[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Virender Singh & Anr vs Union Of India on 28 November, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 15.11.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 28.11.2025
+ FAO 39/2021 & CM APPL 3099/2021
VIRENDER SINGH & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Rajan Sood, Advocate
versus
UNION OF INDIA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Jivesh Kumar Tiwari, CGSC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. The present first appeal under Section 23 of the Railway
Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (the RCT Act), has been filed for
setting aside the impugned judgment dated 12.09.2017, passed by
the Railway Claims Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi (the
Tribunal), in Case No. OA(IIU) No. DLI/29/2017, whereby the
claim of the appellants/applicants was dismissed, holding, inter
alia, that the deceased was not a bona fide passenger of the train.
2. Brief facts of the case are stated as follows:- Deceased,
Vikrant, aged about 16 years, boarded the Jan Shatabdi Express,
being Train No. 12058, on 08.08.2016 after purchasing a valid
ticket bearing No. J-56204807 for ₹10/- and bearing excess
charges, for travel from Sonepat to Delhi. Due to heavy rush in the
train, the deceased was compelled to stand near the door of the
compartment. When the train was running near the railway
crossing of Holambi Kalan Railway Station, there was a sudden
jerk, as a result of which the deceased fell from the running train.
He sustained grievous injuries all over his body and died on the
spot. The deceased left behind his parents as dependants, who are
the appellants/applicants in the present appeal.
2.1. The appellants/applicants filed a claim under Sections 13
(1-A) and 16(1) of the RCT Act, and Section 124-A of the
Railways Act, 1989 (the Railways Act), seeking compensation to
the tune of ₹8,00,000/- from the respondent/railways on account of
the death of their unmarried son in the untoward incident, alleged
to have occurred on 08.08.2016.
2.2. The respondent/railways contested the claim by filing a
Written Statement, denying the averments made by the
appellants/applicants. The primary defence raised by the
respondent was that ticket No. 56204807 recovered from the body
of the deceased was an ordinary passenger ticket, which was not
valid for travel in Train No. 12058 - Jan Shatabdi Express. The
respondent further contended that no excess fare ticket had been
recovered from the deceased, thereby contradicting the
appellant's/applicants' claim that excess charges were infact paid.
On these grounds, the respondent sought dismissal of the claim
application.
2.3. The Tribunal, vide the impugned Order dated
12.09.2017, dismissed the claim application of the
appellants/applicants. Although the Tribunal held that the death of
the deceased was a result of deboarding from the train while itwas
still in motion and it was an untoward incident under Section
123(c) of the Railways Act, it was however found that the
deceased was not a bona fide passenger as the ticket was not valid
for travel in Jan Shatabdi Express. Aggrieved, the appellants have
filed the present appeal.
3. Along with the appeal, the appellants have filed an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the
Limitation Act), for condonation of delay of 988 days in filing the
appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the appellants/applicants
submitted that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. The
appellants/applicants were unable to file the appeal within the
stipulated time on account of paucity of funds, inability to obtain
timely legal advice, and the time taken in arranging documents
necessary for filing the appeal. According to the appellants, these
circumstances were bona fide and beyond their control.
4.1. It was further submitted that only after arranging the
necessary funds, the appellants were able to approach their counsel
at Delhi, seek legal advice, and collect the requisite documents
essential for filing the accompanying appeal before this Court. It
was prayed that refusal to condone the delay would result in grave
and irreparable loss.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the application for condonation of delay is wholly
misconceived and not maintainable. It was pointed out that Section
23(3) of the RCT Act prescribes a limitation period of 90 days for
filing an appeal before this Court, whereas the present appeal has
been filed after an inordinate delay of 988 days.
5.1. It was submitted that the appellants/applicants have
failed to explain the delay satisfactorily, let alone on a day-to-day
basis. The explanation that funds had to be arranged is stated to be
vague, insufficient, and not constituting "sufficient cause" in law.
It was further submitted that the appellant has also not disclosed
the date on which the certified copy of the impugned order was
applied for or received. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of
this Court in Leelu & Ors. vs. UOI (WP No. 4724/2010).
6. Heard both sides.
7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers this Court to
condone delay if the appellant establishes "sufficient cause" for
not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. The
expression "sufficient cause" must certainly receive a liberal
construction to advance substantial justice. However, such
liberality cannot be extended to condone delays arising out of
negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.
8. Paragraph no. 3 of the application for condonation of delay
reads thus-
"That the accompanying appeal could not be filed in time
before this Hon'ble Court as the certified copy of the impugned
order and judgment dated 12.09.2017 was received by the
appellant only on _________, the appellants are the poor
persons and could not contacted to the counsel for appropriate
legal advice for the wants of funds and the appellants after
arranging the funds approached to the counsel at Delhi and
taken the legal advice and arranged the relevant papers
required for preferring accompanying appeal before this
Hon'ble Court and there has been delay of 988 days in filing the
accompanying appeal."
8.1. As is apparent, the date on which the certified copy was
received is left blank. This itself shows the callous and careless
manner in which the application has been filed. The application
does not even state when the application for a certified copy was
made and when it was received.
9. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court, while considering an application for
condonation of delay of 565 days wherein no explanation, much
less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation had been given, held
that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes, and the Courts have never intended to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds.
9.1. Similarly, in PundlikJalam Patil v. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon, (2008) 17 SCC 448, the Apex Court observed
that Courts cannot inquire into belated and stale claims on the
ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who
are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.
9.2. Further, in Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, (2021)
18 SCC 384, it was reiterated that the law of limitation has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes, and the
Courts cannot extend the same on equitable grounds.
9.3. Likewise, in Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it was observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It was further
held that where a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona
fides, or inaction, there cannot be any justified ground for
condoning the delay, even by imposing conditions.
10. The appellants have not even broadly accounted for how
the delay escalated to 988 days. The cause shown does not
constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
11. Having considered the rival submissions and the material
placed on record, this Court finds that the appeal suffers from a
substantial delay of 988 days, that is, nearly three years, which has
not been properly explained.
12. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in the
application. Hence, the application for condonation of delay of 988
days in filing the appeal is dismissed.
13. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed as barred by
limitation. Application(s), if any pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 28, 2025/er
