Ranbir Singh vs Union Of India & Ors.
2017 Latest Caselaw 5300 Del

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*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                          Date of Decision: 21st September, 2017
+     W.P.(C) 4577/2017
      RANBIR SINGH                              ..... Petitioner
                       Through     Mr. Shanker Raju and Mr.
                                   Nilansh Gaur, Advs.
                       versus
      UNION OF INDIA & ORS                      ..... Respondent

                       Through     Ms. Meera Bhatia, Adv for
                                   UOI/R-1.
                                   Mr. Satyakam, Adv for R- 2-4
                                   with ASI Sanjeev, Delhi Police.

REKHA PALLI, J (ORAL)

1. The present writ petition assails the order dated 24.08.2016 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in OA No.2000/2000 whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the Original Application filed by the Petitioner. The Petitioner, a Constable in Delhi Police, had filed the OA challenging his dismissal from service vide order dated 07.11.1997.

2. While the Petitioner was posted in the North East District, one Sh. Nanhe Mal made a complaint to the Commissioner of Police, alleging therein that four police personnel from the Special Staff, North East District including the Petitioner, had, on 15.04.1996, illegally picked up and detained his son Subash Chand and his two servants Krishan Kumar and Chander Pal, on a false accusation of manufacturing and storing spurious cold drinks, and had also recovered crates of the allegedly spurious cold drinks. It was also alleged that the team of police personnel headed by Net Ram, of

which team the Petitioner was also a member, had demanded illegal gratification of Rs.50,000/- and had released the detained persons only after receiving a sum of Rs.30,000/- on 16.04.1996 as bribe. Based on this complaint, an joint departmental enquiry was ordered against the Petitioner and the other three police personnel, vide order dated 16.05.1996 of the Additional Commissioner of Police/R-4. In the enquiry, the Petitioner set up a defence of denial by stating that he was not a part of the raiding team, which had raided the shop of Mr.Subhash Chand on 15.04.1996, as at that time on 15.04.1996, he was part of another team headed by SI Devender Singh. His plea was that this team had gone on 'Ilaka Gasht' and had come across gambling activities by some persons which led to registration of FIR No.99/1996 based on the report given by him. However, the Enquiry Officer upon consideration of entire evidence adduced in the enquiry, rejected the Petitioner's defence and vide his report dated 05.08.1997 concluded that the charges framed against the Petitioner and his co- delinquents stood fully proved.

3. Based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Respondent No. 4, passed an order dated 07.11.1997 dismissing the Petitioner from service.

4. The Petitioner's departmental Appeal and Revision Petition having failed, he preferred OA 2000/2000 before the Tribunal on 12.09.2000. During the pendency of the OA, he also filed a Miscellaneous Application on 08.08.2011 to bring on record copies of certain additional documents to show his alibi and non-involvement in the incident relating to Shri Subhash Chand.

5. The Petitioner's OA was dismissed by the Tribunal on 05.04.2002 but subsequently Review Application No. 114/2002 filed by the Petitioner was allowed. The Tribunal vide its order dated 29.01.2003 partly allowed the OA by remitting back the matter to the departmental authorities for fresh enquiry after obtaining approval of the ACP. This order passed by the Tribunal was challenged by the Respondents by way of W.P.(C) No. 6026/2003 before this Court. Vide order dated 24.07.2006 the Writ Petition of the Respondents was allowed and the Tribunal's order remitting back the matter was set aside. The Petitioner, then sought a review of the order dated 24.07.2006, which prayer was rejected by this Court on 08.12.2006.

6. At this stage, the Petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.4834/2007 challenging the Tribunal's order dated 29.01.2003 before this Court. This Court after considering the plea of „alibi‟ raised by the Petitioner vide order dated 27.11.2014 remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for adjudication of the OA on merits. This Court also directed the Tribunal to consider the documents filed by the Petitioner, in support of his plea, that he had no involvement in the alleged incident as he was part of a different raiding team i.e. which went on 'Ilaka Gasht' and came across a gambling incident, which led to lodging of a separate FIR, i.e. 99/1996 on 15.04.1996, under the Gambling Act at the same time as the alleged incident.

7. Upon remand, the Tribunal has once again considered the Petitioner's OA. The main plea of the Petitioner before the Tribunal was that, there was no evidence on record to connect him with the alleged charge. To support his plea that he was part of a raiding party

headed by SI Devender Singh, and was not connected with the raiding team headed by Net Ram, the Petitioner had relied upon copies of certain documents annexed with his Miscellaneous Application filed in 2001. These documents included copies of DDR Entries No.14A and 16A, both dated 15.04.1996, copies of FIR/police report in criminal case No.99/96 under Section12/5/99 of Public Gambling Act, site plan, recovery memo, search memo and conviction slip in respect of FIR No.99/96. Relying on copies of these documents, the Petitioner had contended before the Tribunal that since the factum of his being a member of the investigation team headed by SI Devender Singh in a criminal case registered vide FIR No.99/1996 under the Gambling Act stood proved, it was evident that he could not have been a part of the raiding party headed by Net Ram, which was alleged to have demanded and accepted bribe from Mr. Subhash Chand and he was, therefore, falsely implicated.

8. On the other hand, the stand of the Respondents before the Tribunal was that, there was overwhelming evidence including the statement of PW-4 - Nanhe Mal, to show the involvement of the Petitioner in the incident in question and that he was a part of the team which had visited the house of PW-4 on 16.04.1996 and taken a bribe of Rs.30,000/-. It was contended that the Enquiry Officer and the departmental authorities had appreciated and evaluated the evidence in the right perspective, and there was no infirmity in the finding of the Enquiry Officer or the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority.

9. The Tribunal, not only examined the documents on which the Petitioner had sought to rely, but also considered the evidence led by

the Respondents before the Enquiry Officer to prove the Petitioner's guilt. The Tribunal found that the authenticity of the copies of DDR No.14A and 16A dated 15.04.1996 itself was very doubtful. The Tribunal held that, even otherwise, the documents relied upon by the Petitioner in support of his plea of „alibi‟ pertained to 15.04.1996, whereas there were specific allegations and evidence to show that he had gone to the complainant's house on the next day, i.e. on 16.04.1996, and received the bribe money. The Tribunal, therefore, vide its impugned order dated 24.08.2016 dismissed the OA by holding that there was sufficient oral and documentary evidence to prove the Petitioner's guilt.

10. In these circumstances, the Petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition.

11. Before us, Mr.Shanker Raju, Advocate, arguing for the Petitioner submits that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the Enquiry Report indicting the Petitioner, was wholly perverse and the finding of guilt arrived at by the Enquiry Officer was based on 'no evidence'. He submits that despite specific directions given by this Court, vide its order dated 27.11.2014 - while remanding the matter back to the Tribunal to consider the documents produced by the Petitioner in support of his plea of alibi, the Tribunal has brushed aside those crucial documents produced by the Petitioner. According to him, these documents clearly show that at the relevant time, the Petitioner was a part of the raiding party headed by SI Devender Singh and in these circumstances, he just could not be a part of the raiding

party headed by Net Ram, which team was involved in the alleged incident of demanding and accepting bribe from Mr.Subhash Chand.

12. Drawing our attention to the copies of documents including DD Entries, FIR, seizure memo etc., on which reliance had been placed by the Petitioner before the Tribunal, Mr.Raju contends that this clinching evidence has been wrongly ignored by the Tribunal. According to him, once the Petitioner's participation as a member of the raiding party led by SI Devender Singh on 15.04.1996 was proved, it was just not possible for him to simultaneously be a part of the other raiding team led by Net Ram, at the same time.

13. In support of his plea that since it is a case of 'no evidence', the the Enquiry Report and all consequential orders are liable to be set aside, Mr.Raju has placed reliance on judgments of the Apex Court in Sher Bahadur vs. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 142, Union of India vs. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364, Union of India & Ors. vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 Commissioner of Police, Delhi & others v. Jai Bhagwan (2011) 6 SCC 376 and judgment of this Court in Jai Bhagwan vs. Commissioner of Police, 2010 (166) DLT 563.

14. Per Contra, Mr.Satyakam, the learned counsel for the Respondents while supporting the impugned order, submits that the Tribunal has meticulously examined not only the Enquiry Report but also the documents filed by the Petitioner along with his Miscellaneous Application. He submits that the Tribunal after considering the entire evidence had come to a categoric conclusion

that there was sufficient oral as well as documentary evidence on record to prove the guilt of the Petitioner.

15. Having heard the learned counsels and perused the impugned order as well as the record, we are unable to find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.

16. We find that despite the well settled legal position that the Court cannot and should not re-appreciate evidence or examine the sufficiency of evidence led before the Enquiry Officer, the Tribunal has examined the entire evidence and come to a conclusion that there was no infirmity in the enquiry report. The Tribunal also held that even though the Petitioner has raised an alibi for 15.04.1996, there was no defence raised qua the incident of 16.041996. The Tribunal also found that there was sufficient direct evidence to show the Petitioner's involvement on 16.04.1996, when the bribe was actually received by the raiding team led by Net Ram.

17. We have also examined the copies of documents including DD entries relied upon by the Petitioner, but we find that the Petitioner has sought to rely only on typed copies of some documents and has failed to produce even photocopies of these documents which, according to him, are crucial in proving his false implication. In these circumstances, the Tribunal has, in our view, rightly observed that the authenticity of these documents is doubtful, and no reliance could be placed on them.

18. We have also considered the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. We find that the common thread running through all these judgments is that disciplinary proceedings

being quasi-criminal in nature, there should at least be some evidence to prove the charge and in cases where the Court finds it to be a case of 'no evidence', the Court can and should interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authorities. The judicial approach, thus, has been that the Court/Tribunal should not re- appreciate evidence. The Court may interfere only in cases where the enquiry is held in violation of principles of natural justice or is held in violation of statutory rules, or it is a case of 'no evidence'. There can be no dispute with this legal proposition. In our view, in cases, where the Court finds that it is a case of 'no evidence', it is the duty of the Court to go into the merits of the case and not reject the case by merely relying on the findings of the Disciplinary Authorities

19. We are fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs.Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 where, while reiterating the principles and scope of judicial review in departmental proceedings, the Supreme Court in paras 12 and 18 held as under:-

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof fact or evidence as defined

therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held that proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have never reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."

"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."

20. Having examined the record, including the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the order passed by Disciplinary Authority, we do not find that this is a case of 'no evidence'. In fact, we find that there was sufficient evidence before the Enquiry Officer to hold the Petitioner guilty of the charge levelled against him. Without delving

into the evidence in detail, we find that the statement of PW4-Nanhe Mal, which has gone uncontroverted, was in itself sufficient to hold the charges against the Petitioner as proved.

21. We also find that neither the plea of violation of principles of natural justice nor of any violation of statutory rules had been raised either before the Tribunal or before us. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the findings of the Disciplinary Authorities. The Tribunal has, in our view, rightly declined to interfere with the conclusions of the Disciplinary Authorities.

22. In these circumstances we see no infirmity in the Tribunal's order. We find no merit in the petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

(REKHA PALLI) JUDGE

(VIPIN SANGHI) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 21, 2017/gm