[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Usha Deva & Ors vs Mohan Lal & Anr on 1 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 15th January 2026
Pronounced on : 1st April 2026
Uploaded on : 2nd April 2026
+ MAC.APP. 173/2016
USHA DEVI & ORS .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Advocate.
versus
MOHAN LAL & ANR .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Shadab Khan, Advocate for
Respondent no.2.
+ MAC.APP. 725/2015 & CM APPL. 44495/2025
MOHAN LAL & ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Shadab Khan, Advocate.
versus
USHA DEVI & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Advocate for
Respondent nos.1 & 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed assailing the impugned award dated 2nd July
2015 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohini Courts,
(North-West), Delhi ('MACT/Tribunal') in MACT No.433/2008. The
cross-appeal has been filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of
compensation.
The Incident
2. On 27th February 2008 at about 12:15 P.M., Sh. Prem Lal (since
deceased), along with his brother-in-law Sh. Amardeep Singh, father-in-law
Sh. Kripal Singh and some other relatives were going to Agra, Uttar Pradesh
from Delhi by Indica car bearing registration No. DL-8CJ-2670, driven by
the deceased. When they reached NH-2 near Fatiha Pul, PS Farha, Mathura,
U.P., the offending vehicle, i.e. U.P. Roadways Bus bearing registration No.
UP-80-AC-9090, driven by Mr. Mohan Lal (hereinafter referred to as
'driver'), allegedly at a very high speed, rashly and negligently came from
the side of Agra and hit the Indica car with great force. As a result, the
occupants, including the deceased, sustained injuries. During the course of
treatment, Sh. Prem Lal passed away.
3. Mohan Lal, who was the driver of offending vehicle, filed the written
statement stating that he was driving the offending vehicle at normal speed
and properly. When he reached Fatiha Pul and was descending from the
railway bridge, the Indica car was coming from the side of Delhi at a fast
speed and was on the wrong side of the road, and it struck against the driver
side of the offending vehicle. He tried his best to avoid the accident, but
driver of Indica car could not control and dashed against the offending
vehicle, due to which the accident occurred.
4. Post the framing of issues, the following witnesses were examined:
(i) PW1, Smt. Usha Devi - wife of the deceased;
(ii) PW2, Sh. Devender Singh - eye-witness; and
(iii) R1W1, Mohan Lal - driver of the offending vehicle.
Impugned Award
5. Regarding the issue whether accident was caused due to the rash and
negligent driving of the offending car, the MACT examined the evidence
and reached the conclusion that the accident was caused by Mohan Lal, who
was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and had
caused the death of Sh. Prem Lal. The Indica car was on the wrong side of
the road due to traffic diversion, and there was no negligence on the part of
the driver of the Indica car.
Compensation
6. Total compensation of Rs.7,58,200/- was awarded along with interest
@ 7.5% per annum. The components are tabulated as under:
SL. No. Compensation under various heads Amount awarded
1. Loss of dependency Rs.5,23,200/-
2. Loss of love & affection Rs.1,00,000/-
3. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000/-
4. Funeral expenses Rs.25,000/-
5. Loss of estate Rs.10,000/-
Total Rs.7,58,200/-
Submission on behalf of Driver of the offending vehicle
7. The following submissions were placed by Mr. Shadab Khan, counsel
for driver of the offending vehicle:
i. The issue of negligence was decided by the MACT primarily on the
testimony of PW2, Sh. Devender Singh, who was an interested
witness, being real brother of Smt. Usha Devi. It was contended that
he appeared only to improve the case of the claimants.
ii. FIR was lodged at the behest of one Amardeep Singh, who is the son
of Sh. Kripal Singh, owner of Indica car. FIR did not mention that
PW2 was travelling with them. However, PW2 stated in his affidavit
of evidence that he, along with Prem Lal, were going to Agra. Further,
although PW2 stated that the police recorded the statement of the
injured person regarding the accident, he did not state that his own
statement was recorded by the police, nor did he claim that he
sustained any injuries. He also did not state that he had taken the
injured to the hospital.
iii. If PW2 had been present at the spot, he could have made the call to the
police, and the FIR could have been lodged at his behest. He was
merely the witness for identification of dead body, as recorded in the
charge-sheet. Had he been present at the spot, he would have been
made an eyewitness.
iv. During cross-examination, PW2 made a story relating to the
construction on one of the carriageway of the road, but it was not
stated in the evidence of PW1 nor in the claim petition. There were no
documents on record which show that PW2 was present on the spot,
or that one side of road was blocked due to any construction work or
that PW2 was following the Indica car.
v. The claimants in the claim petition did not state that PW2 was also
going along with the deceased, nor was the same stated in the FIR.
Moreover, the FIR did not state that Amardeep Singh, who lodged the
FIR, was travelling in the car.
vi. Bus driver appeared as a witness (R1W1) and deposed about the
manner of accident. The same was not disputed during
cross-examination of R1W1, and no question was put to him
regarding the manner in which the accident occurred.
vii. Site plan clearly shows that the Indica car was on the wrong side of
the road, and, therefore, the bus driver could not be negligent for the
said accident. Since the accident was a head-on collision, both drivers
ought to have been held liable for contributory negligence, in light of
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bijoy Kumar Dugar v.
Bidyadhar Dutta & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 242.
viii. As regards computation of compensation, it was contended that age of
the deceased was 45 years as per the date of birth mentioned in the
driving licence on the date of accident, which was corroborated by
post-mortem report, which mentioned age as 44 years, and Ration
Card, which also mentioned age of deceased as 44. Accordingly,
multiplier ought to have been used at 14, whereas it was taken at 16.
ix. The amount of Rs.1,00,000/- awarded towards love and affection has
been held to be no longer justified as per Supreme Court's decision in
United India Insurance v. Satinder Kaur (2021) 11 SCC 780.
x. Loss of consortium has been awarded at Rs.1,00,000/-, whereas as per
National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC
680, it ought to be around Rs.40,000/- per family member.
xi. Funeral expenses have been awarded at Rs.25,000/-; however, as per
Pranay Sethi (supra), it ought to be awarded at Rs.15,000/- and Loss
of estate also at Rs.15,000/-.
Submission on behalf of Claimants
8. Counsel for legal representative of the deceased, relating to the
insured's contributory negligence, submitted that the main focus in reply by
respondent nos.1-4 (Usha Devi and the other claimants) was that the
eye-witness (PW2/ Devender Singh) categorically stated that one side of the
road was closed and they were travelling on the extreme left side of the other
side as clear from the site plan. There was no suggestion to the witness that
there was no road closure.
9. He further submitted that once there is double traffic and there is a
divider, the question of travelling in the wrong direction does not arise. The
credibility of PW2 in his cross-examination was not impeached. FIR and the
charge-sheet state that the negligence was attributed to driver of the
offending vehicle. The driver had not challenged before any authority that he
had been wrongly arrayed in the case. In his cross-examination, as R1W1, he
admitted that a criminal case was pending against him. Considering that the
involvement of the vehicle was not under challenge, the claimants were only
required to prove the negligence of the touchstone of preponderance of
probability and had failed to bring any record to the contrary, nor had they
examined the Investigating Officer of the case.
10. The driver did not state in his evidence that both sides of the road were
functional.
11. On the issue of multiplier, it was submitted that no ground had been
taken in the appeal, and the issue could not be raised at the stage of
arguments. It was also contended that no amount had been awarded towards
future prospects, even though the deceased was stated to be a property
dealer. Though no documentary proof of income was produced, it was
submitted that the deceased could not be treated as an unskilled labourer and
that minimum wages of a semi-skilled worker ought to have been applied.
Analysis
12. Examination of the site plan would show that it was a head-on
collision and occurred on the right side of the road next to the divider which
separated the other carriageway. For ease of reference, site plan is extracted
hereunder:
13. From the site plan, it is clear that Indica car was coming from the front
and travelling on the left side of the carriageway, whereas the bus was
travelling on the right side of the carriageway, and the accident had occurred
at point 'A'.
14. The testimony of PW2, Devender Singh, would have to be examined
with some care, since interpretation of that is mostly in dispute.
15. In his affidavit (Ex. PW2/A), PW2 stated that he was travelling along
with his brother-in-law, Prem Lal, on 27 February 2008 in the Indica car
when the bus coming from the Agra side hit the car with great force. The bus
stopped at the spot, but the driver fled away, and an FIR was registered.
16. In his cross-examination though, he stated that he was travelling in a
Tavera car and was following the Indica car, and the speed of the Indica car
was about 40 kmph. He also stated that the entire traffic was diverted to the
right side of the road as work was going on to the left side.
17. He further stated that there were five persons travelling in the said car
and that after the accident "we took out the deceased Prem Lal from the
Indica car and took everyone to hospital".
18. The FIR, however, was registered at the behest of Amardeep Singh,
who stated that Prem Lal was his relative and that the accident occurred due
to the rash and negligent driving of the bus. The Indica car was hit, and all
those in the car were injured. As per his statement, his father, Sardar Kripal
Singh, was going in his Tata Indica car along with Prem Kumar, Chaudhary
ji and some other friends of his father from Delhi to Agra. As regards the
issue whether there were 4 or 5 passengers, it may not be relevant,
considering that even in the Detailed Accident Report ('DAR'), it has been
recorded that Prem Lal was going to Agra with his brother-in-law Amardeep
Singh, father-in-law Kripal Singh and other relatives.
19. It is further noted that Devender Singh/PW2 was mentioned in the
police record only for identification of the dead body, whereas Amardeep
Singh was cited as a witness. Accordingly, it was contended that Devender
Singh was introduced as an eyewitness and, therefore, his testimony was
unreliable.
20. There is no evidence on record in either of the testimonies recorded of
PW1, PW2 or R1W1 that the road was closed on the other side, nor does it
form part of the site plan.
21. Moreover, the testimony of PW2 seems to be completely unreliable.
He initially stated that he was in the Indica Car, and later he stated that he
was following the Indica Car. He was neither the one who informed the
police nor was shown to have taken the deceased to the hospital. He was the
real brother of Smt. Usha Devi and could possibly have been introduced later
to be placed as an eyewitness.
22. Even in the evidence, Devender Singh, PW2, did not state that the
road was closed on the other side and, therefore, they were forced to travel
on this side of the road. Even Amardeep Singh did not state that in the
statement recorded at the time of the lodging of the FIR.
23. As regards the age of the deceased, it is clear from the driving license,
which forms part of the TCR, that his date of birth was 14th March 1963;
therefore, his age on the date of his death would have been 44 years. The
Ration Card was made on 8th November 2006 and notes the year of birth as
1964. Even the post-mortem report notes that his age was about 44 years.
Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the multiplier of 16 was incorrectly
assessed only on the basis of the PAN Card, where his date of birth is shown
as 10th June 1972 (age being calculated as 35 years on the date of the
accident by the Tribunal).
24. Even though the MACT in the impugned award was convinced about
the testimony of PW2, it cannot be said, after perusal of the testimony, that it
inspires confidence; therefore, the MACT has been amiss in that
determination. Even assuming that the road was closed on the other side and
the Indica car had been forced to travel on the wrong side of the
carriageway, both the car and the bus ought to have been cautious to avoid a
head-on collision. If indeed there was traffic coming from the other side, the
bus driver ought to have been careful, and so would the Indica car going on
the right side would have been extra careful as to avoid a collision.
25. The Supreme Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan (2008) 3 SCC 748,
held that when an injury is caused partly by another person's negligence and
partly by the injured person's own lack of care, the injured person is said to
be contributorily negligent. This does not completely bar them from
claiming compensation; instead, the amount of damages they can recover is
reduced according to the extent to which their own negligence contributed to
the injury. The relevant paragraphs of T.O. Anthony (supra) are extracted as
under:
"6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the
part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as
a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong
doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of
the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a
case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to
the injured for payment of the entire damages and the
injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or
any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish
the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer
separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine
the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On
the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to
the negligence on the part of another person or persons,
and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the
negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to
the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence.
Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim
for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the
negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by
him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion
to his contributory negligence.
7. Therefore, when two vehicles : are involved in an
accident, and one of : the, drivers claims compensation
from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other
driver denies negligence or claims that the injured
claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary
to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent
and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for
the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his
contributory negligence. Therefore, where the injured is
himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite
negligence' will not apply nor can there be an automatic
inference that the negligence was 50 : 50 as has been
assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have
examined the extent of contributory negligence of the
appellant and thereby avoided confusion between
composite negligence and contributory negligence. The
High Court has failed to correct the said error."
(emphasis added)
26. The argument that the charge-sheet was not challenged, cannot be
determinative of the matter. The assessment of the respective negligence of
the parties is made on the basis of preponderance of probability. The
criminal record, at best would have given some kind of indication or
guidance but considering the burden of proof in a MACT inquiry is different
than a criminal proceeding, it cannot become fully conclusive.
27. The Supreme Court in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC (2009) 13 SCC
530, stated that strict proof of the manner of the accident is seldom possible
and that once the claimants place material such as the FIR, site plan or
eyewitness account, the Tribunal must accept the occurrence on a
'preponderance of probabilities'. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as
under:
"11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal
stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties;
its function being to determine the amount of fair
compensation in the event an accident has taken place by
reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is
true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the
provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua
non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not
mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the
claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an
accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be
ignored only on the basis of a post-mortem report vis-à-vis
the averments made in a claim petition.
***
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly
taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be
borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a
particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible
to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to
establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of
probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose,
the High Court should have taken into consideration the
respective stories set forth by both the parties."
(emphasis added)
28. Similarly, in Kusum Lata v. Satbir (2011) 3 SCC 646, the Supreme
Court cautioned that the Tribunal and the High Court must not discard
otherwise reliable evidence on hyper-technical grounds, such as
non-mention of an eyewitness in the FIR, given the traumatic circumstances
in which such accidents occur. The Court held that MACT proceedings do
not require the strict proof applicable in criminal trials and that the evidence
must be appreciated in a realistic and humane manner. Relevant observations
are as follows:
"8. Both the Tribunal and the High Court have refused to
accept the presence of Dheeraj Kumar as his name was not
disclosed in the FIR by the brother of the victim. This
Court is unable to appreciate the aforesaid approach of
the Tribunal and the High Court. This Court is of the
opinion that when a person is seeing that his brother,
being knocked down by a speeding vehicle, was suffering
in pain and was in need of immediate medical attention,
that person is obviously under a traumatic condition. His
first attempt will be to take his brother to a hospital or to a
doctor. It is but natural for such a person not to be
conscious of the presence of any person in the vicinity
especially when Dheeraj did not stop at the spot after the
accident and gave a chase to the offending vehicle. Under
such mental strain if the brother of the victim forgot to take
down the number of the offending vehicle it was also not
unnatural.
9. There is no reason why the Tribunal and the High Court
would ignore the otherwise reliable evidence of Dheeraj
Kumar. In fact, no cogent reason has been assigned either
by the Tribunal or by the High Court for discarding the
evidence of Dheeraj Kumar. The so-called reason that as
the name of Dheeraj Kumar was not mentioned in the FIR,
so it was not possible for Dheeraj Kumar to see the
incident, is not a proper assessment of the fact situation in
this case. It is well known that in a case relating to motor
accident claims, the claimants are not required to prove
the case as it is required to be done in a criminal trial. The
Court must keep this distinction in mind."
(emphasis added)
29. In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajani Sahoo
(2025) 2 SCC 599, the Supreme Court held that FIR, charge-sheet, and final
report can be relied upon by the Tribunal to infer rash and negligent driving.
Filing of a charge-sheet prima facie indicates negligence. The Tribunal
needs to have a holistic view of the evidence available with it. The following
was observed by the Supreme Court:
"8. As regards the reliability of charge-sheet and other
documents collected by the police during the investigation
in motor accident cases, this Court in Mangla Ram v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2018) 5 SCC 656, held in
para 27, thus :
"27. Another reason which weighed with the High
Court to interfere in the first appeal filed by
Respondents 2 and 3, was absence of finding by the
Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the
driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is
untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done
by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701
was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2
when it collided with the motorcycle of the
appellant leading to the accident. This can be
discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the
contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police,
naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent
decision in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier
Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646, noted that the key of
negligence on the part of the driver of the offending
vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to
be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability and certainly not by
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice
it to observe that the exposition in the judgments
already adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet
against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards
his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and
rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be
acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined
that the same may be of no effect on the assessment
of the liability required in respect of motor accident
cases by the tribunal."
(emphasis supplied)
9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral and
documentary evidence including the FIR, final report and
such other documents prepared by the police in connection
with the accident in question. The Tribunal had also taken
note of the fact that based on the final report, the driver of
the offending truck was tried and found guilty for rash and
negligent driving. The High Court took note of such
aspects and found no illegality in the procedure adopted
by the Tribunal and consequently dismissed the appeal.
10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a
decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi
(2023) 13 SCC 510 this Court held thus :
"12. ... A holistic view of the evidence has to be
taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict
proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle
in a particular manner need not be established by
the claimants. The claimants have to establish their
case on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities. The standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be applied while
considering the petition seeking compensation on
account of death or injury in a road traffic
accident. To the same effect is the observation
made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v.
Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC 646 which
has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla
Devi."
11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the
position that the question regarding negligence which is
essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident
claim should be considered based on the evidence
available before the Tribunal. If the police records are
available before the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of
the Act it cannot be said that looking into such documents
for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible or
inadmissible."
(emphasis added)
30. In light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in a plethora
of judgments, it would be imperative for this Court to assess the evidence
placed on record by the parties.
31. A perusal of the FIR reveals that Amardeep Singh, in his statement,
has not stated that he was travelling in the car at the time of the accident.
Therefore, his testimony to that extent cannot be relevant.
32. There is no mention of a road blockage in the FIR, the statements or
the charge-sheet. In the cross-examination of Mohan Lal (the driver),
nothing has been put forward on behalf of the claimants that he himself was
driving negligently or that the road was blocked on the other side. None of
these aspects has been recorded; in fact, the cross-examination is extremely
short, and the only thing which is noted is as follows:
"I have not made any complaint against the driver of the
Indica car regarding rash and negligent driving of the car
by him. I was arrested by the police and I am on bail."
33. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Mohammed Siddique & Anr. v
National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. 2020 INSC 17 held that
contributory negligence applies only when there is a clear link between the
victim's violation of law and either the occurrence of the accident or the
severity of the injuries. If the accident could have been avoided, or the harm
could have been minimised had the victim not violated the law, the victim
may be held partly responsible. The relevant paragraph is extracted as under:
"13....There must either be a causal connection between the
violation and the accident or a causal connection between the
violation and the impact of the accident upon the victim. It may so
happen at times, that the accident could have been averted or the
injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if there had
been no violation of the law by the victim. What could otherwise
have resulted in a simple injury, might have resulted in a
grievous injury or even death due to the violation of the law by
the victim. It is in such cases, where, but for the violation of the
law, either the accident could have been averted or the impact
could have been minimized, that the principle of contributory
negligence could be invoked..."
(emphasis added)
34. The Supreme Court in Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v.
Karamasey Kunvargi Tak & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 455, observed as under:
"9. Subject to non-requirement of the existence of duty, the
question of contributory negligence is to be decided on the same
principle on which the question of the defendant's negligence is
decided. The standard of a reasonable man is as relevant in the
case of a plaintiff's contributory negligence as in the case of a
defendant's negligence. But the degree of want of care which
will constitute contributory negligence, varies with the
circumstances and the factual situation of the case. The
following observation of the High Court of Australia in Astley v.
Austrust Ltd. [(1999) 73 ALJR 403] is worthy of quoting:
"A finding of contributory negligence turns on a factual
investigation whether the plaintiff contributed to his or her
own loss by failing to take reasonable care of his or her
person or property. What is reasonable care depends on the
circumstances of the case. In many cases, it may be proper
for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to perform its duty. But
there is no absolute rule. The duties and responsibilities of
the defendant are a variable factor in determining whether
contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. In
some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the
plaintiff from a claim of contributory negligence; in other
cases, the nature of the duty may reduce the plaintiff's share
of responsibility for the damage suffered; and in yet other
cases the nature of the duty may not prevent a finding that the
plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for the safety of his or
her person or property. Contributory negligence focuses on
the conduct of the plaintiff. The duty owed by the defendant,
although relevant, is one only of many factors that must be
weighed in determining whether the plaintiff has so
conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care for the
safety of its person or property."
(emphasis added)
35. In view of the above, the claimants have failed to prove that the
negligence was only on part of driver of the offending vehicle. Submission
of the claimant that the FIR and chargesheet are enough to prove sole
negligence on the part of driver is unmerited. There seems to be some
contributory negligence by the deceased, considering he was driving on the
wrong carriageway. Even if it is accepted (though not proved) that the other
carriageway was closed due to road work, driver of the Indica car ought to
have been extra careful in avoiding any oncoming traffic and using all
precautions like slow driving, blinking hazard lights, and honking to warn
the oncoming vehicles of their presence. None of this has been stated by the
witnesses in their testimonies before the MACT.
36. To the contrary, Mohan Lal, driver of the offending vehicle, has
categorically stated that Indica car was on the wrong side of the road, in high
speed, and he tried his best to avoid the accident.
37. Accordingly, contributory negligence of 50% is attributed to the
deceased.
38. As regards the issue of assessment of quantum, Smt. Usha Devi
deposed as PW-1 and stated that deceased was a property dealer and used to
earn Rs.7,000/- per month; however, she had not adduced any
evidence/document to prove the earnings of the deceased, also no document
had been filed to show educational qualifications of the deceased.
Accordingly, the MACT was right in assessing it as minimum wages of an
unskilled worker and, therefore, Rs.3,633/- per month had been taken as the
monthly income.
39. As per Pranay Sethi (supra), since deceased was self-employed,
future prospects ought to have been taken into account.
40. In this regard, the following shall be granted:
i. Future Prospects at 25%, considering that the deceased was 44 years
of the age and was self-employed at the time of accident.
ii. Only Rs. 1,00,000/- was awarded towards the loss of consortium,
whereas there were four dependents and, therefore, loss of consortium
would be Rs. 40,000/- X 4 = Rs. 1,60,000/-.
iii. Compensation awarded under the head of Loss of love and affection
ought to be deleted, in view of United India Insurance Company
Limited vs. Satinder Kaur Alias Satwinder Kaur and Others (2021)
11 SCC 780
iv. Funeral expenses were awarded at Rs. 25,000/-; shall be reduced to
Rs. 15,000/- in terms of Pranay Sethi (supra).
v. Loss of estate awarded at Rs. 10,000/-; shall also be enhanced to Rs.
15,000/- in terms of Pranay Sethi (supra).
41. The revised computation, therefore, is provided as under:
S. Heads of compensation Awarded by the Awarded by this
No. Tribunal Court
1 Income of deceased (A) (less Rs. 3,633/- Rs. 3,633/-
Income Tax)
2 Add Future Prospects (B) - 25% of 3,633 =
Rs. 908.25/-
Rounded off to
Rs. 908/-
3 Less Personal expenses of the Rs. 908/- Rs. 1,135.25/-
deceased (C) @ 1/4th
4 Monthly loss of dependency [(A Rs. 2,725/- Rs. 3,405.75/-
+B)-C = D]
5 Annual loss of dependency Rs. 32,700/- Rs. 40,869/-
(Dx12)
7 Total loss of dependency Rs. 5,23,200/- Rs. 5,72,166/-
(Dx12xE = F)
8 Medical expenses (G) - -
9 Compensation for loss of Rs. 1,00,000/- 40,000 x 4 =
consortium (H) Rs. 1,60,000/-
10 Compensation for loss of love Rs. 1,00,000/- -
and affection (I)
11 Compensation for loss of estate Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 15,000/-
(J)
12 Compensation towards funeral Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 15,000/-
expenses (K)
13 Total compensation Rs. 7,58,200/- Rs. 7,62,166
(F+G+H-I+J+K = L)
14 Rate of Interest Awarded 7.5% per annum 7.5% per annum
42. As stated above, the deceased is liable for the contributory negligence
to the extent of 50% and thus, compensation payable to the claimant is Rs.
3,81,083/- (Rs.7,62,166 - 50% of Rs. 7,62,166), along with the interest at the
rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.
Directions
43. Vide order dated 18th September 2015, this Court directed the
appellant/UPSRTC to deposit the awarded amount, subject to which stay
was granted. Further the Court directed release 50% of the amount to
claimants, in terms of the award passed by MACT and the remaining amount
was directed to be kept in an interest-bearing FDR. On 05th October 2016,
this Court noted that in terms of order dated 18th September 2015, 50% of the
amount has been released and directed the Registrar General of this Court to
release monthly interest on the FDR to Smt. Usha Devi, wife of the deceased
every month by transferring the same to her savings bank account.
44. Accordingly, the balance amount, if any, as per the revised
computation, shall be released to Smt. Usha Devi/claimant upon due
verification and the balance be released in favour of UPSRTC.
45. Accordingly, the appeals stand disposed of with above directions.
46. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of as being rendered
infructuous.
47. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to Insurance Company.
48. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL
(JUDGE)
APRIL 01, 2026/ak/bp
