Delhi High Court
Mr Deepak Duggal vs Delhi Development Authority on 12 August, 2025
$~102
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Delivered on: 12.08.2025
+ W.P.(C) 15107/2024 and CM 48961/2025
MR DEEPAK DUGGAL .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mohit Chaudhary, Mr. Kunal
Sachdeva, Ms. Katyayani Vajpayee and Ms.
Meghna, Advocates.
Versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. G.S. Oberoi, ASC with Mr. J.S.
Oberoi, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a
direction to respondent/DDA to process the mutation application of the
petitioner preferred on 01.03.2016 in respect of property bearing no. A-31/4,
Rewari Line Industrial Area, Mayapuri, Phase-I, New Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as the 'property') in favour of petitioner in a time bound
manner. Further, prayer has been made seeking direction to
respondent/DDA to process the application for conversion of the property
from leasehold to freehold as applied on 01.03.2016.
2. The undisputed facts of the case set out in the present petition are that
petitioner's father namely Sh. Kuldeep Rai Duggal [hereinafter the
'allottee'] was allotted the property by respondent/DDA on leasehold basis
vide perpetual lease deed on 25.09.1968.
3. Subsequently, vide letter dated 21.06.1971, the DDA appears to have
cancelled the lease alleging that allottee had executed a sub-lease agreement
in favour of Syndicate Bank.
4. The allottee, namely, Kuldeep Rai Duggal had filed a civil suit
challenging the cancellation and seeking declaration to the effect that
cancellation of the lease was ultra vires and against the law. Further, relief
of perpetual injunction was also sought. The said suit, registered as Suit no.
R-349/93, was decreed by the Court of Sh. Balbir Singh, Sub-Judge, Delhi
vide judgment and decree dated 22.09.1993, whereby the order of
cancellation of lease was held to be ultra vires and against the terms of
lease. The relevant part of the said judgment reads thus:
"5. The order of cancellation of the lease is ultra vires and
against the terms of lease and & breach of an obligation
existing in favor of the plaintiff and an invasion of the plaintiff's
right to enjoyment of his property. It is, therefore, just and
expedient that it may be declared that the cancellation of lease
is ultra vires and against law and same cannot be cancelled by
serving a letter and defendant be restrained from taking
possession of the land, building and fixtures by coercive
methods as threatened in the impugned order dated 21st June,
1971 of the defendant and without taking recourse of law. If
the defendant is not restrained from taking possession in such
arbitrary manner as threatened by the defendant, it will result
into multiplicity of judicial proceedings and the plaintiff is
bound to suffer damage and injury which cannot be
compensated in money. Plaintiff is also entitled to a
declaration that the action of the defendant in cancelling the
lease is ultra vires, without Jurisdiction and arbitrary.
xxx xxx xxx
11. I have considered the facts of the present case and the
judgments referred to by the plaintiff's counsel. I agree with the
contentions of the plaintiff's counsel and I am of the view that
the lessor has no right to cancel the lease deed in question.
The defendant has no right to apply coercive methods to take
possession of the suit property. In view of the discussion made
above, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed as prayed for
declaration and injunction with costs of the suit. Decree sheet
in terms of the Judgment be prepared and file be consigned to
Record Room."
[emphasis supplied]
5. After the said judgment, allottee approached DDA vide letter dated
08.05.1998 and apprised about the judgment and decree passed by the Court
of Sh. Balbir Singh, Sub-Judge, Delhi and also furnished a copy of the said
judgment.
6. Later, the allottee-Kuldeep Rai Duggal is stated to have expired on
30.08.2013. He was survived by his following Class-I legal heirs:
Sr. No. Name Age Relationship with
deceased
1. Kanta Duggal 77 Wife
2. Deepak Duggal 58 Son [petitioner]
3. Sushma Sahni 57 Daughter
4. Renu Chawla 55 Daughter
5. Sangeeta Khurana 53 Daughter
6. Rajni Kwatra 48 Daughter
7. The Class-I legal heirs, other than the petitioner, had executed a
relinquishment deed dated 01.09.2015 in favour of petitioner herein on the
basis of which he acquired absolute rights in the property. Thereafter,
petitioner had applied to the respondent/DDA on 01.03.2016 for mutating
the property in his name, as well as, for conversion of property from
leasehold to freehold. Since there was no response from DDA, petitioner
was constrained to file the present writ petition.
8. Respondent/DDA has filed their counter-affidavit taking an objection
that judgment and decree was passed by the Court of Sh. Balbir Singh, Sub-
Judge as early as on 22.09.1993, but execution of the same was never filed
by petitioner. Therefore, no relief can be sought by the petitioner as period
of 12 years has elapsed since the passing of the judgment and decree dated
22.09.1993 and the execution itself is barred by law.
9. Mr. Mohit Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
petitioner has referred to the decision of the Full Bench of Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Prakash Chand v. Sh. S. S. Grewal, I.A.S. Chief
Secretary to Government of Punjab and Ors., 1974 SCC OnLine P&H 43,
to contend that in case of declaratory decree, filing of Execution is not
warranted as such decree cannot be executed, it only declares the rights of
decree-holder qua the judgment-debtor and does not, in terms, direct the
judgment-debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. The
relevant excerpts from the said decision on which reliance has been placed
by Mr. Chaudhary reads thus:
"19. A declaratory decree, in my opinion, cannot be executed
as it only declares the rights of the decree-holder qua the
judgment-debtor and does not, in terms, direct the judgment-
debtor to do or to refrain from doing any particular act or
thine. Since there is no command issued to the judgment
debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued for the
compliance of that mandate or command. The decree-holder is
free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on
the be is of the declaration given in his favour. Question 2 is
answered accordingly."
[emphasis supplied]
10. He further submits that aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of Punjab
and Haryana High Court was also subsequently relied upon and affirmed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Mangilal Sharma, (1998) 2
SCC 510.
11. Per contra, Mr. G.S. Oberoi, Additional Standing Counsel, for the
respondent/DDA has argued on the lines of counter-affidavit.
12. The passing of judgment and decree dated 22.09.1993 by the Court of
Sub-Judge, Delhi is not in dispute, nor it is the case of the respondent/DDA
that any appeal was preferred against the said decree. Therefore, the said
judgment and decree attained finality.
13. The only surviving controversy is that whether the petitioner ought to
have filed separate execution to get the said decree executed, if yes, whether
such execution has become time barred.
14. Having heard the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the
parties, this Court is of the view that after having obtained declaratory
decree vide judgment dated 22.09.1993, no execution of the same was
required to be filed in view of the law laid down in Prakash Chand (supra)
and Mangilal Sharma (supra).
15. Since the cancellation of lease was declared ultra vires and against the
law, therefore, by virtue of said declaration, the status quo ante stood
restored, and filing of separate 'execution' or issuance of civil process to get
the lease deed restored was not warranted under law.
16. Thus, the position which emerges is that after cancellation of lease
was declared unlawful, the lease deed in favour of the allottee stood restored
automatically. In that view of the matter, the stand taken by DDA that
petitioner ought to have filed a separate execution, or that the execution has
become barred by law, is not tenable.
17. Accordingly, there is no impediment in granting the relief as prayed
for in the present petition.
18. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and DDA is directed to
process the mutation application dated 01.03.2016 submitted by petitioner
with regard to property bearing no. A-31/4, Rewari Line Industrial Area,
Mayapuri, Phase I, New Delhi, in accordance with rules. Let needful be
done within a period of six (06) weeks.
19. Thereafter, the respondent/DDA shall process the application of
petitioner for conversion from leasehold to freehold, subject to the petitioner
complying with other requisite conditions, within a period of eight (08)
weeks from the date of mutation.
20. In case any further documents are required from petitioner for the
purposes aforesaid, the respondent/DDA is at liberty to call upon the
petitioner to furnish the same.
21. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms.
22. Pending application shall also stand disposed of.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J
AUGUST 12, 2025/jg
