Delhi High Court
Bharti Sharma vs The Managment Of Rukmani Devi ... on 18 February, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Reserved on: 05th February , 2019
Pronounced on: 18th February, 2019
LPA 199/2018 & CM APPL. 14304/2018
BHARTI SHARMA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Parvinder Chauhan and Mr. Nitin
Jain, Advocates.
versus
THE MANAGMENT OF RUKMANI DEVI JAIPURIA PUBLIC SCHOOL
& ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Dr. M. Y. Khan, Advocate for R-1.
Mr. Santosh Kumar Sahani, Vice
Principal Zone-7, District North,
Directorate of Education.
Mr. V. Balaji, Panel Counsel with
Ms. Sripradha Krishan, Advocate for
R-2.
WITH
+ LPA 210/2018 & CM APPLs. 15103/2018 & 15104/2018
DINESH CHAND .... Appellant
Through: Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Advocate with
Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Advocate.
versus
THE MANAGEMENT OF RUKMANI DEVI JAIPURIA PUBLIC
SCHOOL & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Dr. M. Y. Khan, Advocate for R-1.
Mr. Santosh Kumar Sahani, Vice
Principal Zone-7, District North,
Directorate of Education.
LPA 199/2018 & connected matters Page 1 of 19
Mr. Avnish Ahlawat, Standing
Counsel GNCTD with Mr. Nitesh
Kumar Singh, Advocate for R-2.
AND
+ LPA 214/2018 & CM APPLs. 15381/2018 & 15382/2018
SADHNA PAYAL ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Advocate with
Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Advocate.
versus
THE MANAGEMENT OF RUKMANI DEVI JAIPURIA PUBLIC
SCHOOL & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Dr. M. Y. Khan, Advocate for R-1.
Mr. Santosh Kumar Sahani, Vice
Principal Zone-7, District North,
Directorate of Education.
Mr. V. Balaji, Panel Counsel with
Ms. Sripradha Krishan, Advocate for
R-2.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J
1. The present appeals arising under Clause X of the Letters Patent Appeal
are directed against the common impugned judgment dated 5th March 2018
whereby the WP(C) nos. 6155/2016, 6156/2016 and 6513/2016 have been
dismissed.
2. While dismissing the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge has upheld
the order of the Delhi School Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as „DST‟)
passed in favor of the Appellants. However, at the same time, learned
Single Judge has granted liberty to the Respondent-School to conduct de
novo inquiry against the Appellants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. Since the facts in all the three writ petitions were quite similar and the
orders impugned were challenged on more or less identical grounds, the
petitions were heard together and decided by a common judgment passed by
the learned Single Judge. The present appeals likewise, challenge the
impugned judgment mostly on identical grounds and hence, the same are
being decided by a common judgment. However, for the sake of clarity, the
essential facts of one of the appeals being LPA No. 199/2018 are being
noted separately.
LPA No. 199/2018
4. The Appellant was appointed as Assistant Teacher with Respondent
School on 15th July 1994. On the introduction of the 5th Pay Commission,
the Schools of Govt. of NCT of Delhi implemented the pay revision w.e.f.
1st January 1996. The Management of the Respondent-School however
implemented the pay revision in lieu of 5th Pay Commission belatedly w.e.f
1st April 1997 as against 1st January 1996. The Appellant and some other
teachers filed writ petitions seeking its implementation from the cut-off date
of 1st January 1996. The said petition WP(C) No. 19668/2005 and
5046/1999 were decided in favour of the Appellant and other employees by
this court vide judgment dated 11th January 2010. The said judgment was
later upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 286/2010 and
308/2010 vide judgment dated 11th May 2012.
5. Despite the orders of this Court, the Respondent-School failed to grant the
Appellant and the other employees the benefit of the 5th Pay Commission,
constraining the Appellant to file a contempt petition no. 630/2012.
6. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, apparently the
management of the Respondent-School attempted to arrive at a settlement
with its employees. Appellant did not accept the said terms. Thereafter,
Appellant was served with a memo dated 31st October 2011 wherein
allegations were made against her to the effect that she had tampered with
her service book. The memo was refuted by the Appellant along with a
request to the Respondent-School to provide her with the copies of the
alleged tampered service book. The request was turned down by the
Respondent.
7. On 7th March 2012, Respondent-School issued a charge sheet and
informed the Appellant that a disciplinary committee in its meeting held on
28th February 2012 has resolved to initiate disciplinary action against her.
This charge sheet was also duly replied to by the Appellant denying the
allegations and charges made against her.
8. The inquiry conducted against the Appellant ultimately culminated into
the inquiry report dated 13th March 2013. The Appellant submitted its
response/representation on the inquiry report and on its consideration, the
Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 8th April 2013, inflicted upon the
Appellant, a major penalty of punishment of „removal from service‟.
LPA Nos. 210/2018 and 214/2018
9. Likewise, in LPA Nos. 210/2018 and 214/2018, the Appellants Dinesh
Chand Sharma and Sadhna Payal were appointed as Physical Training
Instructor and Assistant Teacher respectively with the Respondent School
and a similar charge-sheet was issued against them inter-alia alleging
tampering of service book, neglecting of duties etc. The said charge sheet
resulted in enquiry proceedings and subsequent order of compulsory
retirement was passed against both the Appellants.
10. The aforesaid orders were impugned by each of the Appellant before the
Delhi School Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the orders holding that the
findings of the Inquiry Officer were without any evidence and perverse. At
the same time, it was held that the inquiry proceedings against the
Appellants were illegal and arbitrary on the ground that Principal of the
Respondent-School had appeared as a witness in the inquiry proceedings
against the Appellant and also participated as a member in the meeting of
Disciplinary Committee; no nominee of Directorate of Education was
present in the Disciplinary Committee; no teachers‟ representative was
included in the Disciplinary Committee; relevant documents were not
provided to the Appellant despite a specific request in this regard.
11. In view of the above noted findings, while setting aside the order of
removal, the Tribunal directed that Appellant be reinstated with immediate
effect with full wages and consequential benefits. With respect to the extent
of back wages, it was directed that Appellant should make an exhaustive
representation to the Respondents under Rule 121 of Delhi School
Education Act and Rules 1973, which was directed to be decided by the
Respondents within four weeks of making such representation. The order of
the Tribunal was assailed by Respondent No. 1 by way of writ petition no.
6155/2016. The same was decided by the learned Single Judge by way of
the judgment impugned in the present petition, wherein inter alia it was held
that the penalty inflicted was liable to be set aside.
12. Learned Single Judge upheld the order of the DST and dismissed the
petition while granting liberty to the School to conduct a de novo inquiry
against the Appellant within 16 weeks, failing which Respondents were
directed to reinstate the Appellant with back wages.
13. The order of the learned Single Judge is now impugned in the present
appeal.
14. Since there are minor differences in the articles of charges , for the sake
of clarity, the essential facts of each case are being noted:-
LPA No. Date of order Punishment Appointed at post Date of
of removal/ ordered appointment
compulsory
retirement
199/2018 08.04.2013 Removal from Assistant Teacher 15.7.1994
service
210/2018 30.07.2012 Compulsory Physical Training 16.7.1990
retirement Instructor
214/2018 30.07.2012 Compulsory Assistant Teacher 9.7.1980
retirement
promoted to TGT on
01.04.1984
promoted to PGT on
01.09.1994
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
15. Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant in LPA Nos. 210/2018 & 214/2018 and Mr. Parvinder Chauhan,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of Appellant in LPA No. 199/2018, at
the outset, drew the attention of the Court to the impugned judgment and
submitted that the learned Single Judge has upheld the order of DST. They
submitted that on account of the aforesaid finding of the learned Single
Judge, the only grievance of the Appellant is in respect of the liberty granted
to the Respondent-School to conduct de novo inquiry against the Appellants.
16. Elaborating on this submission, they submitted that the effect of the
impugned judgment, upholding the order of the DST, is that the findings
arrived at by the Tribunal have not been disturbed. They also submitted that
the DST had passed the order of reinstatement, setting aside the orders of
removal from service/compulsory retirement on the ground that the inquiry
conducted by the Disciplinary Committee did not find any material or
evidence to sustain the charges. Learned counsels further submitted that in
view of the aforesaid findings, it would cause serious prejudice to the
Appellants in case they are asked to face the enquiry all over again.
17. The learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2
SCC 308 and submitted that even though the learned Single Judge noted the
aforesaid judgment, he has not appreciated the same in the correct
perspective. In support of this contention, he referred to para 8 of the said
judgment, wherein the Supreme Court has held that while remanding the
matter to Disciplinary Authority or to the Inquiry Officer for fresh report,
the Court should also examine the question of prejudice likely to be caused
to the Charged Officer on account of a fresh inquiry.
18. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents
urged that the directions given by the learned Single Judge to conduct a
fresh inquiry, was proper in the facts of the present case. He submitted that
the learned Single Judge has passed such a direction on the ground that the
charges leveled against the Appellant were of a serious nature and the
penalty inflicted upon them was set aside on account of procedural
irregularities. He submitted that since the Court held that the inquiry was
deficient procedurally, the directions given by the Court remanding the
matter back to the authority for fresh inquiry was appropriate and the correct
course of action.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
19. We have given our due consideration to the rival submissions of the
parties.
20. In order to decide present appeals, we consider it necessary to examine
the findings of the Enquiry officer as noted by the DST. Before we venture
there, we would like to note that at the appellate stage, we would have
ordinarily refrained ourselves from doing so. However, the facts and
circumstances of the present case warrant such a scrutiny. This is primarily
for the reason that in the impugned judgment, we find no discussion at all on
this aspect. We therefore do not have the benefit of the analysis by the
learned Single Judge with respect to the findings of fact discussed by the
Tribunal. The legal effect of the Tribunal‟s observations, that there was no
evidence against the Appellants, is critical for deciding the present appeal.
This we say for the reason that this issue directly influences the reasoning
given in the impugned order for giving the liberty to the Respondents to
hold a fresh inquiry. We shall elaborate on this aspect a little later in this
judgment. The DST has passed separate orders on the respective appeals
filed by the Appellants. However, the conclusion arrived at by the DST that
the findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse, is common to all the orders.
The Tribunal has examined the entire evidence produced before the Inquiry
Officer and concluded that there was no evidence brought on record to
sustain the charges leveled against the Appellants.
21. In order to appreciate the evidence brought on record by the
Management to sustain the charges, we have juxtaposed the articles of
charges and the findings of the Inquiry Officer as noted by the DST and
noted the observations/findings of the Tribunal. The same are being
illustrated with the help of a table:
Appellant Articles of Charges Findings of DST
LPA Bharti Sharma 1. You have tampered with the 1. On Charge 1:
199/2018 official record (Service Book) on Adverse inference should be drawn
06.09.2011 by writing and pasting against the Respondent School because
certain remarks on page No. 12 of of non-production of page no. 13 of the
your service book. Hence you have service book and hence, no inference
violated Code of Conduct for with regard to making of any cutting,
Teachers, Rule 123 (a) (iv) and (b) addition, interpolation, over-writing or
(xv), Delhi School Education Act tampering the service book by the
and Rules, 1973. Appellant can be drawn. Thus,
Appellant has not tampered the service
book.
2. You have been neglecting your 2. On Charge 2:
duties and often reporting late for Respondent School has not produced
duty in the class. You are also ACRs of relevant years of the Appellant
lacking in honesty and integrity as on the file, which are most relevant
per review of your service record documents to decide the Article of
for the years i.e. 2008-2009, 20096- Charge no. 2. Thus, finding of the
2010 & 2010-2011. Despite Enquiry Officer qua Article of Charge
repealed counseling and no. 2, is without evidence and hence,
admonishment by the Principal of perverse.
the School from time to time, you
have not shown any improvement
in your conduct, misbehavior, and
discipline. You have, thus, clearly
violated Code of Conduct for
Teachers, Rule 123 (a) (i) and (c)
(i), DSEAR, 1973.
3. Final finding:
The impugned order dated 08.04.2013
is illegal and arbitrary hence the same
is set aside. Respondents are directed
to re-instate the Appellant with
immediate effect.
LPA Dinesh Chand 1. You have tampered with the 1. On Charge 1:
210/2018 Sharma official record (service book) on I have perused alleged page of the
06.09.2011 by writing & pasting service book. The Appellant has not
certain remarks on page no. 12 of made any cutting, addition,
your service book in violation of interpolation, over-writing in the service
Code of Conduct For Teachers, in book. The Appellant has only recorded
violation of Rule 123 (a)(iv) and his protest. According to the Appellant,
b(xv), Delhi School Education Act he had written remarks in presence of
and Rules, 1973, Dr. K.G. Rastogi, Manager of the
Respondent School. Dr. K.G. Rastogi
has not filed his affidavit denying this
fact on the judicial file. Thus, writing of
remarks does not amount to tampering
of service book.
2. You have been .neglecting your 2. On Charge 2&3:
duties, reporting late on duty often Respondent School has not produced
and in the class and lacking honesty ACRs of relevant years of the Appellant
and integrity as per review of your on the file, which are most relevant
service record for the years 2008- documents to decide the Article of
2009, 2009 - 2010 & 2010-2011. Charge no. 2&3. Thus, finding of the
Despite repeated counseling and Enquiry Officer qua Article of Charge
admonishments from time to time no. 2&3, is without evidence and hence,
by the Principal of the School. perverse.
3. You have not taken your duties
seriously and failed to overcome
your deficiencies in your
performance and conduct.; You
have, thus, clearly violated Code of
Conduct for Teachers Rule 123
(a)(i) and (c)(i), DSEAR, 1973.
3. Final finding:
The impugned order dated 30.07.2012
is illegal and arbitrary hence the same
is set aside. Respondents are directed
to re-instate the Appellant with
immediate effect.
LPA Sadhna Payal 1. You have tampered with the 1. On Charge 1&3:
214/2018 official record by writing certain Page no. 23&24 of service book are not
remarks on page nos. 23 & 24 of placed on the judicial file. Relevant
your service book, in violation of ACRs not produced. Thus, Articles of
Code of Conduct for Teachers i.e. Charge 1&3 are without evidence and
Rule 123(a)(iv) and (b)(xv), Delhi hence perverse.
School Education Act and Rules,
1973.
2. On 14.11.2011. at about 01.15 2. On Charge 2:
p.m. you went to the office of the Principal of Respondent School
Principal for inspection of your appeared and supported the case of
service book and entered into Management and Inquiry Officer relied
argument with him without any on his evidence to hold Article of
rhyme and reason and threatened Charge 2 as proved. It is proved that
the Management with dire Inquiry Officer was biased in favor of
consequences and also uttered the Respondent School.
following words;-
"SCHOOL WALON NE AGAR
MUJH PER KOI ACTION LIYA
TOH MEIN
SCHOOL KI EENT SE EENT
BAJA DOONGI".
3. You have been neglecting your 3. On Charge 1&3:
duties often, reporting late on duty, Page no. 23&24 of service book are not
lacking in initiative revealed in placed on the judicial file. Relevant
review of your service record for ACRs not produced. Thus, Articles of
the years 2008-2009, 2009-2010 Charge 1&3 are without evidence and
and 2010-2011. You are advised hence perverse.
and requested to improve your
behavior and conduct, on several
occasions by the Principal of the
School, but in vain. You have thus,
clearly violated Code of Conduct
for Teachers, Rule 123 (a)(i) and
(c)(i), DSEAR, 1973.
4. Final finding:
The impugned order dated 30.07.2012
is illegal and arbitrary hence the same
is set aside. Respondents are directed
to re-instate the Appellant with
immediate effect.
22. From the above, it conspicuously emerges that there was in fact no
material with the Management to sustain the articles of charges. The DST
has therefore rightly concluded that the findings of the Inquiry Officer are
perverse, as it is a case of "no evidence". The conclusion of the Inquiry
Officer therefore has been rightly set aside. The departmental inquiry is a
quasi-judicial procedure (Roop Singh Negi v Punjab National Bank,
(2009) 2 SCC 570). This means that the charges against an Officer must be
proved by consideration of the evidence brought before the Inquiry Officer.
The Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra) has also stressed that the
Inquiry Officer must give reasons for arriving at a finding of guilt against
the Charged Officer. The common charge against all the Appellants is that
of tampering of service book. In the case of LPA Nos. 199/2018 and
214/2018, it is indeed shocking to note that this charge was held to be
proved in spite of the fact that the document which was alleged to be
tampered was never produced before the Inquiry Officer. In LPA No.
210/2018, though the alleged tampered document was produced, however,
there was no cutting/addition/interpolation or over-writing in the book and
the remarks made therein were only recording his protest. Therefore, the
charge of tampering of service book could not under any stretch of
imagination be said to be proved. Similarly, the charge with respect to
neglecting of duties could not be established without the relevant ACRs
being produced before the Inquiry Officer.
23. The findings of the Inquiry Officer therefore are certainly and without
any doubt contradictory and irreconcilable. In absence of any evidence of
whatsoever kind in support of the conclusions arrived at by the Inquiry
Officer, his report was indeed perverse and it was a straightforward case of
"no evidence". It has been established through multiple decisions of the
Apex Court that the Court/Tribunal may interfere where the proceedings
held by a disciplinary authority have been conducted in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached
by the disciplinary authority is based on "no evidence". (BC Chaturvedi v
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, Narinder Mohan Arya v United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2006) 4 SCC 713). If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to
make it appropriate to the facts of each case (High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416). The facts of the case
thus warranted the Tribunal to interfere with the findings of the Disciplinary
Committee and it has rightly done so.
24. The learned Single Judge has examined the matter only from the stand
point of the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee and the procedural
irregularities in that regard. The learned Single Judge has held that the
Disciplinary Committee did not have the requisite Coram as neither nominee
of Directorate of Education nor teachers‟ representative was included in the
meeting of the Disciplinary Committee. The learned Single has further held
that the approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the
Appellants was to be given by the Disciplinary Committee which was not
properly constituted. The learned Single Judge thus concluded that the
initiation of the departmental inquiry was by improperly constituted
Disciplinary Committee and even the penalty inflicted did not have proper
approval of the Directorate of Education. Thus it has been held that the
above noted infirmities are sufficient to nullify the penalty.
25. While the above-noted aspects are correctly appreciated by the Learned
Single Judge, we however do not find any discussion with respect to the
findings of fact which form the bed rock of the decision of the Tribunal for
setting aside the order of removal from service and order of compulsory
retirement. No doubt, the Tribunal has also held that the Disciplinary
Committee was not properly constituted and consequently held the inquiry
to be vitiated. However, more pertinently, it was lack of evidence to sustain
the charges that prevailed upon the Tribunal to set aside the findings of the
Inquiry Officer holding it to be perverse.
26. The aforesaid findings of fact have been sustained in the writ petitions
and the learned Single Judge has upheld the order of the Tribunal. It is to
be noted that the order of the learned Single Judge has not been challenged
by way of cross objections or cross appeal by the Respondents. The only
conclusion from the above is that the order of the Tribunal and the judgment
of the learned Single Judge upholding the same remains unchallenged by the
Respondents and leads to the conclusion that the aforesaid findings prevail
and have attained finality. It has been held in the case of Biswajit Sukul v.
Deo Chand Sharma & Ors, (2018) 10 SCC 584 that in the absence of
appeal/cross-objections qua issues decided in favor of appellant, not having
been challenged by the respondent cannot be re-adjudicated by the Appellate
Court. Thus, we are not swayed with the contention of the Respondents
regarding the gravity of charges against the Appellants. The only question
that survives and merits consideration is that, whether the procedural
irregularities justified the liberty granted to the Respondents to hold the de
novo inquiry.
27. On this issue, the learned Single Judge has referred to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank (supra) and Appellants
also relied on the same. It would thus be apposite to note the relevant paras
of the said decision.
"8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases
where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either
procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to
remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the
same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the
present case. The matter could be remanded back to the
Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper
enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not
have been the only course open in a given situation. There may
be situations where because of a long time lag or such other
supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair,
harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or
fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what
the High Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court
has taken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed
under suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year
2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in
the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the
High Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the
intervening period the respondent superannuated on 30th
November, 2011. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack
and a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and
confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65
years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a
fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order
or even to the Appellate Authority would thus be very harsh
and would practically deny to the respondent any relief
whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High
Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any
evidence to show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank
on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent. The
discretion vested in the High Court in not remanding the
matter back was, therefore, properly exercised."
28. In the said case, the Supreme Court while summarizing the principle
regarding the scope of the judicial review in cases related to departmental
inquiry, has reiterated that in cases where the findings of Disciplinary
Authority are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, the writ Court
would be justified in examining the matter while exercising judicial review
and granting relief in appropriate cases. The relevant portion of the said
judgment reads as under:-
"7. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow
in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a
Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on
record. But it is equally true that in a case where the
Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported
by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable
person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified
if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in
appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with
disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the
competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was
vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural
justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case.
Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the
Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support
of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on
which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the
orders of punishment."
29. The dicta of the above judgment is that after setting aside the inquiry
report, the Court while deciding the question of remanding the matter to the
authorities, would also be required to examine the facts of the case, to
determine the appropriate course of action.
30. Where the inquiry is deficient procedurally, the proper course is to
remand the matter back to the concerned authority, but this course of action
does not have a universal application. There cannot be any straight jacket
formula for deciding this point at issue. Appellants have raised this precise
question before us. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
granting liberty to the Respondents for a de novo inquiry? Since, the learned
Single Judge has examined the matter only from one angle i.e. the
procedural irregularities in the Disciplinary Committee vis-à-vis initiation of
disciplinary proceedings and infliction of penalty, he lost sight of the fact
that the DST had also given a categorical finding on merits after carefully
and meticulously examining the evidence produced before the Inquiry
Officer. The observations of DST that the findings were perverse on the
ground of "no evidence" have escaped the attention of the learned Single
Judge.
31. The Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank (supra) has held that there can
be many situations and circumstances that can prevail in the Writ Court to
decline the permission to hold a fresh inquiry or fresh order by the
competent authority.
32. In the facts of the present case where the Respondents have no evidence
in hand, present case is one where the de novo inquiry is not warranted.
Besides, in this case, the Appellants were issued the charge sheet in 2012.
They have struggled for 7 years and faced the inquiry and proved that there
is no material in hands of the management to sustain the charge against
them. At this stage, ordering a fresh inquiry would be extremely harsh and
unfair to the Appellants and would be wholly inappropriate. We, therefore,
in the facts of the present case, set aside the impugned judgment in all the
Appeals only to the limited extent that the learned Single Judge has granted
liberty to the Respondents to conduct a de novo inquiry against the
Appellants.
33. Consequently, we uphold the order of the DST reinstating the Appellants
with back wages. The Respondents are directed to comply with the orders
of the Tribunal forthwith. Respondents shall also issue consequential orders
and ensure the appointment with the monetary/consequential benefits is
given to the Appellants within a period of one week from today. In the facts
of the present case, we also allow each of the Appellants a cost of Rs.
10,000/- which is directed to be paid by the Respondents within a period of
two weeks from today.
34. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. Pending applications are
disposed of.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
S. MURALIDHAR, J
FEBRUARY 18, 2019
ss
