Delhi High Court
Rajendra Prasad & Anr. vs Shyam Lal on 4 January, 2018
$~R-709
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 04th January, 2018
+ MAC APPEAL 11/2013
RAJENDRA PRASAD & ANR. ..... Appellant
Through: None
versus
SHYAM LAL ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
1. The first respondent (claimant) had instituted accident claim
case (suit no.249/2010) on 28.03.2007 seeking compensation for
injuries sustained and the permanent disability consequently suffered
by him in a motor vehicular accident that had occurred on 08.01.2007
due to negligent driving by the first appellant (driver) of a motor
vehicle described as a mail van bearing registration no.DL-1LP-1401
of the second appellant (owner).
2. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) held inquiry
and, by judgment dated 04.07.2012, awarded compensation in the total
sum of Rs.5,89,220/- in his favour directing the appellants to pay with
interest at 9% p.a., the said amount inclusive of Rs.4,08,220/- towards
medical expenditure, Rs.1,50,000/- towards loss of amenities of life
and pain and suffering, Rs.25,000/- towards conveyance and special
diet and Rs.6,000/- for loss of income.
3. It may be mentioned here that during the course of proceedings
before the tribunal, it was pleaded by the claimant that he was earning
his livelihood by working as an Umpire with Delhi District Cricket
Association (DDCA) at Firozshah Kotla Stadium, New Delhi at
monthly income of about Rs.8,000/-. He produced an income
certificate (Ex. PW1/3) issued by Honorary Secretary of the DDCA to
substantiate the said claim. During the course of contest, the
appellants also led evidence, inter alia, by examining Rajender Prasad
(RW1) to prove another income certificate (Ex. RW1/5) issued by
DDCA. It is on the basis of the said certificate (Ex. RW1/5) that it
was argued that the claimant had filed a false affidavit to the effect
that he had not been able to assume the work of Umpire / Scorer with
DDCA after the incident. The appellant filed an application under
Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking criminal
action to be initiated on the basis of such affidavit. The tribunal,
however, was not impressed. It rejected the application for criminal
action and accepted the claim for compensation granting the award
which result is impugned through the appeal at hand.
4. The appeal was admitted and put in the list of „regulars‟, to
come up on its own turn as per order dated 11.09.2015. When it is
called out on its own turn, there is no appearance on behalf of the
appellants.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent has been heard and, with
his assistance, the record has been perused. The plea taken in the
appeal that there is no independent eye witness to the accident leads
the appellants nowhere. The claimant had appeared as his own
witness (PW-1) to narrate the sequence of events leading to the
collision between the scooter driven by him and the mail van of the
appellant. Undoubtedly, the first appellant also appeared in the
witness box (as RW1) primarily to contend that there was no collision
between the two vehicles and reliance was also placed on the evidence
of another witness Pramod Kumar (RW2). Given the fact that the
tribunal has gone by the corroboration received from the record of the
corresponding criminal case, this court finds no good reason to disturb
the conclusions reached by the tribunal on the issue of involvement of
the vehicle of the appellants and negligence on the part of its driver.
6. The court has compared the two certificates, one produced by
the claimant (Ex. PW1/3) and, the other, (Ex. RW1/5) produced by the
appellants. The learned counsel for the claimant is correct in pointing
out that while the first certificate was issued on 05.05.2007, the second
certificate was issued on 27.02.2009. The language employed in both
the certificates is almost similar. It appears from both the certificates
that the issuing authority had opted to use general language
mentioning the period of engagement of the claimant with DDCA as a
scorer / umpire for about a decade. Obviously, the certificates are not
intended to spell out the exact period of such engagement, for the
reason, the period would not have remained "ten years" even in 2009
after a lapse of two years of the issuance of the first certificate in
2007. As is further seen from the document filed with the reply to the
application (CM 1754/2015), it being another letter dated 13.09.2013
issued by DDCA in response to a communication from the second
appellant that the engagement of the appellant with DDCA was not in
the nature of an employment, it was more of a periodical assistance
rendered as and when occasion would arise for his services to be
availed for umpiring or scoring in matches organized by the said
entity.
7. Against the above backdrop, it is not fair on the part of the
appellants to contend that the claimant is guilty of making any false
statement on oath to the effect that he had not been able to resume the
work of umpire / scorer.
8. The appeal is thus found to be devoid of substance and is
dismissed.
9. In terms of order dated 07.01.2013, the appellant had been
directed to deposit 60% of the awarded amount with up-to-date
interest with UCO Bank, Delhi High Court Branch and by orders
dated 01.05.2013 and 11.09.2015 some amount was directed to be
released to the claimant. The balance with accrued interest shall now
be released to the claimant. The appellant will be obliged to deposit
the balance of its liability under the award by requisite deposit with
the tribunal within 30 days making it available to be released to the
claimant.
10. The statutory deposit, if made, by the appellant shall be
refunded, after proof of the award having been satisfied is furnished.
R.K.GAUBA, J.
JANUARY 04, 2018
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