Delhi High Court
Anoop Singh Karayat vs State on 16 February, 2022
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16th FEBRUARY, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.M.C. 3517/2021
ANOOP SINGH KARAYAT ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Tarun Chandiok, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Amit Chadha, APP, Ms.
Manvi Priya, SPP, Mr. A.T. Ansari,
Mr. Sanjeevi Seshadri and Mr. Sukrit
Seth, Advocates with IO/SI Nikhil
Chaudhary.
Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Raavi Sharma, Advocate for the
complainant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
1. Vide the present petitions, the Petitioner seeks to challenge the Order
dated 03.12.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala
House Courts, rejecting the application of the Petitioner herein filed under
Section 389(2) Cr.P.C for suspension of sentence during the pendency of
Appeal.
2. It is pertinent to mention here that the impugned Order arises from a
batch of criminal appeals, being Crl. Appeals No. 89/2021 (filed by the co-
accused - Gopal Ansal), 90/2021 (filed by the co-accused -Sushil Ansal),
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91/2021 (filed by the co-accused - P.P. Batra), 92/2021 (filed by the co-
accused - Dinesh Chandra Sharma) and 95/2021 (filed by Anoop Singh
Karayat, the Petitioner herein). Co-accused Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal
have also challenged the Order impugned herein by filing CRL.M.C.
3276/2021 & CRL.M.C. 3277/2021 respectively. All the petitions were
heard together. Mr. Arvind Nigam, learned Senior Counsel appeared for
Sushil Ansal (Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 3276/2021), and Dr. Abhishek Manu
Singhvi, Mr. N. Hariharan, and Mr. Pramod K. Dubey, learned Senior
Counsels appeared for Gopal Ansal (Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 3277/2021).
I. FACTUAL MATRIX:
3. For a better understanding of the instant petition, it is imperative to
narrate the backdrop of the entire episode, which is stated as under:
A. The genesis of the entire proceedings stems from the devastating
fire that occurred in Uphaar Cinema on 13.06.1997 which
resulted in the death of 59 people due to asphyxia and caused
injuries to more than 100 people. Initially the investigation was
conducted by Delhi Police and later on it was transferred to the
CBI which registered a case, being case No. RC-3
(S)/97/SIC.IV/New Delhi. After investigation, charge-sheet was
filed on 15.11.1997 against 16 persons. There was delay in trial
and a petition, being Criminal Writ Petition No. 353/2002, was
filed by the Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy
(hereinafter, "AVUT") before this Court for a direction to
expedite the trial. This Court vide Order dated 04.04.2002 in
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Criminal Writ Petition No. 353/2002, titled as Association of
Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.,
directed the Ld. Trial Court to conduct the trial for ten days in a
month from May 2002 onwards, except for June 2002. It was
directed that the Ld. Trial Court shall adjust its calendar suitably
in consultation with the Ld. Principal District and Sessions
Judge, if need be, to explore that no other matter was taken up on
the fixed dates. CBI was directed to take steps to ensure that
sufficient numbers of witnesses were present and available on the
dates fixed for prosecution evidence. The Trial Court was
directed to complete the examination of prosecution witnesses on
a day-to-day basis. It was also directed that no adjournments
would be granted for non-availability of a defence counsel
resulting in deferring of the cross-examination of a prosecution
witness and in that event, it would be open to the Ld. Trial Court
to take recourse to various options in terms of Section 309
Cr.P.C, including closure of cross-examination or cancellation of
bail of the accused persons. It was directed that the trial shall be
completed by 15.12.2002.
B. Material on record discloses that during the examination of PW-
33 (Mr. T. S. Sharma - ADO, Delhi Fire Service), it was found
that certain documents which had been marked and which had to
be exhibited were found to be torn/mutilated. On 13.01.2003, an
application was filed by the Ld. Special Public Prosecutor
bringing to the knowledge of the Court that important documents
that were seized by the investigating agencies during the course
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of investigation, which were part of the charge-sheet and judicial
record, were missing/mutilated and had been tampered with. On
20.01.2003, after scrutinizing all the papers, the Ld. Special
Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Ld. Additional
Sessions Judge stating that since certain documents in the Court
file had been torn and were missing, therefore, permission must
be given for leading secondary evidence. The application was
allowed on 31.01.2003 and the prosecution was granted
permission to lead secondary evidence to prove the following
documents which were found to be missing/mutilated in the
Court file.
C. The learned Additional Sessions Judge directed for an inquiry
against Dinesh Chandra Sharma, the Court Ahlmad. It is
pertinent to mention here that Dinesh Chandra Sharma took
charge as the Court Ahlmad in the Court in which trial of the
Main Uphaar case was being concluded. Pursuant to the inquiry,
it was found that Dinesh Chandra Sharma was prima facie guilty
of misconduct as well as for the loss and tampering with the
documents which formed a part of the judicial record. He was
dismissed from service vide an Order dated 25.06.2004. It is
stated that after his dismissal from service, Dinesh Chandra
Sharma approached the co-accused, P.P. Batra, to secure any
form of employment/job. P.P. Batra recommended Dinesh
Chandra Sharma to Mr. D.V. Malhotra, the General Manager of
Star Estates Management Ltd. (a subsidiary of Ansal Properties
and Industries Ltd.) who in turn recommended Dinesh Chandra
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Sharma for employment at A-Plus Security Agency, which was
run by the Petitioner herein who was the Chairman of A-Plus
Security Agency. It is stated that Dinesh Chandra Sharma was
given job for a remuneration of Rs. 15,000/-, which was higher
than the salary that he was paid as a Court Ahlmad. It is stated
that this salary was paid to Dinesh Chandra Sharma through D.V.
Malhotra (now deceased). It is stated that when the Petitioner
herein was made aware of the connection between Dinesh
Chandra Sharma and the Main Uphaar Case, the Petitioner herein
applied white fluid on the name of Dinesh Chandra Sharma in the
register of A-Plus Security Agency in order to shield the possible
role that his Agency might have played in the conspiracy which
was alleged against Dinesh Chandra Sharma.
D. When the factum of tampering with the Court record came to
light, AVUT filed an application before the Sessions Court on
14.02.2003 under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C for cancellation of bail
granted to the accused in the Main Uphaar case. The Sessions
Court vide Order dated 29.04.2003 dismissed the said application
on the ground that the trial in the Main Uphaar case was at its fag
end. AVUT challenged the Order dated 29.04.2003 before this
Court by filing CRL. M.C. 2380/2003. Along with CRL. M.C.
2380/2003, CRL. M. No. 2229/2006 was also filed by the AVUT
for registration of FIR for tampering with the Court records. This
Court vide Order dated 05.05.2006 rejected CRL. M.C.
2380/2003, but allowed CRL. M. No. 2229/2006 and directed the
Special Branch of Delhi Police to register a case under
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appropriate provisions of law against all such persons who were
responsible for the disappearance/mutilation and tampering of
documents which formed a part of judicial record in the trial of
the Main Uphaar case. This Court also directed that the
investigation be conducted by an officer not below the rank of
ACP. Resultantly, FIR No.207/2006 dated 17.05.2006 was
registered at Police Station Tilak Marg for offences under
Sections 109/193/201/218/409/120B IPC on the complaint by R.
Krishnamoorthy, the General Secretary of AVUT.
E. The instant proceedings arise out of the aforementioned FIR.
Vide Order dated 25.05.2006, the investigation of the case was
transferred to the Economic Offence Wing (EOW). It is pertinent
to mention that in the Main Uphaar case, Gopal Ansal, Sushil
Ansal and other co-accused were convicted by an Order dated
20.11.2007 and were sentenced to undergo 2 years rigorous
imprisonment for the offences punishable under Section 304-A
read with Section 36 of the IPC. The Order on sentence and
conviction were challenged before this Court in appeal and this
Court vide Order dated 04.01.2008 suspended the sentence of the
accused till the pendency of appeal. This order was challenged by
the Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (AVUT) and the
CBI before the Supreme Court by way of filing Special Leave
Petitions. The Supreme Court vide Order dated 10.09.2008
reversed the Order of this Court and directed this Court to hear
the appeal on a day-to-day basis. This Court heard the appeals on
a day-to-day basis and dismissed the appeals vide Order dated
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19.12.2008. This Order was challenged by the accused before the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court vide Order dated
05.03.2014 dismissed the challenge and the accused were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, but
having regard to the advanced age of Gopal Ansal & Sushil
Ansal, it was directed that the sentence would be reduced to the
period of sentence already undergone, provided they paid Rs. 30
Crores each within three months from the date of Order. It was
directed that if the amount was not deposited within the
stipulated time, then the accused would have to undergo the full
sentence.
F. In the instant matter, FIR was registered in the beginning only
against Dinesh Chandra Sharma, the Court Ahlmad. It is stated
that during the initial stages of the investigation, the Petitioner
herein was summoned as a prosecution witness in the matter
against Dinesh Chandra Sharma. Subsequently, supplementary
charge-sheets were filed and the Petitioner herein along with
Gopal Ansal, Sushil Ansal, H.S. Panwar and D. V. Malhotra
were arrayed as accused. Summons were issued and ultimately
charges were framed vide Order dated 31.05.2014. Order framing
charges was unsuccessfully challenged by the Petitioner herein
and the other co-accused by filing CRL. REV. P. 262/2016,
263/2016, 264/2016 & 265/2016 before this Court. This Court
vide Order dated 12.05.2017 dismissed the revision petitions.
After going through the entire evidence, the Ld. Trial Court held
that the evidence on record indicated that there was a conspiracy
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on behalf of the accused (including the Petitioner herein) to
ensure that the documents, which were essential to bring home
offence against Gopal Ansal, Sushil Ansal and H.S. Panwar (now
deceased), were mutilated by tearing of pages, spreading ink on
the pages or by causing their disappearance - in connivance with
other accused person. The Ld. Trial Court relied upon various
circumstances to come to the conclusion that there was motive on
the part of the accused to destroy the documents which had been
entrusted to Dinesh Chandra Sharma who was the Court Ahlmad.
The Ld. Trial Court had also found that this occurrence of the
documents related to the Main Uphaar case being destroyed and
tampered with would result in securing acquittal of the accused
in Main Uphaar case. The Ld. Trial Court further held that the
employment of Dinesh Chandra Sharma, post his dismissal, with
the A-Plus Security Agency which was run by the Petitioner
herein indicated that the conspiracy between the accused persons
was subsisting till the matter attained finality by way of the
judgments of the Supreme Court.
G. Vide Order dated 08.10.2021, the Petitioner herein along with
other accused persons were convicted for offences under Section
120B IPC and Section 409 IPC read with Section 120B and
Section 201 IPC read with Section 120B IPC and by way of a
separate Order dated 08.11.2021, the Petitioner herein was
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for seven years with a
fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) for the offence
punishable under Section 120B IPC; for offence punishable
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under Section 409 IPC read with Section 120B IPC, the
Petitioner was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of three years with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh only); and for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC
read with Section 120B IPC, the Petitioner was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), and in the event of default in
payment of the fine, the Petitioner was directed to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months for each offence. The
sentences were to run concurrently
H. Thereafter, the Petitioner herein along with other co-accused
filed appeals, being Criminal Appeals No. 89/2021 (filed by the
co-accused - Gopal Ansal), 90/2021 (filed by the co-accused -
Sushil Ansal), 91/2021 (filed by the co-accused - P.P. Batra),
92/2021 (filed by the co-accused - Dinesh Chandra Sharma) and
95/2021 (filed by the Petitioner herein), against the Order on
charge and Order on sentence. In the abovementioned appeals,
applications were also filed by the accused under Section 389(2)
Cr.P.C for suspension of sentence during the pendency of
Appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House
Courts, vide Order dated 03.12.2021, dismissed the applications
filed by the Petitioner herein and the co-accused under Section
389(2) Cr.P.C for suspension of sentence during the pendency of
appeal.
I. It is this Order dated 03.12.2021 which has been challenged by
way of the instant petitions.
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4. Detailed arguments have been advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
herein and the co-accused, and also on behalf of the State. Even though the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the Orders passed by the
Sessions Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C is extremely limited,
however, given the nature of the case, this Court permitted the learned
Counsels to advance detailed arguments on merits of the case to ascertain as
to whether the impugned Judgment dated 03.12.2021 suffers from perversity
of such nature which would require interference of this Court.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
5. Though Mr. Tarun Chandiok appeared for the Petitioner herein, but as
majority of the arguments were advanced by Mr. Arvind Nigam, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for Sushil Ansal (Petitioner in CRL.M.C.
3276/2021), Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. N. Hariharan, and Mr.
Pramod K. Dubey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Gopal Ansal
(Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 3277/2021), which covers certain legal issues in the
present case, this Court is also recording the arguments of Mr. Nigam, Dr.
Singhvi and Mr. Hariharan which would be applicable to the present case
also.
6. Mr. Arvind Nigam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the co-
accused Gopal Ansal in CRL.M.C. 3276/2021, states that in conspiracy
cases, it is extremely important to fix the parameters of conspiracy. He
contends that Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter,
"IEA") is based on the principle of agents and conspiracy cannot extend
beyond the period where the object of conspiracy has been achieved or when
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it gets frustrated. He states that once the object of conspiracy gets frustrated,
Section 10 of the IEA is not available and statements made or things done
after the conspiracy cannot be taken into account. He further submits that the
Courts below have erred in taking into account the fact that the Court
Ahlmad - Dinesh Chandra Sharma, who was given the job after his dismissal
from the service of the Court, would amount to continuing of conspiracy. He
states that this was a very important factor considered by the Ld. Trial Court
to hold that the conspiracy continued much beyond 2003 when it was found
that the documents have been torn/mutilated and, therefore, it could not have
been taken into account at all for the purpose of the case. Mr. Nigam states
that if Section 10 of the IEA is to be applied even beyond the period of
conspiracy which is frustrated/unearthed, then it would mean that all the
accused who were partners in crime would be partners in perpetuity, which
is contrary to the settled law.
7. Mr. Nigam relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan
Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682, to
contend that the evidentiary value of the acts which have been done in
furtherance of conspiracy is limited by two circumstances, namely, that the
acts shall be in reference to their common intention and in respect of a
period after such intention was entertained by any one of them. He,
therefore, states that one cannot look into the acts that have been done
beyond the period after conspiracy has been frustrated. For the same
proposition, Mr. Nigam relies on the judgment of State v. Nalini, (1999) 5
SCC 253, wherein the Supreme Court has held that a statement made by a
conspirator before the commencement of the conspiracy is not admissible
against the co-conspirator under Section 10 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, a
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statement made after the conspiracy has been terminated on
achieving/abandoning/frustrating its object or on the conspirator leaving the
conspiracy in between, is not admissible against the co-conspirator. He,
therefore, states that the fact that Dinesh Chandra Sharma was given
employment by a different agency cannot be stated to be evidence available
against the co-accused - Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal, and it cannot be said
that the conspiracy would extend up to a point where Dinesh Chandra
Sharma was given a job by the agency.
8. Mr. Tarun Chandiok, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner
herein, adopts the submissions of Mr. Nigam on the aspect of conspiracy. He
reiterates that conspiracy cannot extend beyond the period where the object
of conspiracy has been achieved or when it gets frustrated. He states that in
the instant case, conspiracy ended when it was found that the documents had
been tampered with and, therefore, the act of providing employment to
Dinesh Chandra Sharma could not be factored into the period of conspiracy.
Relying upon the statement of Mr. Nigam, Mr. Chandiok states that acts
done beyond the period of conspiracy, especially after the period of
conspiracy has been frustrated cannot be looked into.
9. Mr. Chandiok states that the factum of destruction of evidence was
brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court on 13.01.2003 and
consequently, Mr. Y.K. Saxena, Ld. SPP for the State, moved an application
for leading secondary evidence on 20.01.2003 which was allowed on
31.01.2003. Mr. Chandiok states that when the factum of alleged tampering
with the Court record came to light, AVUT filed an application before the
Sessions Court on 14.02.2003 under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C for cancellation
of bail granted to the accused in Main Uphaar case which was dismissed
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vide Order dated 29.04.2003 and thereafter, AVUT challenged the Order
dated 29.04.2003 before this Court by filing CRL. M.C. 2380/2003 along
with which CRL. M. No. 2229/2006 was also filed by the AVUT for
registration of FIR against Gopal Ansal, Sushil Ansal and other persons for
tampering with the Court records and resultantly, FIR No.207/2006 dated
17.05.2006 was registered at Police Station Tilak Marg for offences under
Sections 109/193/201/218/409/120B IPC. Mr. Chandiok states that in that
FIR, the Petitioner herein was initially summoned as a prosecution witness
and it is only by way of a supplementary charge-sheet that the Petitioner
herein was arrayed as an accused.
10. Mr. Chandiok submits that the Ld. Trial Court‟s finding that the role
of the Petitioner herein was limited to "causing disappearance of important
piece of the evidence to screen the offender" was not based on any cogent
evidence and there was no material on record to suggest that the Petitioner
herein had anything to do with the conspiracy to tamper with the judicial
record in the Main Uphaar case. He states that with regard to the charge of
conspiracy, it is important to show that the Petitioner herein had knowledge
of tampering with evidence and merely because the Petitioner herein is
alleged to have used white fluid on the name of Dinesh Chandra Sharma in
the register of A-Plus Security Agency is not sufficient to establish the
complicity of the Petitioner herein. He states that the mere allegation that the
Petitioner herein had employed Dinesh Chandra Sharma at A-Plus Security
Agency was of no consequence as imputing that the said employment was to
further the conspiracy without any shred of evidence was a stretch and ought
to be dismissed. Mr. Chandiok submits that the Petitioner herein is 73 years
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of age and is suffering from various ailments. He, therefore, prays that the
sentence of the Petitioner be suspended during the pendency of appeal.
11. Per contra, Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the State, submits that the parameters for grant of bail and parameters for
considering an application for suspension of sentence under Section 389
Cr.P.C are different. He places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645, wherein the
Apex Court has held that there is a difference between grant of bail under
Section 439 Cr.P.C in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence
under Section 389 Cr.P.C and grant of bail, post conviction. The Apex Court
has held that while considering an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C,
there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of
criminal jurisprudence, and the Courts may be liberal, depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and
jail is an exception. However, in case of post-conviction bail by way of
suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the
question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of
bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction
upon trial. He contends that the Apex Court in the said judgment has held
that the Courts while considering an application for suspension of sentence
and grant of bail, have to consider the prima facie merits of the Appeal,
coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for
grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of
sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the
Order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. He further
submits that the while considering an application for suspension of sentence,
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the Appellate Court only has to examine if there is such patent infirmity in
the Order of conviction that renders the Order of conviction prima facie
erroneous. He states that where there is evidence that has been considered by
the Ld. Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under
Section 389 Cr.P.C. to reassess and/or re-analyse the same evidence and
take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release
the convict on bail.
12. Mr. Krishnan further contends that the Order on charge is clear and
unambiguous. He states that the object of conspiracy was to ensure that
certain key documents which would bring home the case of Section 304A
against the accused in the Main Uphaar case were mutilated and tampered
and the only purpose of doing so was to secure the acquittal of the co-
accused Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal. Mr. Krishnan states that even though
Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal were not successful in their endeavour, it has
resulted in delay in the hearing of the matter. He states that the accused
entered into conspiracy for committing various offences like criminal breach
of trust by a public servant, being the Court Ahlmad - Dinesh Chandra
Sharma, and, thereby, committing the act of
missing/destructing/tampering/obliterating the documents which were vital
for the case in order to give advantage to Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal
during trial of the Main Uphaar case. He states that the object was to secure
acquittal or delay the trial as much as possible. He further states that the
charge is clear as the co-accused P.P. Batra, who acted as a link between
Gopal Ansal, Sushil Ansal and the Court Ahlmad, remained in constant
touch with the Court Ahlmad and after his dismissal from the service, the
Court Ahlmad was provided a job at A-Plus Security Agency that was run
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by the Petitioners herein at a monthly remuneration of Rs.15,000/- which
was much more than his existing salary as a Court Ahlmad. Mr. Krishnan
states that in any event, when this order on charge was challenged before
this Court in Crl. Rev. P. No. 262/2016, 263/2016, 264/2016, 265/2016, this
Court while affirming the said Order had observed as under:
"106. Coming now to the offence of conspiracy. The
argument of the revisionists that the conspiracy came
to an end when the conspiracy was frustrated, i.e.,
when the fact of the destruction of documents was
brought to the knowledge of the concerned court,
cannot be countenanced, inasmuch as, the object of
the conspiracy was not the destruction of the
documents, per se.
107. It is in fact, evident from the material hereinabove
elaborated, that prima facie the object of conspiracy
was to secure, favourable orders and the acquittal of
Mr. Sushil Ansal, Mr. Gopal Ansal and Mr. H.S.
Panwar, by employing illegal means. Therefore, all
acts of commission and omission, done in furtherance
of the object of the conspiracy, can be considered to
form a part of the same offence of the alleged
conspiracy. [Ref: State v. Nalini (supra)]
108. In this regard, it is also trite to observe that, it is
not necessary that all the actors in the conspiracy
must have joined the offence from its very inception.
Conspiracy is a continuing offence and the acts of the
persons who join the conspiracy at a later point in
time, in furtherance of the object thereof, form a part
of the same offence of conspiracy. [Ref: State v. Nalini
(supra); Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of
Maharashtra (supra), Leo Roy Frey (supra)]
109. Therefore, it follows that the acts allegedly
committed in furtherance of the objective of the
conspiracy include, (i) the act of destruction of the
documents forming a part of the judicial file, which
were vital to the case of the prosecution in the Main
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Uphaar Trial as against Mr. Sushil Ansal, Mr. Gopal
Ansal and Mr. H.S. Panwar; and (ii) providing a job to
Mr. Dinesh Chandra Sharma, in order to „take care‟
of him in lieu of his role in the conspiracy.
110. In view of the foregoing, the argument of the
revisionists that the acts of commission and omission
by Mr. D.V. Malhotra and Mr. Anoop Singh, did not
form a part of the same alleged conspiracy, does not
hold water and is thus, rejected."
13. Mr. Krishnan places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Main Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 10 SCC 130, wherein the Supreme
Court after relying on the judgment of Willie (William) Slaney v. State of
M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116, had held that when an accused is tried by a
competent court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the
offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly
explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend
himself, then, provided there is „substantial‟ compliance of law, mere
mistakes in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions in the trial
are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the
accused can show substantial prejudice. He states that the Petitioner knew
and had been given notice of the fact that the charge against them was that
the conspiracy extended up to a point where the Court Ahlmad was provided
a job at the instance of Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal at a higher salary
which was in furtherance of conspiracy.
14. Mr. Krishnan states that it cannot be said that the judgment of the Ld.
Trial Court is based on null evidence or is completely unjustified. He states
that there is a strong case against the Petitioner. He states that the Ld.
Appellate Court has looked into all the factors while refusing to suspend the
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sentence of the Petitioner herein. He further states that a High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C can interfere with the
order of the Sessions Court only when the High Court comes to a conclusion
that the order of the Sessions Court, in refusing to suspend the sentence of
the Petitioner herein, was perverse or that it shook the consciousness of the
Court. He states that the High Court should not substitute its own conclusion
to the one arrived at by the Sessions Court just because some other view is
possible.
15. Mr. Vikas Pahwa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Complainant, places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Atul
Tripathi v. State of U.P., (2014) 9 SCC 177, wherein the Apex Court has
laid down parameters to be considered while dealing with an application for
suspending the sentence of a convict and has held that while releasing an
accused by suspending his sentence during the pendency of appeal, the
Court must see the manner in which the crime is committed, gravity of the
offence, age of the convict, criminal antecedents of the convict, impact on
public confidence in the justice-delivery system, etc. He states that the
Petitioner is accused of a very serious offence. He states that Gopal Ansal
and Sushil Ansal along with the Petitioner herein and other co-accused have
tried to delay the proceedings at every stage and, therefore, they now cannot
turn around and take advantage of their age. He further states that granting
suspension of sentence to the Petitioner herein would have a major impact
on public confidence inasmuch as the Petitioner in connivance with Gopal
Ansal and Sushil Ansal has trampled the sanctity of law and that the majesty
of Court has been lowered by them.
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16. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Gopal Ansal (Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 3277/2021), in rejoinder, contends
that the Courts must adopt a holistic approach while considering an
application for suspension of sentence under Section 389 Cr.P.C. He
contends that just because the High Court is hearing a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C against an order of the Ld. Appellate Court rejecting an
application filed by the Petitioner herein and other co-accused under Section
389 Cr.P.C., the High Court must treat the petition as if it is hearing an
application under Section 389 Cr.P.C for suspension of sentence. He states
that there is no statutory standing of the power of High Court while
exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C nor there is any judicial
circumspection on the power of the High Court to grant bail. He states that
when it comes to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, there cannot be
implied circumspection of the power of a High Court. He states that once
bail is granted, the superior Courts must be very slow in interfering with the
order granting bail, but if bail is not granted, the superior courts have a duty
to re-evaluate the entirety of the matter and then only decide whether bail
should be denied or not. Dr. Singhvi contends that when applications were
filed for secondary evidence, it was the legal right of the Petitioners to do so
for furthering a genuine defence. He contends that the trial was never stayed
and the Petitioner cannot be accused of delaying the trial. He also contends
that the finding of the Main Uphaar case cannot be used in the present case
and they have to be proved independently.
17. Dr. Singhvi draws the attention of this Court to paragraphs No.35, 36,
38 & 40 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Preet Pal Singh (supra) to
contend that the Ld. Appellate Court, while considering an application under
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Section 389 Cr.P.C has only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in
the order of the Ld. Trial Court that renders the order of conviction prima
facie erroneous. He states that a holistic approach must be made by the
Courts while deciding an application under Section 389 Cr.P.C and not a
technical approach. He states that in the Main Uphaar case, the Order
framing charges was passed on 13.05.2014, while the third charge-sheet was
filed on 12.02.2014. He, therefore, states that the trial could not have begun
before the third charge-sheet was filed. He states that the trial concluded on
08.10.2021 and by any standards of trial, the trial in the Main Uphaar case
has not been delayed. Dr. Singhvi submits that the authors of the documents
have not been examined to prove the document and the documents have,
therefore, not been proved in accordance with law. He relies on Paragraphs
No.49 & 50 of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Malay Kumar
Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 and on Madholal
Sindhu v. Asian Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 Bom 305.
18. Mr. N. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Gopal Ansal
(Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 3277/2021), contends that this Court, while
deciding a revision petition against an Order on charge has not expanded the
scope of charge. He has taken this Court through paragraphs No.34 and 117
of the judgment dated 12.05.2017 passed by this Court in CRL. REV. P.
Nos. 262/2016, 263/2016, 264/2016 & 265/2016 to substantiate his
contention. He contends that Section 10 of the IEA is a rule of evidence and
Section 10 of the IEA comes into play only when there is a reasonable
ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to
commit an offence or an actionable wrong. He states that there is no finding
by the Ld. Trial Court that the Petitioners have entered into a conspiracy
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with any person. He, therefore, states that the second part of Section 10 of
IEA being that anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in
reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was
first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the
persons believed so to be conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the
existence of the conspiracy. To buttress his argument, Mr. Hariharan places
reliance on Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. The State of Bombay, 1961 SCC
OnLine SC 1. He also places reliance on L.K. Advani v. Central Bureau of
Investigation, 1997 SCC OnLine Del 382, and more particularly on
paragraph No. 87 of the said judgment wherein this Court has held that the
prosecution must prove the factum of evidence other than the disputed
evidence i.e. the diaries and the loose sheets. Paragraph No.87 of decision in
L.K. Advani (supra), on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Hariharan,
reads as under:
"87. There is another aspect of the matter. The
prosecution must prove the factum of the conspiracy by
evidence other than the disputed evidence i.e. the diaries
and the loose sheets which have been placed on the
record of this Court. It has been observed above that
there is no such evidence. The alleged entries relate to
past facts. The alleged entries must have been made after
the disbursement. Hence they cannot be said to have
been made in execution of the common intention of the
conspiracy."
19. Mr. Hariharan also places reliance on the judgments of the Supreme
Court in State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 and, Paragraphs No.84 and 102
of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. Mr.
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Hariharan then contends that the Petitioner cannot be charged for an offence
under Section 409 IPC read with Section 120B IPC or with Section 201 IPC
read with Section 120B IPC without substantiating any evidence of a
conspiracy for the offences punishable under Sections 409 IPC or 201 IPC.
He states that since the Petitioner was not entrusted with any documents, an
offence under Section 401 IPC is not made out against the Petitioner and the
same analogy is applicable to the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC
for the reason that there is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner
conspired with Dinesh Chandra Sharma, the Court Ahlmad.
20. Mr. Hariharan further relies on Paragraph No.153 of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
(1984) 4 SCC 116, to contend that in case of circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established. He states that a reading of the Ld. Trial Court judgment
showcases that it is only based on probabilities without there being a
definitive finding.
III. REASONING OF THIS COURT:
21. Heard Mr. Tarun Chandiok, learned Counsel appearing for the
Petitioner herein, Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned SPP for the State, and Mr.
Vikas Pahwa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Complainant, i.e.
Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (AVUT), and perused the
material on record.
22. The learned Counsels have taken this Court through the facts of the
case, evidence on record, the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. while deciding a
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challenge to an Order refusing to grant suspension of sentence, and also
detailed arguments have been addressed on merits of the case.
23. A perusal of the material on record indicates that on 13.06.1997, a fire
occurred at Uphaar Cinema which resulted in the death of 59 people due to
asphyxia and caused injuries to more than 100 people. The investigation had
been initially conducted by Delhi Police, but later on it was transferred to
the CBI which registered a case, being case No. RC-3 (S)/97/SIC.IV/New
Delhi. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 15.11.1997 against 16
persons. When charges were framed, all the documents were intact. Accused
Dinesh Chandra Sharma took charge as the Court Ahlmad of the Court
which was dealing with the trial on 30.04.2001. During the examination of
PW-33 (Mr. T. S. Sharma - ADO, Delhi Fire Service), a letter dated
28.11.1996 was found half-torn from the judicial file. On scrutiny, it was
found that certain documents were torn, stained with ink and/or were
missing. CBI moved an application apprising the Ld. Trial Court about the
tampering. CBI also sought permission from the Ld. Trial Court to lead
secondary evidence with respect to the missing/tampered documents, which
was subsequently allowed. An application under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C was
filed for cancellation of the bail that had been granted to the accused in the
Main Uphaar case alleging that they were responsible for the said tampering.
24. The material on record further reveals that an inquiry was conducted
against Dinesh Chandra Sharma who was the Court Ahlmad and, after the
said inquiry, it was held that the Ahlmad was responsible for tampering of
certain documents, disappearance of certain documents and for spreading
ink on certain documents. An application was filed by AVUT before this
Court, being CRL.M.No.2229/2006, seeking registration of a criminal case
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against the offenders for tampering with the documents. Vide Order dated
05.05.2006, this Court directed the Delhi Police to register a case against the
accused with regard to the incident of tampering with the evidence.
Resultantly, FIR No.207/2006 dated 17.05.2006 was registered at Police
Station Tilak Marg for offences under Sections 109/193/201/218/409/120B
IPC. Consequently, Dinesh Chandra Sharma was arrested and sent to police
custody. First charge-sheet was filed on 12.02.2007. Supplementary charge-
sheet was filed on 17.01.2008 against Gopal Ansal, Sushil Ansal, the
Petitioner herein, H. S. Panwar, P.P. Batra, and Col. D. V. Malhotra.
Summons were issued. Third supplementary charge-sheet was filed on
12.02.2014. Charges were framed on 31.05.2014 against all the seven
accused persons and, after conclusion of the trial, the accused were
convicted vide Order dated 08.10.2021 for offences under Section 120B IPC
and Section 409 IPC read with Section 120B and Section 201 IPC read with
Section 120B IPC. The accused filed appeals, being Crl. Appeals No.
89/2021 (filed by the co-accused - Gopal Ansal), 90/2021 (filed by the co-
accused -Sushil Ansal), 91/2021 (filed by the co-accused - P.P. Batra),
92/2021 (filed by the co-accused - Dinesh Chandra Sharma) & 95/2021
(filed by the Petitioner herein), against the Order on charge and Order on
sentence, along with applications under Section 389(2) Cr.P.C for
suspension of sentence during the pendency of Appeal and the same was
rejected vide Order dated 03.12.2021. The said Order is under challenge
before this Court.
25. The charges framed against the accused are that from the date of filing
of the charge-sheet in Case No. RC-3 (S)/97/SIC.IV/New Delhi, for offences
under Sections 304/304A IPC till 13.01.2003, when the facts of the missing
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documents came to the knowledge of the Ld. Trial Court, the accused had
already entered into criminal conspiracy for committing various offences
like criminal breach of trust by a public servant, by causing the
disappearance/destruction/obliterating/tampering as well as spreading ink
over the documents which were vital for the trial in the case arising out of
Case No. RC-3 (S)/97/SIC.IV/New Delhi, to give advantage to Gopal Ansal,
Sushil Ansal and H.S. Panwar during the trial of the Main Uphaar case.
Charges were framed under Section 120B IPC and Section 409 IPC read
with Section 120B and Section 201 IPC read with Section 120B IPC.
26. The germane allegation against the Petitioner is that after Dinesh
Chandra Sharma was dismissed from service, he approached P. P. Batra,
who was a stenographer at Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Ltd. (APIL)
as well as the pairvi for the co-accused - Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal. It is
stated that P.P. Batra introduced Dinesh Chandra Sharma to D. V. Malhotra,
who was the General Manager of Star Estate Management Pvt. Ltd which
was a subsidiary of APIL, which was run by Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal,
for providing him a job and D. V. Malhotra in turn recommended Dinesh
Chandra Sharma to A-Plus Security Agency which was run by the Petitioner
herein. Dinesh Chandra Sharma was given job for a remuneration of
Rs.15,000/- which was much more than what he was receiving as Court
Ahlmad. It has further been alleged that D.V. Malhotra was acting on behalf
of Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal and he was paying cash to A-Plus Security
Agency for payment to Dinesh Chandra Sharma who, after a period 8
months, i.e. November 2004 to June 2005, left the said employment. It is,
therefore, the allegation of the prosecution that Dinesh Chandra Sharma was
provided the job with double the pay only to cover-up the tampering of the
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documents done by Dinesh Chandra Sharma at the behest of Gopal Ansal
and Sushil Ansal. It is further stated that when police went to the office of
A-Plus Security Agency, an attempt was made to put white fluid on the
registers in order to obscure the fact that Dinesh Chandra Sharma was in
employment with A-Plus Security Agency. It is, therefore, the contention of
the prosecution that the Petitioner herein was a part of the conspiracy and
that his role was to cover-up the conspiracy by providing Dinesh Chandra
Sharma a job.
27. The first issue which arises in the instant matter is whether the
Petitioner's act of giving employment to Dinesh Chandra Sharma at A-Plus
Security Agency, on the request of D. V. Malhotra, who was acting at the
behest of Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal, and whether the Petitioner‟s act of
applying white fluid on the register at A-Plus Security Agency to obscure
Dinesh Chandra Sharma‟s name would amount to furtherance of the
conspiracy that had been hatched to prevent conviction of Gopal Ansal and
Sushil Ansal in the Main Uphaar case.
28. In State v. Nalini (supra), the Supreme Court has held that a statement
made by a conspirator before the commencement of the conspiracy is not
admissible against the co-conspirator under Section 10 of the IEA.
Similarly, a statement made after the conspiracy has been terminated on
achieving its object or it is abandoned or it is frustrated or the conspirator
leaves the conspiracy in between, is not admissible against the co-
conspirator. The Apex Court has further held that fixing the period and
parameters of conspiracy is, thus, important as provisions of Section 10 IEA
would apply only during the existence of the conspiracy.
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"575. In the present case, there is no evidence to support
the charge as regards the period of conspiracy. It is as
important to know the period as to ascertain the object of
conspiracy. It appears that period of conspiracy in the
charge from July 1987 to May 1992 has been mentioned
as the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was entered into in July
1987 and LTTE was declared an unlawful association by
notification dated 14-5-1992 issued under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. There is, however, no
evidence that the conspiracy was hatched immediately on
entering into the Accord and was terminated only on the
issue of the notification. A statement made by a
conspirator before the commencement of the conspiracy
is not admissible against the co-conspirator under
Section 10 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, a statement
made after the conspiracy has been terminated on
achieving its object or it is abandoned or it is frustrated
or the conspirator leaves the conspiracy in between, is
not admissible against the co-conspirator. Fixing the
period of conspiracy is, thus, important as provisions of
Section 10 would apply only during the existence of the
conspiracy. We have held that object of the conspiracy
was the killing of Rajiv Gandhi. It is not that immediately
after the object of conspiracy is achieved, Section 10
becomes inapplicable. For example principle like that of
res gestae as contained in Section 6 of the Evidence Act
will continue to apply.
*****
664. Section 10 of the Evidence Act recognises the
principle of agency and it reads as follows:
"10. Things said or done by conspirator in
reference to common design.--Where there is
reasonable ground to believe that two or more
persons have conspired together to commit an
offence or an actionable wrong, anything said,
done or written by any one of such persons in
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reference to their common intention, after the time
when such intention was first entertained by any
one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of
the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well
for the purpose of proving the existence of the
conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any
such person was a party to it."
665. To apply this provision, it has to be shown that (1)
there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more
persons have conspired together; and (2) the conspiracy
is to commit an offence or an actionable wrong. If these
two requirements are satisfied then anything said, done
or written by any one of such persons after the time when
such intention was entertained by any one of them in
furtherance of their common intention, is a relevant fact
against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring
as well as for the purpose of proving the existence of
conspiracy and also for the purpose of showing that any
such person is a party to it."
(emphasis supplied)
29. The Supreme Court has further succinctly delineated the principle of
law governing Section 10 IEA in Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan L. & Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 682). The relevant portion has been
reproduced as under:
"8. Before dealing with the individual cases, as some
argument was made in regard to the nature of the
evidence that should be adduced to sustain the case of
conspiracy, it will be convenient to make at this stage
some observations thereon. Section 120-A of the Indian
Penal Code defines the offence of criminal conspiracy
thus:
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"When two or more persons agree to do, or cause
to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not
illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is
designated a criminal conspiracy."
The essence of conspiracy is, therefore, that there should
be an agreement between persons to do one or other of
the acts described in the section. The said agreement may
be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from
acts and conduct of the parties. There is no difference
between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy
and that of any other offence: it can be established by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. But
Section 10 of the Evidence Act introduces the doctrine of
agency and if the conditions laid down therein are
satisfied, the act done by one is admissible against the
co-conspirators. The said section reads:
"Where there is reasonable ground to believe that
two or more persons have conspired together to
commit an offence or an actionable wrong,
anything said, done or written by any one of such
persons in reference to their common intention,
after the time when such intention was first
entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact
as against each of the persons believed to be so
conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the
existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of
showing that any such person was a party to it."
This section, as the opening words indicate, will come
into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons
have conspired together to commit an offence or an
actionable wrong, that is to say, there should be a prima
facie evidence that a person was a party to the
conspiracy before his acts can be used against his co-
conspirators. Once such a reasonable ground exists,
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anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators
in reference to the common intention, after the said
intention was entertained, is relevant against the others,
not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the
conspiracy but also for proving that the other person was
a party to it. The evidentiary value of the said acts is
limited by two circumstances, namely, that the acts shall
be in reference to their common intention and in
respect of a period after such intention was entertained
by any one of them. The expression "in reference to their
common intention" is very comprehensive and it appears
to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope
than the words "in furtherance of" in the English law;
with the result, anything said, done or written by a co-
conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be
evidence against the other before he entered the field of
conspiracy or after he left it. Another important
limitation implicit in the language is indicated by the
expressed scope of its relevancy. Anything so said, done
or written is a relevant fact only "as against each of the
persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the
purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for
the purpose of showing that any such person was a party
to it". It can only be used for the purpose of proving the
existence of the conspiracy or that the other person was a
party to it. It cannot be used in favour of the other party
or for the purpose of showing that such a person was not
a party to the conspiracy. In short, the section can be
analysed as follows: (1) There shall be a prima facie
evidence affording a reasonable ground for a court to
believe that two or more persons are members of a
conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything
said, done or written by any one of them in reference to
their common intention will be evidence against the
other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should
have been said, done or written by him after the intention
was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be
relevant for the said purpose against another who
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entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or
written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left
it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator
and not in his favour."
(emphasis supplied)
30. The Ld. Trial Court in its Order dated 08.10.2021 relied on various
judgments of the Apex Court to hold that the conspiracy of tampering with
documents extended much beyond the date on which the tampering of
documents inside the Court was discovered and extended to Dinesh Chandra
Sharma being employed by A-Plus Security Agency. It is the contention of
the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Section 10 of the IEA cannot be
extended to a period after conspiracy has either achieved its purpose or has
been frustrated. The Ld. Appellate Court in its impugned Order dated
03.12.2021 has found that the approach of the Ld. Trial Court in coming to
the conclusion that the conspiracy would extend much beyond 13.01.2003
does not suffer with any perversity while deciding the application filed by
the Appellant's for suspension of sentence during the pendency of Appeal.
31. The question as to whether the Petitioner herein knew about the
conspiracy of tampering with the documents or whether he knew that Dinesh
Chandra Sharma was being given a job only to cover-up the conspiracy of
tampering with the documents as well as the question as to whether the
white fluid that was applied on the register after coming to know about the
conspiracy and Dinesh Chandra Sharma‟s connection with the same is a
knee-jerk reaction or not, and whether Section 10 of the IEA can be
stretched to this extent are all arguments which have to be dealt with by the
Ld. Appellate Court while deciding the appeal of the Petitioner herein.
Furthermore, the issue as to whether D.V. Malhotra had informed the
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Petitioner herein that the employment at A-Plus Security Agency for a
remuneration of Rs. 15,000/- was a favour that was being done to Dinesh
Chandra Sharma for aiding Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal as a Court
Ahlmad, and the Petitioner, after being cognizant of the same, had provided
the job to Dinesh Chandra Sharma, or even if the Petitioner herein was not
informed, would providing the job still be construed as being part of the
conspiracy, are all matters that are to be dealt by the Ld. Appellate Court
while deciding the appeal.
32. The second issue pertains to the scope of Section 389 Cr.P.C and the
parameters that have to be kept in mind while granting suspension of
sentence has been stipulated by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments.
It is well settled now that there is a difference between the factors that have
to be taken into consideration for grant of bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C
prior to conviction and grant of suspension of sentence under Section 389
Cr.P.C, which is post-conviction, for the simple reason that presumption of
innocence is no longer applicable to the person who stands convicted for an
offence. Even though presumption of innocence is lost, however, at this
juncture, taking into account the nature of role of the Petitioner herein to
provide employment to Dinesh Chandra Sharma after he was dismissed
from service for tampering with the records of the Court to favour Gopal
Ansal and Sushil Ansal, and to ensure that they are not convicted for the
offence for which they were charged with in the Main Uphaar case, the fact
that the Petitioner was not arrested during the pendency of trial as well as
the fact that the Petitioner is 73 years of age and having no previous
antecedents, this Court is inclined to suspend the sentence of the Petitioner
herein during the pendency of the appeal on the Petitioner furnishing a
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personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with two sureties in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. The petitioner shall not leave
NCT of Delhi without the prior permission of the Court. He shall also
surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if not already surrendered.
33. It is to be noted that since the matter relates to tampering of the
judicial record, the same has to be decided as expeditiously as possible in
order to ensure that the faith of the public in the judicial system is not
eroded. This Court is of the view that cases of this nature should be heard
and decided at the earliest as any delay in dealing with the same will only
make people lose faith in the cherished institution, that is the judiciary. The
Ld. Trial Court is, therefore, requested to expedite the hearing of the appeal
filed by the Petitioner herein and conclude the same within a period of one
month from the date of this Order and if necessary, conduct day-to-day
hearing for the same and after concluding the hearing, pronounce the
judgment as expeditiously as possible. If it is found that the Petitioner herein
is trying to delay the proceedings, it is open to the State as well as to AVUT
to approach this Court for cancellation of suspension of sentence during
pendency of the Petitioner‟s appeal.
34. With the above observations, this petition is disposed of, along with
pending application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
FEBRUARY 16, 2022
Rahul
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