution case on the aspect of demand. As regards
acceptance, both PW3 and PW4 have consistently deposed that
former handed over the tainted currency note of ₹100/- to the
accused, who accepted the same with his left hand and kept it in
the left side pocket of his shirt. There are no material
inconsistencies on this aspect. The conduct of the accused in
accepting and retaining the tainted note clearly establishes
voluntary acceptance. The recovery of the tainted currency note
from the possession of the accused immediately after the signal
given by PW4 further corroborates the prosecution case. The
testimony of PW5, the TLO, though showing a minor
inconsistency as to who actually recovered the currency note,
does not vitiate the core prosecution case, as the factum of
recovery from the accused remains intact. Further, the
phenolphthalein test conducted on the left hand and the left
pocket of the accused yielded positive results, as both solutions
turned pink. This scientific evidence further corroborates the
prosecution version that the accused had handled the tainted
currency note and had kept the same in his pocket.
21. It is true that from the evidence on record, one
Surinder appears to have been the person attending to the marking
of attendance of the constable personnel pertaining to the Delhi
Home Guard. However, it is equally borne out from the record
that the said Surinder was functioning as a Munshi in the office of
the accused and was, thus, a subordinate to him. Therefore, even
if the immediate act of marking attendance was being carried out
by Surinder, the same does not absolve the accused of his
authority and control over the said function, and it cannot be said
that the accused had no role or influence in the matter for which
the illegal gratification was demanded.
22. As regards the documentary evidence i.e. Ext.
PW9/B1 to Ext. PW9/B7 which shows the duty record of PW3
for the relevant dates, a perusal of the same shows that PW3 had
marked his attendance on the day of the trap also, that is,
28.11.1997 from 03:00 p.m. to 09:00 p.m. In the case on hand,
the prosecution has led consistent oral evidence through PW3 and
PW4 to establish that PW3 was present at the spot and
participated in the trap proceedings. On the other hand, the
defence has not brought any cogent or credible material to show
that PW3 was physically incapable of being present at the spot at
the relevant time. There is no material contradiction of such
nature so as to discredit the otherwise reliable testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.
23. In view of the above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully
established the foundational facts necessary for invoking the
presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. Consequently, it is
to be presumed that the gratification received by the accused was
as a motive or reward for doing an official act. At this stage, the
burden shifts to the accused to rebut the said presumption. The
question that now arises for consideration is whether the accused
has been able to rebut the statutory presumption cast upon him by
raising a probable defence.
24. In this context, I refer to the dictum of the Apex
Court in State of Maharashtra v. Rashid B. Mulani, (2006) 1
SCC 407. In the said case, the complainant therein and his
brother B had taken a loan from one K and had secured the land
owned by them in favour of K by way of mortgage. A mortgage
suit was filed by the mortgagee which ended in compromise. The
complainant then requested the respondent, who was working as a
Talathi, to delete the name of K from the revenue record in view
of repayment of the mortgage loan in terms of the compromise.
According to the prosecution, the respondent demanded ₹900/-
for this work. The complainant paid₹600/- but the respondent
insisted on payment of the balance amount of ₹300/- for doing the
work. The complainant then lodged a report with the Anti-
Corruption Bureau, which laid a trap. Evidence of the
complainant (PW1) showed payment of ₹300/- as illegal
gratification by him and acceptance thereof by the respondent in
his house. PW2 (panch witness) who accompanied the
complainant corroborated the evidence of the complainant. The
defence as put forth in the cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses and the explanation given in the statement under
Section 313 CrPC was as follows : some amount was outstanding
from the complainant in regard to a Tagai loan taken in the name
of his brother B. The Tahsildar sent a communication on
03.09.1986 to the respondent stating that B was due in a sum of ₹
2575.90/- towards interest in respect of an engine loan taken in
the year 1966. The accused was, therefore, instructed to recover
the said amount and deposit it in the government treasury.
Therefore, the accused sent a notice dated 06.09.1986 to the
complainant, demanding payment of the amount due. In
pursuance of it, the complainant came to the accused's house on
06.10.1986 and paid him ₹300/- towards the amount outstanding
to the Government, and it was received by him as government
dues and not as a bribe for showing any official favour to the
complainant. The explanation given by the accused was rejected
by the trial Judge giving reasons for the same and convicted the
respondent for the offences punishable under Section 161 IPC
and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(l)(d) of the PC Act, 1947. In
appeal, the High Court set aside the conviction holding that the
explanation given by the respondent for receiving the amount was
reasonable and probable, thus giving him the benefit of doubt and
acquitted him.
24.1. In the appeal by the State, the Apex Court held
that Section 4 of the Act, inter alia, provided that where in any
trial of an offence punishable under Section 161 IPC or Section
5(1)(a) or (b) punishable under Section 5(2) of the Act, it is
proved that an accused person has accepted any gratification
(other than legal remuneration), it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that he accepted that gratification as a motive
or reward, such as is mentioned in the said Section 161. This
would mean that a mere explanation in the statement under
Section 313 that the amount was received towards a loan will not
be sufficient. The contrary position should be established by the
accused either from inferences legally drawn from the evidence
on record let in by the prosecution, or by letting in direct evidence
in regard to the explanation. The statutory presumption raised
under Section 4 will not stand rebutted merely by offering an
explanation under Section 313 if such explanation does not find
support from the evidence let in by the prosecution.
24.2. In Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 575, it has been held that, once it
is established that the accused person has received a sum of
money which was not due to him as a legal remuneration, the
Court has no choice in this matter. Of course, it is open to that
person to show that though that money was not due to him as
legal remuneration, it was legally due to him in some other
manner or that he had received it under a transaction or an
arrangement which was lawful. The burden resting on the
accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where
a presumption is raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act
and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact
that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and
probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true
one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in
this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be
rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely
plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is
directly established or when upon the material before it the
Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man
would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the
explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by
the provision cannot be said to be rebutted. Presumption of law
cannot be successfully rebutted by merely raising a probability,
however reasonable, that the actual fact is the reverse of the fact
which is presumed. Something more than raising a reasonable
probability is required for rebutting a presumption of law. The
bare word of the appellant is not enough and it was necessary for
him to show that upon the established practice his explanation
was so probable that a prudent man ought, in the circumstances,
to have accepted it.
24.3. Further, in Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel v.
State of Gujarat, (1976) 3 SCC 46, it has been held that the
burden which rests on an accused to displace this presumption, is
not as onerous as that cast on the prosecution to prove its case.
Nevertheless, this burden on the accused is to be discharged by
bringing on record evidence, circumstantial or direct, which
establishes with reasonable probability, that the money was
accepted by the accused, other than as a motive or reward such as
is referred to in Section 161.
25. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the
facts of the present case, it is evident that the accused has failed to
rebut the statutory presumption arising under Section 20 of the
PC Act. As held in the aforesaid decisions, a bare explanation
which is merely plausible is insufficient to rebut the presumption
of law. Further, no enmity or plausible ill motive has been shown
by the defence as to why PW3, an officer subordinate to the
accused, would falsely implicate the latter and subject himself to
such hardship of a trap proceeding. It is also necessary to be
borne in mind, as observed by the Apex Court in State of U.P. v.
G.K. Ghosh, (1984) 1 SCC 254, that a citizen is ordinarily
reluctant to approach the Vigilance authorities and undergo such
burdensome process of laying a trap and facing trial. Such action
is taken only when one feels genuinely aggrieved. In the absence
of any materials on record to show that PW3 had any reason(s) to
falsely implicate the accused, I find no reason to disbelieve him.
His version is supported by the testimony of PW4, whose
testimony also, I find no reason(s) to disbelieve. Accordingly,
this Court finds that the accused has failed to rebut the statutory
presumption arising under Section 20 of the PC Act. Hence in
these circumstances, I find no infirmity in the impugned
judgement calling for an interference by this court.
26. In the result, the appeal, sans merit, is dismissed.
27. Application(s), if any, pending shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
APRIL 06, 2026
rs
