Mool Chand vs Union Of India & Ors.
2019 Latest Caselaw 313 Del

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*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                               Reserved on: 10th January, 2019
                                                Decided on: 17th January, 2019

+                          W.P.(C) 4528/2015
MOOL CHAND                                                 ..... Petitioner
                           Through: Mr. Sumit Bansal, Ms. Sumi Anand
                           and Ms. Vishnushree Dalmia, Advocates

                           versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                             ..... Respondents
                   Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain and Ms. Jyoti Tyagi,
                   Advocates for LAC/L&B.
                   Mr. Dhruv Tamta, Advocate for R-3.
                   Mr. Dev. P.Bhardwaj, CGSC for UOI.

CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
       JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

                                    JUDGMENT

Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:

1. The prayers in the present petition read as under:

a. pass a writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of declaration thereby declaring the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of the land of petitioner bearing Property no. 214 forming part of Khasra no.580 admeasuring 550 sq. yds. In Village Karkardooma, Delhi as deemed to have lapsed in view of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013;

b. pass a writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus thereby directing the Respondents not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land of the

Petitioner bearing Property no. 214 forming part of Khasra no.580 admeasuring 550 sq. yds. in Village Karkardooma, Delhi ; and

c. pass such other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."

2. Notice was issued in this petition on 8th May, 2015 and it was directed that in the meanwhile the parties would maintain status-quo with regard to the nature, title and possession of the land in question.

3. The narration in the petition reveals that the father of the Petitioner, Shri Jassi was in 1938 given possession of the land in question as a non- occupancy tenant. Shri Jassi expired in 1960. The land is stated to have been inherited thereafter by the Petitioner and his two brothers Shri Kartar Singh and Shri Phool Singh.

4. The land in question forms part of a large chunk of land admeasuring 34,070 acres including Village Karkardooma Delhi which was sought to be acquired and notification was issued on 13th November, 1959 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 („LAA‟) for the Planned Development of Delhi. This was followed by declaration under Section 6 of the LAA issued on 14th June, 1966. The land acquisition Award No. 54/A/70-71 was passed on 7th January, 1971. The Petitioner claims that possession, pursuant to the Award, was taken only of 13 biswas. 11 biswas (550 sq. yards) is claimed to have remained with the Petitioner. It is also claimed that no compensation was paid in respect of the said extent of land.

5. It is stated that in April, 1983 the Petitioner and his two brothers let out an area of 230.07 sq. yards out of the total area of 550 sq. yds. on Property No. 210 forming part of Khasra No. 580 at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 to Shri Pradeep Kumar.

6. It is stated that in 1988 the two brothers of the Petitioner executed Registered General Power of Attorney („GPA‟) in the Petitioner's favour with respect to the land in question. On 12 th October, 1988 a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was served upon Shri Pradeep Kumar, the tenant, despite which he continued to reside on the said land. It is stated that the Petitioner filed Suit No. 428/1988 against the tenant for possession. This was decreed by the Civil Judge on 21st May, 1999 in favour of the Petitioner. The tenant Shri Pradeep Kumar filed appeal-RCA No. 67/1999, which came to be dismissed on 13th July, 1999. Shri Pradeep Kumar then filed RFA No. 61/1999 in this Court. During the pendency of that appeal, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi („MCD‟) sealed the plot admeasuring 231.07 sq. yards as Shri Pradeep Kumar had raised a tin shed thereon and was using it for non-residential purposes.

7. Much later on 26th September, 2011 the Petitioner is stated to have filed an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 („RTI Act‟) seeking reasons for sealing of the property let out to Shri Pradeep Kumar. The Petitioner states that he was informed by letter dated 14th October, 2011 that the plot was sealed due to misuse for commercial purposes and not in relation to any acquisition proceedings.

8. In September, 2011 a notification was issued by the Delhi Government regularising 1071 unauthorised colonies. It is stated that the extended abadi of village Karkardooma also formed part of those 1071 unauthorised colonies. It is categorically stated in para 4 (xv) that "the land of the Petitioner admeasuring 550 sq. yards, which also includes 231.07 sq. yards also form part of those unauthorised colonies."

9. It is stated that on 5th March, 2014 the Delhi Development Authority („DDA‟) (Respondent No.3), with Police assistance, demolished the existing tin shed on the land admeasuring 231.07 sq. yds. The Petitioner and his two brothers filed Suit No. 100/2014 against the DDA for permanent injunction to restrain the DDA from dispossessing the Petitioner. The Petitioner also made a police complaint at Police Station (PS) Anand Vihar against both the MCD and the DDA officials.

10. On 24th April, 2014, Shri Pradeep Kumar withdrew RFA No. 61/1999 which was then dismissed as withdrawn. On 15th May, 2014 the East Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi (EDMC) filed a status report pertaining to the tenanted property stating that it was an open plot which was lying vacant and no demolition action was taken by the EDMC on that plot. The Additional District Judge hearing Suit No. 100/2014 adjourned it to 24th July, 2014 in view of the above status report without granting any interim relief to the Petitioner.

11. It is stated that on 9th July, 2014 the DDA raised a wall up to a height of 2 feet facing the main road and put a sign board there in the name of DDA

despite strong opposition by the Petitioner and his brothers. Suit No.100/2014 for permanent injunction became infructuous and was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh application under the changed circumstances. On 5th August, 2014 the Petitioner and his two brothers served a statutory notice to the DDA protesting against its allegedly illegal action. They then filed suit No. 421/2014 in the Court of the Sr. Civil Judge, Karkardooma on 13th October, 2014. The said suit is stated to be pending.

12. In response to an RTI application filed on 1st December 2014 with respect to the status of compensation, the Petitioner was informed by letter dated 19th December, 2014 that compensation in terms of the Award in respect of the land in question had not been paid. Claiming that the Petitioner has been in actual physical possession of the land in question till date and further that no compensation has been paid in respect of the acquired land, the Petitioner seeks a declaration under Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the „2013 Act‟) that the land acquisition proceedings should be deemed to have lapsed.

13. In response to the said petition the DDA has filed a counter affidavit dated 16th November, 2015 stating inter-alia that actual physical possession of the land in question was handed over to the DDA by the LAC on 15 th September, 1971. A copy of the possession proceedings has also been enclosed by the DDA.

14. A separate counter affidavit has been filed by the LAC on 24 th April,

2018 confirming the handing over possession to the DDA. It is further stated that the original compensation was mentioned as disputed in the revenue records and as per LAC No. 317/2017, 40% of the enhanced compensation was sent to the Reference Court in the name of Shiv Prakash on 23 rd April, 1971.

15. In the rejoinder filed on 3rd July, 2018 the Petitioner for the first time stated as under:

"Inadvertently the area in the Writ Petition has been mentioned by the Petitioner as 550 Sq. yds, which is stated to be in the possession of the Petitioner. The Petitioner craves leave to correct the same and submit that the said area be read as 231.07 Sq. yds which is in possession of the Petitioner. It is further submitted that the said area of 231.07 Sq. yds is part of a larger area admeasuring 550 Sq. yds and the Petitioner has placed on records the photograph at page 128 which shows the total area of 550 Sq. yds. It is submitted that the two constructed buildings shown at Page 128 are on the 550 Sq. yds. of plot and the property of the Petitioner is situated in between the two buildings. The Petitioner further submits that it is outside the realm of imagination that the possession of the plot belonging to the Petitioner has been taken whereas there exists the construction on more than 300 Sq. yds. on the total plot of 550 Sq. yds of which possession has not been taken."

16. According to the Petitioner in terms of the revenue record:

"title of Property No. 214 forming part of Khasra No.580 admeasuring 0 Bigha 11 Biswa situated in revenue estate of Village Karkardooma, New Delhi is with the Petitioner's father and after the death of Petitioner's father same has been inherited by the Petitioner. Further, the possession of the subject land is with the Petitioner and the same is evident from the photographs of the property have been filed along with Writ Petition as

Annexure P-6."

17. It is further stated that:

"there was a reference under Section 18 filed before the court of the Additional district Judge being LAC 317/1971 which was decided vide judgment dated 20.07.1976 wherein it has been categorically held that the 40% of the enhanced compensation is of the owner and remaining 60% is of the occupancy tenant."

18. The Petitioner reiterates that physical possession remains with him. Reference is also made to the provisions of the National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2014 in terms of which status-quo was required to be maintained in respect of the land in question being the subject matter of an unauthorised colony. The Petitioner has enclosed with the rejoinder affidavit, as Annexure- P-17, a plan of the unauthorised colony showing the property of the Petitioner in yellow colour.

19. This Court has recently in a series of judgment following the decision in Mahavir Singh v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588 dismissed various writ petitions seeking similar relief on the ground of laches for the obvious reason that the Petitioners were seeking declarations under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act in respect of land which formed the subject matter of land acquisition Awards passed more than three to four decades earlier. In the present case too, the Award was passed in 1971.

20. Mr. Sumit Bansal, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that in view of the reference made by the five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court for determining the correctness of the decision of the three judge Bench of

the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412, this Court should not proceed to deal with the present petition and should await the decision of the Constitution Bench. Mr. Bansal also made extensive reference to the referral order.

21. According to Mr. Bansal all the issues considered by the three Judge Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) have been referred for consideration before the Constitution Bench. He further refers to the decision in D.K.Trivedi & Sons v. Ambalal Manibhai Patel AIR 1986 SC 1323 and submits that till such time the Constitution Bench does not answer the questions referred, which would include the question whether the Petitioner seeking declaration under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act could be rejected on the ground of laches, the Court should not proceed in the present case.

22. In order to appreciate the above submission it requires to be noted that the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 interpreted Section 24 of the 2013 Act. One of the issues considered was whether the deposit of compensation in the Government treasury, when the land owner refuses to accept it would amount to tendering compensation for the purpose of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act. This was answered in the negative in the said decision.

23. Another issue arose in Yogesh Neema v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 6 SCC 387 whether the Supreme Court was considering whether

Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act can be invoked even where land acquisition proceedings are kept pending by the land owners by filing successive petitions in which interim orders have been passed. In the said decision the Court doubted the correctness of the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 as regards exclusion of the period covered by the interim orders from the calculation of the period of five years under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger Bench.

24. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court formulated the following questions for determination:

"3.1 (i) What is the meaning of the expression „paid'/„tender' in Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and section 31 of the Act of 1894? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?

3.2 (ii) Mode of taking physical possession as contemplated under section 24(2) of the 1894 Act.?

3.3. (iii) Whether section 24 of Act of 2013 revives barred and stale claims?

3.4 (iv) Whether the conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. 5 State of Tamil Nadu [(2015) 3 SCC 353]

makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act?

3.5 (v) Whether the principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit", namely act of the Court should not prejudice any parties would be applicable in the present case to exclude the period covered by an interim order for the purpose of determining the question with regard to taking of possession as contemplated in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

25. The questions were answered by a majority of 2:1 as under:

"Q. No. I: 218.l. The word „paid‟ in section 24 of the Act of 2013 has the same meaning as „tender of payment‟ in section 31(1) of the Act of 1894. They carry the same meaning and the expression „deposited‟ in section 31(2) is not included in the expressions „paid‟ in section 24 of the Act of 2013 or in „tender of payment' used in section 31(1) 194 of the Act of 1894. The words „paid'/tender' and „deposited' are different expressions and carry different meanings within their fold. In section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 in the expression „paid,' it is not necessary that the amount should be deposited in court as provided in section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 does not result in a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Due to the failure of deposit in court, the only consequence at the most in appropriate cases may be of a higher rate of interest on compensation as envisaged under section 34 of the Act of 1894 and not lapse of acquisition. Once the amount of compensation has been unconditionally tendered and it is refused, that would amount to payment and the obligation under section 31(1) stands discharged and that amounts to discharge of obligation of payment under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 also and it is not open to the person who has refused to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been deposited in court, acquisition has lapsed. Claimants/landowners after

refusal, cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek protection under the provisions of section 24(2). Q. No. II:- 218.2. The normal mode of taking physical possession under the land acquisition cases is drawing of Panchnama as held in Banda Development Authority (supra).

Q. No. III :- 218.3. The provisions of section 24 of the Act of 2013, do not revive barred or stale claims such claims cannot be entertained.

Q.No. IV:- 218.4. Provisions of section 24(2) do not intend to cover the period spent during litigation and when the authorities have been disabled to act under section 24(2) due to the final or interim order of a court or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the period of five years as provided in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. There is no conscious omission in section 24(2) for the exclusion of a period of the interim order. There was no necessity to insert such a provision. The omission does not make any substantial difference as to legal position.

Q. No. V:- 218.5. The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit is applicable including the other common law principles for determining the questions under section 24 of the Act of 2013. The period covered by the final/ interim order by which the authorities have been deprived of taking possession has to be excluded. Section 24(2) has no application where Court has quashed acquisition."

26. Relevant to the present petition is the conclusion with respect to Question No. 3 that Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act does not revive barred or stale claims.

27. It may be mentioned here that the third learned Judge, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J. while concurring on the conclusions qua Questions II to

V, dissented on Question I only to the extent on whether Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was per incuriam. According to the learned Judge, the correctness of that decision, rendered by the three Judge Bench could be considered only by the larger Bench.

28. The operative order passed by the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) reads as under:

"We unanimously agree to the answers given to all the questions i.e. (i) to (v), except to the aspect decided by majority whether Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki 2014 (3) SCC 183 is per incuriam or not. As the majority has taken the view that it is per incuriam, it is declared to be per incuriam. The questions referred stand answered in terms of majority judgment. Hence, ordered accordingly."

29. The decision in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) was rendered on 8th February, 2018. Within two weeks thereafter on 21st February, 2018 another three Judge Bench in State of Haryana v. G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585 was seized with the issue. It was submitted to the said Court that a reference would have to be made to a larger Bench of the issues arising out of the decision in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) "since a Bench of three Judges cannot hold another decision rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges per incuriam." In the circumstances the Supreme Court in para 9 of its order dated 21st February, 2018 in State of Haryana v. G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (supra) observed as under:

"we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate if in the interim and pending a final decision on making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts be requested not to deal with any cases relating to the interpretation of or concerning Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Secretary General will urgently communicate this order to the Registrar General of every High Court so that our request is complied with."

30. This was followed by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on the immediate next date i.e. 22nd February, 2018 passing the following order in in SLP No. 9798-99/2016 (Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma):

"Vide order dated 18.04.2016 Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma, this matter was directed to be listed after the decision in SLP(Civil) No.10742 of 2008. The same has since been decided in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412. A copy of order dated 21.02.2018 in SLP (C) No. 5552/2018 CC. No.8453/2017 State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited has been shown to this Court by Mr. Rohatgi, Senior Advocate. We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the issues involved in the matter, the issues need to be resolved by a larger Bench at the earliest. These matters may be placed before the appropriate Bench tomorrow i.e. 23 February, 2018, as per orders of Hon‟ble the Chief Justice of India."

31. A similar order was passed on the same date by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4835/2015 (State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust).

32. All these matters were considered by the Constitution Bench in Indore

Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 3 SCC 405 on 6th March, 2018. The operative portion of that order reads as under:

"8. Keeping in view the aforesaid orders, it was thought appropriate by the Chief Justice of India to constitute a Constitution Bench to deal with all the issues in an apposite manner, and that is how these matters have been placed before us.

9. The learned counsel for the parties argued at some length and requested for framing questions of law. We think it appropriate to state, this Bench shall consider all the aspects including the correctness of the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and the other judgments following the said decision as well as the judgment rendered in Indore Development Authority (supra). Be it noted, learned counsel for the parties would be at liberty to file their propositions of law when the matter is taken up for hearing.

10. We would have proceeded for hearing of these matters but as we are in the midst of hearing of another Constitution Bench matter, we think it appropriate to list these matters after conclusion of hearing of Item No.506 i.e. W.P.(Crl.) No.76/2016. However, the matters shall remain in the cause- list."

33. What is clear is that the earlier interim order passed by the three Judge Bench in State of Haryana v. G.D.Goenka (supra) was not continued by the Constitution Bench when it made the reference. The second aspect is that while referring the matters, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme court did not consider it necessary to frame questions of law but stated that the Constitution Bench shall consider "all the aspects including the correctness of the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other decisions following the said decision as well as the decision rendered in

Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra)."

34. The question then arises whether only the points of difference between the decisions in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) and all issues incidental thereto have been referred to the Constitution Bench? In this context it requires to be noted that although several questions were framed in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra), it is only on Question I, viz., on whether the deposit in the RD Account would amount to having tendered compensation for the purposes of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, that there was a difference of opinion between the view expressed in the two decisions viz., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra).

35. The other point of difference was that arising in Yogesh Neema v. State of MP (supra) where the correctness of the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) as regards exclusion of the period covered by the interim orders from the calculation of the period of five years under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act was questioned. On this point the three-Judge Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) unanimously overruled the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra). On this issue no subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court of co-ordinate strength appears to have taken a contrary view. It is doubtful, therefore, whether this issue would be examined by the Constitution Bench.

36. Relevant to the issue on hand, there was no difference of view qua Question III addressed in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) i.e. "Whether section 24 of Act of 2013 revives barred and stale claims?" On this question there was no view (much less a contrary view) expressed in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) or for that matter in any other subsequent decision of a smaller, co-ordinate or even larger Bench of the Supreme Court. This question, therefore, was not the subject matter of reference before the Constitution Bench.

37. Consequently, this Court is of the view that although the order passed by the Constitution Bench refers to "all the aspects" being considered by the Constitution Bench, that expression would not include questioning the correctness of the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) as far as it holds by a unanimous opinion that Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act cannot revive old and stale claims.

38. In this context it requires to be noticed that in Indore Development Authority (supra) in the judgment of the majority, between paras 120 and 130 (SCC), Question III was discussed. The decision in Mahavir v. Union of India (supra) was referred to with approval. It was further observed as under:

"128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section

24(2). We have come across the cases in which findings have been recorded that by which of drawing a Panchnama, possession has been taken, now again under Section 24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them. Such claims cannot be entertained in view of the previous decisions in which such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions would operate as res judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plea raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was not raised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul the court‟s decision and the provisions cannot be misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants.

130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have come barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of section 24 (2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the courts in cases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of law could never have been the intention behind enacting the provisions of

section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, by the decision laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), and this Court never, even for a moment, intended that such cases would be received or entertained by the courts."

39. It may be noticed here that in the category of claims that cannot be revived are not only dead or stale claims but even those which have been contested earlier and where the land owners have lost the case. Section 24(2) was also held not to revive claims that have been "lost/negatived", "become barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law". Therefore, inaction with regard to claims for several years would also attract the principle of laches and bar the invocation of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.

40. Even assuming that when the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in its referral order while using the expression "all aspects" was referring even the above question of the non-revival of dead or stale claims by resorting to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act for consideration by the larger Bench, it is significant that the Constitution Bench did not continue the injunction issued by the three Judge Bench in State of Haryana v. G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (supra). In other words, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the referral order dated 6th March, 2018 in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 3 SCC 405 did not intend to and in fact did not restrain the High Courts from proceeding with writ petitions where interpretation of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act was involved. Also, importantly, the Constitution Bench while making the reference did not stay the operation of the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra).

41. While the Court takes note of the observation in D.K.Trivedi & Sons v. Ambalal Manibhai Patel (supra) that if a larger Bench of the Supreme Court is seized of an issue, the High Court should ordinarily not proceed to decide the matter, in the present case considering that an earlier stay order passed by the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (supra) was not continued by the Constitution Bench at the time of making the reference, the said decision in the D.K.Trivedi & Sons v. Ambalal Manibhai Patel (supra) is distinguishable on facts.

42. Mr. Bansal then referred to an order dated 18th May, 2018 in SLP (Civil) No. 12295/2018 (Anita Mittal v. State of Rajasthan) which was an appeal filed against an order dated 17th April, 2018 of the High Court of Rajasthan. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was open to the High Court to decide any issue "except the applicability of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act which was pending consideration before the Constitution Bench." It must be noticed here that the Constitution Bench itself has not passed any such order restraining the High Court from proceeding with matters involving interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. The order of the Constitution Bench passed on 6th March, 2018 would obviously therefore prevail over the above order dated 18th May, 2018 which was passed by a two-Judge Bench.

43. Turning now to the facts of the present case, there are three distinct aspects which require consideration. First is the aspect of delay and laches. From the narration of the petition itself, it is plain that at no point of time

after passing of the 1971 Award, either the predecessor-in-interest or the Petitioner himself questioned the land acquisition proceedings. The mere fact that the 2013 Act came into force on 1st January 2014, would not per se provide a fresh cause of action for those cases where no action was taken to challenge the land acquisition proceedings earlier. Therefore, the present petition is certainly barred by laches.

44. On the aspect of laches, Mr. Bansal referred to an order dated 27 th March, 2011 in WP(C) No.3636/2016 (Union of India v. Gopaldas Bhagwan Das) where in para 6, the Supreme Court observed as under:

"In view of the above, the view taken by two-Judge Bench in Kulsum R.Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 348 to the effect that delay and laches have to be ignored is not free from doubt."

45. We do not see how the above observations help the present Petitioner in any manner.

46. The second question is on the merits of the petition involving the correctness of the claim of the Petitioner that neither compensation was paid nor physical possession taken of the land in question. From the affidavits filed both by the DDA and the LAC the question arises whether the Petitioner could be said to have re-entered the land subsequent to the actual physical possession being taken by the LAC and handed over to the DDA? In which case, it would amount to an encroachment on Government land.

47. Even as regards compensation, it will be recalled that in his rejoinder the

Petitioner states that a reference was made to the learned Additional District Judge under Section 18 LAA being LAC 317/1971 which was decided by a judgment dated 20th July 1976 holding that "40% of the enhanced compensation is of the owner and remaining 60% is of the occupancy tenant." Yet, the Petitioner makes no attempt to explain whether during the period of nearly four decades thereafter, those amounts were paid and if not, what steps were taken by him to recover the amount. Therefore, both aspects of possession and compensation involve disputed questions of fact which cannot possibly be examined in the present proceedings.

48. The third aspect of the case is that the Petitioner admits that the land in question is part of an unauthorised colony. The very basis for seeking regularisation of an unauthorised colony is that it is located on land which belongs either to the public or to some other private parties. The Petitioners would therefore not have the locus standi to seek a declaration in terms of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act in such cases since the very fact that they have sought regularisation on the basis that they are in unauthorised colony would be an admission that they do not otherwise have any valid right, title or interest in the land in question.

49. This Court has by order dated 19th December 2018 in WP(C) No.190/2016 (Harbhagwan Batra v. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi) and order dated 8th January 2019 in WP(C) No.10201/2015 (Gurmeet Singh Grewal v. Union of India) negatived similar pleas by the Petitioners who were trying to seek similar declaration of lapsing even while admitting that they were pursuing regularisation of an unauthorised colony.

50. In a decision dated 10th January 2019 in W.P. (C) 3623 of 2018 (Akhil Sibal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi) this Court observed in this context as under:

"18. The Court at this stage may also observe that many of the unauthorized colonies are awaiting regularization orders. A large portion of these colonies are by way of encroachment on public land, some of it may be on private land, but in any event, the constructions themselves are unauthorized. The major premise on which such regularization is sought is that these constructions have been erected on public or private land which does not belong to the persons who are under occupation of those structures. That very basis gets contradicted as some of them try to seek a declaration about lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings by invoking Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. This is a contradiction in terms and is legally untenable."

51. For all the aforementioned reasons, the Court sees no merit in this petition and it is dismissed as such. The interim order dated 8th May 2015, confirmed on 19th March 2018, is hereby vacated.

S. MURALIDHAR, J.

SANJEEV NARULA J.

JANUARY 17, 2019 mw