Delhi High Court
Dr. Ankita Baidya vs Union Of India & Ors on 1 February, 2019
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 28th January, 2019
Pronounced on: 01st February, 2019
+ W.P.(C) 8748/2018 & CM APPL.45209/2018
DR. ANKITA BAIDYA ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.K. Dubey and Mr. Udit
Malik, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ... Respondents
Through: Mr. Bhagvan Swarup Shukla,
CGSC for Union of India with
Mr.Kamaldeep, Advocate.
Mr. Vibhor Garg, Mr. Tushar
Gupta, Ms. Puja Agarwal and
Mr. Deepanshu Panwar, Advs.
For R-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
% JUDGMENT
1. Oprah Winfrey once said, in a moment of sombre reflection,
that "the choice to become a mother is the choice to become one of the
greatest spiritual teachers there is". That may very well be, the All
India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) would seek to contend -
but it is also the choice of a delay of six months in obtaining the
coveted and prestigious degree of DM (Doctorate of Medicine), if you
happen to be an aspiring student and chance to become enceinte
during the currency of your course. The petitioner, who so chanced to
become pregnant during the currency of her DM course, applied, to
the AIIMS, for maternity leave and was informed, even while the
leave, was sought and granted, that the attainment of the DM
qualification, by her, would be postponed by 6 months, by reason of
grant, to her, of maternity leave. Perplexed and distressed thereby, the
petitioner has moved this Court.
2. The writ petition, therefore, seeks issuance of a writ of
mandamus, to the AIIMS, to allow the petitioner to undertake the said
DM examination in December, 2018.
3. The short issue that arises for determination, in the present writ
petition is, therefore, whether a DM student in the AIIMS, who
applies for maternity leave, would have to suffer a delay of 6 months
in the completion of the DM course and, consequently, the award of
the DM qualification.
4. Be it noted, during the pendency of this writ petition, the
petitioner was permitted, vide order dated 30th November, 2018, to
appear in the final examinations of the DM programme, which was
conducted in December, 2018, without creation of any equities
thereby.
5. Proceeding, then, to the facts.
6. On 1st July, 2011, the petitioner joined the Post Graduate MD
course in Microbiology in the AIIMS. She cleared the final
examination of the said course in December, 2014. She, thereafter,
joined as a Senior Resident in Laboratory medicine in, the AIIMS, in
2015 and, thereafter, as a Senior Resident in Microbiology in July,
2015, clearing the requisite entrance examinations on each account.
7. In January, 2016, the AIIMS issued a Prospectus for the DM
programme in Infectious Disease which, it may be noted, was being
introduced, for the first time in India, in the AIIMS. The petitioner
applied, as a general category candidate, for the said programme in
DM (Infectious Disease) and she cleared the entrance examination, in
the first attempt.
8. The Prospectus for the DM programme in Infectious Disease, as
issued by the AIIMS, contained various clauses setting out the terms
and conditions applicable to persons/students undertaking the said
programme. Clause 7 of the said Prospectus, which dealt with
"leave", stipulated that the candidate would be entitled to 24 days
leave in the first year, 30 days leave in the second year and 36 days in
the third year. No other stipulation, regarding "leave", insofar as the
DM programme in the various super specialties, including that of
Infectious Diseases, was concerned, is to be found in the said
Prospectus. For ready reference, Clause 7 of the Prospectus, which
deals with the leave available to candidates undertaking
superspeciality DM courses, may be reproduced, thus:
"7. Leave
1st year: 24 days; 2nd year: 30 days; 3rd year: 36 days."
9. Consequent to clearing of the entrance examination, for the DM
(Infectious Diseases) course, the petitioner joined the Medicine and
Microbiology Department of the AIIMS, which administered the said
programme, as Senior Resident (SR) (Academic), for the Academic
Session January, 2016-December, 2018, on 1st January, 2016.
10. The Memorandum, dated 4th December, 2015, issued by the
AIIMS, whereby the petitioner was informed that she had been
selected as a student for the DM course, besides stipulating other
conditions, applicable to the said course, specified, with respect to
leave, as under:
"He/she will be entitled for 90 days leave during three
years i.e. 1st year 24, IInd Year 30 days and IIIrd year 36.
If leave is extended in a year then the extended period is
treated as Extra Ordinary Leave without pay and the
registration period is also extended by postponing the
Exam for one session."
11. During the tenure of the aforementioned DM course being
undertaken by her, the petitioner applied, to the AIIMS, for 180 days
Maternity Leave, for the period 8th March, 2016 to 3rd September,
2016.
12. The said application was allowed, by the AIIMS, vide letter
dated 18th April, 2016. The said letter reads thus:
"ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES
ACADEMIC SECTION-I
No.F-.5-l/2016-Acad.l Ansari Nagar, New Delhi-29
Dated: 18 April 2016
MEMORANDUM
Subject:- Grant of Maternity Leave in respect of Dr.
Ankita Baidya, Senior Resident (DM) in the
Department of Medicine & Microbiology.
With reference to his/her letter dated 07.03.2016
on the subject cited above, Dr. Ankita Baidya, Senior
Resident (DM) in the Department of Medicine &
Microbiology is hereby informed that Dean has been
pleased to grant Maternity Leave as under:
1. 180 days maternity leave from 08.03.2016 to
03.09.2016.
2. Her registration for DM has been extended for 180
days from 01.01.2019 to 29.06.2019. Her final
examination also postponed for one session. She will
appear in the final examination in May 2019.
3. On return from leave she will/has join/joined her
duty in the forenoon of 30.06.2019.
Sd/-18.04
(Dr. Sanjeev Lalwani)
Registrar"
13. Mr. Vibhor Garg, learned counsel appearing for the AIIMS,
emphasized the fact - which Mr. Dubey, learned counsel for the
petitioner, fairly does not deny - that the petitioner never assailed the
above-extracted letter dated 18th April, 2016 and availed maternity
leave, as allowed by the said order.
14. Consequent to expiry of the period of her maternity leave, the
petitioner rejoined the services of the AIIMS on 4th September, 2016.
Since then, the writ petition asserts, that the petitioner availed only 6
days of leave for the remaining period of her DM programme, from
September, 2016 to December, 2018, and the counter affidavit of the
AIIMS does not dispute this fact.
15. On 23rd March, 2018, the petitioner presented her thesis for the
DM programme, which was duly approved by the competent faculty
member, whereafter the petitioner commenced working towards
completion of the thesis, so that she could submit it at least three
months prior to the final examinations, scheduled for December, 2018.
16. On 1st May, 2018, the petitioner addressed a representation, to
the AIIMS, requesting that the Maternity Leave granted to her be not
considered as an extension of leave admissible to her under the terms
and conditions of her admission to the DM course. She relied on a
government Directive dated 14th March, 2018, which ordained that
Maternity Leave be considered as part of tenure and not as an
extension to the leave ordinarily available.
17. This was followed by a more detailed representation, dated 15 th
May, 2018, in which, besides relying on notification dated 4th April,
2018, issued by the AIIMS, and the aforementioned notification dated
14th March, 2018 of the Government of NCT of Delhi, the petitioner
also placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in
Dr. Deepthi S. v. Director of Medical Education [W.P.(C)
14649/2012].
18. The above representations of the petitioner were rejected by the
AIIMS vide the impugned Memorandum dated 23rd June, 2018, which
provides, no reason for the rejection, but merely states that the request
had been "examined by the competent authority but the same cannot
be acceded to".
19. The petitioner is, therefore, before this Court by means of the
present writ petition.
Rival Contentions
20. Mr. Dubey submits that the grant of maternity leave, to his
client, could never constitute a justifiable ground for extending the
date of the final examination of the DM course in which she was to
appear, from December, 2018 to May, 2019.
21. Apropos the clause, in the Memorandum dated 4th December,
2015 (supra), issued by the AIIMS, to the effect that, if leave was
extended, in the first year, beyond the permissible 24 days, the
extended period was to be treated as Extra Ordinary Leave without
pay, and the registration period was liable to be extended by
postponing the examination by one session. Mr. Dubey submits that
the said clause could not apply to grant of maternity leave. He draws
my attention, in this regard, to Rules 32 and 43 of the Central Civil
Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 which distinguishes between Extra
Ordinary Leave and maternity leave. Mr. Dubey submits that,
inasmuch as maternity leave was distinct from Extra Ordinary Leave,
there could be no question of treating maternity leave as Extra
Ordinary Leave and, consequently, the stipulation regarding extension
of the date of the examination, which was a sequitur to treating the
extended leave as Extra Ordinary Leave, would also not apply.
22. Mr. Dubey further points out, in this regard, that the Prospectus
of the AIIMS, governing the DM course, did not contain any such
stipulation and that, therefore, the introduction of such stipulation in
the letter admitting the petitioner to the DM course, being de hors the
Prospectus, was unenforceable in law.
23. Reliance was also placed, by Mr. Dubey, on Articles 39 and 42
of the Constitution of India, as well as the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as the "Maternity Benefit Act").
24. Mr. Dubey draws especial attention to Section 32 of the
Maternity Benefit Act and invokes, in juxtaposition therewith,
Sections 5 and 12 of the said Act, which, in his submission, would be
squarely infracted if, merely because maternity leave, as granted to
her, was availed by the petitioner, she was to suffer 6 months' delay in
her final examinations.
25. Mr. Dubey also places reliance on the judgments of this Court
in Vandana Kandari v. University of Delhi, 2010 SCC OnLine Del
2341, the High Court of Kerala in Dr. Deepthi S. (supra), the High
Court of Madras in P. Sowmyaa v. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu
Health and Family Welfare Department [W.P.(C) 6475/2018] and
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Priyanka Gujarkar v. Registrar
General [W.P.(C) 17004/2015].
26. Arguing on behalf of the AIIMS, Mr. Garg, learned counsel,
submits, per contra, that the petitioner was estopped from raising the
above challenge, as she has accepted the clause in the Memorandum
dated 4th December, 2015 (supra), wherein it was specifically
stipulated that if leave, in extension of the permissible periods
stipulated therein was granted, it would result in postponement of her
examination by one session. Having agreed to the said stipulation and
having also accepted the conditions, contained in the letter dated 18th
April, 2016, granting maternity leave to her, Mr. Garg submits that the
petitioner could not now turn back and insist that she be permitted to
write the final examination in December, 2018. Mr. Garg also sought
to rely on the following clause, in the Guidelines for Academic
Course, Awards and Orations at AIIMS":
"11. Leave
During the term of employment the Junior
Residents/Demonstrators will be entitled leave as under:-
First year - 30 days
Second year - 36 days
Third year - 36 days
The leaves cannot be carried forward. They are not
entitled to any other leave except that mentioned above.
Residency as well as exam of residents who avail the 30
days leave over and above their entitlement will be
extended. However, upto 30 days leave without pay in
overall three years may be condoned by the Dean on
special grounds for appearing in usual term of
examination but the candidate is required to work for the
extended period. However, the unavailed leave will be
encashed after completion of three years. No encashment
is eligible for sponsored/foreign national."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. On it being pointed out, to Mr. Garg, that the above clause dealt
with Junior Residents, whereas the petitioner was a Senior Resident,
Mr. Garg had sought time to produce material to establish that an
identical clause existed in respect of Senior Residents as well.
28. Pursuant to the grant of an opportunity, to Mr. Garg, for the said
purpose, he has filed, under a cover of an index, the Minutes of the
117th Meeting of the Academic Council of the AIIMS, held on 20th
November, 2018.
29. Mr. Garg relies on Agenda Item No. AC/117/8, as considered
and approved in the said meeting. The said Agenda Item merits
reproduction, in extenso, as under:
"Item no AC/117/ 8: Regarding grant of Paternity
leave and extension of tenure for academic courses if
leaves extend beyond the permitted period for DM/M.Ch
candidates.
The proposal regarding grant of paternity leave and
extension of tenure for academic courses if leaves extend
beyond the permitted period for DM/M.Ch candidates
was discussed.
It was informed that the Senior Resident
(DM/M.Ch) are entitled for leave during the three years
tenure as under:-
1st year 24 Days
2nd year 30 Days
3rd year 36 Days
If leave is extended in a year then the extended
period is treated as Extra Ordinary Leave without pay and
the registration period is also extended by postponing the
Exam for one session). The Dean is the competent
authority to condone the leave upto 30 days on the merit
of each case.
Maternity leave:- Senior Resident (Non-
Academic.), Senior Resident (DM/M.Ch) and Junior
Residents (Acad.) are entitled for maternity leave for 180
days. However the tenure of Senior Resident (DM/M.Ch)
and Junior Residents (Acad.) is extended in lieu of
Maternity leave and final examination also postponed for
one session.
Paternity leave:- Senior Resident (Non-
Academic.), Senior Resident (Acad.) are entitled for 15
days paternity leave but tenure is not extended.
It was proposed that for calculating tenure
extension due to paternity leave, the total number of leave
availed in 3 years would be calculated. If the total leaves
availed is more than 90 days (including paternity leave),
then the tenure will be extended by the extra number of
days beyond 90 days. Dr. Mahesh B. Patel and Dr. S
Venkatesh said that the provisions for paternity and
maternity leave to SR/JR have already been notified as
per CCS Rules. The Director said that exam
postponement would depend on total number of leaves
availed as per existing policy.
The proposal was unanimously approved."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. The judgment in Vandana Kandari (supra), Mr. Garg would
submit, stands overruled by the judgment dated 7th September, 2018,
of a Division Bench of this Court, in LPA 294/2018 (Ankita Meena
v. University of Delhi).
Analysis and Conclusion
31. I have heard learned counsel at length and applied my mind to
the material on record as well as the legal submissions advanced
before me.
The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, and its application to the facts:
32. The first question that arises for consideration, before one
proceeds to provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, on which Mr.
Dubey places reliance, is whether the said Act applies, at all, to the
petitioner, given the relationship between the petitioner and the
AIIMS. Though I must confess, I had some misgivings regarding the
applicability of the said Act, as the petitioner was, essentially, a
student of the AIIMS, rather than an "employee" thereof, as
understood in its classical sense, a reading of the Memorandum, dated
4th December, 2015 (supra), in extenso, would merit applicability of
the Maternity Benefit Act even to "students" such as the petitioner. In
so holding, I am also persuaded by the fact that the Maternity Benefit
Act, being in the nature of a piece of social welfare legislation, the
reach and sweep thereof has to be as expansive as possible, rather than
limited by any pedantic considerations of word or phrase.
33. The Preamble of the Maternity Benefit Act itself states that "it
is an Act to regulate the employment of women in certain
establishments for certain periods before and after childbirth and to
provide for maternity benefit and certain other benefits." The
Memorandum, dated 4th December, 2015 (supra), while referring to
the selection, of the petitioner "as a student for admission to
DM/M.Ch. Course", goes on to set out the leave to which the
petitioner would be entitled, the payment (₹ 18,750 + ₹ 6600 Grade
Pay + NPA and usual allowance as admissible under the rules,
equivalent to the post of Senior Resident), to which the petitioner
would be entitled during the tenure of her DM course, her entitlement
to Book Allowance of ₹ 3000/-per year, her entitlement to LTC,
applicability, to the petitioner, of "the code of conduct rules", vesting,
in the Director of the AIIMS, of "all powers relating to discipline and
disciplinary action", qua the petitioner and, perhaps most importantly,
the offering, to the petitioner, of "a temporary post of Senior Resident
(Academic), consequent to his/her admission to the above-mentioned
course", which has its own terms and conditions, of which Clauses 1,
2, 3 and 9 may be reproduced thus:
"1. Private practice of any kind, whatsoever, is
prohibited.
2. The tenure of the post/course is for a period of
three years and co-terminus with the DM/M.Ch Course.
3. He/she will be on probation/trial for one year.
During period his/her services are liable to be terminated
by the Institute at any time without assigning any reasons.
In case he/she resigns from service during trial period, he
will have to give one month's pay in lieu thereof. After
the completion of probationary period any extension the
terms of appointment, the services can be terminated by a
month's notice by either side. The appointing authority
however reserves the right to terminate the services of the
appointee forthwith or before the expiry of the stipulated
period of notice by making payments to him of a sum
equivalent of the pay & allowances for the period of
notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
9. Other conditions of service such as benefits of
pension provident funds etc. will be as are provided under
the regulations of the Institute and/or may be provided
therein in future. In case he/she will be governed by the
rules as applicable to student registered for similar
courses at the Institute."
34. In view of the above-mentioned covenants, figuring in the
Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015 (supra), whereby the
petitioner was admitted as a student to the DM course, I am of the
view that the petitioner cannot be excluded from the benefits available
under the Maternity Benefit Act.
35. Having said that, however, it remains to be seen whether, in
postponing the final examination of the DM course, to which the
petitioner was admitted, by one session, the AIIMS infracted, in any
manner, the provisions of the said Act. Mr. Dubey has, in this
connection, relied on Section 27 of the Maternity Benefit Act, and
juxtaposed the said provision with Sections 5 and 12 thereof. It may
be appropriate to address these provisions, seriatim.
36. Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act reads thus:
"5. Right to payment of maternity benefits
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every woman
shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for,
the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of the average
daily wage for the period of her actual absence, that is to
say, the period immediately preceding the day of her
delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period
immediately following that day.
Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section, the
average daily wage means the average of the woman's
wages payable to her for the days on which she has
worked during the period of three calendar months
immediately preceding the date from which she absents
herself on account of maternity, the minimum rate of
wage fixed or revised under the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 (11 of 1948) or ten rupees, whichever is the highest.
(2) No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit
unless she has actually worked in an establishment of the
employer from whom she claims maternity benefit, for a
period of not less than eighty days in the twelve months
immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery:
PROVIDED that the qualifying period of eighty days
aforesaid shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated
into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of
the immigration.
Explanation: For the purpose of calculating under this
sub-section the days on which a woman has actually
worked in the establishment, the days for which she has
been laid off or was on holidays declared under any law
for the time being in force to be holidays with wages
during the period of twelve months immediately
preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken
into account.
(3) The maximum period for which any woman shall
be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks of
which not more than six weeks shall precede the date of
her expected delivery:
PROVIDED that where a woman dies during this period,
the maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days
up to and including the day of her death:
PROVIDED FURTHER that where a woman, having
been delivered of a child, dies during her delivery or
during the period immediately following the date of her
delivery for which she is entitled for the maternity
benefit, leaving behind in either case the child, the
employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for that
entire period but if the child also dies during the said
period, then, for the days up to and including the date of
the death of the child."
37. Quite clearly, Section 5 of the said Act deals with the right to
payment of maternity benefits, and with the wages, to which a woman
employee, availing maternity leave, would be entitled. The said
provision would not, in any way, stand infracted by the clause in the
communication dated 4th December, 2015, which permitted
postponement of the examination by one term in the case of extension
of leave beyond the number of days prescribed in the said clause,
which had nothing to do with the wages to which the petitioner would
be entitled for the period of her maternity leave.
38. Coming, now, to Section 12 of the Maternity Benefit Act, which
was pressed into service, by Mr. Dubey, with somewhat greater
emphasis than was accorded to Section 5 thereof, the said provision
reads as under:
"12. Dismissal during absence of pregnancy -
(1) When a woman absents herself from work in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, it shall be
unlawful for her employer to discharge or dismiss her
during or on account of such absence or to give notice of
discharge or dismissal on such a day that the notice will
expire during such absence, or to vary to her
disadvantage any of the conditions of her service.
(2)(a) The discharge or dismissal of a woman at any time
during her pregnancy, if the woman but for such
discharge or dismissal would have been entitled to
maternity benefit or medical bonus referred to in section
8, shall not have the effect of depriving her of the
maternity benefit or medical bonus: Provided that where
the dismissal is for any prescribed gross misconduct, the
employer may, by order in writing communicated to the
woman, deprive her of the maternity benefit or medical
bonus or both.
(b) Any woman deprived of maternity benefit or
medical bonus, or both, or discharged or dismissed during
or on account of her absence from work in accordance
with the provisions of this Act, may, within sixty days
from the date on which order of such deprivation or
discharge or dismissal is communicated to her, appeal to
such authority as may be prescribed, and the decision of
that authority on such appeal, whether the woman should
or should not be deprived of maternity benefit or medical
bonus, or both, or discharged or dismissed shall be final.
(c) Nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect
the provisions contained in sub-section (1)."
(Emphasis supplied)
39. Mr. Dubey seeks to rely on Section 12 of the Maternity Benefit
Act by contending that the clause, in the Memorandum dated 4 th
December, 2015 (supra), or, consequently, in the letter, dated 18th
April, 2016 (whereby maternity leave was granted to the petitioner),
permitting postponement of the examination by one session, would
infract sub-Section (1) thereof, as it would, "vary to the disadvantage",
of the petitioner, "the conditions of her service". Quite frankly, I am
unable to appreciate this submission. I do not see how the
postponement, of the final examination of the petitioner, from
December, 2018 to May 2019, amounts to a "variance in the condition
of service" of the petitioner. Rather, the contention, of the AIIMS, is
that it was, by incorporating the said condition, only enforcing the
clause, in the letter dated 4th December, 2015, whereby the petitioner's
session could be extended by one term in the event of availing of
leave, by her, over and above the period stipulated in the said clause.
40. The submission of Mr. Dubey that the said clause amounted to a
variation of the condition of the services of the petitioner also, does
not, therefore, commend acceptance.
41. In view of my findings, hereinabove, regarding the applicability
of Sections 5 and 12 of the Maternity Benefit Act, to the facts of the
present case, the applicability of Section 27, thereto, would also, ipso
facto, stand ruled out. Section 27 of the Maternity Benefit Act reads
thus:
"27. Effect of laws and agreements inconsistent with
this Act.
(1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law or in the terms of any award,
agreement or contract of service, whether made before or
after the coming into force of this Act:
Provided that where under any such award, agreement,
contract of service or otherwise, a woman is entitled to
benefits in respect of any matter which are more
favourable to her than those to which she would be
entitled under this Act, the woman shall continue to be
entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that
matter, notwithstanding that she is entitled to receive
benefits in respect of other matters under this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to
preclude a woman from entering into an agreement with
her employer for granting her rights or privileges in
respect of any matter which are more favourable to her
than those to which she would be entitled under this Act."
42. Mr. Dubey relies on the first part of Section 27(1) (supra),
which accords the provision of Maternity Benefit Act overriding pre-
eminence over anything inconsistent contained in any other law or any
award or contract in service. His submission is that the clause, in the
communication dated 4th December, 2015, whereby the petitioner was
admitted to the DM course, stipulating that leave, if extended beyond
the permissible limits mentioned in the said clause, i.e. 24 days in the
first year, 30 days in the second year and 36 days in the third year,
would result in postponement of the examination by one session, if
extended to maternity leave, would infract Section 5 and 12 of the
Maternity Benefits Act. Section 27 would, in such circumstances, Mr.
Dubey would seek to contend, kick in with full force, and would
operate in favour of the petitioner irrespective of the aforementioned
clause contained in the communication dated 4 th December, 2015
(supra).
43. I have already held that the clause, in the Memorandum, dated
4th December, 2015 (supra), or the stipulation, in the letter, dated 18th
April, 2016, whereby the petitioner was granted maternity leave, to the
effect that grant of such leave would result in the postponement, of the
petitioner's final examination, by one session, does not violate either
Section 5 or Section 12 of the Maternity Benefit Act. Per corollary, the
applicability of Section 27 of the said Act would also stand ruled out.
44. The reliance, by Mr. Dubey, on the Maternity Benefit Act has,
therefore, necessarily to be characterised as misplaced.
The "extension" clause in the Memorandum dated 4th December,
2015:
45. Adverting, now, to the clause, in the Memorandum dated 4 th
December, 2015, permitting postponement of the examination of the
petitioner (hereinafter referred to, for the sake of convenience, as "the
extension clause"), one finds that the clause is somewhat peculiarly
worded. It first stipulates that the petitioner was entitled to 90 days
leave during three years, with her entitlement, for the first, second and
third year being 24 days, 30 days and 36 days, respectively. It then
goes on to talk of "extension of leave in a year", and ordains that, "if
leave is extended in a year", then "the extended period is treated as
Extra Ordinary Leave without pay and the registration period is also
extended by postponing the Exam for one session".
46. Three questions come to mind, when one reads this clause, viz.
(i) What does the clause mean?
(ii) Was this clause meant to apply, at all, to the availing of
maternity leave?
(iii) Is this clause enforceable at law?
47. I proceed, therefore, to examine the three issues, enumerated in
para 46 (supra), which arise from a reading of the extension clause as
contained in the Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, seriatim.
What does the "extension clause" mean?
48. A reading of the extension clause makes it immediately
apparent that it does not postulate that availment of leave in excess of
the periods stipulated therein would result in extension of the
registration period by postponement of the examination. What it
postulates, instead, is that extension of leave, beyond the said
stipulated periods, would result in such extension of registration
period and postponement of examination.
49. In my opinion, it would be folly to confuse the concept of
availment of leave in excess of the periods stipulated in the extension
clause, with extension of leave beyond the periods stipulated in the
extension clause. These are two different concepts.
50. The concept of "extension", when applied for leave as
ordinarily understood, connotes carrying the leave beyond the period
for which it was originally granted. An "extension", etymologically
speaking, can only be to something which already exists, and cannot
itself exist in vacuo. "Extension of leave", therefore, would
presuppose grant of leave, already existing, in the first place. It is only
when leave, already granted, is extended, that "extension of leave"
could be said to have taken place.
51. P. Ramanatha Aiyar, in his classic tome the "Advanced Law
Lexicon" defines "extension" as "the act of extending or stretching
out; enlargement in any direction, in length, breadth circumference,
the continuance of an existing thing". In Provash Chandra Dalui v.
Biswanath Banerjee, AIR 1989 SC 1834, the Supreme Court held
that, in connection with a lease, "the word 'extension' when used in its
proper and usual sense... means a prolongation of the lease." In
Hamiduddin Saladhuddin v. State of U.P., 2006 (1) All LJ 717, it
was held, by the High Court of Allahabad, that "the term 'extension'
means enlargements, expansion, lengthen, prolong etc., which is
permissible only where an incumbent is already in service, but after he
has ceased to be the holder of the post and is not in service, he cannot
claim 'extension'". For leave to be 'extended', therefore, leave must
exist in the first place. It is only, therefore, where existing leave is
extended beyond the periods stipulated in the extension clause in the
Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, that the adverse
consequences (if they may be so termed), conceptualised by the said
clause, would become applicable.
52. The applicability of this clause, therefore, is dependent on the
candidate/student concerned extending leave, sought by her/him,
beyond the period of 24 days, if in the first year, 30 days if in the
second year and 36 days if in the third year. Interpreted in its plain
and common-sense meaning, this clause would admit application only
where a candidate avails of leave within the stipulated period of 24
days in the first year, 30 days in the second year or 36 days in the third
year, and proceeds to extend such leave. In such an eventuality, the
clause ordains that the period for which the leave is extended, beyond
the period of 24, or 30, or 36, days, depending on the year in which
the leave is availed, would be treated as Extra Ordinary Leave, and
would result in extension, of the registration period, by postponement
of the examination by one session.
53. In the present case, the petitioner never having sought any
extension of the leave granted to her, at any point of time, and the
leave sanctioned to the petitioner never, in fact, having been extended
at any point of time, the extension clause, as contained in the
Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, ex facie would not apply.
Is the "extension clause" at all applicable in the case of availment of
maternity leave?
54. The answer to this poser would become apparent if one were to
consider the consequence which would ensue, were the extension
clause to be applied to candidates who availed maternity leave during
the currency of their DM course - such as the petitioner.
55. Maternity leave, by its very definition, can never be of 24, or
30, or 36 days' duration. Assuming, therefore, that the extension
clauses were, as the AIIMS would prefer, to be interpreted as applying
even to availment of leave in excess of the periods stipulated therein,
any, and every, student, who availed maternity leave during the
currency of her DM course, would be hit by it. One would, therefore,
be reading, into the Memorandum dated 4 th December, 2015, an
additional clause, to the effect that, if the petitioner were to avail
maternity leave, her examination would be postponed by one session.
If the Memorandum desired to so postulate, it could have done so in
plain words, and, it not having chosen to so do, it becomes extremely
questionable whether the extension clause, which does not expressly
so state, could be extrapolated to such an extent.
56. The incongruity of the situation is underscored if one takes, into
account, the reality that a candidate applies for a DM course only after
having already obtained her MBBS and MD qualifications and that,
therefore, in the case of women candidates who secure admission to
the DM course, the chance of the candidate seeking maternity leave is
a live possibility, to which the framers of the Prospectus, or even the
AIIMS itself, could not be regarded as having been blind. In my view,
it would be unreasonable to interpret the clause as postponing the final
examination of the course being undertaken by the candidate, in every
case where the candidate sought maternity leave during the tenure of
the course, especially where no such express stipulation is to be found
therein.
57. Indeed, given our avowed constitutional goals, if a clause,
stipulating that availment of maternity leave, by a DM candidate,
would necessarily result in delay in awarding of the DM qualification
to the candidate, by 6 months, were to be enforced, such enforcement
might be perilously pregnable to challenge, as violating Article 42 of
the Constitution of India. This aspect would be examined in greater
detail hereinafter; however, even at this point, the court expresses its
disinclination to accord, to the extension clause, any such
interpretation, as would permit it to be operated to the prejudice of the
petitioner, in a manner which would infract Part IV of the Constitution
of India.
58. In my opinion, therefore, the extension clause, as contained in
the Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, could never have been
intended to cover all cases of DM students who sought to avail
maternity leave during the currency of their DM course.
59. In this context, it is worthwhile to note the submission, of Mr.
Dubey, premised on the distinction between Extra Ordinary Leave
(hereinafter referred to as "EOL") and "maternity leave", as contained
in the CCS (Leave) Rules. Mr. Dubey sought to contend that, as EOL
and maternity leave were fundamentally distinct concepts, for which
different, and distinct, dispensations were to be found in the CCS
(Leave) Rules, maternity leave could never be regarded as EOL. Mr.
Dubey, therefore, sought to submit that, even if the maternity leave
availed were to be in excess of the period of 24, or 30, or 36, days, as
stipulated in the extension clause, it could never be treated as EOL,
EOL and maternity leave being, as already noted, different and distinct
concepts. Proceeding from this premise, Mr. Dubey sought, however,
to draw a conclusion which, in my opinion, cannot follow, viz., that,
as maternity leave, sought and granted, could never be regarded as
EOL, the question of postponement of the examination by one session
could also not arise.
60. The submission, as thus advanced by Mr. Dubey, is inherently
flawed, proceeding, as it does, on the fallacious premise that the
extension of the registration period, as postulated by the extension
clause in the Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, was conditional
upon the extended leave period being treated as EOL. A reading of the
extension clause discloses, however, that this is not so. The clause
postulates that, if leave is extended in a year (beyond the periods
stipulated in the earlier part of the clause), then two consequences
follow. The first consequence is that the extended period is treated as
EOL without pay. The second consequence is that the registration
period of the candidate is extended by postponing the examination for
one session. These consequences are independent of, and not
interdependent on, each other. As such, the issue of whether maternity
leave is, or is not, different from EOL and, therefore, whether, if the
extended period is attributable to maternity leave, and would be
permissible to be treated as EOL without pay, cannot decide, or
influence the decision on, the issue of whether the registration period
of the candidate was liable to be extended by postponing the
examination. The submission of Mr. Dubey that, as EOL and
maternity leave were conceptually and statutorily distinct
dispensations, the availment of maternity leave in excess of the
periods stipulated in the extension clause could never result in
extension of the registration period or postponement of the
examination, therefore, has necessarily to be rejected.
61. Though the conclusion that Mr. Dubey seeks to draw from the
jurisprudential distinction between EOL and maternity leave is,
therefore, unfounded, the distinction itself is not without significance.
Apples can never be equated with oranges, and Mr. Dubey is,
therefore, correct in his initial premise that "extra" maternity leave
could never be regarded - or treated - as EOL. The stipulation, in the
extension clause, to the effect that the "extended" period of leave
would be treated as EOL without pay, also, therefore, indicates that
the clause was never meant to cover cases of availment of maternity
leave.
If the extension clause were to be interpreted in the manner canvassed
by the AIIMS, would it be enforceable at law?
62. The answer to this question has necessarily to be in the
negative, for two reasons.
63. Firstly, as Mr. Dubey correctly points out, the Prospectus, on
the basis thereof the candidates, including the petitioner, applied for
enrolment in the DM course, did not contain any stipulation, to the
effect that, if leave, in excess of 24 days, was taken in the first year of
the course, it would result in postponement of the final examination to
be undertaken by the candidate. Mr. Garg, appearing for the AIIMS,
did seek to submit that there was, in fact, a pre-existing stipulation,
applicable to Senior Residents, whereby, in the event of the candidate
availing leave in excess of the period of 24 days in the first year (or,
for that matter, the maximum periods of leave stipulated for the
second or third years), the consequence would be postponement of the
date of final examination to be undertaken by the candidate. Despite
such an assertion, being made at the Bar, Mr. Garg was unable to
produce any Regulation, clause or other stipulation, to that effect. The
reliance, by Mr. Garg, on Clause 11 of the "Guidelines for Academic
Course, Awards and Operations at AIIMS" (extracted in para 26
supra), on its plain terms, applies to Junior Residents, and not to
Senior Residents. Pursuant to the opportunity granted, to him, for the
said purpose, to produce an equivalent clause covering Senior
Residents, Mr. Garg candidly confessed his inability to trace any such
clause, and limited himself to relying on Agenda Item No AC/117/8,
in the 117th Academic Meeting of the AIIMS, held on 20th November,
2018 (supra). As the italicised words, in the said Agenda Item (as
extracted in para 29 hereinabove) disclose, the reference, to the
entitlement of Senior Residents to a maximum of 24 days leave in the
first year, 30 days leave in the second year and 36 days leave in the
third year of their Course, and the attending stipulation, to the effect
that, in the event of extension of the leave beyond the said periods, the
extended leave would be treated as EOL without pay and would also
result in extension of the registration period, is only to be found in the
"information", provided the Academic Council by the representative
of the AIIMS. It is obvious that this "information" was incorrect, as
the Clause, in the Guidelines, to which Mr. Garg referred, applies only
to Junior Residents, and not to Senior Residents. Incorrect
information, as conveyed by the AIIMS to the Academic Council, can
hardly constitute a basis for the AIIMS to contest the case of the
petitioner. That apart, the "approval", accorded by the Academic
Council against the said Agenda Item, was for grant of paternity leave,
and not maternity leave. Needless to say, the petitioner is, for reasons
biological, least concerned with the availability of paternity leave.
Neither, consequently, is this court - at least in the present case.
64. Interestingly, and essentially as an aside, a reading of the
approval, granted by the Academic Council in the said Meeting,
against Agenda Item No. AC/117/8, indicates that it proceeds on the
premise of availment, by the concerned candidate, of paternity leave in
excess of the total period of 90 days. The distinction between
"availment" and "extension" of leave, apparently, never engaged the
attention of the Academic Council. The correctness of the position, as
placed before the Academic Council was, therefore, itself seriously
open to question. However, as this case does not concern itself with
paternity leave, nothing further is required to be said thereon.
65. The pre-eminence of the Prospectus, in delineating the
conditions subject which a person is admitted to a course, stands
underscored by a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through the
Chief Justice (as Hon'ble Dipak Misra, J., then was), in Varun Kumar
Agarwal v. U.O.I., (2011) 179 DLT 24 (interestingly, involving the
AIIMS itself), in the following words:
"14. Presently we shall refer to certain authorities in the
field that have dealt with sanctity of a prospectus or
brochure and the legal impact when it is changed in the
midstream. In Dr. M. Vannilav. Tamil Nadu Public
Services Commission, 2007 (3) CTC 69, a Division
Bench of the High Court of Madras has opined thus:
"19. The principle that the prospectus is binding on all
persons concerned has been laid by the Supreme Court
in Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh v. Sanjay
Gulati, (AIR 1983 SC 580 = 1983 (96) LW 172 S.N.).
Following the same, a Division Bench of this Court has
also observed in Rathnaswamy, Dr. A. v. Director of
Medical Education (1986 WLR 207) that the rules and
norms of the prospectus are to be strictly and solemnly
adhered to. The same view is also taken by another
Division Bench of this Court in Nithiyan P. and S.P.
Prasanna v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994 WLR 624). The
same principle is reiterated in the case of Dr. M. Ashiq
Nihmathullah v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, 2005
WLR 697. It is clear that the prospectus is a piece of
information and it is binding on the candidates as well as
on the State including the machinery appointed by it for
identifying the candidates for selection and admission."
[Underlining is ours]
15. In Indu Gupta v. Director Sports, Punjab, AIR
1999 P&H 319 (FB), the Full Bench in paragraphs 9, 10
and 11 has expressed thus:
"9. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Raj
Singh v. Maharshi Dayanand University, (1994) 4
Recent Services Judgments, 289 disapproved the
liberal construction of the terms and conditions of
the brochure and specified the need for their strict
adherence to avoid unnecessary prejudice to the
candidate or the authority during the course of
admission. The bench approved that the eligibility
for admission to a course has to be seen according
to the prospectus issued before the entrance test
examination and that the admission has to be made
on the basis of the instructions given in the
prospectus having the force of law. While
disapproving the law laid down by a Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Madhvika
Khurana (minor) v. M.D. University Civil Writ
Petition No. 15367 of 1991, where contrary view
had been taken, the Full Bench observed that the
students seeking admission to the professional
colleges are even otherwise matured enough and
supposed to understand the full implication of
filling the admission form and compliance with the
instructions contained in the brochure.
10. Subsequently, another Full Bench of this Court in
the case of Rahul Prabhakar v. Punjab Technical
University, Jalandhar, 1997 (3) RSJ 475: (AIR 1998
Punj. & Har. 18) recapitulated the entire law on the
subject. The Full Bench was considering the same
brochure for the previous year of the Punjab Technical
University. The Court held as under:-
"A Full Bench of this Court in Amardeep Singh
Sahota v. State of Punjab, (1993) 4 Serv LR 673
had to consider the scope and binding force of the
provisions contained in the prospectus. The Bench
took the view that the prospectus issued for
admission to a course, has the force of law and it
was not open to alteration. In Raj
Singh v. Maharshi Dayanand University, 1994 (4)
R.S.J. 289 another Full Bench of this Court took
the view that a candidate will have to be taken to
be bound by the information supplied in the
admission form and cannot be allowed to take a
stand that suits him at a given time. The Full Bench
approved the view expressed in earlier Full Bench
that eligibility for admission to a course has to be
seen according to the prospectus issued before the
Entrance Examination and that the admission has
to be made on the basis of instructions given in the
prospectus, having the force of law. Again Full
Bench of this Court in Sachin Gaur v. Punjab
University, 1996 (1) RSJ 1: (AIR 1996 Punj. &
Har. 109) took the view that there has to be a cut
off date provided for admission and the same
cannot be changed afterwards. These views
expressed by earlier Full Benches have been
followed in CWP No. 6756 of 1996 by the three of
us constituting another Full Bench. Thus, it is
settled law that the provisions contained in the
information brochure for the Common Entrance
Test 1997 have the force of law and have to be
strictly complied with. No modification can be
made by the court in exercise of powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whenever
a notification calling for applications, fixes date
and time within which applications are to be
received whether sent through post or by any other
mode that time schedule has to be complied with in
letter and spirit. If the application has not reached
the coordinator or the competent authority as the
case may be the same cannot be considered as
having been filed in terms of the provisions
contained in the prospectus or Information
Brochure. Applications filed in violation of the
terms of the brochure have only to be rejected."
11. The cumulative effect of the above well enunciated
principles of law, is that the terms and conditions of the
brochure where they used preemptory language cannot be
held to be merely declaratory. They have to be and must
necessarily to be treated as mandatory. Their compliance
would be essential otherwise the basic principle of
fairness in such highly competitive entrance examinations
would stand frustrated. Vesting of discretion in an
individual in such matters, to waive or dilute the
stipulated conditions of the brochure would per se
introduce the element of discrimination, arbitrariness and
unfairness. Such unrestricted discretion in contravention
to the terms of the brochure would decimate the very
intent behind the terms and conditions of the brochure,
more particularly, where the cut off date itself has been
provided in the brochure. The brochure has the force of
law. Submission of applications complete in all respects
is a sine qua non to the valid acceptance and
consideration of an application for allotment of seats in
accordance with the terms prescribed in the brochure.
[Emphasis added]
16. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to
highlight that the conditions stipulated in the prospectus
are guidelines for all concerned and everyone is required
to follow the same in letter and spirit and not act in
transgression. The hopes and aspirations of the students,
who came within the zone of merit, cannot be scuttled by
changing the prospectus by way of introducing a
corrigendum. A change in the conditions of the
prospectus can be conceived of and allowed if such
power is specifically reserved while making the
prospectus public as in that case, no one can think of
having a right. In that event, the same could be capable of
change. In the case at hand, in the absence of a power
reserved in the prospectus, in our considered opinion, the
same could not have been altered by way of corrigendum.
It is interesting to note that by issuing a corrigendum, the
scenario of results changed because further results were
published and more candidates were called. This,
according to us, is nothing but an accommodation. The
AIIMS may have been conferred the privilege of
institutional preference, but that would not enable AIIMS
to change the prospectus in the manner it has been done.
Thus, the action of the AIIMS on this score is vitiated and
despite the laboured attempt by the learned counsel for
the AIIMS, we cannot give the stamp of approval to the
action of the institution."
66. That, in the matter of admission to an educational institution,
the terms and conditions of the prospectus by the institution of the
candidate, no departure therefrom is permissible may, therefore, be
justifiably regarded as a position, in law, that is no longer res integra.
67. Mr. Dubey points out that the Prospectus, governing the DM
course, in the various super specialities in which the said course was
administered by the AIIMS, did not contain any clause permitting
postponement of the examination of the candidate, on the candidate
availing leave in excess of the periods stipulated for each year of the
course. A reading of the Prospectus reveals that this is, indeed, so.
The consequence, inevitably, would be that the AIIMS would be
foreclosed from postponing the final examination of the petitioner,
solely on the ground of her having availed maternity leave. The
extension clause, in the letter dated 4th December, 2015, on which Mr.
Garg places reliance, may not be susceptible to such an interpretation;
even if it were, it could not be so enforced, in the absence of any such
stipulation finding place in the Prospectus, on the basis whereof
applications were invited, by candidates, for the DM course which, in
view of the law laid down in the judgments relied upon, by this Court,
in Varun Kumar Agarwal (supra), as well as in the said decision
itself, was inviolable and sacrosanct.
68. The second reason, for the non-enforceability of the extension
clause in the manner in which the AIIMS would seek to enforce it, is
relatable to Article 42 of the Constitution of India, on which, too, Mr.
Dubey rightly relies. "Maternity relief" is a sanctified constitutional
goal, fossilized, as it were, in Article 42, which requires the State to
provide "for just and humane conditions of work and maternity
relief." Mr. Dubey is, therefore, correct in his submission, that
extending the aforementioned clause, in the letter, dated 4th December,
2015, to cover cases where maternity leave is sought by the candidate,
would fall foul of Article 42 of the Constitution of India, and can,
therefore, never be permitted. The AIIMS has all the trappings of a
public authority - indeed, of "State" - and is, therefore, bound by the
principles and precepts enshrined in Parts III and IV of the
Constitution of India. It would be impermissible, therefore, for the
AIIMS to include, in the order of appointment, a clause which
effectively penalises a student, who avails maternity leave, for having
done so, by extending the period of the course to be undertaken by the
student by any length of time. Such an interpretation, if accorded,
would render the said Clause violative of Article 42 of the
Constitution of India and, even for that reason, unenforceable.
69. The ability of woman to create, nurture, and sustain, life, is
celestially unique, and, even in the most conservative and puritanical
of cultures, commands reverence and respect. The protection and
preservation of this ability is central to the most basic human rights
which govern existence, and any dispensation, customary or in statute,
which derogates therefrom, is constitutional anathema. Adverse
consequences can never be allowed to visit any woman, solely by
virtue of the fact that she availed maternity leave, perhaps in excess of
the maximum leave admissible - provided, of course, the maternity
leave was necessary and required for health of mother and child. In
the present case, especially, as I have already held that the "extension
clause", in the Memorandum dated 4th December, 2015, is not
susceptible of any such interpretation, the decision, of the AIIMS, to
postpone the final examination of the petitioner, solely for the reason
that the maternity leave availed by her exceeded the periods of
24/30/36 days, stipulated in the said clause, cannot, consequently,
sustain, and has necessarily to be set aside.
The question of delay/laches
70. Delay and laches, it is trite, are not inevitably fatal to a writ
petition, Article 226 of the Constitution of India not being hedged in
by any period of limitation. Even on facts, I am of the opinion that the
petitioner, in the present case, cannot be non-suited on the ground of
delay and laches. Delay in approaching this Court, by the petitioner,
cannot be computed from the 4th December, 2015, i.e. the date of the
Memorandum admitting her to the course, for the simple reason that,
on that date, no cause of action had occurred, as would compel the
petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. That apart, the
"extension clause", contained in the said Memorandum, was, as has
already been observed by me hereinabove, ambiguous at best, so that
it cannot be said that the petitioner ought, by the said clause, to have
been forwarn of the consequences, were she to become pregnant
during the currency of her DM course. The cause of action, if any,
arose on 18th April, 2016, when the AIIMS included, in the letter
granting maternity leave to the petitioner, the stipulation that her final
examination would stand postponed to May 2019. The fact that the
petitioner availed maternity leave, as granted by the said letter, can
hardly be held against her as, given the situation in which she was
placed, she could not very well be expected to adopt a militant stance
and refuse to avail maternity leave. The petitioner has approached this
Court, invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, on 17th August, 2018 i.e. within about two years of the
issuance of the said letter. I am of the opinion that, in these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is guilty of any such
unconscionable delay as would disentitle her to maintain the writ
petition.
71. The submission, of Mr. Garg, that the writ petition deserves to
be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, is, therefore, rejected.
A cautionary caveat
72. Before parting ways with this litigation, I deem it appropriate to
enter an important cautionary caveat. I have limited my consideration,
and decision, to the issue of whether, by virtue of the fact that the
maternity leave availed by the petitioner exceeded the periods
stipulated in the extension clause contained in the Memorandum dated
4th December, 2015, or, for that matter, in Clause 7 of the Prospectus,
insofar as it dealt with the terms and conditions applicable to DM
candidates, the final examination of the DM course undertaken by the
petitioner could be postponed by one session, from December, 2018 to
May, 2019. The question, in my view, has necessarily to be answered
in the negative, and in favour of the petitioner, and I have so held
above.
73. The prayer in the writ petition is not, however, to quash the said
stipulation, or to hold that the final examination of the petitioner could
not be postponed by reason of her having availed maternity leave, but
to issue a mandamus to the AIIMS to allow the petitioner to undertake
the DM examination in December, 2018. The facts on record do not
enable me to issue any such unqualified and absolute mandamus. All
that can be held is, therefore, that the petitioner's right to undertake
the final DM examination in December, 2018, would not be defeated
by reason of the maternity leave availed by her, or the duration
thereof. Her right to participate in the said examination would,
however, necessarily be subject to the petitioner fulfilling all other
requirements or pre-conditions required to be fulfilled to enable her to
do so.
74. While entering this caveat, I may add that the AIIMS is not
expected to use it as a means to deny the petitioner the right to
undertake the examination in December 2018, if, but for the maternity
leave availed by her, she fulfils all necessary requirements in that
regard. In case there is no other impediment in the petitioner's way,
her right to undertake the final DM examination in December, 2018,
would, it is clarified, stand confirmed. In that event, the grant of the
DM qualification would abide by the result of the final examination
undertaken by the petitioner, in December, 2018, pursuant to the
interim order, dated 30th November, 2018, passed by this Court in
these proceedings.
Conclusion
75. The writ petition stands allowed, to the above extent and in the
above terms.
76. There shall be no order as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J
FEBRUARY 01, 2019
HJ
