S. Satinder Singh & Ors. vs S. Raminder Sarup Singh & Anr.
2018 Latest Caselaw 261 Del

*           IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                        CS(OS) No. 973/1994

%                                                11th January, 2018

S. SATINDER SINGH & ORS.                          ..... Plaintiffs
               Through: Mr. I.S. Alagh, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
                         J.S. Lamba, Mr. Giriraj Subramanium,
                         Mr. Jaitegan Singh and Mr. Sidhant
                         Krishan Singh, Advocates.

                         versus

S. RAMINDER SARUP SINGH & ANR.             ..... Defendants
              Through: Mr. Manjit Singh Ahluwalia,
                       Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1.

This suit is filed by three plaintiffs being two brothers

and one sister against effectively today only the defendant

no.2/brother seeking the relief that plaintiffs should be declared as

owners of 3/4th share of the suit property bearing no. 3, Sardar Patel

Marg, New Delhi. Through the suit the three plaintiffs, being the

three children of late Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh/defendant no.1,

claim that 3/4th ownership of the suit property has to be held to be of

the plaintiffs in terms of various family settlements but more

particularly and finally the family settlement dated 15.9.1988 entered

into between the three plaintiffs and the defendant no.1/mother.

Plaintiffs also pleaded that because of the finality of the family

settlement dated 15.9.1988, all the subsequent documents entered into

by the defendant no.1/mother with the defendant no.2/brother would

and cannot in any manner take away the rights of the plaintiffs of

being owners of 3/4th share of the suit property by virtue of the family

settlement dated 15.9.1988 and consequently the plaintiffs pray that on

account of the finality of the family settlement dated 15.9.1988, any

subsequent compromise entered into between defendant no.1 and

defendant no.2 in Suit no. 3403/1991 titled as Sardarni Raminder

Sarup Singh Vs. Sardar Govinder Singh, whereby the defendant

no.1/mother agreed that the defendant no.2 herein would not have 1/4th

share but would have half/50% ownership interest in the suit property,

is to be declared null and void. Though there are many prayer clauses,

in sum and substance, the basic prayer in the suit is for declaration of

3/4th ownership right of the three plaintiffs to the extent of 1/4 th share

of each of the plaintiffs, with respect to the suit property 3, Sardar

Patel Marg, New Delhi and that defendant no.2 has only 1/4th

ownership interest in the suit property and not half/50% ownership

interest as is claimed by the defendant no.2 in terms of the agreement

of the defendant no.2 with the defendant no.1/mother dated 10.3.1989

and the subsequent compromise entered into by defendant no.2 with

defendant no.1 in Suit no. 3403/1991.

2. The present suit was originally contested by both the

defendant nos. 1 and 2. Defendant no.1/mother, firstly by filing her

written statement took the side of her son defendant no.2 and against

the other three children being the three plaintiffs in the suit.

Defendant no.1/mother pleaded that the family settlement dated

15.9.1988 entered into by her with the three plaintiffs was got signed

from her by the three plaintiffs by undue pressure, undue influence etc

and hence the same is not binding upon the defendant no.1/mother. It

was also pleaded by the defendant no.1/mother that she had

subsequently cancelled this family settlement dated 15.9.1988, and

that therefore the three plaintiffs cannot claim any rights on the basis

of the family settlement dated 15.9.1988. During the pendency of the

suit, altering her defence in her written statement, the defendant no.

1/mother entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs and filed an

application under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC/Ex. PW1/41 whereby in

terms of this compromise the defendant no.1 stated that plaintiffs be

taken as owners of 50% share of the suit property, but that in case the

compromise entered into between defendant no.1 with defendant no. 2

in Suit No. 3403/1991 is held to be bad, and consequently the

defendant no. 2 is only 1/4th owner of the suit property, then each of

the three plaintiffs be held to be entitled to an ownership of 1/4th share

each in the suit property. The compromise in terms of the application

under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC/Ex. PW1/41 is affirmed by means of

statements recorded of the three plaintiffs and the defendant no.1 in

the suit on 30.10.1995. Defendant no. 2 has objected to this

compromise between defendant no.1 and plaintiffs on account of prior

rights allegedly created in his favor by the agreement dated 10.3.1989

and compromise in Suit no. 3403/1991 and therefore merits of the suit,

as regards the case of the defendant no. 2, was left open to be decided

in the course of final arguments in the present suit that the defendant

no. 2 should be taken as 50% owner in the suit property and not only

of 25% ownership interest in the suit property.

3. Defendant no. 2 has contested the suit by filing a written

statement pleading that in terms of a registered Gift Deed dated

31.3.1971, the mother/defendant no.1 had gifted 1/4th ownership

interest in the suit property to the defendant no. 2. It is further the

case of the defendant no. 2 in the written statement that no

compromise or family settlement at all was entered into between

defendant no. 1 and plaintiffs culminating in the family settlement

agreement dated 15.9.1988. It is also pleaded by the defendant no. 2

that even assuming for the sake of arguments that there was a family

settlement dated 15.9.1988 between the plaintiffs and the defendant

no.1, this family settlement was firstly conditional upon a Will having

to be made by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiffs with respect to

3/4th ownership right of the plaintiffs in the suit property and that no

such Will was made and consequently that the family settlement dated

15.9.1988 was, in fact, cancelled by the mother by writing her letter

dated 28.10.1990. Defendant no.2 also relies upon the agreement

10.3.1989 entered into by him with defendant no.1 and he also pleads

that the subsequent compromise entered into between him and the

mother/defendant no.1 in Suit no. 3403/1991 is final whereby the

mother/defendant no.1 admits that the defendant no. 2 has been given

an additional 1/4th ownership right in the suit property making the

defendant no. 2 as 50% owner of the suit property.

4. The following issues have been framed in the suit on

3.3.2003:-

"1. Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988? OPD.

2. Whether the 3/4th share of defendant no. 1 in the property bearing No. 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi was to belong to and vest in the plaintiffs as their exclusive property in equal shares after her death? OPD.

3. Whether the compromise filed in suit No. 3403/91 by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 under which defendant No. 1 gave away 1/4th share out of 3/4th share in the property to defendant No. 2 in null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs? OPP

4. Whether the judgment and decree dated 25th November, 1993 passed in suit No. 3403/91 is null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs? OPP.

5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 3/4th share in the air conditioning plant and the furniture in property bearing No. 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi including all kinds of furnishing etc., under the Will of Sardar Swarup Singh dated 4.6.1981?

6. Relief."

5. An additional issue was also got framed by the defendant

no. 2 as recorded in the order dated 21.3.2005. This issue reads as

under:-

"Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs claimed by them in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act? OPD 2."

6.(i) Counsels for the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 agree that

this Court is not required to decide issue no.1 framed on 3.3.2003 and

additional issue framed on 21.3.2005.

(ii) That leaves us with issue nos. 2 to 5 framed on 3.3.2005 and all

these issues since are interconnected are being decided together. In

essence, the issue to be decided is whether or not the family settlement

dated 15.9.1988 entered into between defendant no.1/mother with the

plaintiffs is or is not final and even if it is final whether the same

cannot be looked into firstly as contended by defendant no.2 that it is

not stamped and registered and secondly that the family settlement

even if was validly entered into between defendant no.1 and plaintiffs,

however this family settlement dated 15.9.1988 was cancelled by

defendant no.1 (who was legally capable of cancelling the same) in

terms of a letter dated 28.10.1990 sent by the defendant no.1 to all the

plaintiffs and the agreement dated 10.3.1989 entered into by the

defendant no.1 with the defendant no. 2 and as confirmed by the

compromise between defendant no.1 and defendant no. 2 in Suit no.

3403/1991.

7. For the discussion and reasoning hereafter given the

following admitted and proved documents are being referred to:-

(i) Letter-cum-compromise-cum-agreement dated 23.10.1987

entered into between three plaintiffs and defendant no.2 and confirmed

by the defendant no.1, by duly signing the same being Ex. PW1/9.

(ii) Family settlement dated 15.9.1988, entered into between

defendant no.1 and the plaintiffs, which is Ex.PW1/12. This family

settlement stands proved because it is not disputed by defendant no.1

in her written statement that she had signed the family settlement and

it was only alleged that this family settlement was signed by her under

undue influence, coercion etc but that the defendant no. 1 thereafter in

terms of the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC with the

plaintiffs in the suit, Ex. PW1/41, withdrew her allegations that she

had signed the family settlement dated 15.9.1988 under any undue

influence, coercion etc.

(iii) Agreement dated 10.3.1989 entered into between the defendant

nos.1 and 2 (this document is part of Ex.PW1/32 colly). The plaintiffs

do not dispute the existence of this document but it is the

validity/legality of this agreement dated 10.3.1989 which is questioned

on the ground that defendant no.1 had no power to enter into this

agreement in view of the defendant no.1 already having given her 3/4th

share in the suit property to the plaintiffs in terms of the family

settlement/agreement dated 15.9.1988/Ex. PW1/12.

(iv) Letter of defendant no.1/mother dated 28.10.1990 to the three

plaintiffs and defendant no.2 stating cancellation of various

agreements including family settlement dated 15.9.1988 is Ex. D-2/12.

(v) Fax dated 23.11.1992 allegedly sent by plaintiff no.1 to plaintiff

no.3, and this fax is denied by the plaintiffs and not proved by the

defendant no. 2. Legally therefore this document cannot be considered

to decide the issues in question.

(vi) Order dated 25.11.1993 recording compromise in Suit no.

3403/1991 between defendant no.1 and defendant no. 2, whereby

defendant no. 1 agreed that defendant no. 2 is 50% owner in the suit

property. This document is part of Ex. PW1/32 (colly).

8. In addition to the above, reference if so required, will be

made to other documents.

9(i). Chronologically when we refer to the first document

being the agreement dated 23.10.1987 entered into between three

plaintiffs and defendant no. 2, as duly confirmed by defendant no. 1

with her signing the same, it is seen that this agreement shows an

agreement and/or resolve of defendant no. 1 to grant 3/4th ownership

rights at the future date in the suit property to the plaintiffs in the suit

however this document cannot be taken as final with respect to

creation of any right to the extent of 1/4th each of each of the three

plaintiffs in the suit property, inasmuch as this document admittedly

contains a clause that this document only shows the resolve of

defendant no. 1 and which resolve may or may not finalize and brining

into effect the resolve is postponed for happening to a future date as

per the convenience of defendant no.1. This letter-cum-compromise-

cum-agreement dated 23.10.1987 reads as under:-

"New Delhi, 23rd October, 1987.

Protocol between Hemant, Satinder, Tejinder & Govinder, signed at 3 Sardar Patel Mg., N. Delhi.

- That as per the wishes of our mother, Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh, Tejinder is to give Govinder a sum of INrs. 400,000/- (four hundred thousand rupees), which payment to be completed by the end of 1988. Tejinder has agreed to make this payment, and Govinder to accept it; implicit herein is the understanding by the parties hereto that by this payment all matters relating to the HUF of S.B. Sarup Singh & Sons stand resolved and closed, and that matters are amicably settled.

- That all Parteis to this protocol declares that it is their individual and collective wish, intention and objective that the house/property at 3 S.

Patel Mg. be divided in such a manner that each of the four becomes owner of one-fourth (25% each) of the said property.

- Since Govinder is already owner of one-fourth of the property, this would mean in fact that our Mother, Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh, divide the three-fourths share that she owns into three equal shares, one each of Hemant, Satinder and Tejinder, at a time of her choosing.

- It is recognized by the Parties hereto that it is within the realm of legal possibility for our Mother to do other than the objective and wish stated above, however unlikely, but this remote possibility would not affect the resolve stated herein to ensure an equal division.

- That our mother Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh shall have full and uninterrupted right of action and of income from No. 3 S. Patel Mg., till the time and manner of her choosing. This right refers to the whole of the property, notwithstanding that Govinder is registered owner of one-fourth of the same.

- That the „Last Will & Testament‟ of our father, S.B. Sarup Singh, has been conveyed to us by our Mamaji, S. Hardev Singh, and there is no disagreement whatsoever on the contents and the action required for compliance. It is accepted that the Will conveyed to us by Mamaji Hardev is the only one to be complied with.

- That all the above four matters are agreed to collectively and simultaneously.

Signed by the Parties in the presence of witnesses:

           _____________           ________      _________ ___________
           Hemant                  Satinder         Tejinder    Govinder
           WITNESSES: _________                                 _______
                           S. Hardev Singh               Sardarni R. Sarup Singh."


(ii)       However one thing is clear from a reading of this agreement

dated 23.10.1987 that parties were in fact discussing and had

differences and disputes with respect to how different shares in the

suit property would go to the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 after the

demise of defendant no. 1, and that in this regard there was a resolve

by the agreement dated 23.10.1987 whereby the defendant

no.1/mother had resolved to give 3/4th share in the suit property to the

three plaintiffs to the extent of 1/4th share each to the three plaintiffs.

10(i). The next document chronologically is the family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988/Ex.PW1/12 and as per this agreement it

is found that the defendant no.1/mother agreed that each of the three

plaintiffs will be 1/4th owner each in the suit property. Since some

arguments will turn upon language of this family arrangement dated

15.9.1988 this document in its entirety is reproduced as under:-

"FAMILY ARRANGEMENT THIS FAMILY ARRANGEMENT is made and executed this 15th day of September, 1988 BETWEEN (1) Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh wife of the late S.B. Sarup Singh, resident of 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi (hereinafter called the Party of the First Part) AND (2) Smt. Hemant Sukhcharan Singh Pasrich daughter of the late S.B. Sarup Singh, temporary resident of 3, Sardar Patel Road, New Delhi (hereinafter called the Party of the Second Part), AND (3) Sh. Satinder Singh son of the late S.B. Sarup Singh, temporary resident of 3, Sardar patel Marg, New Delhi (hereinafter called the Party of the Third Part), AND (4) Sh. Tejinder Singh son of late S.B. Sarup Singh, temporary resident of 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi (hereinafter called the Party of the Fourth Part).

Cont.....2/

The terms "Party of the First/Second/Third and Fourth part" unless repugnant to the context, means and includes their respective heirs, successors, legal representatives, assignees, nominees and administrators;

WITNESSETH AS UNDER :-

WHEREAS the Party of the first part owned the entire property 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi.

AND WHEREAS the lease of the land underneath the said property was granted by the President of India in favour of the party of the First Part.

AND WHEREAS the party of the First Part constructed a two storeyed bungalow over the said plot of land.

AND WHEREAS the party of the First Part gifted one quarter (1/4) share in the said property with 1/4th lease-hold rights in the land underneath to Shri Govinder Singh, her youngest son.

AND WHEREAS the said property is in the full enjoyment of the party of the First Part inasmuch as the rent of the ground floor is being received by the party of the First Part and the first floor is being self occupied by the party of the First Part.

Cont.....3/

AND WHEREAS the intention of the party of the First Part has been that in the event of her demise, the parties of the Second, Third and Fourth Parts shall also become the absolute and exclusive owners of one quarter (1/4) share each in the said property.

AND WHEREAS Govinder Singh has already been gifted one quarter (1/4) share and the remaining three quarters are to be divided equally between the parties of the Second, Third and Fourth parts.

AND WHEREAS with this objective the party of the First Part has also executed a Will bequeathing all her rights, titles and interests in her three quarter (3/4) share of the said property with lease-hold rights in the land to the parties of the Second, Third and Fourth Parts.

AND WHEREAS the party of the first part is also trying to create a settlement during her life time to this effect with regard to the said property but in case she is unable to do so, her Will has to be operative.

AND WHEREAS the parties to this Family Arrangement are all members of one family and an arrangement has to be arrived at between the parties which is intended Cont.....4/

to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family with further objective to compromise at this preliminary stage doubtful or disputed rights for preserving the family property and for preserving the peace and security of the family and in order to avoid disputes and litigation between the members and for saving the honour of the family.

AND WHEREAS Govinder Singh presently is outside the country and there has already been a protocol to this effect on 23.10.1987 that parties of second, third, fourth part and Shri Govinder Singh shall, on the demise of the party of first part shall become owners of 1/4th share each in the said property.

AND IT IS ADMITTED, acknowledged, and so recorded that Shri Govinder Singh is the owner of 1/4th share in the said property, and accordingly his share remains unaltered and uneffected.

AND WHEREAS the consideration for this arrangement being the expectation that such an agreement or settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and Good-will among the mother, sister and brothers and in the case of the demise Cont.....5/

of the party of the first part among sister and brothers.

AND WHEREAS this arrangement is bonafide, fair and equitable. AND WHEREAS the parties have already by a protocol dated 23.10.1987 understood and agreed to be bound by this arrangement, the said protocol is annexed as annexure „A‟, now this arrangement witnesseth as follows :-

1. That the party of the first part shall be entitled to full use, enjoyment of the property, 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi as is in the present condition and to utilize the First floor for her own use and to receive, utilize and appropriate to herself the rents of the ground floor.

The party of the First Part agree to keep the first floor self occupied for her use and that of the temporary use by her children and their families whenever they are in India, and ground floor tenanted as it is.

2. That on the demise of the party of the first part, the property, 3, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi shall belong to and owned by the parties of the Second, Third, Fourth Part and Govinder Singh in equal shares of one quarter (1/4) each.

Cont.....6/

3. That in the case the party of the first part chooses to do so earlier she may create a settlement in favour of the parties of the Second, Third and Fourth Part for devolving her rights, titles and interests of her three quarters (3/4) share unto them with similar right to enjoyment as per clause (1) above as Settlor.

4. That the Parties of the Second, Third, Fourth Part and Govinder Singh can negotiate for transfer of their share amongst themselves whether before or after the demise of the party of the first part and for valuable consideration and that Party of the First Part agrees to sign, execute and further assurance to this effect.

THIS ARRANGEMENT is being made for the benefit of the family generally and for the purpose of avoiding family disputes and litigations and the parties shall irrevocably be bound by it.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have signed Cont.....7/

and executed this Family Arrangement on the day and year above written in the presence of :-

WITNESSES :-

       1. ____sd/-______                         ________sd/-_________
       2. ____sd/-______                         Party of the First Part.
                                                 ________sd/-_________
                                                 Party of the Second Part.
                                                 ________sd/-_________
                                                 Party of the Third Part.
                                                 ________sd/-__________
                                                 Party of the Fourth Part."

(ii) On behalf of the defendant no. 2 it is firstly contended that this

agreement is not final because of the second last para at internal page

three of this document and which provides that defendant no. 1 is

trying to create a family settlement during her lifetime and in case the

defendant no. 1 is not successful to do so her Will which was to be

executed pursuant to the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 would

be operative. It is accordingly argued on behalf of defendant no. 2 that

family arrangement was not unconditional but conditional and had the

requirement of defendant no. 1 making a Will with respect to 3/4th

ownership rights in the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs, and

since which has not been done because plaintiffs have not filed and

proved the Will executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs

giving 3/4th ownership rights in the suit property to the plaintiffs,

hence plaintiffs can take no benefit of the family arrangement dated

15.9.1988.

(iii) The second contention of defendant no.2 is that family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988 even if validly entered into and binding

between the defendant no. 1 and plaintiffs, yet, the same cannot be

looked into because the family settlement actually was in fact a

document which created right, title and interest in favour of the

plaintiffs in an immovable property over Rs.100 and since this family

arrangement is not registered as required under Section 17(1)(b) of the

Registration Act, 1908 plaintiffs hence can take no benefit of this

family arrangement dated 15.9.1988.

(iv) It is thirdly contended that defendant no. 2 since is not a

signatory to the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988, hence defendant

no. 2 cannot be held to be bound by the terms of the family

arrangement/settlement dated 15.9.1988.

11.(i) Taking the aspect first with respect to whether this family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988 is required to be registered under Section

17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, in my opinion this family

arrangement is only a putting on record of the settlement already

entered into between the parties being the plaintiffs and defendant no.

1/mother and hence the document being the family arrangement dated

15.9.1988 does not in itself create any rights for the first time but only

records the rights to the extent of 3/4th share in favour of the plaintiffs

which was already agreed to between the parties. Whatever doubt, if

any, is removed by the sub-para before the first numerical para of the

family agreement which refers to the earlier protocol/agreement dated

23.10.1987/Ex.PW1/9, and which protocol/agreement dated

23.10.1987 was in fact annexed as the annexure to this family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988. Therefore, in my opinion the family

arrangement is not in the nature of a partition deed or a document

which for the first time created rights to the extent of 3/4 th share in

favour of the plaintiffs in the suit property and therefore this document

does not require registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration

Act.

(ii) In fact, Courts always lean towards upholding of family

settlements and not quashing them on technical grounds as so also

held by the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Singh Vs. Zile

Singh AIR 1988 SC 881 wherein the Supreme Court in spite of the

language of the document which stated that each party will get the

shares stated in the agreement held that such a document is not one

creating rights for the first time but that the document is only in the

nature of a family settlement.

(iii) I would also at this stage seek to refer to the observations of the

Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Kale and Others Vs. Deputy

Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119, and which

judgment besides providing that even an assumed right can be a

subject matter of family settlement, the Supreme Court further

observed that Courts will try to ensure that family settlements are

upheld and not questioned. The relevant paras of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Kale and Others (supra) are paras 9 to

19 and these paras read as under:-

"9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in general the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature of the family arrangement which may be extracted thus:

"The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend."

The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long- drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain .and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. The law in England on this point is almost the same. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles governing the existence of the same are made:

"A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour.

The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied.

Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements. "

10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."

11. The principles indicated above have been clearly enunciated and adroitly adumbrated in a long course of decisions of this Court as also those of the Privy Council and other High Courts, which we shall discuss presently.

12. In Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain the statement of law regarding the essentials of a valid settlement was fully approved of by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In this connection the High Court made the following observations which were adopted by the Privy Council:

The learned Judges say as follows:

"The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this light, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement, and we think that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement. Their Lordships have no hesitation in adopting that view."

13. In Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram this Court appears to have amplified the doctrine of validity of the family arrangement to the farthest possible extent, where Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows:

"It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary. But, in our opinion, the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, and we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of

their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present."

14. In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi this Court observed as follows:

"Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word „family‟ in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute .... The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another. That consideration having been passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right asserted by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter."

15. In Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil it was pointed out by this Court that a family arrangement could be arrived at even orally and registration would be required only if it was reduced into writing. It was also held that a document which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to did not require registration. This Court had observed thus:9 .;

"Family arrangement as such can be arrived at orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess."

16. Similarly in Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham it was held that even if there was no conflict of legal claims but the settlement was a bona fide one it could be sustained by the Court. Similarly it was also held that even the disputes based upon ignorance of the parties as to their rights were sufficient to sustain the family arrangement. In this connection this Court observed as follows:

"It will be seen from the said passage that a family arrangement resolves family disputes, and that even disputes based upon ignorance of parties as to their rights may afford a sufficient ground to sustain it. xxxxx Briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it.

17. In Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand it was pointed out that the word "family" had a very wide connotation and could not be confined only to a group of persons who were recognised by law as having a right of succession or claiming to have a share. The Court then observed: [SCC p. 843, paras 7-8] "To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi the word "family" in the context of a family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement -- see Ram Charan Das case. The courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all."

18. In the recent decision of this Court in S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai the entire case law was discussed and this Court observed as follows: [pp. 319, 321-322, paras 12, 24-25] "If in the interest of the family properties or family peace the close relations had settled their disputes amicably, this Court will be reluctant to disturb the same. The courts generally lean in favour of family arrangements.

xxxxx Now turning to the plea of family arrangement, as observed by this Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram the Courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all. As observed in that case the family

arrangement can as a matter of law be inferred from long course of dealings between the parties.

In Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham this Court held that although conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of family arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes present or possible, which may not involve legal claims would be sufficient. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an agreement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, the Courts would more readily give assent to such an agreement than to avoid it. "

19. Thus it would appear from a review of the decisions analysed above that the courts have taken a very liberal and broad view of the validity of the family settlement and have always tried to uphold it and maintain it. The central idea in the approach made by the courts is that if by consent of parties a matter has been settled, it should not be allowed to be reopened by the parties to the agreement on frivolous or untenable grounds." (emphasis added)

12. In my opinion therefore not only for the reason of the

language of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 which simply

records and brings into black and white an arrangement which has

already been agreed upon and hence is a family arrangement and is not

a document which creates right in favour of the plaintiffs for the first

time, also, that such document as held by the Supreme Court in the

judgments in the cases of Roshan Singh (supra) and Kale and Others

(supra) must be read so as to ensure that the family settlement entered

into between family members is not in any manner disturbed, but is

carried further, I therefore reject the argument urged on behalf of the

defendant no. 2 that the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 cannot be

looked into on account of the same not being registered under Section

17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.

13.(i) The related argument on behalf of the defendant no. 2 for

challenging the bindingness of the family arrangement dated

15.9.1988 was that the second last para of the internal page three of

this family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 talks of making of the Will

by the defendant no.1/mother and her trying to create a settlement

during her lifetime and therefore this para according to defendant no. 2

shows that unless the defendant no.1/mother made a Will in terms of

the family arrangement, the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988

should not be taken as final.

(ii) I am unable to agree with the argument urged on behalf of

defendant no. 2 in this regard because what is stated in the second last

para of internal page three of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988

cannot be torn out of context and this para has to be read as a part of

whole document being the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988.

When we look at the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 as a whole

there remains no manner of doubt that the same records an

understanding between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 whereby

each of the plaintiffs was to be 1/4th owner in the suit property and the

factum of finality of this arrangement is no way lessened by the

second last para of internal page three of the family arrangement.

(iii) While on this aspect I would like to note that in terms of the

family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 ownership rights of three

plaintiffs in the suit property to the extent of 1/4th each was to vest and

come into existence from the demise of the mother/defendant no. 1,

and this is very much permissible in law in view of Section 14 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which deals with the rule of perpetuity

providing that the vesting of a property can be taken at a future point

of time provided that such future vesting is not at a point of time after

the life time of one person who is alive on the date when decision to

vest is taken plus the majority age period of one another person

commencing after the death of the person who is alive on the date

when decision is taken to vest the property. Section 14 of the Transfer

of Property Act reads as under:-

"14. Rule against perpetuity.--No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong."

(iv) In my opinion, therefore the effect of the family arrangement

dated 15.9.1988 is that three plaintiffs will become 1/4 th owner each in

the suit property. Of course, this is subject to consideration of the

other arguments urged on behalf of defendant no. 2 with respect to

invalidity of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 on account of the

later agreement dated 10.3.1989 entered into between defendant nos. 1

and 2 whereby defendant no. 1 gave ownership of additional 1/4th right

in the suit property in addition to 1/4th ownership rights in the suit

property which the defendant no. 2 had by virtue of Gift Deed of

1971. Also, the other arguments urged on behalf of defendant no. 2

will be appropriately examined hereinafter.

14.(i) The first issue to be examined with respect to the final

bindingness of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 is as to

whether this family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 stands validly

cancelled by the defendant no. 1 including through her letter dated

28.10.1990. This letter dated 28.10.1990 is an admitted document and

is a letter written by the mother/defendant no. 1 to all the three

plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 whereby the mother has cancelled

various documents including the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988.

The issue is that could the mother/defendant no.1 have cancelled the

family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 by this letter dated 28.10.1990.

(ii) In my opinion, by this letter of the defendant no.1/mother dated

28.10.1990 the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 could not have

been legally cancelled. The family arrangement in this case is a

document in the nature of the document showing a contract entered

into between four parties being the three plaintiffs and the defendant

no. 1. Such a document which involves four parties cannot be

unilaterally cancelled by one party to a

contract/understanding/arrangement/agreement. In law, a bilateral

document can only be cancelled by an agreement of both the parties or

where there are more parties then by cancelling by all the parties and

that no one party to an agreement is entitled at his/her own will to

unilaterally cancel an agreement entered into. It is trite that if such

cancellation is permitted there will be complete chaos because

documents such as sale deeds, mortgaged deeds which are duly

executed and signed by the parties, can be sought to be set at knot by

unilateral action of one party to an agreement. Accordingly, I hold that

defendant no. 1 had no right in terms of the letter dated 28.10.1990 to

cancel the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988.

(iii) While on this aspect it is also required to note that defendant no.

2 has argued before this Court that the plaintiff no. 1 had written a fax

dated 23.11.1992 to the plaintiff no. 3 in the suit, and this fax shows

that plaintiffs understood that the mother/defendant no.1 had already

cancelled the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 in terms of her

letter dated 28.10.1990.

(iv) This argument urged on behalf of the defendant no. 2 by relying

on this fax has to be rejected straightaway because this fax is not a

proved document. Since this document is not a proved document by

the defendant no. 2, this Court hence cannot entertain any argument on

behalf of defendant no. 2 by placing reliance upon this photocopy of

fax dated 23.11.1992.

(v) Even for the sake of argument if this Court has to refer to the

fax dated 23.11.1992, yet once again a sending of a fax; which is in

the form of transcript of an oral conversation between two persons;

cannot by itself be such so as to hold to have the legal effect of

cancelling a document entered into between various parties namely

plaintiffs and defendant no. 1, being the family arrangement dated

15.9.1988 because for bringing about a cancellation as already

observed above, it is required that such a document entered into

between various persons cannot be cancelled except with the consent

of all the parties. The misunderstanding of the legal position, and that

too by only one of the plaintiffs in the suit, being the plaintiff no. 1

who has written this fact to plaintiff no. 3 that mother/defendant no.1

could have cancelled bilateral documents unilaterally, would not mean

that the legal position is changed requiring that a contractual document

can only be cancelled by all the parties to the contractual document

and not unilaterally by one of the parties to the document.

(vi) Also, such a fax dated 23.11.1992 even if it is taken as proved,

can at best be taken only as against the plaintiff no. 1 who has sent it

and surely not against plaintiff nos. 2 and 3 who are not found in any

manner to have consented to or agreed upon the contents of this fax

dated 23.11.1992.

(vii) For all the aforesaid reasons I reject the reliance placed by

defendant no. 2 on the fax dated 23.11.1992 for the purpose of holding

as cancelled the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988.

(viii) I may also note that counsel for the defendant no.2 had sought

to draw attention of this Court to the certain questions put in the cross-

examination of the defendant no.2 by the plaintiffs as per which the

plaintiffs had by placing reliance upon the letter of the defendant

no.1/mother dated 28.10.1990 sought to contend and put a case to the

defendant no.2 that the mother/defendant no.1‟s agreement dated

10.3.1989 with the defendant no.2 was held invalid, but for the self-

same reasons why the document being the letter of the

mother/defendant no.1 dated 28.10.1990 has been rejected, therefore

equally the plaintiffs cannot place any reliance upon the letter dated

28.10.1990 for cancelling of the agreement dated 10.3.1989 entered

into between the defendant no.1 and defendant no.2, and as discussed

below even if the agreement dated 10.3.1989 is found to have been

validly executed between defendant no.1 and the defendant no.2, yet

in law, the defendant no.1 had no right to enter into such an agreement

because defendant no.1 from 15.9.1988 was no longer the owner of

the 3/4th ownership interest in the suit property for after 15.9.1988 to

give of 1/4th out of the said 3/4th share to the defendant no.2 under the

agreement dated 10.3.1989 of the defendant no.1/mother with the

defendant no.2.

15. It is required at this stage to be observe straightaway that

once the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 is final, then even

though the defendant nos.1 and 2 have entered into an agreement

dated 10.3.1989 whereby defendant no.1 purported to give 1/4th

additional right in the suit property to the defendant no.2, and further

that to the same effect the defendant nos.1 and 2 have compromised

their disputes in the Suit no. 3403/1991 in terms of which defendant

no.1 agreed that defendant no.2 was the owner of an additional 1/4th

portion in the suit property making the defendant no.2 as 50% owner

of the suit property, therefore, in view of finality of the family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988, and defendant no.1 no longer being

owner of the 3/4th interest in the property which was to vest with the

plaintiffs on the demise of the defendant no.1, it has hence to be held

that the defendant no.1 in terms of the agreement dated 10.3.1989

with the defendant no.2 or by their compromise in Suit No.3403/1991,

could not have given a further 1/4th share in the suit property to the

defendant no.2 for increasing ownership of the defendant no.2 in the

suit property from 25% to 50%.

16. I also reject the argument urged on behalf of the

defendant no.2 that family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 is not binding

upon the defendant no.2 as defendant no.2 is not a party to this the

family arrangement dated 15.9.1988, for the reason that there was no

need of the defendant no.2 to be a party to the family arrangement

dated 15.9.1988 inasmuch as the subject matter of the family

arrangement was of 3/4th interest of the defendant no.1/mother and of

which share she undoubtedly was the sole owner on 15.9.1988 when

the family arrangement was entered into between the plaintiffs with

her and therefore the defendant no.1/mother was fully entitled to the

deal in whatever manner so required with her ownership of 3/4th

interest in the suit property, hence the defendant no.2 need not have

been a party to the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 for the said

family arrangement to be binding upon the defendant no.2.

Accordingly, it is held that even if the defendant no.2 is not a party to

the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 yet the same would bind the

defendant no.2 because defendant no.1/mother when she had entered

into this family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 she was the only person

legally entitled to enter into the family arrangement as regards the

3/4th ownership in the suit property, and which 3/4th share because of

the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 was given in the portion of

1/4th each to each of the three plaintiffs in the present suit.

17. Learned counsel for the defendant no.2 then sought to

argue, and which in my opinion is only a stand of desperation, that

since questions have been put to the plaintiffs in their cross-

examination in this suit whereby plaintiffs had admitted that they were

parties to the Suit no. 3403/1991 and therefore the compromise in Suit

no.3403/1991 between the defendant no.1 and defendant no.2 is also

binding upon the plaintiffs, however these types of oral questions and

answers cannot change the court record and the court record shows

that the Suit no.3403/1991 was filed only by the defendant no.1 in the

present suit being the mother Sardarni Raminder Sarup Singh and the

only defendant in that Suit no. 3403/1991 was the defendant no.2

herein namely Sardar Govinder Singh. Plaintiffs had become parties to

the Suit no.3403/1991 only at the stage after the death of the mother

for the limited purpose because the mother/defendant no.1, and who

was the plaintiff in the said suit, had filed an application in the said

suit for recalling of the compromise entered into between her and the

defendant in the said suit (being defendant no.2 herein) and on the

death of the mother, the plaintiffs in this suit got themselves

substituted in the said application as applicants for recalling of the

compromise entered into between the defendant no.1 and defendant

no.2 in the said Suit no.3403/1991 by which share of the defendant in

that suit (defendant no.2 in the present suit) was got increased by the

mother from 25% to 50%. As already stated above since the family

arrangement dated 15.9.1988 has to be taken as final the defendant

no.1/mother hence thereafter no longer had any subsisting rights in the

suit property for her to have given any ownership interest in the suit

property to the defendant no.2, and therefore, even if therefore there

was an agreement dated 10.3.1989 entered into between the defendant

no.1/mother in this suit with the defendant no.2 in the present suit with

the fact that there was also a compromise in Suit no. 3403/1991

between the defendant no. 1/mother and the defendant no.2 herein

confirming the agreement dated 10.3.1989 and thus effectively

confirming the ownership rights of 50% in the suit property to

defendant no. 2, yet and as already discussed in detail above, once a

family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 had became final then the

defendant no. 1/mother no longer had any legal right whatsoever

remaining for her to give any share in the suit property thereafter to

any persons including defendant no. 2, by an act etc unilaterally done

on and after 15.9.1988.

18.(i) Next it was argued on behalf of defendant no. 2 that the

suit is not maintainable because in the suit plaintiffs have only sought

declaration of bindingness of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988

but the plaintiffs have not sought the further relief of partition, and

which was mandatory in view of the Proviso of Section 34 of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963, however besides the fact that no such

ground has been urged by defendant no. 2 in the written statement and

no such issue got framed, even if I look at this issue, since admittedly

the mother/defendant no. 1 was alive on the date of filing of the suit,

and in terms of the family arrangement dated 15.9.1988 vesting all

rights in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent of 1/4th each to the three

plaintiffs was to take place only on the demise of the

mother/defendant no. 1, hence the plaintiffs in the present suit could

not have asked for partition till the demise of the mother/defendant

no.1 and therefore plaintiffs were justified in seeking the main and

essential relief of declaration as to bindingness of family settlement

dated 15.9.1988 entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant no.

1/mother whereby plaintiffs became 3/4th owners of the suit property

on the demise of the defendant no.1/mother. This argument of the

defendant no. 2 is also therefore rejected.

(ii) I may also note that learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs

have stated that plaintiffs have already initiated suit for partition of the

suit property in this Court, since the defendant no. 1/mother died

during the pendency of this suit resulting in plaintiffs becoming 3/4 th

owners of the suit property, and which suit is pending disposal.

19. Finally the counsel for the defendant no. 2 has sought to

argue on the basis of interim orders passed in this suit of an interim

application by the mother‟s/defendant no. 1 being dismissed and that

hence defendant no.2 being 50% owner, however it is trite that interim

orders do not create any rights and more so because the issue in this

suit has always in all proceedings been left open for being decided as

to whether or not it was the defendant no. 2 who became 50% owner

of the suit property or that defendant no. 2 was only 1/4th owner of the

suit property with 3/4th ownership interest being of the plaintiffs. I

therefore reject this argument urged on behalf of the defendant no. 2.

20. For the purpose of passing the decree in this suit it is to

be noted that there are undisputed facts on the record of this suit

whereby during the pendency of the suit plaintiff nos. 1 and 3 have

transferred their 1/4th ownership interests in the suit property in favor

of plaintiff no. 2, and once that is so it will be the plaintiff no. 2 who

will be the owner of 3/4th ownership interest in the suit property.

RELIEF

21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this suit is decreed

and a decree of declaration is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and

against the defendant no. 2 declaring that three plaintiffs were the

owners of 1/4th ownership interest each in the suit property no. 3,

Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi in terms of the family arrangement

dated 15.9.1988, and that the defendant no. 2 will be the owner of only

1/4th ownership interest in this property i.e it is also declared that

defendant no. 2 is not the owner of 50% ownership interest in the suit

property and that the defendant no. 2 is only the owner of 25%

ownership interest in the suit property. Defendant no. 2 is directed to

only represent that he is only 25% owner of the suit property and is

injuncted from representing to the world at large that the defendant no.

2 is the 50% owner in the suit property. The aforesaid directions will

have the effect that the plaintiff no. 2 will be 3/4th or 75% owner in the

suit property with the defendant no. 2 being only an owner to the

extent of 1/4th or 25% share. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

Decree sheet be prepared.

All pending applications being I.A. nos. 3346/2006,

12988/2012, 20796/2014, 5865/2015 and CCP(O) no. 40/2011 will

stand disposed of in terms of this final judgment.

JANUARY 11, 2018                               VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
AK/Ne/SRwt