Delhi High Court
Om Prakash vs The Delhi Pinjrapole Society ... on 26 August, 2022
$~66(Appellate)
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CM(M) 864/2022 & CM APPL.37131/2022, CM
APPL.37132/2022
OM PRAKASH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vishal Bhatnagar, Ms. Lata
Ublia, Is.Ishu Manakriya, Ms.Richa Narang
Malik and Mr.Pratap Singh, Advs.
versus
THE DELHI PINJRAPOLE SOCIETY (REGO.)
..... Respondent
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T (O R A L)
% 26.08.2022
1. This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
assails order dated 5th July 2022, passed by the learned Principal
District & Sessions Judge (the learned Pr. DSJ) in RCT 77/2018 (Om
Prakash v. The Delhi Pinjrapole Society), to the extent the learned Pr.
DSJ has rejected the petitioner's request to adjourn RCT 77/2018
[being an appeal preferred by the petitioner against order dated 31 st
May 2018 of the learned Additional Rent Controller (the learned
ARC], till the Division Bench of this Court adjudicated on the
questions of law referred to it by a learned Single Judge in a batch of
Rent Control Revision Petitions headed by K.S. Bhandari v.
International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd.1.
(2018) 167 DRJ 277
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
2. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at some length,
it appears that the petitioner is harbouring a serious misconception of
law which is that District Courts are competent only to decide
questions of law for which prior authoritative precedents in the form
of decisions of High Courts or the Supreme Court exist.
3. The submission advanced by Mr. Vishal Bhatnagar, learned
Counsel for the petitioner, is that one of the issues which arises for
consideration in RCT 77/2018 before the learned Pr. DSJ is whether a
public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a
―public institution‖ for the purposes of Section 222 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (the DRC Act). This issue, points out, learned
Counsel, stands referred by the afore-noted decision in K.S. Bhandari1
by a learned Single Judge of this Court to the Division Bench. He has
drawn my attention, in this context to para 50 of the report in K.S.
Bhandari, the relevant portion of which reads thus:
―50. On the basis of the above and for the sake of
convenience, I hereinbelow list the questions which may be
answered by the Division Bench:
22. Special provisions for recovery of possession in certain cases-
Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local
authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such
landlord or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then,
notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an
application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of
such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if
the Controller is satisfied--
(a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in
the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or
(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was
authorised to occupy such premises; or
(c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises; or
(d) that the premises are required 'bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its
activities.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "public institution" Includes any educational
institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary.
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
*****
(v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on
public activities qualifies as a public institution.‖
4. To a query from the Court as to why the learned Pr. DSJ cannot
adjudicate on the aforesaid issue, till the reference to the Division
Bench is decided, learned Counsel has provided an explanation which,
frankly, it took some time to comprehend. His submission appears to
be that there may be issues which are either res integra, having not
been decided by any High Court or the Supreme Court prior thereto,
or issues for which prior precedent is available do. Where the issue
stands decided by an earlier decision of the High Court or the Supreme
Court, then, according to learned Counsel, even if the issue was
referred to a Larger Bench, there is no requirement of awaiting the
decision of the Larger Bench for any hierarchically lower judicial
authority to adjudicate the matter. For this purpose, learned Counsel
has placed reliance on para 25 of the report in State of Maharashtra v.
Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli3 which reads thus:
―25. The respondents, however, submitted that in the
meanwhile the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply4 will
have to be followed until it is overruled, since the proposition
therein continues to hold good. Reliance is placed in that
behalf, on the approach adopted by this Court in such a
situation, in a matter concerning arbitration in State of Orissa
v. Dandasi Sahu5. In that matter this Court has held that in
the exercise of this Court's discretion under Article 136, it
would not be justified to allow a party to further prolong or
upset adjudication of old and stale disputes till the decision of
the larger Bench is received.‖
(2013) 16 SCC 16
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213
(1988) 4 SCC 12
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
5. The submission of learned Counsel is, therefore that, where a
precedent on the question of law exists, the Trial Court can go ahead
and adjudicate on the matter before it, following the said precedent.
Even if the said precedent has been referred to a larger Bench, there is
no embargo on the Trial Court deciding the matter, for the simple
reason that there exists a precedent of the High Court which it can
follow. Where, however, there is no prior precedent on the question
of law, in the form of a decision of the High Court or the Supreme
Court, the submission of learned Counsel is that the Trial Court cannot
adjudicate on the matter, especially where the precise question of law
stands referred to a Division Bench of the High Court. In such a
situation, learned Counsel's submission is that the Trial Court has
necessarily to await the decision of the Division Bench of the High
Court on the reference made to it, before adjudicating the lis pending
before it.
6. The submission is completely misconceived in law.
7. There is no proscription whatsoever on a Trial Court taking a
decision on any question that arises before it whether of fact or of law,
irrespective of whether there exists, or does not exist, a prior precedent
on the issue or there does not exist a precedent on the issue. Trial
Courts are wholly competent to decide all questions of fact and law
which may arise before them. Many such questions may be res
integra, previously undecided by any superior court. The ld. Trial
Court is well within its authority to decide all such issues and,
possibly, even be the first judicial authority to take a view on the
subject.
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
8. There is no principle of law which requires the existence of a
prior judicial precedent on a question of law before a ld. Trial Court
takes a view on the said issue. If there is any binding judicial
precedent, of course, the ld. Trial Court would be bound to follow it
unless the ld. Trial Court deems the precedent to be distinguishable for
reasons which it would be required to elucidate. As such, even if the
precise question of law that arises before the ld. Trial Court stands
referred to the Division Bench of this Court, there is no embargo
whatsoever on the learned Pr. DSJ taking a view on the issue. Qua the
present case, there is no embargo whatsoever on the learned Pr. DSJ
taking a view on whether a public charitable trust carrying on public
activities qualifies as a ―public institution‖ under Section 222 of the
DRC Act, even while that question stands referred to a Division Bench
in K.S. Bhandari1.
9. Learned Counsel then ―asked himself‖ as to how, in case the
Trial Court were to take a particular view on the issue and later, the
Division Bench, in the reference made in K.S. Bhandari1 were to take
a contrary view, the impasse could be resolved. The question is as
easily posed as answered. If the ld. Pr. DSJ takes a view - which he
is competent and well within its power to take, that view would
always be amenable to challenge in accordance with law. If, in the
interregnum, the Division Bench, in the reference made in K.S.
Bhandari1 takes a view which is opposed to the view that the ld. Pr.
DSJ would take, the judgment of the Division Bench can always be
cited by the party who seeks to challenge the decision of the ld. Pr.
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
DSJ. The court which is seized of the challenge to the judgment of the
ld. Pr. DSJ would then have to take a view as to whether the decision
of the Division Bench would operate to nullify or justify setting aside
of the decision of the ld. Pr. DSJ.
10. These principles are so elementary that it is somewhat
surprising that the present petition was filed in the first place.
11. The impugned order dated 5th July 2022, passed by the learned
Pr. DSJ also refers to the order of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of M/s. Suvinys Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Verma Beauty
Parlor and Hair Dressers6. The Coordinate Bench of this Court has
correctly held, in the said decision, that the mere pendency of the
question before a Division Bench or any higher forum is no
justification for the ld. Trial Court adjourning the case before it sine
die.
12. Expeditious disposal of proceedings, especially before the
learned District Courts, has become a pressing necessity in today's
day and age. Arrears are clogging the Courts and if matters are to be
adjourned sine die merely because the question of law involved
therein is not guided by any earlier precedent and stands referred by a
higher forum to a Division Bench or even to a larger Bench of the
Supreme Court, it would become impossible for the District Judiciary
to decide matters before it.
Order dated 6th November 2020 in RC.REV. 545/2019
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
13. This petition is, therefore, thoroughly misconceived. It is
accordingly dismissed in limine. Pending applications are also stand
disposed of.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J
AUGUST 26, 2022/kr
Signature Not Verified
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:29.08.2022
14:39:07
