Delhi High Court
Kishan Lal Gupta And Ors vs Kewal Krishan Bansal on 11 July, 2022
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 11th JULY, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ RC.REV. 73/2022 & & CM APPL. 18632/2022 (Stay)
KISHAN LAL GUPTA AND ORS ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sanjay Dua,
Mr.Sharvan Dev, Advocates
versus
KEWAL KRISHAN BANSAL ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Vikram Baweja, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
1. The instant Revision Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as „the DRC Act‟)
against the Order dated 17.09.2021 passed by the learned Additional Rent
Controller-02 (Central), Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, in CNR No.DLCT03-
002992/2020, ARC No.311/20, E-98/20 wherein the learned ARC dismissed
the Petitioners' application for leave to defend and consequently allowed the
eviction petition of the Respondent/landlord herein and directed the
Petitioners/tenants to vacate the premises in question i.e. a private shop at
front side facing main road in Property No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand
Marg, Delhi-110006.
Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:14.07.2022
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2. The facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the instant petition are that
the Respondent/landlord (Petitioner in the eviction petition) had purchased
the property in question bearing No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand Marg,
Delhi - 110006 vide a registered Sale Deed dated 18.09.2015 executed by
the erstwhile owner Sh. Bhusan Raheja. It is stated in the eviction petition
that the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 along with Sh. Pran Nath Gupta and Sh. Om
Prakash Gupta were co-tenants in the tenanted shop and all of them were
running their businesses from the tenanted shop. However, after the death of
the Sh. Pran Nath Gupta and Sh. Om Prakash Gupta, Sh. Ashish Gupta
(Petitioner No.3 herein) being the son of Sh. Pran Nath Gupta, and Sh.
Abhinav Gupta (Petitioner No.4 herein) being the son of Sh. Om Prakash
Gupta occupied the tenanted shop and started carrying out business from the
same. It is stated that the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are carrying out their
business as Partners under the name of M/s Rekha Agency, Petitioner No.3
is running his business under the name of M/s Adishakti Enterprises, and
Petitioner No.4 is running his business under the name of M/s Technomast
in the tenanted shop. It is stated that all the Petitioners herein (Respondents
in the eviction petition) are running their businesses by partitioning the
tenanted shop without the permission of erstwhile owner as well as the
Respondent herein (Petitioner in the eviction petition).
3. It is stated in the eviction petition that the Respondent/landlord now
requires the tenanted shop bona fidely for his son, namely, Pankaj Bansal,
who wants to start his business of electrical/machinery and its parts from the
tenanted shop as he is currently employed. It is stated that though the son of
the Respondent/landlord was working earlier, he has now left his job and
intends to start his own business of electrical/machinery and its parts.
Therefore, the Respondent/landlord, wanting to discharge his responsibility
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as a father, requires the tenanted shop for his son in order for his son to start
his own business from the tenanted premises as neither the
Respondent/landlord nor does his son have any other commercial property
with them besides the said tenanted premises. It is also stated in the eviction
petition that since the tenanted shop is situated in the commercial area where
the majority of the shops are suitable for the business of electrical/machinery
and its parts, and as the Respondent/landlord is having no other commercial
property available with him nor does his son has any other property,
therefore, the said tenanted shop is required by the Respondent/landlord for
his son Pankaj Bansal.
4. The Petitioners herein (Respondents in the eviction petition),
thereafter, filed an application under Section 25B (4) of Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 seeking leave to defend. The grounds raised by the Petitioners
herein in their leave to defend application are as follows:
a) that the Respondent/landlord had earlier filed a petition under Section
14(1)(j) of the DRC Act which was dismissed as withdrawn vide
Order dated 28.02.2019;
b) that the said petition under Section 14(1)(j) of the DRC Act was filed
by the Respondent/landlord on false allegations with an intention to
harass the tenants;
c) that the Respondent/landlord has not disclosed the age of his son and
also as to whether the son of the Respondent/landlord was minor or
major at the time of filing the petition under Section 14(1)(j) of the
DRC Act;
d) that the petition under Section 14(1)(j) of the DRC Act was filed by
the Respondent/landlord against the seven (7) respondents, but the
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eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) has been filed only against
the four (4) Respondents;
e) that there is a dispute between the two sets of tenants, i.e. the LRs of
Late Sh. Sham Narain Gupta and the LRs of Late Ram Narayan
Gupta; that the present Petitioners are LRs of Sh. Ram Narain Gupta
and both sets of LRs are claiming to be the tenants with civil
litigations pending before this Court in this regard. The entire factum
of litigation to ascertain the real owners of the Property is still
pending before this Court and, therefore, the eviction petition is not
maintainable.
5. It is stated that a civil suit bearing No.361/81 (old) 337/2014 (new)
was filed by one Sh. Sham Narain against Smt. Sumitra Devi and other
persons, including the present Petitioners and the erstwhile owner of the
property, Sh. Bhushan Raheja. The said suit was filed for dissolution of
partnership and rendition of accounts. After completion of the pleadings in
the said suit some issues were framed by the learned ADJ. The relevant
issues framed by the learned ADJ read as under:
a) Issue No.3 as to whether the Shop No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand
Marg, Delhi-110006 came to the share of the defendents.
b) Issue No.5 as to whether Sh. Sham Narain had been and continues to
be a tenant of No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand Marg, Delhi-110006 as
alleged.
c) Issue No.6 as to whether Sh. Sham Narain was the tenant of No.49,
GB Road, Shardha Nand Marg, Delhi-110006 and whether after his
death, his legal heirs have become the tenants.
6. It is stated that the above mentioned Civil Suit was dismissed by the
learned ADJ (Central), Delhi vide Judgment and decree dated 21.04.2014. It
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is stated that thereafter, an appeal bearing RFA No.473/2014 against the said
Civil Suit was filed which is pending adjudication before this Court.
7. It is stated in the leave to defend application that the
Respondent/landlord and his son are well settled, and the son of the
Respondent/landlord is not dependent upon his father (Respondent/landlord
herein). It is stated that the son of the Respondent/landlord is well qualified
and is more than 40 years of age. It is further stated in the leave to defend
application that the son of the Respondent/landlord has recently purchased a
flat bearing A-139, Sector - 21, Jalvayu Vihar, Noida - 201301 in his name.
It is stated that if the son of the Respondent/landlord is capable of
purchasing a property in his name, he cannot be said to be dependent on his
father. It is also stated that the Respondent/landlord and his son are also well
settled at Rudrapur, Uttrakhand, and have purchased the suit property for a
valuable consideration which itself shows that they are well off and well
settled and, therefore, disentitles the Respondent/landlord from instituting
and proceeding with the eviction petition. It is stated that the
Respondent/landlord has not disclosed as to how many members in his
family are dependent upon him.
8. The learned Additional Rent Controller-02 (Central), Tis Hazari
Court, Delhi, has dismissed the leave to defend application of the Petitioners
herein vide impugned order dated 17.09.2021 by observing as under:
a) that the withdrawal of the petition under Section 14(1)(j) of the DRC
Act is no bar for the Respondent/landlord to file an eviction petition
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and it does not raise a triable
issue;
b) the fact that an appeal bearing RFA No.473/2014 is pending for
adjudication before this Court, which arises out of the said Civil Suit
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in a dispute between the two sets of tenants i.e. the LRs of Late Sh.
Sham Narain Gupta and the LRs of Late Ram Narayan Gupta, who
are claiming to be the tenants, is of no concern for the adjudication
of the eviction petition.
c) no convincing and reliable document has been furnished by the
Petitioners/tenants in respect of the employment of the son of the
Respondent/landlord. Even if it is assumed that the son of the
Respondent/landlord is working and employed, it is not expected
from the son of the Respondent/landlord to await the outcome of the
eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act for
starting his business;
d) as far as the age of the son of the Respondent/landlord is concerned,
nothing has been placed on record by the Petitioners/tenants to show
that the son of the Respondent/landlord was minor at the time of
filing of the petition under Section 14(1)(j) of the DRC Act;
e) the fact that the Respondent/landlord and his son are well settled in
Rudrapur, Uttrakhand cannot raise a triable issue for the reason that
the son of the Respondent/landlord wants to start his own business
and it is not expected that he will continue to be unemployed and
stay with his father as he is not working anywhere at present. There
is nothing mala fide, if the son of the Respondent/landlord wants to
start his own business from the tenanted premises.
f) that the residential premises at Noida i.e. a flat bearing A-139, Sector
- 21, Jalvayu Vihar, Noida - 201301 and the property at Rudrapur,
Uttrakhand are all residential premises only, and no commercial
activities can be conducted at the said properties and, therefore, the
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tenanted shop is required by the Respondent/landlord for his son so
that he can start his own business.
9. Aggrieved by the order dated 17.09.2021 passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-02 (Central), Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, the
Petitioners have filed the instant petition seeking setting aside the order
dated 17.09.2021 and praying for their application for leave to defend to be
allowed.
10. Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners, contended that it is yet to be ascertained as to whether the
Petitioners are the tenants in the tenanted premises/shop or not. He draws
attention of this Court towards a legal notice dated 23.07.2016 sent by the
Respondent to the Petitioner Sh. Kishan Lal by stating that the erstwhile
owner of the property in question Sh. Bhushan Raheja had never accepted
the Petitioners as his tenants and in consequence of which the Petitioners
herein has never been a tenant of the erstwhile owner, namely, Sh. Bhushan
Raheja. He states that once the stand has been taken by the erstwhile owner,
namely, Sh. Bhushan Raheja of the tenanted shop that the Petitioners are not
the tenants of the tenanted premises/shop in question, then it has to be first
ascertained as to whether the Petitioners are the tenants or not in the
tenanted premises/shop. Mr. Sindhwani argues that until this was decided,
the learned ARC could not have assumed jurisdiction to entertain the
eviction petition filed by the Respondent/landlord herein. He states that said
issue is pending for adjudication before this Court in an appeal bearing RFA
No.473/2014 and in case the said appeal is allowed then the Appellant Sh.
Sham Narain and his Legal Representatives will become the tenants of the
Property.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
Signing Date:14.07.2022
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11. Mr. Sindhwani further states that the son of the Respondent/landlord
has purchased a flat bearing bearing A-139, Sector - 21, Jalvayu Vihar,
Noida - 201301. He states that if the son of the Respondent/landlord could
afford to purchase a property in Noida in his name, he cannot be said to be
dependent on his father for the purposes of accommodation. He further
states that the son of the Respondent/landlord is employed and nothing has
been placed on record to demonstrate otherwise.
12. Mr. Sindhwani further states that the Respondent/landlord and his
son are well settled in Rudrapur, Uttrakhand and, therefore, the so-called
bonafide requirement of the tenanted shop in question by the
Respondent/landlord is only a sham and, at best, only a desire. He states that
it has not been specifically averred in the eviction petition that the son of the
Respondent/landlord is dependent upon his father, and until and unless it is
not specifically pleaded that the son of the Respondent/landlord is dependent
upon his father for the purposes of accommodation, the eviction petition can
not be entertained.
13. Per contra, Mr. Vikram Baweja, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent, contends that the pleadings should be read in totality. He draws
the attention of this Court towards the eviction petition wherein it is
specifically stated that the Respondent/landlord requires the tenanted shop
for bona fide purpose for his son Pankaj Bansal who wants to start his own
business of electrical/machinery and its parts from the tenanted shop as he is
currently umeployed. He states that the absence of the word "dependent"
itself would not defeat a legitimate claim of the Respondent/landlord.
14. Mr. Baweja further states that the fact that a legal notice dated
23.07.2016 was sent to the Petitioner Sh. Kishan Lal by stating that the
Petitioners herein have never been the tenants of the erstwhile owner,
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Signing Date:14.07.2022
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namely, Sh. Bhushan Rajeja, fails in its significance for the simple reason
that the Petitioners had moved a petition for depositing the rent in Court in
favour of the Respondent/landlord in respect of the tenanted premises/shop
wherein it was specifically admitted by the Petitioners herein that the
Respondent herein was their landlord. He states that in fact the Petitioners
have also sent money orders to the Respondent herein in respect of the
tenanted premises/shop admitting the fact that they are the tenants of the
property in question. He states that the Petitioners herein now cannot be
permitted to take a complete U-turn by saying that they are not the tenants of
the tenanted premises/shop.
15. Mr. Baweja further states that the Respondent herein had sent an
intimation letter dated 29.07.2020 to the Petitioners herein for remitting rent
in respect of the tenanted premises/shop bearing No.49, GB Road, Shardha
Nand Marg, Delhi - 110006 by way of a cheque or demand draft at his
Noida residence. He states that a reply to the said intimation letter dated
29.07.2020 was duly sent by the Petitioners herein by sending a Demand
Draft bearing DD No.317090 dated 03.04.2021 for a sum of Rs.660/- drawn
on Yes Bank as rent of the said tenanted premises/shop w.e.f 01.04.2021 to
31.03.2022 @ Rs.55/- per month. He states that this categorically proves the
relationship of the landlord and tenant between the Respondent and the
Petitioners herein. He, therefore, states that the eviction petition is
maintainable.
16. Heard Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the Petitioner, Mr. Vikram Baweja, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent, and perused the material on record.
17. The principal contention of the Petitioners/tenants is that the erstwhile
owner of the tenanted premises/shop Sh. Bhusan Raheja had himself denied
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that the Petitioners herein are his tenants and to substantiate this Contention,
the learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioners draws attention of
this Court towards a legal notice dated 23.07.2016 sent by the Respondent
herein to the Petitioner, Sh. Kishan Lal, by stating that the erstwhile owner
of the property in question, Sh. Bhushan Raheja, had never accepted the
Petitioners as his tenants, and in consequence of which the Petitioners herein
have never been a tenant of the erstwhile owner of the tenanted
premises/shop Sh. Bhushan Raheja. There is a dispute between the two sets
of tenants i.e. the LRs of Late Sh. Sham Narain Gupta and the LRs of Late
Ram Narayan Gupta; that the present Petitioners are LRs of Sh. Ram Narain
Gupta and both sets of LRs are contesting among themselves as to who are
the real tenants of the tenanted premises/shop in question. A civil suit
bearing No.361/81 (old) 337/2014 (new) was filed by one Sh. Sham Narain
against Smt. Sumitra Devi and other persons, including the present
Petitioners and the erstwhile owner of the Property Sh. Bhushan Raheja. The
said suit was filed for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. In
the said suit the Plaintiff - Sh. Sham Narain had stated that the property in
issue i.e. Property No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand Marg, Delhi - 110006
was taken by him from the erstwhile owner - Sh. Bhushan Raheja on
tenancy as long before the partnership came into existence. It was stated in
the suit that Sh. Sham Narain was the sole tenant in the said premises and
the partnership has nothing to do with the tenancy rights and the Plaintiff -
Sh. Sham Narain was only permitted to use the premises only as a licencee.
In the written statement filed by the Petitioners herein in the suit, the only
stand taken by the Petitioners herein was an arbitration clause. The essence
of the partnership was to distribute the shares amongst themselves.
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18. The said Civil Suit was dismissed by the Ld. Additional District
Judge, Central-14, Delhi vide Judgment dated 21.04.2014. The relevant
portion of the said judgment reads as under:
"11. It is the case of the plaintiff that in the process of
dissolution while resolving the dispute following division
took place and acted upon. It is also the case of the
plaintiff that the shop No. 49 G.B.Road, Delhi was taken
on tenancy by Sh. Shyam Narain which was his exclusive
tenancy though partnership was allowed to use that. It is
the case of the plaintiff in the plaint that he has taken the
property No. 49 G.B.Road on tenancy from the landlord
which prior to the coming into being the partnership in
question dissolution of which he has sought. It was his
exclusive tenancy and the partnership has nothing to do
with the tenancy right but the plaintiff has allowed the
partnership to use the same only as a licencee, the para 4
of the plaint is reproduced as under;
"That the shop No. 49 G.B.Road, Delhi was
taken by the plaintiff from the landlord on tenancy
basis long before the partnership in question. As
such, he is the sole tenant in the said premises. The
partnership firm has nothing to do with the
tenancy rights but the plaintiff has allowed the
partnership to use the same only as a licencee."
12. The bone of contention is regarding only this
particular property which at present seems in possession
of defendant No.1 to 5. So as per his own case, the form
of the business stopped in 1978 thereafter and the
distribution of the six assets has taken place as per
mutual settlement and this fact was reiterated in the
statement made by PW1 before the court so as per his
own case dissolution of assets or distribution as
mentioned in para 8 and 9 of the plaint took place.
Business was already stopped so nothing is left to be
disputed.
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13. It has been duly placed on record and proved and
admitted by the plaintiff as to be correct position of the
account on the record sealed upto 31st March 1978.
There is nothing left to be divided and as per the own
case of the plaintiff itself when he is claiming for
property No. 49 G.B. Road, Delhi was under the
exclusive tenancy of the plaintiff and partnership form
has nothing to do with the tenancy right of the same and
he permitted the partnership firm to use the possession as
a licencee only. After saying that if he want to go back
and say that this property is still the disputed property of
the partnership and again the dissolution take place of
the partnership asset re-opening, acted upon the
settlement on the ground of some mis-conception in his
mind regarding what he is saying in the plaint as far as
pleading in the plaint qua property No:49, G.B.Road,
Delhi.
14. According to the case of the plaintiff it was never a
partnership asset. Though the counsel for plaintiff Sh.
S.K. Bhattachatya has tried to argue against the plaintiff
itself that it was the intention of the plaintiff that he threw
the tenancy rights in the hotch - potch and the rent was
being paid by the partnership firm so it be treated as
asset of partnership firm.
15. I am constrained to say after making these
submissions, he left saying it was the intention of the
plaintiff and the words are not matching the intention of
the plaintiff which should not be strictly contributed and
they meant this after that Ld. Seasoned counsel for the
defendant No.1 to 5 has clearly drawn the attention of the
court to para No.4 of the plaint qua property No.49
G.B.Road, Delhi where it is specifically mentioned. There
cannot be other clear words for the position of this
property in the mind of the plaintiff as per the case of the
plaintiff that this was allowed to be use by the
partnership firm as a licencee by the plaintiff and the
partnership firm has nothing to do with the tenancy
rights. After this statement in para No.4 of the plaint, the
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plaintiff seek dissolution of the property which according
to the case of the plaintiff in para 4 of the plaint is the
exclusive tenancy of the plaintiff with the tenancy rights
of which partnership firm has nothing to do and it was
allowed to be used as a licencee by the firm.
16. So as per his own case, it is not a asset of the
partnership firm so on the basis of his own pleadings
over other assets stood resolved by mutual settlement of
account settled, admittedly as proved on record, so as
per his own admitted case nothing left to be divided. The
dissolution has already taken place where it is in the
form of arbitration agreement, mutual settlement, or any
other way on the basis of the plaint, nothing survives to
be divided.
17. In view of my above discussions, all the issues are
decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the
defendants as the declaration is inconsequential because
as per the case of the plaintiff in the plaint itself the
shares were determined by way of mutual settlement by
meets and bounds as it had taken place and admittedly as
per statement of account duly proved on record and
accepted by the plaintiff, the accounts stood settled."
19. A perusal of the above deliberation in the said suit indicates that the
Court did not go into the question as to who was the tenant of the tenanted
premises/shop in question.
20. The Petitioners had moved a petition for depositing the rent in Court
in favour of the Respondent/landlord in respect of the tenanted
premises/shop wherein it was specifically admitted by the Petitioners that
the Respondent herein was their landlord. In view of this fact, the Petitioners
herein now cannot be permitted to take a complete U-turn by saying that
they are not the tenants of the tenanted premises/shop. The Petitioners
cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. In the wake of assertion
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made by the tenants by moving a petition for depositing rent as if they were
the tenants of the tenanted premises/shop, the pendency of the RFA
No.473/2014 which is pending for adjudication before this Court becomes
meaningless, as far as the eviction petition is concerned. In case, the said
RFA is allowed, it is for Sh. Sham Narain to take further proceedings in
respect of the tenancy and the Petitioners herein shall not be concerned with
the same. In case the RFA is dismissed, it still remains that there is no
finding as to whether the Petitioners herein are not the tenants of the
tenanted premises/shop and it will again be futile in view of the assertion
made on the part of the Petitioners herein, in their petition for depositing
rent, that they are the tenants of the tenanted premises/shop, and as a result
of which they would be liable to face proceedings under the DRC Act.
21. The fact that the word "dependent" is not mentioned in the eviction
petition will not be fatal for the eviction petition. It is well settled that each
and every word of the relevant statutory provision need not be reproduced in
the eviction petition. The Apex Court in Ram Sarup Gupta vs. Bishun
Narayan Inter College and Ors, (1987) 2 SCC 555 has observed as under:
"The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the
adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have
a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the
essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by
surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal
construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat
justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Some times, pleadings
are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a
case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a
case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the
pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place
undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings
should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of
pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the
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form of the pleadings; instead the court must find out whether in
substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which
they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in
the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial
on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not
be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings
in appeal."
22. Similarly, the Apex Court in Bhagwati Prasad vs. Chandramaul,
(1966) 2 SCR 286 has observed as under:
"If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by
an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the
said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that
the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would
not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it
is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no
doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings
made by the parties. But where the substantial matters
relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched,
though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and
evidence has been led about them, then the argument that
a particular matter was not expressly taken in the
pleadings would be purely formal and technical and
cannot succeed in every case. What the court has to
consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the
parties know that the matter in question was involved in
the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it
appears that the parties did not know that the matter was
in issue at the trial and one of them has had no
opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that
undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one
party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other
party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity
to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of
prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the court
cannot do injustice to another."
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23. A perusal of the above judgments of the Apex Court shows that the
pleadings are to be read as a whole, and that no specific expression or phrase
is required to be pleaded in this regard. Mere reproduction of language of
the statute is not necessary or desirable.
24. Keeping in view the above principle in mind, it is necessary to peruse
the pleadings in the eviction petition which reads as under:
"4. That the petitioner now requires the tenanted shop
bonafidely for his son namely Shri Pankaj Bansal, who
wants to start his business of electrical / machinery and
its Parts, from the tenanted shop as he is not doing
anything now a days, however, earlier he was doing
some job but he has left the job and wants to start his
own business and accordingly the petitioner being the
father requires the tenanted shop for his son to start his
business from the tenanted shop as neither the petitioner
nor his son namely Shri Pankaj Bansal is having any
other commercial property with them beside the tenanted
shop and other Shops of the Property No.49, GB Road,
Shradha Nand Marg, Delhi-110006 is being occupied by
other owners. On main road facing is best suited to start
the business and accordingly the tenanted shop is being
required bonafidely by the petitioner.
5. That the tenanted shop is being required
bonafidely by the petitioner or his son namely Shri
Pankaj Bansal as the tenanted shop is situated in the
commercial where the majority of shop deals in electrical
and Machinery goods and its parts and accordingly the
tenanted shop is best suited for starting the business of
electrical / machinery goods by the son of the petitioner
and since the petitioner is having no other property
available with him nor Shri Pankaj Bansal is having any
other property available with him, hence the tenanted
shop is required bonafidely by the petitioner for his son
namely Shri Pankaj Bansal for the reason stated herein
above."
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
Signing Date:14.07.2022
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25. A reply to the leave to defend application has been filed wherein, the
Respondent/landlord has stated as under:
"4. That in reply to para No.4 of the leave to defend
affidavit of the respondents No.1 to 3, it is submitted that
the earlier petition filed under section 14(1) (j) of the
D.R.C. Act by the petitioner against the respondents has
no concern with the present petition, moreover the
withdrawal of the said petition by the petitioner has no
affect in the present petition as the present petition is
being filed by the deponent / petitioner under section
14(1)(e) of the D.R.C. Act which is an independent
proceeding and the petition under section 14(1)(j) of the
D.R.C. Act which was prior to this petition and also
withdrawn by the present petitioner has no binding upon
the present petition. Further it is pertinent to mention
here that it has been clearly mentioned by the deponent /
petitioner that the tenanted premises is required
bonafidely for his son Shri Pankaj Bansal, who wants to
start his business of electrical / machinery and its parts
from the tenanted premises and as the son of the
petitioner now wants to start business as earlier he was
doing some job but had left the same and wants to start
his own business and accordingly the tenanted premises
is being required by the petitioner / deponent for his son
bonafildely as the deponent as well as his son Shri
Pankaj Bansal does not have any other suitable
commercial property available with them beside the
tenanted premises which is located in the Central Delhi
that too in the vicinity of electrical and machinery shops
i.e. G.B. Road, Delhi.
Further regarding disclosing Age of Son, it is submitted
that the age of Shri Pankaj Bansal is 38 years and earlier
doing job and now wants to start his own Business."
10. That in reply to para No.10 of the leave to defend
affidavit of the respondents No.1 to 3, it is submitted that
the son of the deponent / petitioner is not well settled and
not working and require the tenanted premises
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bonafidely. The petitioner requires the tenanted premises
for his son namely Shri Pankaj Bansal, who is not
employed these days and earlier he was working in the
company Jabong and he has left the job and accordingly
the petitioner / deponent requires the premises bonafidely
for his son Shri Pankaj Bansal who wants to start his
business of electrical / machinery and its parts from the
tenanted premises and it is settled proposition of law that
the respondent / tenant cannot dictate terms to the
petitioner / deponent / landlord / owner and it is the
prerogative of the petitioner / landlord to get the tenant
evicted from the tenanted premises on bonafide ground
under section 14(1)(e) of the D.R.C. Act and the
respondent has got no right to challenge the bonafide
needs of the petitioner as he is the best judge to get the
tenanted premises evicted on the bonafide ground.
However, with respect to property bearing No.A- 139,
Sector-21, Jalvayu Vihar, Noida-201301 is being
purchased by the son of the petitioner namely Shri
Pankaj Bansal for residential purpose only as the said
property is a residential one and no commercial
activities can be done from the said property and the
same is being purchased by the son of the petitioner for
residential purpose only as the petitioner as well as his
son is residing in the said flat and moreover it will be
convenient for the son of the petitioner to commute to the
tenanted premises for running his business from the
tenanted premises."
26. From the perusal of the above pleadings in the eviction petition and
the reply filed by the Respondent/landlord to the leave to defend application,
the following facts emerge:
a) that the son of the Respondent/landlord intends to start his own
business of electrical/machinery and its parts from the tenanted shop
i.e. Property No.49, GB Road, Shardha Nand Marg, Delhi - 110006.
b) that neither the Respondent/landlord nor the son is having any other
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commercial premises.
c) in the absence of any other commercial property from where the
business can be started, it can be said that the son is dependent upon
his father for the purposes of accommodation in the tenanted shop.
27. In order to establish that it is the moral duty of the father to settle his
son well in his life, the learned ARC has placed reliance upon a Judgment in
Joginder Pal Singh vs. Naval Kishore Behal, AIR 2002 SC 2256 wherein
the Apex Court has observed as under:
"24......Keeping in view the social or socio-religious
milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of
society or a particular region, to which the landlord
belongs, it may be the obligation of the landlord to settle
a person closely connected with him to make him
economically independent so as to support himself and/or
the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord
may require the tenancy premises and such requirement
would be the requirement of the landlord. If the
requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person
other than the landlord himself the court shall with
circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of
such person can be considered to be the requirement of
the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close
interrelation or identity nexus between such person and
the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first
query. Applying the overlaid tests to the facts of the
present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are
required for the office of the landlord's son who is a
chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the
landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute
his best to see him economically independent."
28. In view of the above, no prejudice has been caused to the
Respondent/landlord by not using the word "dependent". The facts as stated
in the eviction petition categorically bring out that the son of the
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Respondent/landlord is dependent upon his father for the purpose of
attaining accommodation in the tenanted premises/shop to start his own
business. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Respondent,
the son of the Respondent/landlord need not wait till eviction petition is
decided. In fact Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was
introduced only to ensure that the bonafide requirements of the landlord are
immediately met with instead of the landlord going to the rigor of a full-
fledged trial.
29. It is well settled that if the son of the Respondent/landlord does not
occupy the tenanted premises/shop and does not start his own business
within three years, it is always open to the tenants to invoke Section 19 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for getting back the possession of the
tenanted premises/shop.
30. The fact that the son of the Respondent/landlord has purchased a flat
bearing A-139, Sector - 21, Jalvayu Vihar, Noida - 201301, it does not mean
that the tenanted premises/shop in question is not required by the
Respondent/landlord bonafidely for his son who wants to start his own
business of electrical/machinery and its parts from the tenanted
shop/premises. As correctly pointed out by the learned ARC that the
property at Noida i.e. a flat bearing A-139, Sector - 21, Jalvayu Vihar, Noida
- 201301 and the property at Rudrapur, Uttrakhand will not raise a triable
issue inasmuch as both the properties are residential premises only and no
commercial activities can be started from the said properties, and the
tenanted premises/shop is a commercial property from the where the son of
the Respondent/landlord may start his own business of electrical/machinery
and its parts.
31. The Petitioners state that the son of the Respondent/landlord is
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working at some other private organization. In support of this contention, the
Petitioners have filed certain salary statements of Jade eServices Pvt. Ltd.
for the month of May and June, 2016 where the son of the
Respondent/landlord was working, and the last net pay which was drawn by
the son of the Respondent/landlord in month of June, 2016 was
Rs.1,34,482/-. However, these salary statements of the son of the
Respondent/landlord have not been made part of the leave to defend
application nor has it been presented before the learned Trial Court. In
response to this fact, it is stated that though the son of the
Respondent/landlord was doing a job earlier but he has now left the job as
he intends to start his own business of electrical/machinery and its parts, and
the Respondent/landlord being the father requires the tenanted
premises/shop for his son so that his son may start his own business from the
tenanted premises as neither the Respondent/landlord nor does his son have
any other commercial property with them besides the said tenanted
premises.As rightly pointed by the Ld ARC that it is not expected from the
son of the Respondent/landlord to sit idle or to make an attempt get an
alternate employment in the meantime till the disposal of the eviction
petition. This does not raise a triable issue at all. The son of the
Respondent/landlord intends to start his own business of
electrical/machinery and its parts from the tenanted premises/shop and being
the father, it is the duty of the Respondent/landlord to provide the tenanted
premises/shop to his son so that his son may start his own business.
32. This Court is of the opinion that no triable issues arise in the present
case on the facts which are placed before the Court and on the points raised
in the leave to defend application. Even if the points which have been raised
in leave to defend application, are proven in favour of the
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Signing Date:14.07.2022
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Petitioners/tenants, it would not disentitle the Respondent/landlord from
evicting the Petitioners/tenants from the tenanted premises/shop.
33. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, along with pending
application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
JULY 11, 2022
S. Zakir
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
Signing Date:14.07.2022
13:29:17
