Delhi High Court
Rakesh Singh vs Delhi Transport Corporation on 27 September, 2019
$~5
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 27th September, 2019
+ LPA 584/2019
RAKESH SINGH ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Kishore Kumar Patel, Advocate
versus
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION ..... Respondent
Through: Mrs.Avnish Ahlawat, Standing
counsel for DTC with Mr.Nitesh
Singh, Advt.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
CM.APPL 40354/2019 (delay)
1. This is an application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of
3395 days delay in filing the present appeal. Mr. Kishore Kumar
Patel, counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the
appeal was for cogent, bona fide reasons and not on account of any
inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. The counsel
submits that the ground for delay is that the appellant was unemployed
and therefore suffering from financial hardship.
2. We have heard the counsel for the appellant and examined the
application seeking condonation of delay.
3. The application does not inspire confidence. We are not satisfied that
the delay is on account of bonafide reasons. Reading of the
application would show that the same is highly casual in nature, is
devoid of any material particulars, is vague and does not disclose any
cause much less sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present
appeal. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that the
expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should
be given a liberal interpretation to advance substantial justice. It has
also been repeatedly held that length of delay is not to be considered
provided the explanation is genuine and the delay was caused for
sufficient reasons.
4. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
reported at AIR 2014 SC 1612, the Apex Court has held as under:
"11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
However, the court while allowing such application has to
draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want
of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a
party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of
discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court
has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not
complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and
convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on
sympathetic grounds alone.
12. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person
has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately
after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take
benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the
reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the
order passed at the behest of some diligent person.
13. In State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors.,
(1996) 6 SCC 267, this Court rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on
the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know
of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the
same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and
laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly
unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay
and laches.
14. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Jagdish
Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC
2366, observing as under:-
"Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over
their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they
had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh's
ratios...Therefore desperate attempts of the appellants to
re-do the seniority, held by them in various cadre.... are
not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage.
The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ
petition on the ground of delay as well."
5. Applying the settled law to the facts of the present case, we find that
the appellant has failed to either plead or establish sufficient cause for
the condonation of delay. The only ground raised for condonation of
delay is that the appellant was not employed and was suffering from
financial hardship. This, in our view, is not reason enough to condone
the delay in the absence of any details. Accordingly, we find no
grounds to entertain the application.
6. The application is dismissed.
LPA 584/2019
7. Since the application seeking condonation of delay has been
dismissed, the appeal is also dismissed.
G.S.SISTANI, J.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.
SEPTEMBER 27, 2018/rb
