Jagbir Singh vs Central Bureau Of Investigation
2017 Latest Caselaw 5541 Del

*       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                            Reserved on: 14.09.2017
                                             Delivered on: 10.10.2017
+       CRL.A.977/2015

JAGBIR SINGH                                       ..... Appellant

                         versus

CENTAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION                     ..... Respondent

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant:   Mr. P.Vinay Kumar and Mr.B.K.Mishra.
For the Respondent:  Ms. Rajdipa Behura, SPP with Ms.Kriti
                     Handa and Mr.Vignaraj Pasayat.

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

                            JUDGMENT

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J

1. Jagbir Singh, the appellant has been convicted by judgment

dated 05.08.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (P.C.Act) and

CBI-03, South-West District Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in CBI Case

5/2012 (RC No.S19 2006 E 0005) for the offences under Sections 218

and 417 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C

Act, 1988. By order dated 11.08.2015, he has been sentenced to

undergo RI for one year, to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default of

payment of fine, to suffer SI for one month for the offence under

Section 218 IPC; RI for six months, a fine of Rs.25,000/- and in

default of payment of fine to undergo SI for one month for the offence

under Section 417 IPC; and RI for one year and six months, fine of

Rs.50,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo SI for two

months for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)

of the P.C Act, 1988.

2. A bench of Delhi High Court on 20.04.2006 passed an order in

W.P(Crl) No.4582/2003 (Kalyan Sansthan Social Welfare Association

vs. Union of India & Ors) directing the CBI to register a preliminary

enquiry against such engineers and officials of the MCD, who by their

negligence, apathy and connivance had caused large scale

unauthorized construction and further directed to probe their nexus

with their seniors in the engineering department, builders as well as

political leaders (bosses). The Court had directed that the enquiry be

conducted by a task force headed by a person not below the rank of a

Joint Director.

3. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the Delhi High Court, referred

to above, a preliminary enquiry No.2/2006 EOW-VII was registered

on 10.05.2006 against one R.P.Dabas, the then Executive Engineer

(Building), MCD, Najafgarh Zone, New Delhi. Thereafter FIR/RC

No.S19 2006 E0005 dated 27.07.2006 was registered under Sections

120B/193 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the

P.C.Act, 1988 against R.P.Dabas, Jagbir Singh (the appellant) who at

the relevant time was junior Engineer (Building), MCD, Najafgarh

zone, New Delhi and M/s Uppal Orchid Hotel, Samalkha.

4. During the investigation, it was revealed that the Deputy

Commissioner of MCD, Najafgarh zone, on information through some

source, issued instructions on 11.01.2005 for finding out whether there

were any unauthorized construction/deviation by the management of

Uppal Orchid Motel. The aforesaid Motel was inspected on the next

day i.e. on 12.01.2005 by one B.S.Yadav, Assistant Director and the

appellant. The appellant is said to have lodged FIR No.5/B/UC/NG/05

alleging unauthorized construction at the said Motel. The FIR by the

appellant disclosed that the management of the Motel had

unauthorizedly covered areas in excess of the permissible limits. As

such, a show cause notice was issued to the Motel. Since there was no

reply, another notice directing the management of the Motel to

demolish the unauthorized construction was issued at the instance of

Sh.B.S.Yadav, Assistant Engineer (Building). On the report of the

appellant on 01.02.2005 that no demolition action had taken place in

the Motel, a demolition order, as per the policy of the Delhi Municipal

Corporation, was passed.

5. Investigations further revealed that some attempts were made

by the appellant to have the unauthorized construction at the Motel

demolished but those attempts could not succeed. On some occasions,

unauthorized construction could not be demolished because of non-

availability of police force and on other occasions there was shortage

of time for the MCD officials to complete the demolition process.

6. However, on 07.06.2005, as has been alleged, a report was

submitted by the appellant indicating that he had gone to the Motel for

demolition along with police and demolition staff and partially

demolished the room and toilet/bath at the ground floor. As opposed to

the aforesaid report, the beldars of the Central squad, Building

Department, MCD, Headquarters, Town Hall and Building

Department, Najafgarh zone did not confirm the aforesaid demolition.

Later, it was found that on 07.06.2005, the appellant along with the

team had overseen the demolition action at Rajiv farmhouse only,

which fact also was confirmed by the owner of the Rajiv Farm House

namely Rajiv Sharma. However, as per the plan, the appellant along

with the staff had to go to Pushpanjali and Uppal Orchid Motel for

demolition.

7. Apart from the aforesaid alleged false report of 07.06.2005, the

appellant is also alleged to have proposed imposition of demolition

cost on the Motel, which proposal was accepted by the Assistant

Engineer (Building) and an amount of Rs.15,750/- was recovered from

Uppal Orchid Motel.

8. On the basis of the aforesaid investigation, charge sheet was

submitted against the appellant and sanction also was obtained for his

prosecution under Sections 218/417 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read

with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act, 1988. With respect to the senior

officers of the MCD including Sh.R.P.Dabas, the then Executive

Engineer (Building) and the management of the Motel, there was,

according to the investigating agency, no sufficient evidence.

9. The charge sheet against the appellant did not find favour with

the learned Trial Court who directed for further investigation on

03.09.2009. The Court below was of the view that it was of utmost

importance to note as to who had received the notice for unauthorized

construction on behalf of the Motel and who deposited the charges for

demolition. Whether such a notice was challenged and whether any

demolition had taken place or not was required to be investigated

which could only have clarified whether there was any conspiracy

angle to the whole process of so called demolition and recovery of the

demolition charges. Thereafter, a supplementary charge sheet was

filed on 24.02.2011. That also did not disclose the result of

investigation carried out on the angle of conspiracy between the

appellant and the proprietor of the Motel. Again, further investigation

was directed. Thereafter, a second supplementary charge sheet

(Exh.PW-49/D5 dated 26.09.2011) was filed which did not reveal any

monetary trail so as to suggest any illegal/monetary transaction in

favour of the appellant by a private party. The report further indicated

that since the matter was six years old, no material regarding

conspiracy between Uppal Orchid Motel and the appellant could be

found.

10. Cognizance in the case was taken on 23.01.2012, whereas

charges against the appellant were framed on 05.09.2012 under

Sections 218, 417 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of

the P.C.Act, 1988.

11. The Trial Court, after examining 49 witnesses on behalf of the

prosecution and 7 witnesses on behalf of defence convicted and

sentenced the appellant as aforestated.

12. Karan Singh (PW-1), Draftsman, Grade-III, MCD; Satya

Kumar Sharma (PW-2), Office In charge, MCD; Pushkar Sharma

(PW-3), Assistant Engineer (Building), MCD; S.K.Wadhwa (PW-4),

Draftsman Grade-I, MCD; Yusuf Abbas Jafri (PW-5), Junior Engineer

(South), In charge Demolition squad; Jagdish Dayani (PW-7),

Assistant Engineer (Building); K.S.Mehra (PW-12), Commissioner,

MCD; Rajinder Kumar (PW-15), LDC, Building Department; Sher

Singh Mittal (PW-16), Architectural Assistant, MCD; M.S.Yadav

(PW-20), Assistant Engineer, Works Division; Sanjay Sharma (PW-

23), Junior Engineer, Vigilance Department and Ramesh Dahiya (PW-

24), Junior Engineer, Building Department, MCD have deposed

before the Trial Court on behalf of the prosecution. Their depositions

before the Trial Court are vague in as much as PW-1 has only stated

that he had not seen any damaged portion of the property or any repair

work in the said property. Likewise, PW-2 has stated that normally the

police protection is always taken for assisting the demolition work.

After the demolition order is passed and a programme is fixed, the file

is given to Assistant Engineer on the day on which any particular

demolition is to be conducted. PW-4 did not exactly remember as to

whether he had seen any broken portion or any repaired portion in the

Motel. Similar statements have been made, as stated above, by PWs-5

and 7. PW-12, the then Commissioner, MCD had not seen the

demolition register of the year 2005 maintained in the police station,

Kapashera. Thus all that the aforesaid witnesses have stated is that

there is a process of demolition and the same has to be fulfilled before

any unauthorized construction is demolished.

13. Twenty two (22) prosecution witnesses are beldars from

Najafgarh zone, MCD and Headquarters, MCD. They are PWs.8, 13,

26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,

46 and 47. Out of the aforesaid beldars, Abdul (PW-13) has clearly

stated in his cross examination that on 07.06.2005, he had gone to two

places for demolition. The first place was at Bijwasan and the second

at Samalkha. He also has deposed that apart from the appellant there

were others also. At Samalkha, the roof was punctured and a wall and

toilet were demolished. Uppal Orchid Motel, incidentally is at

Samalkha.

14. Om Prakash (PW-26) has also confirmed the fact that at

Samalkha, demolition had taken place where the roof was punctured.

Similar statements have been made by Lekh Ram (PW-29) and Man

Singh (PW-34). Other beldars have, however, not supported the

prosecution version.

15. Constable Sunita (PW-6); Inspector Rajinder Pal (PW-9),

Additional SHO, Kapashera police station; ASI Krishna (PW-10); SI

Nanak Chand (PW-11); ASI Jai Kishan (PW-17); Constable

Dharampal (PW-21); HC Ravinder Singh (PW-22); WSI Rajesh Devi

(PW-25) and WSI Sheila (PW-27) are the persons who were employed

in Kapashera Police Station. Out of the aforesaid police witnesses,

Inspector Rajinder Pal (PW-9) has stated that in June, 2005 he was

posted as Additional SHO at Kapashera police station. On 07.06.2005

he was on duty along with MCD staff for Pushpanjali and Uppal

Orchid. He has also clearly stated that on 07.06.2005, the appellant

had told him that he and PW-9 and others had to go to Uppal Orchid

but PW-9 did not go there. However, before the Court, he was not sure

whether the appellant along with other MCD staff had gone to Uppal

Orchid or not.

16. Nanak Chand (PW-11) has stated that he along with others

stayed at Rajiv Farm till about 4.50 pm on 07.06.2005. The appellant

had mentioned to PW-9 during lunch time that he was to go to Uppal

Orchid for demolition. However, he does not claim to have gone to

Uppal Orchid but also is not categorical whether the appellant had

gone to Uppal Orchid along with beldars and other persons from the

MCD for the purposes of demolition.

17. Thus, there is no direct evidence about the police party having

gone to Uppal Orchid for the purposes of demolition and similarly

there is no direct evidence also with respect to the appellant not having

gone at Uppal Orchid for demolition.

18. There are some of the witnesses namely Ran Singh (PW-30);

Ram Prasad (PW-31); Jarman Singh (PW-33); Ganesh Beldar (PW-

35); Satish Kumar (PW-36); Bhagwan Dass (PW-38) and Satya

Narayan (PW-39) etc, who have stated that the appellant went from

Rajiv farm house along with beldars on 07.06.2005 around lunch time.

19. On behalf of the appellant, it has been argued that there was no

evidence of any money transaction between the appellant and the

management of Uppal Orchid. It has further been argued that some of

the witnesses who were named in the first and second charge sheet

have inexplicably been dropped and not brought before the Court. It

was asserted that the appellant had correctly recorded in his report

dated 07.06.2005 (Exh.PW-2/D6) that part demolition was carried out

at Uppal Orchid. This report, it has been stressed, finds support from

the deposition of Abdul (PW-13), Om Prakash (PW-26); Lekh Ram

(PW-21) and Man Singh (PW-34), all of whom are stated to have

taken part in the demolition at the second place i.e at Uppal Orchid

Motel. Other witnesses have also testified to the fact that from Rajiv

Farmhouse, the appellant had moved to another site. It has further

been argued that only because the police party had not accompanied

the appellant, that by itself would not render the report about

demolition doubtful. Demolition can also be carried out, it has been

argued, without the police force, which procedure also has been

testified to by some of the witnesses.

20. The other limb of argument on behalf of the appellant is that the

report of the concerned persons which forms part of the investigation

papers completely establishes the fact that demolition had taken place

at Uppal Orchid and that the defence witnesses, which include a PRO

of Uppal Group of Companies have testified that demolition had taken

place.

21. Thus, what has been stressed upon on behalf of the appellant is

that no direct evidence has been led by the prosecution to establish

that no demolition had taken place at Uppal Orchid on 07.06.2005 and

that the appellant was not, while being examined under Section 313 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, confronted with the question as to

why did he say that he had gone to Uppal Orchid for demolition along

with the police party. It has been argued that the appellant was all

through of the view that he was to defend himself against the charge

of preparing a false report only. Thus the aforesaid material regarding

majority of the witnesses from Kapashera Police station not testifying

to the fact of their having gone at Uppal Orchid, cannot be

used/pressed to the disadvantage of the appellant.

22. Lastly, it was argued that the file of Uppal Orchid was never

closed and even if the demolition had not taken place on that day, it

would have some day been demolished. There was no gain to the

Motel and no corresponding gain to the appellant. Admittedly, no

money trail between the appellant and the Motel could be established.

Consequently, offence under Section 218 of the IPC which provides

for punishment to a public servant for framing incorrect record or

writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from

forfeiture, is not made out. Similarly, no offence can at all be said to

have been made out under Section 417 of the IPC as nobody has been

cheated. For establishing the offence of cheating, senior officers like

B.S.Yadav and others, had necessarily to be brought to the witness

box by the prosecution so as to bring home charges of

cheating/inducement. Since no money trail or telephonic call could be

established between the appellant and the management of the Motel,

the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C

Act, 1988 can also conclusively be stated to have not been made out.

23. The prosecution, it has been argued, failed miserably and the

Trial Court was not justified in convicting and sentencing the

appellant.

24. On behalf of the CBI, Ms.Rajdipa Behura, submitted that there

was no dispute with respect to an unauthorized construction made at

Uppal Orchid Motel, Samalkha. What is in dispute is the correctness

of the report dated 07.06.2005 (Exh.PW-2/D6) given by the appellant

that part demolition of the Motel had taken place. It was submitted

that during the trial, the appellant had taken a contradictory stand that

he had gone along with few beldars from Rajiv farmhouse to Uppal

Orchid for demolition and had not taken police force with him. It was

also pointed out by the CBI that the appellant had admittedly recorded

his notings on several dates that demolition action at Uppal Orchid

Motel could not take place because of non-availability of police force.

It was, therefore, questioned by the CBI that under what

circumstances, the appellant did not consider the importance of the

police force on 07.06.2005 for carrying out demolition. It was further

contended that the police officers from the Kapashera police station

have clearly deposed before the Trial Court that on 07.06.2005,

demolition proceedings had been conducted only at one place namely

Rajiv Farmhouse at Bijwasan road. Most of those witnesses from the

police station have also deposed that the appellant remained present

throughout the demolition at Rajiv farmhouse till about 5 pm. This, it

has been argued, renders the report dated 07.06.2005 of the appellant

absolutely false. Most of the beldars who have been cited as

prosecution witnesses have also unequivocally stated that demolition

proceedings had taken place only at Rajiv farm house, Bijwasan, New

Delhi on 07.06.2005.

25. From the conspectus of the entire records, it appears that the

FIR was registered on the basis of a preliminary enquiry which was

initially directed against one R.P.Dabas, Executive Engineer

(Building), MCD, Najafgarh zone, New Delhi. The enquiry ultimately

led to the registration of the FIR against three persons but only the

appellant was put on trial. The ground taken by the CBI for not

sending up the other two viz. the Executive Engineer referred to above

and the management of the Uppal Orchid Motel is that there was no

material against them for their prosecution. It does not appear to be

probable that the Executive Engineer would not have known that there

had not been any demolition at Samalkha i.e. at the Uppal Orchid

Motel. The other aspect which strikes the Court is that the notice of

demolition was received by the management of the hotel and in fact

the demolition charges also were paid. It could be argued that with the

proposal of demolition and payment of demolition charges of a lesser

amount, the gaze of the MCD would have been diverted for any

further demolition or action at the hotel but to jump to such a

conclusion, necessary/positive evidence were required to be pitched in

by the prosecution. Admittedly, the file of the Uppal Orchid Motel has

not been closed. The prosecution case against the Motel was initiated

on the report of the appellant only. Several attempts were made,

according to the evidence, by the appellant to have the unauthorized

construction demolished but such attempts did not succeed. It appears

rather curious and not clearly understandable as to why on 07.06.2005,

no resistance was met by the appellant in demolishing the structure. It

also is, in a way, obtuse that the appellant did not consider necessary

to take the police force with him at the Motel for the demolition when

in the past such attempts at demolition could not succeed because of

the non-availability of the police force. But that cannot be the sole

basis for taking a view that no demolition had taken place at the Motel

and the report forwarded by the appellant on 07.06.2005 was a false

report. If it were a false report, it ought to have been with the approval

of the superior staff of the MCD or else the report would not have

been accepted. The fact that the entire issue was raked up by the

appellant; the file of the Motel was not closed after partial demolition

and; the report about partial demolition give an impression that

perhaps some demolition action had taken place at the Motel.

26. What is even more surprising is that if deliberately false report

was submitted and that was only for the purposes of helping the

Motel, there was no reason for the CBI to have not sent up the

management of the Motel for facing trial. If an act which is said to

have been unauthorisedly done and it does not give any benefit to the

person, then that act cannot be stated to be, for any gainful acquisition

for the wrong doer. If Uppal Orchid Motel was not benefitted and was

not put on trial, there would be no justification for trying and

convicting the appellant who allegedly was trying to help the Motel.

On this score alone, the prosecution case becomes doubtful. The

charges against the appellant are under Section 218 and 417 of the IPC

apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act,

1988. For bringing home charge of inducement/cheating, it was

absolutely necessary for the prosecution to have brought the superior

officers of the MCD as witnesses. Not having done so, the prosecution

has failed to put forth positive evidence regarding

cheating/inducement. For the report to be held as false and for

prosecution of the petitioner for forwarding such false report, it was

necessary to try the management of the Motel also.

27. Section 218 of the IPC reads as under:-

218. Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture.--Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such public servant, charged with the preparation of any record or other writing, frames that record or writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or other charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

28. For the offence under Section 218 IPC to be established, it

would be of extreme importance that the public servant who is being

prosecuted, ought to know that the report which is being forwarded is

incorrect and that it is for the purpose of causing loss or injury to

public or to save any person from illegal punishment or save a

property from being forfeited. If there is no evidence on record

brought forward by the prosecution that Uppal Orchid Motel was

benefitted in any manner, then the prosecution under Section 218 must

necessarily fail. If there would have been any gain to the Motel, it was

necessary for the management of the Motel to have been tried for

establishing whether the report dated 07.06.2005 enured in his favour

and that it was deliberately done for helping the management of the

Motel.

29. Similarly, this Court is at a loss to understand as on what

material, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced under

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1988.

Admittedly, there is no telephonic call or any evidence in support of

any monetary gain by the appellant at the instance of the management

of the Uppal Orchid Motel.

30. Way back in the year 1969, the Supreme Court in Hanumant

Vs. State of M.P: AIR 1952 SC 343 held that in cases where the

offence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully

established and all the facts so established should be consistent with

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court went on

to say that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and

tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but

the one proposed to be proved.

31. The aforesaid view of the Supreme Court has been uniformly

followed till date (refer to Tufail (alias) Simmi vs. State of U.P:

(1969) 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal vs. State of Maharashtra: (1972) 4

SCC 625 and Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra:

(1973) 2 SCC 793).

32. Thus what was held in the aforesaid cases was that there must

be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused

and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the

act must have been done by the accused.

33. The Supreme Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of

Maharashtra (Supra) has held as follows:-

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between „may be‟ and „must be‟ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused

34. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra:

(1984) 4 SCC 116, the aforesaid five principles have been

characterized as five golden principles, the panchsheel for the proof of

a case on circumstantial evidence.

35. Section 13(2) and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 read as hereunder:-

Section 13(1)(d) in The Prevention of Corruption Act,

(d) if he,--

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or Section 13(2) in The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

36. For establishing the offence under the aforesaid sections, the

ingredients of the public servant having abused his position and by

abusing that position he has obtained for himself or any other person

any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, has to be proved.

37. In C.Chenga Reddy vs. State of A.P: (1996) 10 SCC 193, the

Supreme Court has held as under:-

"22. On a careful consideration of the material on the record, we are of the opinion that though the prosecution has established that the appellants have committed not only codal violations but also irregularities by ignoring various circulars and departmental orders issued from time to time in the matter of allotment of work of jungle clearance on nomination basis and have committed departmental lapse yet, none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are of any conclusive nature and all the circumstances put together do not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the said circumstances are compatible only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants and wholly incompatible with their innocence. In Abdulla Mohammed Pagarkar v. State (UT of Goa, Daman and Diu) [Abdulla Mohammed Pagarkar v. State (UT of Goa, Daman and Diu), (1980) 3 SCC 110 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 546] , under somewhat similar circumstances this Court opined that mere disregard of relevant provisions of the Financial Code as well as ordinary norms of procedural behaviour of government officials and contractors, without conclusively establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the officials and contractors concerned, may give rise to a strong suspicion but that cannot be held to establish the guilt of the accused. The established circumstances in this

case also do not establish criminality of the appellants beyond the realm of suspicion and, in our opinion, the approach of the trial court and the High Court to the requirements of proof in relation to a criminal charge was not proper."

38. Thus tested on every count, the prosecution case seems to be

faltering.

39. As such, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is set

aside and the appellant is acquitted of all charges. His liabilities under

the bail bonds are discharged.

40. The Trial Court records be sent back.

41. A copy of this judgment be communicated to the

Superintendent of the concerned jail for information and record.

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J OCTOBER 10, 2017 k