Delhi High Court
Ministry Of Work ,Housing & Supply ... vs Ashokta Tarnacha (Secretary)Ssr ... on 16 April, 2024
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CONT.CAS(C) 307/2018
MINISTRY OF WORK, HOUSING & SUPPLY COOPERATIVE
HOUSE BUILDEING SOCIETY LTD ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gurpreet Singh & Mr. C. B.
Bansal, Advs.
M: 9891894030
Email: [email protected]
versus
ASHOKTA TARNACHA (SECRETARY) SSR EDUCATIONAL &
WELFARE SOCIETY & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Pramod Gupta, Adv. with Ms.
Nandita Rathi, Ms. Saloni Narayan,
Ms. Adyanshi Kashyap & Ms. Nicole
Gomez, Advs.
M: 9991688829
Email: [email protected]
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
JUDGMENT
16.04.2024
MINI PUSHKARNA, J:
1. The present petition has been filed alleging willful disobedience of the
order dated 02nd September, 1999 passed in W.P. (Crl.) No. 417/1999,
wherein statement had been made by the respondents that the premises shall
not be used for the purposes other than running of a nursery school. The
contempt has been alleged since the respondent-society is running the school
till Standard 8th.
2. The facts relevant for the present case are as follows:-
2.1 The petitioner society was allotted 222 bighas 4 biswas of land at
Village Mandawali Fazalpur (Trans-Yamuna), Delhi by Delhi
Administration, Land Housing Department, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi.
Subsequently, perpetual lease dated 10th February, 1977 was executed in
favour of the petitioner society, wherein the society popularly known as
"Nirman Vihar" exists.
2.2 It is the case of the petitioner that the DDA did not handover complete
possession of the land to the petitioner-society and had handed over only
203 bighas and 13 biswas. There was encroachment on 18 bighas 11 biswas
of land. Neither the said encroachment was removed by DDA, or the land
handed over to the society, nor was the cost refunded to the petitioner
society.
2.3 Subsequently, DDA allotted the school plot situated at D Block
adjoining D-276 and D-277 in the petitioner-society to the respondent no. 1
admeasuring 0.25 acres.
2.4 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid allotment of land to respondent, the
petitioner-society filed a writ petition before this Court, being W.P. (C)
5083/1997, inter-alia, praying for cancellation of the allotment made in
favour of the respondent. An interim order dated 8th October, 1998 came to
be passed in favour of the petitioner, which continued till 8 th January, 1999,
when the same was vacated.
2.5 Thereafter, the respondent sought to undertake construction of the
school. Since there was obstruction to the construction of the said school
building, respondent no. 1 filed a criminal writ petition bearing W.P. (Crl.)
No. 417/1999, praying for directions to the local police to provide adequate
security to the respondent no. 1 herein for construction of the school.
2.6 The said criminal writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 02nd
September, 1999, by recording the statement on behalf of respondent no. 1
herein that the premises shall not be used for purpose other than nursery
school.
2.7 The aforesaid writ, i.e., W.P.(C) 5083/1997 was ultimately dismissed
vide order dated 27th April, 2009, thereby rejecting the prayer of the
petitioner for cancellation of allotment of land in favour of the respondent.
2.8 Some of the residents of the area residing nearby the land allotted to
respondent no. 1 filed a writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 4735/2000,
alleging use of land by the respondents in violation of the provisions of the
Master Plan. The said petition was dismissed vide order dated 23rd October,
2002, thereby holding that the allotment of land to respondent no. 1
conforms to the layout plan of the area, as the same showed that a nursery
school was provided on the land in question.
2.9 It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no. 1 initially opened
a nursery school on the allotted piece of land, but subsequently started
running a school upto class 8th. Thus, as per the case put forward by the
petitioner, the respondents have acted in violation of the order dated 02nd
September, 1999, as the respondents had made statement that the allotted
land shall not be used for any purpose, other than nursery school. Hence, the
present petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the
respondent no. 1 has committed contempt of Court as the school is being run
in complete contravention to the statement made on behalf of respondent
no. 1. The respondent no. 1 opened the school in the name of KIDZEE and
projected it as a nursery school. However, the respondent no. 1 along with
KIDZEE school, started "Mount Litera Zee School" having classes upto 8th
Standard. Subsequently, the respondent no. 1 changed the name of the
school from KIDZEE to Petals India's Pre School Club.
4. As per the petitioner-society's sanctioned layout plan, the site allotted
by DDA to the respondent no. 1 is meant for nursery school only. However,
the respondents have acted in violation of the order dated 2 nd September,
1999 as the school has been upgraded from nursery till 8th Standard.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted
that the present petition is barred by limitation, as the petitioners had
knowledge of the middle school being run from the said premises since
2016, and even prior.
6. It was further submitted that vide order dated 27th September, 2013
issued by the Directorate of Education ("DOE"), Government of NCT of
Delhi ("GNCTD"), land norms for schools established before 2010 on DDA
land upto elementary level, were relaxed. Pursuant thereto, vide
Communication dated 19th December, 2013, the school was granted
provisional recognition for running classes from Class 1 to Class 8th. The
DOE also granted permission to change the name of the school in question
from Mount Litera Zee School to Petals World School, vide communication
dated 22nd April, 2016.
7. It is further submitted on behalf of respondents that the law itself
permitted the respondents to run the school upto 8th Standard. This position
was not prevalent at the time when the order dated 2 nd September, 1999 was
passed.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
9. The moot question to be decided by this Court is as to whether any
contempt has been committed by the respondents in running a school upto
8th Standard at present, when a statement had been recorded on their behalf
that the premises shall not be used for purposes other than the nursery
school.
10. At the outset, this Court notes the stand of the respondents that at the
time when the aforesaid statement was recorded in the order dated 2nd
September, 1999, the respondent no. 1-society had been allotted 0.25 acres
of land and as per the prevailing norms at that point of time, only a nursery
school was allowed to be run on the said size of the plot.
11. Subsequently, the land norms for recognition of schools were changed
by the DOE, wherein it was stated that for recognition purpose, the DOE
need not strictly adhere to the DDA planning norms, and should have a
measure of flexibility so as to cater to the growth needs of schools in the
planned areas. The Minutes of Meeting held on 12 th January, 2004 in this
regard, as issued by DOE, reads as under:
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
OLD SECRETARIAT DELHI-110054
MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD IN RAJ NIWAS ON 12
JANUARY, 2004 REGARDING LAND NORMS FOR
RECOGNITION OF SCHOOLS
BY THE DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
A meeting was convened by the Hon'ble Lt. Governor to discuss The
land norms to be followed by the Directorate of Education for grant of
recognition to private schools.
The following were present:-
1. Minister of Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi
2. Secretary Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi
3. Secretary to Lt. Governor
4. Commissioner (Land Disposal), Delhi Development Authority
5. Director of Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi
6. Addl. Secretary to Lt. Governor
7. Commissioner (Planning), Delhi Development Authority.
That land norms of 1999 issued by the Directorate of Education, the
new norms prescribed by the Directorate of Education in December
2002 and the land norms of CBSE affiliation of schools in Delhi, were
discussed. It was felt that land being scarce and valuable commodity
in Delhi, land norms for schools impact on several facets of basic
education. In areas not planned by DDA, such as the walled city, the
unauthorized colonies, the unauthorized regularized colonies etc., it
was not feasible to have norms for recognition at par with those for
planned areas. In the trans Yamuna very little land was available. In
other areas, availability of land of the planned dimension was limited
in many cases; it was difficult to come by parcels of land of the exact
prescribed size. Large norms of land also implies that only the big and
well endowed societies and trusts can come forward in the field of
education, eliminating the smaller bodies, to the determent of wider
spread of education. Another corollary of high capital investment in
land would be higher school fees which will have the effect of making
education in the privately run institutions costly and less affordable.
In view of these consideration both the existing land norms, in the
DDA for planning purpose, and in the Education Dept. for recognition
purpose need to be rationalized. A major rationalization was already
effected on the planning side by reducing the land norms from 4 acres
to 2 acres for Senior Secondary Schools; further rationalizations will
be effected under the new Master Plan. For recognition purpose, the
Directorate of Education need not strictly adhere to the DDA
planning norms, and should have a measure of flexibility so as to
cater to the growth needs of schools in the planned areas. In areas not
planned by DDA such as the Special Area, unauthorized regularized
colonies, rural areas etc., more realistic norms are called for.
After deliberations the following decisions were taken:-
i) In respect of areas other than those planned by the Delhi
Development Authority, the Department of Education should follow
the existing CBSE affiliation forms for recognition of schools upto
secondary and Senior Secondary levels, which are as follows:
Secondary School 2000 Sq. Mtrs.
Senior Secondary School with 2 Streams 3000 Sq. Mtrs.
Senior Secondary School with all the 4 streams 4000 Sq. Mtrs.
Further, in sue areas, the current land norms of 1000 Sq. Mtrs. for
middle school was considered appropriate. The Education
Department should accordingly follow this norm.
ii) The land norms laid down by the DDA for areas planned by it
are planning norms and the Directorate of Education need not for
purpose of recognition, strictly adhere to the condition of "level of
school" put by the DDA in its lease deed. In order to encourage
societies and trust to come forward for opening schools, the
Directorate of Education may in areas planned by DDA, grant
recognition on level above the level of school mentioned in the DDS's
land lease and the letter of allotment. For example, if the DDA has
allotted land for primary school and the land is sufficient as per land
norms prescribed for recognition by the Directorate for middle level
then recognition should be granted by the Directorate of Education
upto middle level. Similar level jumping should be allowed for
secondary and senior secondary schools in areas planned by DDA.
iii) Proposals on the above lines should be placed before the Delhi
School Education Advisory Board for their recommendations, which
should then, be put up to the Lt. Governor.
The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the Chair.
F. 15/Act-/2004/2525-37
(RAJENDRA KUMAR)
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION)
Dt. 1-3-04"
12. Subsequently, the DOE issued order dated 27th September, 2013
wherein the land norms for schools situated on DDA land upto elementary
level, were relaxed from 1000 Sq. Meters to 800 Sq. Meters. The order dated
27th September, 2013 issued by DOE, reads as under:
"GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF
DELHI
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
OLD SECRETARIAT, DELHI-110054
No. 11145-11156 Dated 27.09.2013
ORDER
Subject: Relaxation of land norms for schools established before
01.04.2010 situated on DDA land upto elementary level.
The Lt. Governor of Delhi is pleased to grant relaxation of the
land requirement norms for recognition of schools upto elementary
level running on land allotted by the DDA and functioning as on the
date of commencement of the Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, 2009 i.e. 01.04.2010 from the existing 1000
Sq. mtrs. to 800 sq. mtrs.
The grant of recognition will be further subject to the following
conditions:-
1. The school will make provisions for the necessary infrastructure
and comply with the provisions of the RTE Act, 2009 and the various
instructions/directions issued under the provisions of the DSEAR, 1973.
2. The classroom size shall be of the standard type and it should
conform to all the infrastructural requirements.
3. Relaxation of norms would be only upto elementary level and at
no time school would be considered for upgradation to the secondary
or senior secondary level.
4. This relaxation shall not apply to the schools established after
01.04.2010.
5. All such schools desirous of seeking recognition under Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 are required to
following the procedure as laid down below:-
(i) School shall submit an on line application in form 1 (C) on the
official website of the Directorate of Education www.edudel.nic.in three
hard copies of the online application along with a demand draft in the
name of Director of Education as procession fee of Rs. 500/- (Non-
refundable) shall be submitted in the Office of the concerned Deputy
Director of Education, Directorate of Education, GNCT of Delhi, along
with the supporting documents, within 07 days of online submission of
application.
(ii) The schools which fill in the online application and submit the
hard copy of it along with the supporting documents shall be granted
Certificate of Recognition by the Director of Education, GNCT of Delhi
in Form IIA which shall be valid for one year or the order to the
contrary is passed by the appropriate authority, whichever is earlier.
(iii) All such hard copies of the. application alongwith the connected
documents shall be forwarded to the concerned Appropriate Authority
to conduct inspection of the school within two months from the date of
application, to confirm the claim of the school regarding conforming to
the norms laid down in Schedule to Right to Education Act, 2009.
(iv) Therefore all the records of the school shall be kept ready and
be made available to the Inspection team.
(v) The grant of certificate In Form IIA shall not validate any
illegality under any provisions of law related to land matter and in case
of any such illegality certificate shall be void ab-initio.
(vi) Such school which are granted certificate in From IIA will have
to fulfill the conditions laid down in the certificate of recognition
(provisional) and orders/instructions issued under the Delhi School
Education Act, 1973 and Rules made there under except for condition
of grant of Essentially Certificate, within a period of one year.
(vii) The schools which are found conforming to the norms and
standards laid down in schedule to Right to Education Act 2009 shall
be granted certificate of recognition In Form II by the appropriate
authority.
(viii) The Appropriate Authority for grant of Recognition in Form II
shall be the same as defined in Delhi School Education Act & Rules,
1973.
(ix) Relevant amendments of Delhi Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Rules are being notified separately.
This issues with approval of Competent Authority.
(Dr. Madhu Rani Teotia, IAS)
Addl. Director of Education (Act-I)
To,
All un-recognized schools in Delhi.
xxx xxx xxx"
13. Pursuant to relaxation in the land norms, the respondent no. 1-society
was granted provisional recognition from Class 1st to Class 8th vide letter
dated 19th December, 2013 issued by the DOE, which reads as under:
"FORM IIA
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
GOVT. OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI
OLD SECTT., DELHI-110054
(ACT-I BRANCH)
No.F.DE.15/Act.I/Rec./MLZS/East/2013/12835-42 Dated: 19.12.2013
To
The Head of School/Manager,
Mount Litera Zee School,
D-Block, Nirman Vihar,
Delhi-110092.
Subject: Grant of Recognition up to Elementary level under Right of
Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
Sir/Madam,
With reference to your application dated 10-06-2013, I convey
the grant of provisional recognition under Rule 14 of Delhi Right to
Free and Compulsory Education Rules 2011 and amendment Rules
2013 to the Mount Litera Zee School, D - Block, Nirman Vihar, Delhi -
110092 (Name of the school with address) for Class Ist to Class VIIIth
for a period of one year w.e.f. 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2014 or till the order
to the contrary is passed by the appropriate authority, whichever is
earlier.
The above provisional recognition is subject to fulfilment of following
conditions:
01. The grant of provisional recognition does not in any way imply
any obligation for recognition beyond class V/VIII.
02. The School shall abide by the provisions of Right of Children to
Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the Delhi Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011.
03. The School shall admit in class I (or in entry class, as the case
may be), to the extent of 25% of the strength of that class, children
belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group In the
neighbourhood and provide free and compulsory elementary education
till its completion.
04. For the children referred to in paragraph 3, the School shall be
reimbursed in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 12 of the Act. To receive such reimbursements school shall
maintain a separate bank account.
xxx xxx xxx"
14. As per submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
the said recognition to the respondent no. 1 for running the school till
Standard 8th has been continued, till date.
15. Perusal of the aforesaid facts and circumstances clearly depict that the
respondents have been running the school in question till Class 8 th after due
and valid approval from the DOE in terms of the modified norms. Thus,
when the respondents are entitled in law to do an act in terms of subsequent
change in the norms, they cannot be said to have committed any contempt of
Court merely on the basis of a statement that was made in the past in terms
of the prevailing law situation at that point of time. There cannot be any
estoppel against law and the respondents cannot be forced to continue to run
only a nursery school, when the norms prevalent presently, allow running of
the school till Standard 8th.
16. It has been held time and again that the ingredient of willful
disobedience must be there, before anyone can be hauled up for the charge
of contempt and if there is no conscious or willful disobedience, a case for
contempt cannot be held to have been made out. Thus, delving on the issue
of contempt, Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Gupta Versus
United India Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2010) 12 SCC 770,
has held that although disobedience might have been established, absence of
willful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty
unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, it has
been held as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
17. This now leads us to the next question and a more relevant one, as
to whether a proceeding for contempt initiated against the appellant
can be held to be sustainable merely on speculation, assumption and
inference drawn from facts and circumstances of the instant case. In
our considered opinion, the answer clearly has to be in the negative
in view of the well-settled legal position reflected in a catena of
decisions of this Court that contempt of a civil nature can be held to
have been made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience of
the order and even though there may be disobedience, yet if the
same does not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful
disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have been made
out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than one interpretation
giving rise to variety of consequences, non-compliance with the
same cannot be held to be wilful disobedience of the order so as to
make out a case of contempt entailing the serious consequence
including imposition of punishment. However, when the courts are
confronted with a question as to whether a given situation could be
treated to be a case of wilful disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse,
in order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be,
will obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular
case; but while deciding so, it would not be legally correct to be too
speculative based on assumption as the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 clearly postulates and emphasises that the ingredient of wilful
disobedience must be there before anyone can be hauled up for the
charge of contempt of a civil nature.
xxx xxx xxx
23. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore an
important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given out
under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the
disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test
that it is a wilful disobedience to the order. Bearing this important
factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a proceeding for civil
contempt would not lie if the order alleged to have been disobeyed
itself provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an
order or circumstance which is the factual position in the instant
matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party although
acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in
good faith without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the
Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a
contempt proceeding.
24. [Ed.: Para 24 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./146/2010 dated 14-12-2010.] . To reinforce the aforesaid
legal position further, it would be relevant and appropriate to take
into consideration the settled legal position as reflected in the
judgment and order delivered in Ahmed Ali v. Supdt., District
Jail [1987 Cri LJ 1845 (Gau)] as also in B.K. Kar v. High Court of
Orissa [AIR 1961 SC 1367 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 438] that mere
unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of
contempt and although disobedience might have been established,
absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not
hold him guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or
misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is not
sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt. It is further
relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of contempt that
casual or accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the
circumstances which negate any suggestion of contumacy, would
amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the
contemnor liable to punishment and this was the view expressed also
in State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari [AIR 1954 Pat 513] and N.
Baksi v. O.K. Ghosh [AIR 1957 Pat 528] .
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis Supplied)
17. Law is well settled that the Government authorities have a right to
change their policy from time to time under the changing circumstances.
Thus, if as per the changed norms, an act is allowed, a party cannot be held
bound by an earlier norm, which already stands modified. Therefore, it
cannot be held that the respondents are entitled to run only a nursery school
as per the undertaking given before this Court in terms of the norms
prevalent at that point of time, when the modified norms allow the
respondents to run the school till 8th Standard.
18. Thus, Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others
Versus Ram Lubhaya Bagga and Others, (1998) 4 SCC 117, has held as
follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
23. The right of the State to change its policy from time to time,
under the changing circumstances is neither challenged nor could it
be.
xxx xxx xxx
25. Now we revert to the last submission, whether the new State policy
is justified in not reimbursing an employee, his full medical expenses
incurred on such treatment, if incurred in any hospital in India not
being a government hospital in Punjab. Question is whether the new
policy which is restricted by the financial constraints of the State to
the rates in AIIMS would be in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. So far as questioning the validity of
governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not normally
within the domain of any court, to weigh the pros and cons of the
policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or
equitable disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying or
annulling it, based on howsoever sound and good reasoning, except
where it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional, statutory or
any other provision of law. When Government forms its policy, it is
based on a number of circumstances on facts, law including
constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert opinion.
It would be dangerous if court is asked to test the utility, beneficial
effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits.
The court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which
belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen
whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts
reimbursement on account of its financial constraints.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. Likewise, holding that the Government has the power and competence
to change the policy on the basis of ground realities, Supreme Court in the
case of State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Narmada Bachao Andolan and
Another, (2011) 7 SCC 639, has held as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
37. Thus, it emerges to be a settled legal proposition that the
Government has the power and competence to change the policy on
the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot be challenged
through PIL where the State Government is competent to frame the
policy and there is no need for anyone to raise any grievance even if
the policy is changed. The public policy can only be challenged where
it offends some constitutional or statutory provisions.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. Therefore, if the prevalent norms entitle the respondents to run a
school till Class 8th and the same is being done by the respondents legally
and validly, after due approval from the DOE, no case of contempt can said
to lie against the respondents.
21. This Court also notes the submission made by the respondents in their
additional affidavit, which reads as under:
"xxx xxx xxx
9. I state that the recognition so granted by Directorate of
Education was as per the permissible and prevalent land norms,
notified by Hon'ble Lieutenant Governor and various functionaries of
Directorate of Education and Delhi Development Authority, in
meeting dated 12.01.2004, wherein Directorate of Education was
permitted to not to be bound by the terms of lease for the purpose of
optimum utilization of resources. This position was not prevalent at
the time when the statement was made by Ld. Sr. Counsel for
Petitioner and order dated 02.09.1999 was passed by this Hon'ble
Court, law and circumstances have thereafter changed, whereby
new rights have been created, which were not even in existence in
1999. Thus, in view of the changed circumstances which were post
1999, Respondents were of the bonafide belief that it can run School
upto VIIIth standard from the same land, for which the DOE itself has
granted recognition in 2013.
10. I state that Respondents were under the bonafide belief that
since the recognition of school upto Middle level is in accordance
with law, its actions may not be considered as a willful and deliberate
violation of Order of this Hon'ble Court. However, Respondents
reiterate that they have the highest regards and respect for this
Hon'ble Court and again tender our unconditional apology to this
Hon'ble Court.
xxx xxx xxx"
22. Holding that it is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not
explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished, Supreme
Court in the case of Debabrata Bandopadbyay and Others Versus State of
West Bengal and Another, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 91, has held as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
9. A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious
one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the
accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection
as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and
difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals.
It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not
explainable otherwise, arises that the condemner must be punished.
It must be realised that our system of courts often results in delay of
one kind or another. The remedy for it is reform and punishment
departmentally. Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for
when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in
defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make
the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be
encouraged.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis Supplied)
23. This Court also notes that the present petition has been filed in the
year 2018, while the documents on record clearly show that the petitioner
has been in the knowledge that the respondents have been running the
school till Class 8th, since the year 2015 and earlier. Various representations
written by the petitioner-society from the year 2015 onwards are on record.
24. Thus, the letter dated 27th July, 2015 written by the petitioner-society
regarding the respondents running the school upto Class 8th, is on record.
Similarly, letter dated 17th January, 2016 issued by the petitioner-society
with regard to running of middle school by the respondents, is on record.
Likewise, letters dated 18th January, 2016 and 3rd October, 2016 written by
the petitioner-society with regard to the respondents running a middle
school, are also on record.
25. Accordingly, it is clear that the present petition is barred by limitation.
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly stipulates that no
Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt after the expiry of a period
of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. Thus, in the case of Ajay Kumar Bhagat and Others Versus
B.L. Sherwal and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4636, a coordinate
bench of this Court, has held as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
24. Therefore, it is an established fact that the disobedience as
required for initiation of contempt proceedings should be wilful
disobedience. Before analyzing the instant case on the said parameter,
it is pertinent to look whether the contempt proceedings are barred by
limitation or not. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 provides for limitation on initiation of proceedings in following
manner:
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.--No court shall
initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or
otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
25. The said provision has been analyzed by Allahabad High Court
in Islamuddin v. Umesh Chandrara Tiwari, 2009 SCC OnLine All
690 and it was held that the Court should not deal with the petition
after expiry of one year from the date the contempt is alleged to have
been committed. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced
herein:
"66. There is another reason for taking the above view. Section
29(2) of Act, 1963 provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law. From the very
reading of Section 20 of Act, 1971, we are of the view that it
expressly excludes the power of the Court to condone delay in
giving to itself jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for contempt
after expiry of one year from the date the contempt is alleged to
have been committed. Applicability of Section 5 of Act, 1963 to the
bar contained in section 20 of Act, 1971 would make the mandate
contained therein illusory for all purposes. Where the language of
the statute is clear, it is not for the Court to interpret the provision
of statute in a manner which would completely destroy the express
provision of the statute. Reading Section 20 of Act, 1971 in
consonance with Section 29(2) and 17 of Act, 1963, it can be said
that it excludes the period taken beyond one year by a person in
moving application, due to lack of information on account of the
fraud played by the alleged contemnor and the benefit of Section 17
may be stretched to what extent as there is nothing contrary in
Section 20 to exclude section 17 from its application but it does not
mean that Section 5 can also be placed on the same pedestal since
the purpose and object of Section 5 is totally different."
26. In the case of Yogesh P. Sukhanandi v. State of Gujarat, 1995 SCC
OnLine Guj 251, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court
dismissed the petition on grounds of limitation and held as follows:
"6. Another aspect of the matter on which the applications are
liable to be dismissed is that this Court while passing the order on
21-11-1991 has directed the authority to decide the application
preferably on or before December 31, 1991. Both these
applications are filed in the year 1993. Application No. 200/93 is
filed on 20-12-1993 and rule came to be issued on 21-3-1994.
Misc. C.A. No. 914/93 was filed on 18-1-1993 and rule came to be
issued on 21-3-1994. In views of Section 20 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
beyond one year of the act or omission committing or constituting
contempt of the court. In view of these facts, both these
applications are filed beyond the stipulated time. Hence this Court
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same."
xxx xxx xxx
32. One of the underlying principles behind insertion of limitation is
to make the petitioners/aggrieved persons vigil about their rights so
that they can act diligently and not sleep over their rights. In the
instant case, the other aggrieved employees approached this Court
immediately after non-compliance with the interim order, but the
petitioners chose not to do so rather they kept on meddling between
the respondent and the other authorities. Therefore, the petitioners in
the instant case can be only termed as parties who did not exercise
their right within the time as provided under Section 20.
33. In view of the above discussion, it is clearly established that the
situation of the petitioners cannot be termed as an exceptional
situation and is certainly barred by limitation of one year as provided
under the Act.
34. Hence, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground
of limitation as barred by Section 20 of the Act.
xxx xxx xxx"
26. In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion, no merit is found in the
present petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.
(MINI PUSHKARNA)
JUDGE
APRIL 16, 2024/au/ak
