Delhi High Court
Dr Thelma J Talloo vs Jesus And Mary College & Anr on 12 September, 2025
Author: Jasmeet Singh
Bench: Jasmeet Singh
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 31.07.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 12.09.2025
+ O.M.P. 150/2013
DR THELMA J TALLOO .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Yasobant Das, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Arunav Patnaik, Mr. Nirbhay Nitya
Nanda, Advocates
versus
JESUS AND MARY COLLEGE & ANOTHER .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Romy Chacko, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Joe Sebastian, Mr. Akshat Singh, Mr.
Ashwin Romy, Advocates for the
Respondent No. 1.
Ms. Manisha Singh, Advocate for the
Respondent No. 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FACTUAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................... 2
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER ............................................................... 7
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 ............................................... 10
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 ............................................... 12
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS................................................................................ 13
On Charge No. I - Demand of Cash, Mobile Phone and Saree from Aakanksha
Gulia .................................................................................................................... 14
On Charge No. II - Demand of an Inverter from Saraswati Chhabra ............. 18
On Charge No. III - Demand of String of Pearls and Diamond Earrings from
Meghna Khanna.................................................................................................. 19
On Charge No. IV - Demand of Silver Accessory from Deepanjali Khurana . 22
On Charge No. V - Demand of Marks in Examination from Kalpana John... 22
On Additional Contentions of the Petitioner ..................................................... 22
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 29
1. This is a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (for brevity "the Act") challenging the Award dated 23.10.2012
passed by the Appeals Committee constituted under Clause 9 of Annexure to
Ordinance XII of the University of Delhi.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Dr. Thelma J. Talloo (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") is a former
Reader in the Commerce Department with Jesus and Mary College
(hereinafter referred to as "the respondent No. 1") affiliated with University
of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent No. 2").
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3. The facts leading up to the filing of the present petition as per the petitioner
are that in 1982, the petitioner was appointed as a lecturer in the Department
of Commerce at respondent No. 1. The petitioner had strained relations with
the principal of the respondent No. 1 and some members of the
administration, owing to her strong and bold stance on various issues.
4. In the academic year 2007-08, three students of the Second Year B.A. (P)
course, namely, Akansha Gulia, Saraswati Chabbra and Sneha Jaichand,
who were close friends, began to disrupt classes by their behaviour and
frequently absenting themselves. When the petitioner sought to discipline
them, they mocked her in class and started spreading false allegations
against her. Despite repeated showdowns, their harassment continued. At the
end of the academic year, both Akansha Gulia and Sneha Jaichand had
shortage of attendance.
5. On 27.03.2008, Akansha Gulia repeatedly called the petitioner on her
mobile phone at home, offering bribes in return for attendance. The
petitioner reprimanded her for such audacity, yet Akansha Gulia continued
to call, offering items such as a new mobile phone, a new saree and cash.
6. During one of the calls, the petitioner was cooking in the kitchen and her
daughter, Luvika Talloo, was attending the calls on speakerphone so that her
mother could hear. Mr. Shambu Prasad Singh, a Senior Advocate and a
family friend, was present in the house of the petitioner and witnessed the
situation. Observing the distress of the petitioner, Mr. Singh suggested that
the petitioner feign willingness to accept the bribe, to which the petitioner
agreed.
7. When Akansha Gulia called again, the petitioner pretended to accept the
bribe and asked her to come over. Mr. Singh, in turn, alerted the local police.
However, Akansha Gulia never arrived. Unknown to the petitioner, Akansha
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Gulia and Saraswati Chabbra had conspired to record the conversations on
the phone of Saraswati Chabbra. The students later edited the recordings,
deleting portions unfavourable to them, thereby giving the impression that
the petitioner had demanded the bribe. Importantly, no call was ever
initiated by the petitioner and all calls were made by Akansha Gulia.
8. Much later, through an RTI, the petitioner received an extract of the
Governing Body resolution dated 09.04.2008, which recorded two
complaints from Akansha Gulia and Saraswati Chabbra regarding the
mobile phone conversation. No other complaints were placed before the
Governing Body till that time.
9. On 11.04.2008, the principal of the respondent No. 1 summoned the
petitioner, citing representations from students. The petitioner suspected this
to be the handiwork of Akansha Gulia, Saraswati Chabbra and Sneha
Jaichand. She also voiced her apprehensions regarding these students in
writing to the principal of respondent No. 1 on 16.04.2008. However, the
principal of respondent No. 1 appeared disinterested in her explanation and
seemed inclined to exploit the situation.
10. On 30.04.2008, the petitioner was served with a Statement of Articles of
Charge containing five articles of charge based on five complaints. This
came as a shock to her, as until 09.04.2008, only the two complaints from
Akansha Gulia and Saraswati Chabbra were on record. The inclusion of new
complaints clearly revealed a conspiracy.
11. Among the complaints:
A. Akansha Gulia alleged bribery on the basis of the edited conversation.
B. Saraswati Chabbra also alleged demand of illegal gratification, though
her attendance was nearly 100% due to sports concessions, making
her claim false.
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C. Sneha Jaichand, with low attendance, gave a statement claiming to
have heard about the incident nine days later, which is also alleged to
be fabricated.
D. Meghna Khanna, who had been caught cheating in her exams, gave a
backdated complaint dated 12.03.2008 alleging she gifted pearls to the
petitioner in lieu of attendance, but contradicted herself under cross-
examination. Her attendance records disproved her story.
E. Kalpana John and Deepanjali Khurana gave complaints under
pressure from the principal of the respondent No. 1, but did not pursue
them.
12. However, none of these alleged complaints dated March 2008 were
mentioned in the Governing Body minutes of 09.04.2008, confirming that
they were procured later to strengthen the conspiracy against the petitioner.
13. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner was denied access to documents
forming the basis of the charges. She wrote several letters, but to no avail.
On 20.06.2008, she submitted a detailed reply to the charges, highlighting
the fabricated nature of the complaints and warning of a conspiracy to oust
her.
14. On 28.06.2008, the Governing Body decided to initiate an inquiry. Even
before the Inquiry Committee was properly constituted on 02.07.2008, the
petitioner was subjected to prolonged questioning on 01.07.2008, reflecting
a predetermined bias. The Chairman of the Governing Body, while
constituting the Inquiry Committee, even remarked that her denial "lacked
substance", prejudging the case.
15. Thereafter, the inquiry proceeded in a manifestly unfair and biased manner.
The Committee refused to share fair minutes of proceedings, recorded
biased comments and disallowed the petitioner from presenting her
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witnesses, including her entire class and Mr. Singh, who had personally
overheard the incriminating conversation.
16. Matters escalated on 30.10.2008, when the petitioner was suddenly
suspended from her position as Head of Department and reduced to
subsistence allowance, revealing the vindictive intent of the authorities.
17. Despite intervention by this Court in W.P. (C) 7906/2008 directing supply of
documents and fair opportunity to defend, the Inquiry Committee continued
to obstruct her rights.
18. The Committee denied her legal representation, forcing her to cross-examine
complainants herself and even humiliated her counsel. They refused to allow
her witnesses and rejected representations signed by her students. Even after
she suffered a heart attack in 2009, her requests for adjournment or
representation by counsel were denied.
19. The inquiry was rushed and conducted with procedural improprieties. On
20.05.2010, the petitioner received the Inquiry Report holding four out of
the five charges proved. She submitted a detailed representation, leading the
Governing Body to reopen the inquiry. Yet, even after reopening, the
Committee hurriedly concluded proceedings without allowing full cross-
examination or defence witnesses and in its Report dated 19.08.2010, held
three charges proved.
20. Despite her detailed representation, the Governing Body dismissed her from
service on 06.07.2011.
21. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Clause 9(1) of the Annexure to
Ordinance XII of Delhi University before the Appeals Committee. On
23.05.2012, the Appeals Committee, despite testimony from Mr. Singh,
confirming that it was he who had suggested the trap, failed to give due
weight to his statement.
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22. On 23.10.2012, the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal, merely
reducing the penalty from dismissal to termination, so that the retiral dues of
the petitioner would not be affected.
23. The Appeals Committee failed to properly evaluate the evidence, overlooked
the challenge of the petitioner to the tainted inquiry and simply reiterated the
findings of the Inquiry Committee.
24. Aggrieved by the award of the Appeals Committee, the petitioner is
constrained to file the present petition under Section 34 of the Act.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER
25. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has
made the following submissions:
26. Violation of Statutory Safeguards under Ordinance XII : Clause 6 of the
Annexure to Ordinance XII mandates that before terminating services of a
teacher, the Governing Body must (i) furnish written grounds, (ii) provide an
opportunity to reply, (iii) grant personal hearing if requested, and (iv) duly
consider the case of the teacher before arriving at a final decision. In the
present case, the Governing Body failed to issue a further show cause notice
on the inquiry report, did not record independent findings and directly
imposed dismissal, in contravention of Clause 6 and judicial
pronouncements in Dr. M.S. Frank v. Delhi University & Ors.,
2015:DHC:5697 and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 (7)
SCC 739.
27. Improper Constitution of the Inquiry Committee : The Governing Body
appointed its own members as the Inquiry Committee and thereafter
accepted the report with the same members participating in the Governing
Body meeting. This offends the principle that "no person can be a judge in
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his own cause", as laid down in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262 and creates a clear case of bias.
28. Fabricated and Unreliable Evidence : The principal allegation rested on a
manipulated phone recording between the petitioner and a student. The call
was made from the phone of a student but recorded on the device of another
student, raising grave doubts of tampering. No forensic verification was
conducted. Nevertheless, both the Inquiry Committee and the Appeals
Committee accepted the transcript as "natural and reliable", ignoring basic
evidentiary safeguards.
29. Failure to Consider Material Evidence : The Appeals Committee
disregarded crucial defense evidence, including the deposition of Senior
Advocate Mr. Singh, who corroborated the version of the petitioner and had
advised involving the police. Similarly, representations from students
supporting the integrity of the petitioner and contradictions in the
testimonies of the complainants were ignored, namely, Saraswati Chhabra
admitting attendance was not an issue and Meghna Khanna denying shortage
of attendance.
30. Denial of Legal Assistance and Fair Opportunity : The petitioner, being an
academic and not trained in law, was compelled to cross-examine witnesses
without legal assistance, while the Appeals Committee later faulted her for
inadequacies in cross-examination. This denial of counsel, coupled with
reliance on untested testimonies, constitutes a breach of natural justice.
31. Limited and Flawed Exercise by the Appeals Committee : The Appeals
Committee erroneously adopted the stance that its role was merely to see
whether principles of natural justice were broadly followed, rather than
exercising original arbitral jurisdiction under Clause 9. It failed to provide
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independent findings on Articles of Charge II and III, cursorily upholding
them without reasoned analysis, thereby abdicating its statutory function.
32. Arbitral Award Not Meeting Requirements of Law : Under Section 34 of the
Act, an arbitral award must be reasoned, consider all contentions and reflect
judicial application of mind. The present award merely reproduces the
conclusions of the Inquiry Committee without reasons, rendering it
unintelligible and perverse. Reliance is placed on State of Orissa v.
Samantary Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine SC 856 and Dyna
Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, which
permit interference where awards suffer from perversity, patent error, or lack
of reasoning.
33. Disproportionate Penalty : Even assuming that misconduct was established,
dismissal was excessive and disproportionate to the alleged charges,
violating Article 14 as laid down in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal
Pradesh & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 442.
34. Relief Sought - Modification of Award : The petitioner has crossed the age of
superannuation and seeks only removal of stigma. In exercise of powers
under Section 34 of this Act, this Court may modify the arbitral award and
substitute dismissal with voluntary retirement, in line with the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gayatri Balaswamy v. ISG Novasoft
Technologies Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 9861, which recognized a limited
power of modification under Section 34 of the Act.
35. Equitable Considerations : The petitioner has an unblemished record of 26
years. The dismissal has caused immense trauma, including serious health
complications for her and her family. In these circumstances, equity and
justice warrant interference with the impugned arbitral award to prevent
perpetuation of grave injustice.
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36. Mr. Chacko, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
No. 1, has made the following submissions:
37. Proof of Misconduct through Direct Evidence : The petitioner was charged
with demanding illegal gratification from students in return for academic
favours. The charges were supported by cogent evidence, namely, recorded
conversation with Akansha Gulia, admitted by the petitioner and testimonies
of Saraswati Chhabra and Meghna Khanna, consistent and unshaken in
cross-examination. The Inquiry Committee, after due process, found
Charges I, II and III proved.
38. Fair Inquiry and Opportunity of Defence : The petitioner was supplied all
documents and permitted to cross-examine witnesses pursuant to directions
of this Court in W.P.(C) 7906/2008. She admitted the recorded conversation
but failed to substantiate her claim of tampering when specifically asked.
Thus, the petitioner was afforded full opportunity of defence and no
violation of natural justice was made out.
39. No Bias or Illegality in Constitution of the Inquiry Committee : The Inquiry
Committee was duly constituted by the Governing Body in accordance with
Ordinance XII. The petitioner did not object to its composition during
proceedings or in her writ petition. The Inquiry Committee as well as the
Appeals Committee members did not participate in the final decision of the
Governing Body. Thus, the allegations of bias are an afterthought and
untenable.
40. Reasoned Findings by the Appeals Committee : The Appeals Committee
independently assessed the evidence, including the transcript of the phone
recording. It found the conversation natural and reliable and rejected the
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explanation of the petitioner as unconvincing. It upheld the findings of the
Inquiry Committee by a reasoned order, satisfying the mandate of law.
41. Modification of Penalty Already Granted : The Governing Body, on
07.11.2012, modified dismissal into simple termination, ensuring that the
petitioner received all retiral dues. The petitioner accepted the benefits and
having done so, cannot now seek further modification of the penalty.
42. Limited Scope of Judicial Review under Section 34 : It is settled law that
Section 34 of the Act does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or
interference with findings of fact (National Highways Authority of India v.
Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6524). The
arbitral award can be set aside only for conflict with public policy, patent
illegality, or violation of natural justice (National Highways Authority of
India v. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr.,
2025:DHC:5126). The present petition raises only factual disputes without
demonstrating perversity, illegality, or prejudice.
43. Disciplinary Proceedings Not Vitiated by Technicalities : In domestic
inquiries, strict rules of evidence do not apply and logically probative
material is sufficient as held in the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India & Anr., 1982 (1) SCC
143 and State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh, 1977 (2) SCC 491. Both
the Committees comprised eminent individuals with unimpeachable
integrity and no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner.
44. No Violation of Constitutional or Statutory Protection : The petitioner is not
a public servant and thus, Article 311 of the Constitution has no application.
Further, the respondent No. 1 is not a statutory body and hence, no violation
of statutory provisions arises. Thus, the present petition is liable to be
dismissed.
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45. Ms. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2, has
made the following submissions:
46. Scope of the Submissions : The submissions of the respondent No. 2 are
confined to the only legal contention urged on behalf of the petitioner,
namely, that the Appeals Committee failed to give its own finding on the
issues raised and merely adopted the findings of the Inquiry Committee.
47. Independent Application of Mind by the Arbitral Tribunal : The findings of
the Appeals Committee clearly establish that it duly appreciated the
contentions of the petitioner, considered the material placed on record and
thereafter gave its own findings. Even where the Appeals Committee
concurred with the conclusions of the Inquiry Committee, such concurrence
was arrived at only after independent consideration of the rival submissions
and on being satisfied that the findings of the Inquiry Committee were just
and proper.
48. Consideration of Quantum of Punishment : The Appeals Committee did not
mechanically affirm the punishment imposed but applied its mind to the
overall circumstances. Taking a balanced view, the Appeals Committee
converted the punishment of dismissal into that of a simple termination,
thereby safeguarding the retiral dues of the petitioner. This itself
demonstrates independent evaluation and exercise of discretion by the
Appeals Committee.
49. No Blind Borrowing of Findings : In light of the above, it is stated that the
Appeals Committee had not blindly borrowed the findings of the Inquiry
Committee and the record demonstrates active application of mind and
reasoned satisfaction by the Appeals Committee.
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50. Preclusion from Raising Fresh Objections : Further, the petitioner, who was
represented by counsel before the Inquiry Committee, did not seek any
opportunity to lead fresh evidence. Having failed to avail such opportunity,
the petitioner is now precluded from contending that the Appeals Committee
should have permitted or considered fresh evidence and hence, the present
petition is liable to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
51. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
52. The contours of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act are well settled.
This Court is not an appellate forum and cannot reassess or reappreciate
evidence as if sitting in appeal. Its role is supervisory and intervention is
permissible only on the limited grounds expressly provided in Section 34 of
the Act. The arbitral award can be set aside only for conflict with public
policy, patent illegality, or violation of natural justice.
53. This principle has been laid down in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited v. Delhi Airport Metro
Express Limited, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 522, wherein the Hon'ble Court
endorsed the position in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development
Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 and Ssangyong Engineering and Construction
Company Limited v. National Highway Authority of India, AIR 2019 SC
5041, on the scope for interference with domestic award under Section 34 of
the Act. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
"39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available for
setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator
is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable
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person would have arrived at it; or the construction of the
contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take;
or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view.
[Patel Engg. Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd.,
(2020) 7 SCC 167 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 149.] A "finding"
based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of "patent illegality". An
award without reasons would suffer from patent illegality. The
arbitrator commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not
within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of
natural justice."
On Charge No. I - Demand of Cash, Mobile Phone and Saree from Aakanksha
Gulia
54. The principal charge against the petitioner concerns a recorded conversation
between her and a student, which formed the foundation of the disciplinary
action. The Appeals Committee examined this evidence in detail and
observed:
"A perusal of the above transcript does show that the
conversation proceeded on a very natural basis and the flow of
the conversation does not indicate that it was altered or
amended or certain portions omitted. It was also stated that the
telephone on which the recordings was made did not belong to
Aakanksha Gulia but belonged to Saraswati Chhabra.
Aakanksha Gulia stated that the conversation on her phone was
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recorded on Saraswati Chhabra‟s phone who was also a
witness to the incident.
...
... However, insofar the transcript of the tape is concerned, it
does appear to be natural and worthy of reliance. In our view,
Charge No. 1 had been fully brought home and the findings of
the Enquiry Committee and the action thereupon taken by the
Governing Body and affirmed by the Vice Chancellor after
taking a legal opinion are not such so as to warrant
interference in this appeal. We have to keep in mind the fact
that a domestic enquiry has to be procedurally fair, which, in
this case, clearly was and consequently, no fault could be found
by us in the conduct of the enquiry. The appellant‟s plea that
the transcript was edited is not substantiated by perusing the
flow of the conversation and even if it is assumed that the
appellant‟s case of editing the portion of the tape in the end
where she provided her residential address is correct, the
reliance of the enquiry committee upon the conversation cannot
be faulted. Similarly the appellant‟s plea that she was trying to
trap the student Akanksha Gulia, is unnatural and seems to
have been prepared to meet the damaging impact of the
recorded conversation. Similarly the plea that a senior Counsel
was present at about 11.30 A.M on a working day at home is
puzzling and not acceptable. Thus the charge of demand of a
Nokia Phone or money to increase the attendance is fully borne
out. ..."
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55. This Court finds no infirmity in the reliance on such material. In Rattan
Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court settled the principle that strict
rules of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not apply to domestic enquiries.
What is required is some material which is logically probative for a prudent
mind. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act
may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay
evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals
must be careful in evaluating such material and should not
glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the
Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to
cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken
through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both
sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the
basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of
independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such
finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held
good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves,
perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone
out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a
valid finding could be recorded. The „residuum‟ rule to which
counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain
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passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that
extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid
requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or
was there no evidence -- not in the sense of the technical rules
governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense
way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept.
Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the
finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of
any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for
the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law
apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence
of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence
which has relevance to the charge levelled against the
respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is
invalid on that ground."
56. In the present case, the recorded conversation, corroborated by witness
testimony, constitutes probative material that reasonably supports the
findings of guilt. The contention of the petitioner that the tape was edited or
that she was attempting to trap the student was duly considered and rejected
by the Appeals Committee as implausible.
57. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the conclusion reached by the
Appeals Committee is based on appreciation of evidence, application of
mind and is plausible, as the finding of guilt on Charge No. I is based on
evidence which satisfies the test of probative value as recognised in Rattan
Singh (supra). Hence, the concurrent finding of the Inquiry Committee and
the Appeals Committee on evidence cannot be re-appreciated under Section
34 of the Act.
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On Charge No. II - Demand of an Inverter from Saraswati Chhabra
58. With respect to the second charge, the Appeals Committee recorded the
following finding:
"5.1 Insofar as Article II of the charge sheet is concerned it
related to the demand for illegal gratification made to the
Student Saraswati Chhabra for improving her attendance. The
Student‟s testimony for a demand of an inverter not having
been controverted in cross-examination, the said charge was
held proved by the enquiry committee and no fault can be found
with this finding. Accordingly we agree with the Enquiry
Committee that Charge 2 is also proved."
59. The Inquiry Committee, in its Report dated 19.07.2010, had elaborated and
analyzed the evidence in detail. It recorded the testimony of the
complainant, Saraswati Chhabra, who categorically deposed that when she
was in the First Year, the petitioner had demanded an inverter from her in
exchange for attendance. Upon refusal, she was subjected to harassment in
the Second Year, being denied attendance for trivial delays while other
students were granted relaxation.
60. The Report further records that the witness was made available for cross-
examination by the petitioner in several meetings. Ultimately, she was cross-
examined at length on 17.12.2009. Despite this opportunity, the petitioner
did not put any question to controvert the allegation of demand for an
inverter. On the contrary, the witness reiterated in cross-examination that the
demand had indeed been made and that her subsequent difficulties in
securing attendance were retaliatory in nature.
61. The Inquiry Committee thus concluded:
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"This claim of Saraswati Chhabra for the demand of a
"Invertor" by the DE was not refuted by the DE in the cross
examination.
In our opinion, the charge under Article II is substantiated and
found to be correct and the DE is guilty of harassing Saraswati
Chhabra by making various demands on her illegally for
clearing her attendance. The DE by her act is guilty of serious
misconduct, demanding illegal gratification for falsifying
attendance records, dishonestly attempting to extort money and
committing acts subversive of discipline and violating norms of
good behaviour. The DE has acted in a manner detrimental to
the interests and good name of the College/University."
62. This Court finds that the charge rests on direct testimony which remained
unshaken in cross-examination. The proceedings reveal that the petitioner
was afforded multiple opportunities to challenge the witness and to lead her
own evidence, which she failed to utilise. The law is well settled that where
testimony is unchallenged, it constitutes adequate proof of the charge. The
findings of both Committees are thus based on cogent and uncontroverted
material.
63. Accordingly, the finding on Charge No. II is supported by direct, probative
and uncontroverted evidence. The conclusion of the Inquiry Committee,
duly affirmed by the Appeals Committee, does not disclose any perversity or
patent illegality warranting interference under Section 34 of the Act.
On Charge No. III - Demand of String of Pearls and Diamond Earrings from
Meghna Khanna
64. On the third charge, the Appeals Committee observed:
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"5.2 Article III of the charges is in respect of an illegal demand
from the Student Meghna Khanna for a string of pearls (which
was given by her) and diamond earrings which were not given.
Meghna Khanna‟s mother dealt in diamonds and her testimony
has withstood the prolonged cross examination. The Enquiry
Committee rightly believed Meghna Khanna and we are
satisfied that this finding was rightly recorded."
65. The Inquiry Committee recorded as under:
"The complainant/witness Meghna Khanna appeared before
the Inquiry Committee on 26th July 2008 and deposed before
the Inquiry Committee in the presence of DE. She stated that
the complaint was made of her own free will and without any
pressures from anybody, Meghna Khanna stated that the
demands made as well as accepting gifts by the DE were
common knowledge and many students who were victims to the
harassment of DE were afraid to come forward to complain
fearing the consequences. ... In her complaint Meghna Khanna
has stated that the DE had been asking her to gift diamond
earrings for the past about 1 year in return for favours such as
attendance and internal assessment marks. Meghna Khanna
further stated that although she was not short of attendance or
required any favours from the DE, only out of fear from the DE,
she gifted the DE a pearl string in March 2008 and that the DE
took it. ...
The complainant Meghna Khanna was finally Cross Examined
on 17th July 2010 by the DE where in the complainant again
vehemently stood her ground and stated repeatedly that the
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complaint had been made of her own will and based on facts
and there was no duress or coercion from any quarter. In the
Cross Examination by the DE, Meghna Khanna reiterated that
she had given a pearl string to the DE on the college premises
and that the DE had taken it.
Meghna Khanna maintained that although she was not short of
attendance nor required any favours from the DE, she gave the
pearl string out of pressure and fear of the DE. The DE had
been pressing her. Meghna-Khanna, for the gift on the pretext
that she, Meghna Khanna, was short of attendance and that
she, Meghana Khanna had no way of confirming this, except
for the word of the DE. During Cross Examination Meghna
Khanna further stated that she felt that the DE could do any
thing to the attendance record and therefore out of fear of the
DE she gave the pearl string. In our opinion the DE through the
Cross Examination was unable to disprove the allegation and
complaint of Meghna Khanna.
In our considered opinion, the DE is guilty of accepting illegal
gratification in the form of a pearl string with promise of
favours like tampering the attendance and internal assessment,
in return. The DE has committed serious misconduct, misused
her position of authority and victimised the students. The DE
has dishonestly extorted illegal gratification from the student.
All these acts from the DE are subversive of discipline and
violating the norms of proper conduct of the
College/University. The DE has acted in a manner detrimental
to the interests and good name of the College/University."
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66. From the above, it is evident that the allegation of demand and acceptance of
a pearl string was clearly established. The testimony of Meghna Khanna was
consistent, voluntary and withstood prolonged cross-examination. The
petitioner failed to discredit her evidence or to establish any element of
coercion or fabrication. Both Committees concurrently accepted her version,
finding the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification to be proved.
67. This Court finds no reason to interfere with this concurrent appreciation of
evidence under Section 34 of the Act. The finding on Charge No. III, like
the earlier two charges, stands firmly established and does not disclose any
infirmity warranting judicial intervention.
On Charge No. IV - Demand of Silver Accessory from Deepanjali Khurana
On Charge No. V - Demand of Marks in Examination from Kalpana John
68. Charges IV and V against the petitioner were dropped by the respondent No.
1, since despite the prolonged spell of cross-examination, the concerned
complainants, though initially present, could not ultimately be examined,
and on account of their subsequent unavailability, the said charges were not
pursued further.
On Additional Contentions of the Petitioner
69. The petitioner contended that Clause 6 of the Annexure to Ordinance XII of
the University of Delhi was violated. Clause 6 is reproduced as under:
"6. The Governing Body shall not determine the engagement of
the teacher whether summarily or otherwise without informing
him in writing of the grounds on which they propose to take
action and giving him a reasonable opportunity of stating his
case in writing, and before coming to a final decision shall duly
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consider the teacher‟s statement and if he so desires give him a
personal hearing."
70. However, this Court finds no such infirmity. The Statement of Articles of
Charge dated 30.04.2008 was duly served upon the petitioner, a Reply dated
20.06.2008 was filed by the petitioner, several witnesses were examined
before the Inquiry Committee and cross-examination by the petitioner was
also permitted. The Inquiry Committee considered the representations made
by the petitioner and her statutory appeal was heard by the Appeals
Committee. Therefore, the record demonstrates substantial compliance with
the requirements of the principles of natural justice.
71. The petitioner further contended that the Inquiry Committee was not validly
constituted as the Governing Body appointed its own members as the
Inquiry Committee and thereafter accepted the report with the same
members participating in the Governing Body meeting. The Appeals
Committee considered and rejected this argument in the following terms:
"5.4. The Appellant further contended through Counsel that the
Governing Body acted both as a prosecutor and a Judge as the
members of the Enquiry Committee who were members of the
Governing Body placed their report before the Governing Body
which was duly accepted by the Governing Body. There is
nothing in the Ordinances which bars the members of the
Governing Body to be members of the enquiry committee and
this plea thus cannot be accepted.
5.5. Furthermore, none of the enquiry committee members were
present in the meeting of Governing Body dated 20.10.2010.
Thus this plea has no substance and is rejected."
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72. This Court finds no error in the above reasoning. The Coordinate Bench of
this Court in Union of India v. Reliance Industries Ltd. & Ors.,
2022/DHC/005381 (upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of
India v. Reliance Industries Ltd. & Ors., SLP(C) No.594/2023, decided on
09.01.2023) categorically held that bias must be demonstrated through
cogent material and mere apprehension is insufficient. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
"31. Bias as distinct from the above, would be an issue which
would have to axiomatically be established in fact. An
allegation of bias would have to be alleged and proven. Viewed
in that light, it is manifest that it would clearly fall outside the
pale of a de jure disqualification. ... "
73. In the present case, the petitioner has not produced any material to
demonstrate personal interest, prejudice or malafides on the part of the
members of the Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the allegation of bias is
wholly unsubstantiated and stands rejected.
74. The petitioner further urged that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated
as she was not permitted to be represented by a legal practitioner. This plea,
in the considered opinion of the Court, is misconceived. The law on the
issue is well settled. Unless the rules governing the inquiry specifically
confer such a right, a delinquent employee cannot claim legal representation
as a matter of right. In National Agricultural Coop. Mktg. Federation of
India v. Alimenta S.A., (2020) 19 SCC 260, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held:
"76. It is not disputed that before the Arbitration Tribunal, the
Rule debars legal representation; hence the submission as to
non-representation before the Tribunal, cannot be accepted.
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However, in appeal due to refusal to permit representation
through a legal firm, Nafed was not able to point out the
prejudice caused to it. In the absence of proof of prejudice
caused due to non-representation by a legal representative and
to show that it was disabled to put forth its views, we cannot set
aside the award on the ground that it would have been proper
to allow the assistance of a legal representative. Thus, we are
not inclined to render the award unenforceable on the aforesaid
ground."
75. Similarly, in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni, (1983) 1 SCC 124, it was clarified that while
legal representation may be allowed in exceptional cases where the
presenting officer is legally trained, it is not an absolute right.
76. In the present case, the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee dated
08.12.2008 record:
"Dr Thelma Talloo appeared before the enquiry committee
with one person who identified himself as Advocate Abrahim
Pattiyani. No other witnesses were brought. The committee
informed Dr Talloo of its decision conveyed to her on the first
sitting that she will be allowed to bring a peer, to defend
herself, since advocate Abrahim Pattiyani is not a peer, and is a
lawyer he is not allowed."
77. This record shows that the petitioner was permitted to bring a peer to assist
her, in conformity with the applicable rules, but could not insist upon
engaging legal counsel. She in fact conducted cross-examination of
witnesses herself and has been unable to establish what prejudice, if any,
was caused to her defence by the refusal to permit a lawyer.
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78. Accordingly, the plea of denial of legal representation is unfounded. The
proceedings afforded the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend
herself, consistent with the principles of natural justice and the governing
rules.
79. The impugned award dated 23.10.2012 reflects conscious application of
mind. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover,
(1995) 6 SCC 279, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where reasons are
recorded and there is due application of mind, the order of the appellate
authority cannot be interfered with. The Court observed:
"14. ... Assuming, that by necessary implication this Regulation
also requires the appellate authority to give the reasons, still its
order cannot be invalidated, as we find that it has discharged
its obligation by considering the records and proceedings
pertaining to the disciplinary action and the submissions made
by Grover. In other words, the order clearly demonstrates that
the appellate authority had applied its mind not only to the
proceedings of the enquiry, but also the grounds raised by
Grover in his appeal and on such application found that there
was no substance in the appeal."
80. The Appeals Committee, after affirming the guilt on grave charges of
solicitation of illegal gratification from students, moderated the punishment
in the following terms:
"While the charges established by the enquiry committee
validly are of a serious nature which warrant that the
appellant‟s employment with the college must cease but taking
into account the long years of service rendered by the appellant
and no previous punishments for misconduct, we are of the view
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that the extreme punishment of dismissal might be excessive
and disproportionate to the established delinquency. We are
also mindful of the fact that the Appellants would have served
the college for about 15 more years. This matter cannot be
treated as an industrial dispute where alteration of punishment
by the Appellate Authority might be flawed in Law. Our
jurisdiction is laid down in Clause 9(1) of Annexure to
Ordinance XII which makes it evident that we can go into the
facts of the case as well. Accordingly we are of the view that the
interests of justice would be fully served if the dismissal is
reduced to a simple termination so that the retiral dues of the
appellant are not affected. The Appeal this stands dismissed
subject to the reduction in the nature of a punishment."
81. Thus, the Appeals Committee upheld the guilt and considered the
proportionality of punishment, substituting dismissal with termination to
ensure that the retiral dues of the petitioner were not forfeited. The
misconduct proved, namely solicitation of illegal gratification from students,
is grave and strikes at the core of academic integrity and thus, the Appeals
Committee recorded reasons for affirming each of the charges against the
petitioner. The Appeals Committee, further, integrated justice with equity by
converting dismissal to termination, which in fact operated in favour of the
petitioner. Hence, the said consideration clearly shows appreciation of facts
and evidence as well as application of mind by the Appeals Committee.
82. The plea of the petitioner that termination be substituted with voluntary
retirement is misconceived. The Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy
(supra), has clarified that Courts do possess a limited power to "mould
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relief" or "modify" an award, but only in exceptional cases and within
narrow confines. The Court held:
"86. While exercising power under Article 142, this Court must
be conscious of the aforesaid dictum. In our opinion, the power
should not be exercised where the effect of the order passed by
the Court would be to rewrite the award or modify the award
on merits. However, the power can be exercised where it is
required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an
end. Not only would this end protracted litigation, but it would
also save parties' money and time.
87. Accordingly, the questions of law referred to by Gayatri
Balasamy [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies
Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1681] are answered by stating that
the Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the
1996 Act to modify the arbitral award. This limited power may
be exercised under the following circumstances:
87.1. When the award is severable, by severing the "invalid"
portion from the "valid" portion of the award, as held in Part
II of our Analysis;
87.2. By correcting any clerical, computational or
typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the
record, as held in Parts IV and V of our Analysis;
87.3. Post-award interest may be modified in some
circumstances as held in Part IX of our Analysis; and/or
87.4. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power
must be exercised with great care and caution and within the
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limits of the constitutional power as outlined in Part XII of our
Analysis."
83. In the present case, the Appeals Committee has already modified the relief
by mitigating the penalty from dismissal to termination while safeguarding
the retiral dues of the petitioner. To further substitute termination with
voluntary retirement would amount to rewriting or modifying the award,
which is impermissible even under Gayatri Balasamy (supra).
84. In view of the matter, the proceedings were fair, the findings are supported
by evidence and the penalty has already been tempered by leniency. Hence,
under Section 34 of the Act, no ground for setting aside or further
modification of the award is made out by the petitioner.
CONCLUSION
85. For the said reasons, the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act
challenging the Award dated 23.10.2012 passed by the Appeals Committee
constituted under Clause 9 of Annexure to Ordinance XII of the University
of Delhi, is hereby dismissed.
86. Accordingly, the petition, along with any pending application, is disposed
of.
JASMEET SINGH, J
SEPTEMBER 12th, 2025 / shanvi
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