Delhi High Court
Raghav Paswan vs Delhi Development Authority And ... on 15 September, 2017
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 15th September, 2017
+ W.P.(C) 8238/2017
RAGHAV PASWAN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.K. Singh & Ms. Renu Singh,
Advocates
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANR..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, Standing
Counsel for the DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDER SHEKHAR
G.S.SISTANI , J.(ORAL)
1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated
19.8.2017 passed by the Executive Engineer/WD-8, DDA, by which
the permission granted to the petitioner to sell vegetable and fruits
near Max Dry Cleaners, Plot No.1, Sector-6, MLU Market, Dwarka
has been withdrawn.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated
19.8.2017 is bad in law, as the same has been passed without
complying with the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel has
also drawn the attention of the Court to a communication dated
8.2.2016 received by the petitioner, by which the then Executive
Engineer had granted express permission to the petitioner to sell fresh
vegetables and fruits under certificate issued by FSSAI Food
Licensing & Registration system, provided there is no hindrance in
the movement of traffic and the area in question is kept clear. Learned
counsel submits that, in the absence of any show cause notice and in
the absence of any hearing, the impugned order is liable to be
quashed. Learned counsel has also brought to the attention of the
Court that he had approached this Court by filing WP(C)
No.5822/2017, wherein the grievance was raised against the Delhi
Police who was not allowing the petitioner to vend despite the
permission from the DDA. On 1.9.2017, the said writ petition was
disposed of, in view of the Status Report filed by the Delhi Police,
wherein it was stated that the petitioner was not removed from the site
in question.
3. Notice to show cause as to why the petition be not admitted.
Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, Standing Counsel for the DDA enters
appearance on an advance copy and submits that the permission was
issued by an officer, who had no authority in law to issue such a
condition. He further submits that once this fact came to the notice of
DDA, the permission so granted was withdrawn.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. By a communication dated 8.2.2016, the following permission
was granted to the petitioner:
"This is in response to your cited letter. Regarding your
request for allowing to earn your livelihood by selling fruit
juice on purshcart/thela at the designated site described in
the license provided by Department of Food Safety, Delhi
Government Registration under Food Safety and Standards
Act, 2006, under kind of business as "hawker", it is
informed that DDA have no objection to earn your
livelihood on pushcart/thela by selling fresh vegetables and
fruits under certificate issued by FSSAI Food Licensing &
Registration system issued to you provided there is no
hindrance in traffic movement and area in question is
maintained as clean."
6. By a communication dated 19.8.2017, this permission stands
withdrawn. The letter dated 19.8.2017 reads as under:
"This is with reference to the above cited letter, it is to
inform that for allowing by selling fresh vegetable and
fruits on push cart/thela, the no objection certificate
issued by this office dated 8.2.2016 is withdrawn."
An apparent reading of the communication dated 19.8.2017, by which
the permission granted to the petitioner was withdrawn, would show
that the same is bereft of any reasoning. The submission sought to be
raised by learned Standing Counsel for the DDA does not find
mentioned in this communication addressed to the petitioner.
7. In the case of Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthi, [2005] 6 SCC
237, it was held as under:
"Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice.
Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they
are principles ingrained into the conscience of man.
Natural justice is the administration of justice in a
commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially
on natural ideals and human values. The administration of
justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted
considerations which are usually associated with a
formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and
grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which
has to determine its form.
The expressions "natural justice"' and "legal justice"' do
not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance
of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever
legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural
justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice
relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality,
grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies
the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster
said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to
exclude the presentation of a litigants defence.
The adherence to principles of natural justice as
recognized by all civilized States is of supreme
importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on
determining disputes between the parties, or any
administrative action involving civil consequences is in
issue. These principles are well settled. The first and
foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi
alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be
condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this
principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should
appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet.
Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to
enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a
notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the
order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but
essential that a party should be put on notice of the case
before any adverse order is passed against him. This is
one of the most important principles of natural justice. It
is after all an approved rule of fair play."
8. In our view, no doubt, the DDA has issued a communication,
withdrawing the permission in the form of a quasi judicial authority,
but the DDA, being an instrumental of the State, is bound to act in a
fair and just manner.
9. In the absence of any show cause notice and hearing granted to
the petitioner, we accordingly quash the communication dated
19.8.2017 and direct the DDA to issue a show cause notice to the
petitioner, grant a hearing and thereafter pass a reasoned order. The
order would be communicated to the petitioner at the address
mentioned in the writ petition.
10. The Rule is accordingly made absolute and the writ petition is
allowed in above terms.
G.S.SISTANI, J
CHANDER SHEKHAR, J
SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
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