[Cites 1, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Union Of India & Ors vs Ex Nb Sub Madan Pal Singh Tomar on 1 April, 2026
Author: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
Bench: V. Kameswar Rao, Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
$~2
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : 01.04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 2857/2026 CM APPL. 13949/2026
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate with
Major Kanika Sharma Army
versus
EX NB SUB MADAN PAL SINGH TOMAR .....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J. (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 with the
following prayers:
"i. Issue a writ of certiorari interalia setting aside the order
dated 17.04.2018 passed by the Hon'ble Armed Forces
Tribunal.
ii. Pass any other order(s)/direction(s) as this Hon'ble Court
deems fit in the interest of justice."
2. The brief facts are that the Respondent was enrolled in the Army
Medical Corps on 21.10.1963 and was discharged in 1988 on compassionate
grounds under Rule 13(3) Table 1(i) of the Army Rules,1954.
2.1. Prior thereto, Release Medical Board ['RMB'] held on 22.09.1988
assessed his disability "Sciatica (LT)" at 30% for two years and opined the
same to be not attributable to, but aggravated by, military service. He was
thereafter granted service pension vide PPO dated 12.12.1988.
2.2. After about 28 years, the Respondent served a legal notice dated
13.08.2016 upon the Petitioners claiming disability pension with rounding
off benefits. Upon rejection of the said claim vide reply dated 07.02.2017,
the Respondent filed Original Application ['O.A.'] No. 878 of 2017 before
the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench ['Tribunal'].
2.3. The Tribunal allowed the O.A. vide order dated 17.04.2018 and
granted disability element of pension at 30%, rounded off to 50% w.e.f.
01.01.1996.
2.4. Subsequently, in Review Application No. 18 of 2021 filed by the
Petitioners, the said order dated 17.04.2018 was modified vide order dated
25.04.2022 to the limited extent that the disability element of pension,
rounded off to 50%, would be payable w.e.f. 01.01.2006.
2.5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the Tribunal has
failed to appreciate the relevant Pension Regulations governing the field and
has erred in holding the Respondent entitled to disability pension. It is
contended that even on a proper application of Regulations 83 and 85 of the
Pension Regulations for the Army, Part I, 2008, no such entitlement accrues
in favour of the Respondent. It is further submitted that the Respondent does
not satisfy the foundational conditions stipulated in Regulation 81 of the
said Regulations and, therefore, the very basis for grant of disability pension
is absent.
2.6. On this premise, learned counsel argues that the impugned order of
the Tribunal is unsustainable in law and have filed the present writ petition
to set aside the order dated 17.04.2018 which was modified vide order dated
25.04.2022.
2.7. He however clarifies that the impugned order dated 17.04.2018 has
been implemented and the disability pension his been paid.
3. This Court has heard the learned counsels for the Petitioner and has
perused the record.
4. As noted above, the Petitioners have already implemented the order
dated 17.04.2018 and have been extending the benefit of disability pension
to the Respondent in terms thereof.
5. This Court, having considered the facts of the present case as also the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, is of the considered
opinion that, the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay
and laches, having been instituted after an unexplained delay of nearly eight
[8] years. A party invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 is expected to approach the Court with reasonable promptitude.
The extraordinary writ jurisdiction is, by its very nature, discretionary,
and such discretion cannot ordinarily be exercised in favour of a litigant who
has slept over his rights for an unduly long period. There is no justification
whatsoever by the Petitioner for this inordinate delay.
6. At the same time, since this petition is being declined on the threshold
on account of delay and laches, this Court deems it appropriate to leave the
question of law arising in the matter open to be examined and adjudicated in
an appropriate proceeding by the competent authority, if so occasioned,
without the present order being construed as an expression on the merits of
the legal issue involved.
7. The present petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stands
disposed of.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
APRIL 1, 2026/AJ
