The Hindu Educational Trust vs University Of Delhi And Anr.
2017 Latest Caselaw 2750 Del

                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                    Judgment reserved on: January 30, 2017
                                                    Judgment delivered on: May 30, 2017

+        W.P.(C) 494/2013
+        W.P.(C) 616/2013
+        W.P.(C) 1174/2013 and CM Nos. 28932/2016 and 19213/2014

         THE HINDU EDUCATIONAL TRUST
         THE INDRAPRASTHA EDUCATIONAL TRUST
         DAULAT RAM COLLEGE SOCIETY, DELHI AND ANR                            ..... Petitioner(s)

                                    Through:   Mr. Manu Seshadri, Mr. Ishan Bisht and Ms. Sahiba
                                               Ahluwalia, Advs. (in W.P.(C) 494/2013 &
                                               1174/2013)
                                               Mr. G.K. Mishra, Adv. (in W.P.(C) 616/2013)
                           versus

         UNIVERSITY OF DELHI AND ANR                             ..... Respondents

                                    Through:   Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Mohinder
                                               J.S. Rupal and Ms. Simran Jeet, Advs.


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
                                               JUDGMENT

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

1. As the reliefs prayed for in all these writ petitions being the same with more or less

identical facts, the same are being disposed of by this common order / judgment. Suffice to

state the primary prayer in these petitions is for quashing of Executive Council Resolution

No. 51 dated November 3, 2012. I may point out here that in Writ Petition (C) No.

1174/2013, the prayer also includes for quashing of Executive Council Resolution NO. 289

dated 21st August, 1975 and Resolution No. 138 dated 11th February, 2003.

Writ Petition (C) No. 494/2013

2. The facts as noted from the writ petition are, the Hindu College Society came to be

registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 on October 24, 1945.

It is the case of the petitioner that the Society has framed its own Rules and Regulations.

The society was to consist of 15 members, out of which 10 members were to be nominated

by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner. The remaining 5 members were to comprise of

the Principal of Hindu College, Delhi, 2 members of the teaching staff of the Hindu College

and 2 members appointed by the respondent no.1, i.e., University of Delhi. All the

members of the Society were the members of the Governing Body of Hindu College, Delhi

and the members could hold office for not more than a year at a time, but were eligible for

re-appointment without any limitation on the number of terms already served on the

Governing Body of the Hindu College. It is the case of the petitioner that the Hindu

College was initially affiliated to Punjab University. However with the creation of the

University of Delhi, Hindu College came to be affiliated with the said University. It is the

case of the petitioner that the Rules and Regulations of the petitioner as well as the Hindu

College providing for appointment of members to the Governing Body amongst other

things have been approved by the respondent no.1 under Statute 30 (1)(C). It has been

appointing the members of the Governing Body of Hindu College in accordance with and

subject to the Rules and Regulations for a term of one year as stipulated by Ordinance

XVIII. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no.1 in the past has always

approved the appointment of members of the Governing Body of the Hindu College as

made by the petitioner. It is stated that the Executive Council of the respondent no.1,

University framed model Rules for composition and mode of appointment of the Governing

Body of the various colleges vide Executive Council Resolution no. 66 dated April 27,

1963, Executive Council NO April, 23, 1966 and Resolution No. 320 (a) dated November

19, 1966. It is stated that model Rules were never given effect to. It also contemplated that

the constitution, composition, term of office of members and Chairmanship of the

Governing Body has to be in accordance with Statute 30 read with Ordinance XVIII of the

Delhi University Act. Respondent no.1 vide Executive Council Resolution No. 289 dated

August 21, 1975 laid down guidelines for appointment of members of Trust nominees on

the Governing Body of a college. As per the guidelines amongst other things, the Trust was

advised to forward a panel of names to the University consisting of not less than 50% more

names than required numbers. It is the stand of of the petitioner that the guidelines of the

year 1975 were not having any statutory force and were not binding on the respondent no.1,

Hindu College, Delhi. Even otherwise, the said guidelines were contrary to Statute 30

(1)(C) which provides that Governing Body shall consist of not more than 20 members and

that the Rules relating to composition of the Governing Body should conform to the Statute

and Ordinance of the University and the conditions of the Government grant to the College.

The Statute nowhere stipulates that the Trust has to forward a panel of names containing not

less than 50% more names than the required number. It is averred in the writ petition that

on September 10, 1997, respondent no.1, University of Delhi informed the Hindu College,

respondent no.2 herein that the Vice-Chancellor constituted a committee to recommend

modalities/guidelines for nomination of Members on the Governing Body of the Colleges

affiliated to the Delhi University including the proposal to have uniform policy of having 10

trust nominees on the Governing Body of all the colleges, out of which not less than 50%

should be from the panel prepared by the Executive Council of the University. It is the case

of the petitioner that the Board of the petitioner considered the aforesaid proposal of the

respondent no.1 and decided that the system of nominating 10 members of the Governing

Body by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner has been in practice for the last 40 years and

has been functioning well in so far as the Trust Colleges were concerned. No development

took place thereafter in the matter and the Board of Trustees of the petitioner continued to

make nomination of 10 members to the Governing Body of the Hindu College. It was only

vide Resolution No. 138 dated 11th February, 2003, respondent no.l formulated guidelines

for nominating members of the Governing Bodies of Trust Colleges wherein it was

provided that no member shall serve on the Governing Body of a Trust College for more

than 5 terms. It is the case of the petitioner that the said Resolution is contrary to Ordinance

XVIII (3)(1) and has no statutory force inasmuch as the said Ordinance provides that the

member of the Governing Body shall hold office for a period of one year and shall be

eligible for re-appointment or re-election. Thus, there is no restriction in Ordinance XVIII

that a person cannot be re-appointed / re-nominated as a member of the Governing Body if

he has earlier been appointed for 5 times. For the year 2008-2009, the petitioner had sent

10 names for appointment as members of the Governing Body to Hindu College, Delhi.

Respondent no.1 in response thereto vide letter dated January 24, 2008 to the Principal of

the Hindu College stated that the matter of appointment of the trust and nominees was being

considered at appropriate level and the names sent by the College for nomination on the

Governing Body is not in accordance with the guidelines of the Executive Council vide

Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975 and Resolution No. 138 dated February, 11,

2003. It was further requested that a panel of 50% more names along with the Bio-Data

including those of at least 2 women, be sent for nomination as trust nominees on the

Governing Body of the Hindu College, Delhi. The petitioner vide its letter dated February 2,

2008 conveyed its remarks on the stand taken by the respondent no.1 / University. It is the

case of the petitioner that the Vice-Chancellor approved the names forwarded for

appointment as Trust nominees to the Governing Body vide its letter dated August 12,

2009. In other words, the guidelines so referred to are only of a persuasive value and were

in reality never implemented. On August 23, 2011, the petitioner forwarded to the

Principal of Hindu College, Delhi the names of 10 members for appointment to the

Governing Body of the College for the year 2011-12, which was further forwarded to the

respondent no.1 / University. It is the case of the petitioner that a representation dated

November 4, 2011 was made to the respondent no.1 for approving 10 members nominated

by the petitioner to the Governing Body for the year 2011-12. It is averred that the term of

the last Governing Body expired on August 31, 2011. Due to failure of the respondent no.1

to appoint the nominees to the Governing Body of the Hindu College, Delhi, it is

functioning with a truncated Governing Body that does not contain the persons nominated

by the petitioner in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. It received a

communication dated November 11, 2011 from the respondent no.1, wherein it was directed

by the respondent no.1 that four members, namely Shri Desh Raj Gupta, Shri S.N.P. Punj,

Shri Raj Kumar Gupta and Shri T.P. Gadodia have already availed more than 4 terms as

trust nominees on the Governing Body. They should be replaced and proposal for

nomination of trust nominees on the Governing Body of the Hindu College as per the

guidelines approved by the Executive Council be sent by the Hindu College for

consideration of the respondent no.1. Subsequently, yet another communication dated

January 5, 2012 was received by Hindu College from the respondent no.1 wherein, the

College has been called upon to send the panel of Trust nominees in accordance with the

guidelines for consideration by the Executive Council. It is averred that communications

dated November 11, 2011 as well as January 5, 2012 of the respondent no.1 were

challenged in W.P.(C) No. 537/2012. During the pendency of the said writ petition,

respondent no. 1 has approved the names of six persons to be members of the Governing

Body on January 24, 2012. During the hearing of the writ petition, the respondent no.1

framed norms vide the Executive Council Resolution No. 51 dated November 3, 2012

relating to the composition of the Governing Body. Accordingly, the present writ petition

has been filed challenging the Executive Council Resolution No. 51 dated November 3,

2012.

Writ Petition (C) No. 616/2013

3. The petitioner is a registered Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. As

required by the relevant provisions of the Delhi University Act, Statutes, the Ordinance and

the Rules of the respondent no.1, the management and affairs of the respondent no.2

College is run by the Governing Body. The constitution of the Governing Body, the

number of members in the Governing Body, the representation of the nominated members

by the petitioner to the Governing Body and entitlement of the members of the Governing

Body to seek re-election / re-nomination and the tenure of the Governing Body are laid

down in the Rules of the respondent no.2, which is in conformity with the Ordinances of the

respondent no.1 and the Resolution no. 211 of 1969 passed by the Executive Council of the

respondent no.1. The relevant part of the Rules of respondent No.2 containing the

constitution of the Governing Body; Tenure of the Governing Body and the entitlement to

the members to seek re-election as Members of the Governing Body are as under:

"Rule 1 The Governing Body of the Society shall consist of fifteen members.

(ii) Ten, of whom at least two shall be women, shall be appointed by the Indraprastha Educational Trust, two by the University of Delhi, two shall be elected by the teaching staff of the College from among members of the staff of more and less than ten years service respectively, and the Principal of the College shall be a member ex officio.

(iii) Members appointed by the Indraprastha Educational Trust shall hold office for not more than three years at a time, members appointed by the University for such period as the University may determine, not being more than three years, and elected members for such period, not being less than one year, as the Governing Body may determine, but all members shall be eligible for re-appointment or re-election.

(iv)................................

(v).................................

Rule 2

(i) The Governing Body shall elect from among its own members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, one of whom shall be a woman, each of whom shall hold office for a period not exceeding three years, if that does not extend beyond his current term as a member of the Governing Body but shall be eligible for re-election.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that the foresaid Rule, which is part of overall Rules of

respondent no.2 is in conformity with Ordinance XVIII Clause 3 (1), which reads as under:

3.(1) The members of the Governing Body, other than the Principal, shall hold office for a period of one year and shall be eligible for re-appointment or re-election, provided that in respect of teacher's representatives provisions of Sub-Clause (2) of this Clause shall apply.

Provided that on the expiry of one year the Executive Council may, either on the request of the Trust / Delhi Administration or on its own, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that the

circumstances so warrant, extent the term of the existing nominees of the Trust / Delhi Administration on the Governing Body for a further period not exceeding six months but not more than three months, at a time.

Provided further that on the grant of approval by the Executive Council the existing office bearers of the Governing Body shall continue to function as such for the extended period.

(2)...........................

(3) The Governing Body shall elect from among its own members a Chairman to hold office for one year provided that this does not exceed his current term as member of the Governing Body and shall be eligible for re-election."

5. The petitioner has referred to Resolution 211 of 1969 which aspect has already been

referred to Writ Petition (C) 494/2013. It is the case of the petitioner that ever since the

respondent no.2 Society has been affiliated with the respondent no.1, the petitioner has been

nominating 10 members for appointment as members of the Governing Body of the

respondent no.2 and the respondent no.1 every time has approved the said 10 nominees as

members of the Governing Body of the respondent no.2. It is the case of the petitioner that

where the Rules of the respondent no.2 provides for 3 years as tenure of the Governing

Body and where the tenure as mentioned in the Ordinance is of one year, the respondent

no.2 has been following the tenure of one year as provided in the aforesaid Ordinance. The

petitioner has referred to Executive Council‟s Resolution no. 289 dated August 21, 1975,

No. 234 of February 28, 1980 and Executive Council resolution No. 138 of February 11,

2003. It is the case of the petitioner that Resolution No. 138 of February 11, 2003, wherein

it was decided that no member shall serve on the Governing Body of a Delhi Government

College ordinarily for more than 2 consecutive terms and of a Governing Body of a Trust

College for more than 5 terms, it was not made enforceable for the Governing Body for

entire period between 2003-2011. In other words, during the aforesaid period, ongoing

practice of nomination of 10 members by the petitioner and appointment of the said 10

members by the respondent no.1 to the Governing Body of respondent no.2 has been un-

interruptedly followed. In the year 2011-2012, petitioner wrote a letter dated January 13,

2011 to the respondent no.2 which contained 10 names nominated by the petitioner for the

Governing Body for the year 2011-2012 and requested the respondent no.2 that the said

names be forwarded to the respondent no.1 for appointment as members of the Governing

Body. Respondent no.1 vide its letter dated January 21, 2011 raised an issue that the

nominations of 10 names as made by the petitioner and forwarded by the respondent no.2 to

the respondent no.1 was not in accordance with the Executive Council Resolution No. 289

dated August 21, 1975 and Executive Council Resolution No. 138 dated February 11, 2003.

The respondent no.1 vide its letter dated July 6, 2011 communicated to the respondent no.2

approval of only 8 names out of 10 names so nominated by the petitioner and forwarded by

the respondent no.2 for appointment as members of the Governing Body for the year 2011-

2012. Respondent no.1 did not consider the two remaining names on the alleged ground

that the said two members had served the Governing Body for 5 terms and therefore they

were allegedly not eligible for reappointment to the Governing Body in accordance with the

2003 guidelines. The petitioner through respondent no.2 wrote letters dated August 19,

2011 and October 22, 2011 stating that the guidelines of 1975 and 2003 are against the

relevant Statutes and the Rules of the respondent no.2. Respondent no.1 did not consider

the request of the petitioner and the tenure of the Governing Body was not extended as

sought by the petitioner. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition no. 3369 of 2012 seeking

declaration of the guidelines bearing Executive Council resolution No. 138 of 2003 as

arbitrary. The said writ petition was withdrawn on 29 th May, 2012 to give a detailed

representation to the University. The petitioner also filed another Writ Petition bearing no.

W.P.(C) 3552/2012 seeking direction to the respondent no.1 to extend the term of the

Governing Body for a further period of 3 months. In terms of order dated May 29, 2012

passed in W.P.(C) 3369/2012, the petitioner made a detailed representation dated 6th June,

2012 to the respondent no.1 whereby the petitioner categorically explained that the said

Resolutions bearing Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975 and Resolution No. 138

dated February 11, 2003 were against the Statutes and Ordinance and other provisions of

the Delhi University Act. In June, 2012, the tenure of the Governing Body of the

respondent no.2 expired and the respondent no.1 without considering the long term demand

made by the petitioner for extension in the existing Governing Body arbitrarily formed a

truncated Governing Body for the Management and running of respondent no.2 / College.

On 9th June, 2012, the petitioner forwarded a list of 10 Trust Members to the respondent

no.1 for their approval for Governing Body for the period 2012-2013. It is the case of the

petitioner that the respondent no.1 has been arbitrarily insisting upon the enforcement of the

said disputed guidelines. It also adhering to the disputed guidelines of 1975 and 2003, only

approved six names out of ten names as forwarded by the petitioner vide its letter dated 9 th

June, 2012. It is stated that despite the matter being subjudice, resolutions were sought to

be implemented. It is stated that without deciding the representation of the petitioner dated

6th June, 2012, respondent no.1 has come up with another Executive Council Resolution no.

51 of November 3, 2012 which, instead of correcting the stand of the respondent no.1 on the

issue of constitution of the Governing Body has sought to make it mandatory its stand on

those issues as contained in Executive Council Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975

and Executive Council No. 138 dated February 11, 2003. It is the case of the petitioner that

the said Resolution is not only the reiteration of the earlier guidelines of 1975 and 2003, but

further additions are contrary to the basic tenets of allowing Society to have its nominees on

the Governing Body and work as a team. The Resolutions are challenged on the ground

that they are in violation of 30 (1) (C) (i) of the Statute and further in contravention of

second proviso to Section 29 of the Act and Ordinance XXVIII.

Writ Petition (C) No. 1174/2013

6. It is the case of the petitioner that it was established on March 3, 1960 as Daulat Ram

Public Trust Education Society. In the year 1964, the name of the Society was changed to

Daulat Ram College Society. It is a constituent College of the University of Delhi and the

Memorandum of Association of the Society is approved by the University. It is stated that

the Memorandum of Association of the College inter alia provides that the affairs of the

College shall be administered by the Governing Body which shall be constituted as

mentioned in the Rules. It is also provided that Society shall have the power to frame Rules

for the administration of the Society and the College which should conform to the

provisions laid down in the Statutes and Ordinance of the University and the conditions of

Government grant to the College.

7. On the aspect of members of the Governing Body it is stipulated in the Rules that the

constitution of the Governing Body shall be those laid down by the provisions of the

University Statute and Ordinance or such amendments that may be made from time to time.

It is also stated that the College shall have a regularly constituted Governing Body

consisting of not more than twenty persons approved by the Executive Council and

including amongst others at least two representatives of the University and at least 3

representatives of the teaching staff of whom the Principal of the College shall be one. It is

also stipulated that the number of representatives of the Daulat Ram Public Trust shall not

exceed 2/3rd of the total membership of the Governing Body. It is also provided that the

members of the Governing Body other than the Principal and the teachers representatives

shall hold the office for three years and be eligible for re-appointment or re-election. It is

also stated that personnel of the Governing Body shall be approved by the Executive

Council of the University of Delhi and the membership will become operative only after it

has been approved by the Executive Council. The petitioner has also referred to

Resolutions dated November 19, 1966, August 21, 1975, Resolutions No. 689 of 1980 and

Resolution dated February 11, 2003. It is also stated that every year the respondent

University approved the Governing Body‟s list of 10 nominees. It is also averred that on

March 5, 2002, a communication was sent by the petitioner Society to the Principal of the

College re-nominating 9 Trust Nominees and nominating one new Trust Nominee to the

Governing Body of the College. The list so sent to the Principal was forwarded by the

Principal to the respondent University and in response thereto on April 11, 2002,

respondents / University sent a communication to the Principal of the College for the first

time requesting it to send 50% more names of Trust Nominees with their bio-data as per

information required vide Executive Council Resolution NO. 289 of August 21, 1975. A

response thereto was sent on April 22, 2002, stating that it is not possible for the Trust to

send 50% more names as for the last 33 years the Trust has never sent more than 10 names

as nominees which have been accepted by the University. It is stated that no self respecting

person of any status will offer himself for nomination specially to his name being rejected.

Again on April 16, 2003, the Principal of the College on behalf of the petitioner sent to the

respondent University for approval, a list of 10 Trust Nominees of the petitioner / Society to

be appointed on the Governing Body for that year. The said communication re-nominated

eight members and nominated two new nominees. One of these Trust Nominees had been

on the Governing Body since 1985 and two of the Trust Nominees had been on the

Governing Body since 1994. The entire list of Trust Nominees of the Governing Body was

approved by the respondents / University without demur on May 6, 2003. Similar is the

position with respect to approval of list of 10 Trust Nominees of the petitioner Society to

the Governing Body of the College for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06. It was against the

communication dated March 27, 2006 of the Principal of the College sent to the respondent

No.1 / University for approval, the list of 10 Trust Nominees of the petitioner Society to be

appointed on the Governing Body for the next term that the University vide its

communication dated May 9, 2006 requested the Trust to nominate 50% more names as

Trust Nominees and also include the names of two women as Trust Nominees to be

appointed on the Governing Body along with their bio-data for consideration of the

University. In response to the above communication on May 17, 2006, the Daulat Ram

College Society wrote to the Dean of the Colleges stating that the names forwarded to the

University have been forwarded after obtaining the consent of each nominee and to suggest

more names would cause embarrassment to the College as all nominees are highly qualified

and experienced persons fulfilling the requirements prescribed by the University in that

regard and in case a person has consented to be a Trust Nominee and is not appointed, no

one would consent to be nominated and subject himself being rejected. It is the case of the

petitioner that it has never sent more than ten names as its nominees on the Governing Body

for the last 37 years and the same has always been acceptable to the University. In respect

of the proposal regarding nomination of two women members, it is stated that the Trust

would fulfil the said requirement in the next years panel as they had already sent the names

of ten members. On May 23, 2006, the respondents / University replied stating that the

Vice-Chancellor has approved the names of the Trust Nominees on the Governing Body of

the College for the stipulated period of 1 year. It is averred by the petitioner that in the year

2007-2008 the petitioner Society had sent the names of 10 Trust Nominees for being

appointed to the Governing Body of the College. Similarly, a communication as referred

above was sent by the University for sending 50% more names of Trust Nominees

including the names of two women to be appointed to the Governing Body, for which

response was sent by the petitioner. But the fact remains that the Vice-Chancellor has

approved the names of all the Trust Nominees to the Governing Body of College for a term

of one year. For the year 2008-2009, the Trust had forwarded the names of ten nominees

and a similar communication was sent by the respondents to the Trust to send 50% more

names of Trust Nominees including the names of two women members to be appointed to

the Governing Body, by relying on the Resolution Nos. 289 dated August 21, 1975 and 138

dated February 11, 2003. In response thereto, the Chairperson of the petitioner Society sent

a letter dated July 7, 2008 stating that all persons nominated are highly qualified individuals

who fulfilled the requirements of the University in that regard and suggesting more names

would cause a great deal of embarrassment as if the persons who have consented to be Trust

Nominees are rejected by the University, it would lead to no one ever consenting to be

nominated. Respondents / University vide their communication dated 14th August, 2008

yet again requested the petitioner to send at least 50% more names as per Executive Council

Resolution dated August 21, 1975 and Resolution 138 dated February 11, 2003 for

nomination to the Governing Body of the College. Similarly it is averred that on February

6, 2009, the Principal of the College sent to the respondents for approval a list of ten Trust

Nominees of the petitioner Society to be appointed on the Governing Body for the year.

The said communication re-nominated seven persons and nominated three new nominees.

One of the Trust Nominees has been on the Governing Body since 1985 and two Trust

Nominees have been on the Governing Body since 1994. On February 9, 2009, the

respondent approved the same without demur. On November 26, 2009, the Principal of the

College wrote to the respondent No.1 / University requesting it to grant approval to the

extension of the tenure of the Trust Nominees on the Governing Body approved by the

respondent vide letter date February 9, 2009 by three months. The approval sought was

granted without any demur. On July 5, 2010, the petitioner sent to the respondent

University for approval of list of nine Trust Nominees to be appointed on the Governing

Body for the year and stated that tenth nominees shall be communicated shortly. The nine

Trust Nominees were re-nominated. One of the Trust Nominees has been in Governing

Body since 1985 and two Trust Nominees had been on the Governing Body since 1994. In

the month of July, 2010, the respondent No.1 vide its letter dated 21/26th July, 2010 for the

first time since 2003 arbitrarily raised an objection in respect of the list of Trust Nominees

to the Governing Body on the ground that the proposal was not as per the guidelines of

Executive Council Resolution NO. 138 dated February 11, 2003, despite the fact that the

proposal was not different from every year since 2003 and was in conformity with the

guidelines of Executive Council dated February 11, 2003. On August 5, 2010, the

petitioner wrote to the respondents expressing its willingness to change one of the Trust

Nominees. It was further stated that except the trustees themselves and the office bearers,

no member has served on the Governing Body for a long period as stipulated. In respect of

treasurer, it was clarified that he is not only an office bearer, but being the treasurer on the

Governing Body, he is specially connected with OBC, Hostel construction, in the Common

Wealth Games Project and all related accounts as also college accounts. It is also stated that

as the College is celebrating its Golden Jubilee, thus continuity of Governing Body

members is essential. Accordingly on August 30, 2010, respondent No.1 sent a

communication approving the Governing Body. It was also stated that the petitioner should

ensure that while sending the proposal for nomination / re-nomination of the Trust

Nominees on the Governing Body of the College, the College should send a panel of

persons in accordance with the Executive Council guidelines and also the persons to be

nominated on the Governing Body should fulfil the requisite qualifications as contained in

the guidelines for appointment of persons as Trust Nominees. It is also stated that as the

Principal was to retire on September 30, 2010, the College advertised the post of the

Principal in National Dailies. Respondents arbitrarily sent a communication dated

September 28, 2010 to the petitioner stating that UGC has notified new qualification for the

post of the Principal and the Executive Council is yet to amend the relevant Ordinance of

the University with regard to five years term post, directed the petitioner to keep the matter

of appointment of a new Principal in abeyance. Consequently, the petitioner College has

been functioning without a Principal since September 30, 2010 and in every six months a

senior most teacher has to be appointed as an acting Principal in accordance with applicable

Statute. It is also averred that different posts of Assistant Professor / Lecturer are lying

vacant. On June 16, 2011 petitioner sent a list of ten Trust Nominees to the acting

Principal, who in turn send the communication to the respondent no.1 on June 16, 2011. Of

these 8 were re-nominated and two were new nominees. On July 13/14, 2011, respondents

wrote to the petitioner stating that the panel of Trust Nominees sent by the College for

nomination / re-nomination on the Governing Body is not in accordance with the Executive

Council guidelines and requested the College to provide the names and Bio-Data of the

nominees as per the guidelines.

8. It is averred that on August 9, 2011 upon receiving no confirmation of the Governing

Body, the Chairperson of the petitioner Society wrote to the respondents in continuation to

the letter dated July 22, 2011 and further through a telephonic conversation on August 7,

2011 stating that the guidelines are not compulsory and therefore need not be followed in

sense/spirit. It is further stated that since the guidelines stated that no Member shall serve

more than five terms, ordinarily this is directory and not mandatory provision and in

practice applied only to Members, who are trust nominees but not applicable to the trustees

themselves nor the office bearers. It is averred that certain persons are Members of the

parent trust, which nominates other Members/nominees, they are indispensable Members of

the Governing Body and there is no tenure of the sponsor Members. The petitioner referred

to the communication dated August 10, 2011 and August 30, 2011 made to the Vice

Chancellor calling upon him to look into the matter approving the Governing Body. A

reference is made to the communication dated September 7/8, 2011 to the petitioner

requesting for a panel of 50% more names of the trust nominees along with bio-data to be

provided in terms of Resolution No. 289 of August 21, 1975 and Resolution No.138 of

February 11, 2003. The Acting Principal of the College vide his communication dated

September 13, 2011, sought the attention of the University with respect to its earlier

communication and the fact that the University has not approved the list of the nominees on

the Governing Body and called upon the University to grant approval to the trust nominees

urgently.

9. In the writ petition, it is averred that a communication dated September 14, 2011 was

sent by the Acting Principal of the College stating that the Executive Council Resolution

No. 138 dated February 11, 2003 has superseded the Resolution No. 289 dated August 21,

1975 and thus, the requirement to send 50% additional names of trust nominees has not

been operative since 2003 and the demand of the University is in contravention of the

Resolution dated February 11, 2003. A reference is also made to communications dated

September 14, 2011 and September 29, 2011 seeking approval of trust nominees on the

Governing Body, already sent by the petitioner. A reference is also made to communication

dated October 4/7, 2011 of the University wherein the University has stated that the

Resolution No. 138 dated February 11, 2003 is only in addition to the Resolution No. 289

dated August 21, 1975 and therefore, requested the College to forward panel of names

containing not less than 50% more names than required numbers as per the University‟s

guidelines. A reference is also made to the communication dated October 10, 2011 of Mrs.

Sunita Sudershan wherein, she has objected to her being referred as Ex-Chairperson. That

apart, it is stated that the trust is not willing to provide any additional names for the

Universities to pick and choose from the trust on the ground that the trust has appointed

highly placed well educated individuals, who are voluntary nominees and not employees

and no such person would expect to be nominated subject to rejection by the University. A

reference is made to the communication dated October 11, 2011 of the Chairperson of the

petitioner Society; to the letter dated October 27/28, 2011 of the respondent University

calling upon it to send the list of the nominees as per the Executive Council Resolutions

approved from time to time. A reference is also made to the letter dated November 3, 2011

of the Chairperson of the petitioner; letter dated November 3, 2011 of the Acting Principal

of the College; letter dated November 4, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice Chancellor of

the respondent University; letter dated November 16, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice

Chancellor of the University; letter dated November 18, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice

Chancellor of the University; letter dated November 23, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice

Chancellor; letter dated December 14, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice Chancellor;

letter dated December 14, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Dean of the Colleges; letter dated

December 16, 2011 of the Chairperson to the Vice Chancellor; communications dated

December 16, 2011, December 20, 2011 reiterating their earlier stand. A reference is made

to the communication dated January 2, 2012 wherein it is stated that arbitrarily and

unreasonably an inspection was carried out 45 minutes before the official opening time of

the College and it was alleged that the Teachers were absent and classes were not being

held. The said letter was in the nature of a show cause notice why Delhi University should

not take disciplinary action. The said show cause notice was replied on January 6, 2012

denying the allegations made in the said show cause notice. On January 18, 2012, the

Deputy Registrar of the respondent sent a communication to the Acting Principal of the

petitioner College requesting her to put up an application for voluntary retirement before the

Governing Body and forward the recommendation to the respondent for approval of the

Competent Authority. A reference is made to a telephonic conversation on January 19,

2012 calling upon the Acting Principal to convene a meeting of truncated Governing Body

comprising of five persons minus(-) the ten trust nominees on January 24, 2012. The

recommendation of the respondents was communicated to the petitioner Society, which

vide its letter dated January 20, 2012 addressed to the Acting Principal advised the Principal

not to convene any meeting as suggested by the respondents in view of the fact there is no

regular Governing Body in the College. It is averred that the conduct of the University had

created confusion and chaos. A reference is also made to a Writ Petition No. 542/2012 filed

by the petitioners against the respondents‟ refusal to approve trust nominees of the

petitioner Society to the Governing Body and the enforcement of Executive Council

Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975 and Resolution No. 138 dated February 11,

2003. During the midst of the final hearing of the W.P. No. 542/2012, the respondent

passed Executive Council Resolution No. 51 on November 3, 2012 superseding the

previous two resolutions impugned in Writ Petition No. 542/2012.

10. The respondents have filed their counter-affidavit. I need not refer to the contents of

the counter affidavit as I intend to refer to the stand of the respondent University while

referring to the submissions made by Mr.Sudhir Nandrajog, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the University.

SUBMISSIONS

11. Mr. Manu Seshadri, learned counsel appearing in W.P.(C) Nos. 494/2013 and

1174/2013 apart from reiterating the facts as referred to above, would state that the Delhi

University had earlier framed Executive Council Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975

vide which the trust was advised to forward a panel of names containing not less than 50%

more names than required numbers and Resolution No. 138 dated February 11, 2003

providing that no Member shall serve on the Governing Body for more than five terms.

However, they were admittedly for guidance and were directory in nature and were never

given effect to. It was only in the year 1997, for the first time, the University asserted the

applicability of Executive Council Resolution No. 289 dated August 21, 1975 but upon the

petitioners‟ objection, it was withdrawn and the names of the Members of the Governing

Body were approved with observation that "the present system of nominating 10 Members

has been functioning well." Thereafter, till 2011, the same practice was followed and the

nominees of the petitioners were approved without demur. As such, it is apparent that the

University itself treated the said guidelines of 1975 and 2003 as directory and not

mandatory. In this context, he would rely upon the phrases like "the trust be advised" and

"the Council desire", which is sufficient to show that the impugned guidelines were merely

recommendatory and not mandatory. He states, that the guidelines are not mandatory is

also clarified by Executive Council resolution No. 687 dated February 15, 1980, which

reads as under:-

"The Council resolved that a copy of Executive Council Resolution NO. 289 dated

August 21, 1975 laying down the guidelines for appointment of persons as trust

nominees on the Governing Body be circulated to the Colleges from time to time for

their guidance."

12. He would also refer to Abid Hussain Committee vide Resolution No. 251 dated

October 14, 1996 recommending deletion of this guideline. He states that the impugned

Resolution seeking to interfere in the constitution of the petitioners‟ Governing Body, is in

breach of the petitioners‟ fundamental right to establish and administer an educational

institution and carry on an occupation guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Moreover, while the College is required to comply with the prescribed prerequisites as a

condition of recognition, the said conditions would be valid only if they pertain to the

academic and educational character of the Institution; but not if they lead to governmental

control of administration or interference in the constitution of Governing Bodies. He would

state, in any event, no conditions can be imposed unless such conditions are imposed by law

within the meaning of Article 19(6). According to him, Executive Council Resolutions are

not "Law" within the meaning of Article 19(6) but are admittedly Departmental Instructions

that do not have the force of law. He would state, the provisions of Section 29 provide for

amending, repealing and making new statutes. However, the second proviso restricts the

power of the Executive Council expressly in interfering with the extent of the autonomy,

which a College may have and the matters in relation to which such autonomy may be

exercised. He states, from a combined reading of the above provisions, it is apparent that

the restrictions on the autonomy of the college are subject to the provisions of Section 29.

He would further state, the powers and functions of Executive Council are defined under

Statute 6 and does not comprise the power to issue the said Notification, or take any action

that would have a direct impact on the autonomy vested in the petitioner to govern the

College. He states, the said notification would therefore be contrary to the Act, Statutes and

Ordinance. He would state, a conjoint reading of Section 29 of the Act with Statute 6

makes it clear that the Notification issued by the Executive Council and its imposition on

the Colleges is in the species of excessive legislation and colorable exercise of power to

usurp the control in the internal management of the Colleges. He would state, even

otherwise, the Executive Council does not have the power to make and adopt resolutions

prescribing any guidelines for nomination to the Governing Body. The power to make

resolutions must be statutorily delegated to the Executive Council. He would state that such

power has been given only in instances arising under Statute 6 sub clause (2) (ii). No

general power to make resolutions has been delegated to the Executive Council. The

resolutions are thus ultra vires.

13. He would state, Statute 30 provides that the college shall have a regularly constituted

Governing Body, consisting of not more than twenty persons approved by the Executive

Council and the rules relating to the composition and personnel of the Governing Body,

shall conform to the Statutes and the Ordinances as well as require approval of the

University. It is clear from the language of Statute 30, that the University has no power to

make rules (or resolutions) or amend them insofar as the management of petitioners is

concerned but only possesses the power to approve any such rules made in pursuance of

Statute 30(1)(C) during affiliation of the College with the University, and that the legitimate

authority and right to make rules lies with the college itself which is to be governed by such

rules. It is his submission that the University‟s involvement is restricted to ensuring that

such rules are in conformity with the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations of the Act and to

thereafter approve the same at the time of giving affiliation to the College. He would state

that the Rules of the petitioners relating to the composition of the Governing Body have

been approved by the respondents while granting affiliation to the University under the

Statute. He would state that the Memorandum of Association of the petitioner College has

been revalidated again on May 2, 1996. He would state, the respondents only have the

power to approve the personnel of the Governing Body so long as they are appointed in

compliance with the Ordinance, Statute, Act and Rules and do not have the power of

selection. They do not have the power of selection, which is plainly unsupported by the

language of the statute. Thus, they do not have the power to pick and choose and select

(which they are seeking to contend is power to approve/disapprove). Moreover, the source

of this alleged power is plainly not traceable to any of the provisions of the Act, Statute or

Ordinance and the University has not been able to pin point the source of this power which

they have conferred upon themselves. He states, Statute 30 provides the Executive Council

only the power of "approval" and not the power of "selection" of the personnel of the

Governing Body. The University, whose power has clearly been demarcated to the realm of

approval only, by requiring that the list of nominees forwarded contain 50% more names

than the required number seeks to confer discretion upon the Executive Council in deciding

which of the ten nominees to select out of 15. He would state, in conferring such power

upon itself, the University oversteps the precincts of the power prescribed by the Act. The

distinction between the power of approval and power of appointment has been recognized

by the courts and no authority is permitted to vest itself with one while it has expressly been

granted the other. He states, the University, via the impugned Notification seeks to

supersede Statute 30(1)(C) by clothing itself with the power of appointing the members of

the Governing Body of the college whereas it remains the prerogative of the college and it

exercises its prerogative as such by selecting its nominees for the Governing Body and

sending such list to the respondent for its approval. He would state, with respect to the

Governing Body, Ordinance XVIII clause (3)(1) provides that "The members of the

Governing Body, other than the Principal, shall hold office for a period of one year and

shall be eligible for reappointment or re-election". The language of the ordinance is clear.

It provides no limitation on the number of terms a person may serve as the member of a

Governing Body. On the contrary it specifically provides that the member of the Governing

Body shall be eligible for reappointment every one year. Anything that makes such person

ineligible for reappointment is thus contrary to the Ordinance. The University‟s argument

that providing a limit on the number of terms is only to "fill in a gap" in the statute is

therefore, on the face of it, incorrect, and obviously goes beyond the Statute and has the

effect of amending the Statute. Conscious exclusion of the Principal of the college and the

Teachers representatives reflects the fact that the legislature considered the aspect of which

members of the Governing Body should have limited terms and which should not. Hence

the omission of the legislature in providing for a specified number of terms that the

members may serve on the Governing Body, subject to re-election/re-appointment and after

approval by the Executive Council, is in fact a calculated one and not a gap or silence on

part of the law, open to be supplemented by executive instructions.

14. He would state, the Resolution dated November 03, 2012 inter alia providing that no

member shall serve on the Governing Body of a Trust College for more than five terms

overreaches and seeks to provide a stipulation not contemplated by the provisions of

Section 29, or Statute 30 or for that matter Ordinance XVIII. As such the limitation of five

terms in the Notification has no meaning in law and is liable to be set aside. He would

state, even otherwise the University is not entitled to interfere with the autonomy of the

colleges protected under the provisions of Section 29(2)(vii) of the Act read with the

applicable provisions by seeking to impose limitation of five years on the term of

Governing Body members. The imposition of the said Notification and action taken in

terms thereof is a colorable exercise of power and is in bad faith and liable to be struck

down. He would rely upon the following judgments in support of his contention:-

(i)      (2002) 8 SCC 481 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka;

(ii)     (2004) 6 SCC 224 Brahmo Samaj Educational Society v. State of W.B;

(iii)    (1986) 3 SCC 615 Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala;

(iv)     AIR 1988 Ori 130 Sukdev Singh and Ors v. State of Orissa;

(v)      (1964) 1 SCR 332 Kharak Singh v. State of UP;

(vi)     AIR 1967 SC 1170 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh.

(vii) ILR 2010 (4) Kerala 541 Parakkad Sree Bhagavath Devaswom v. Malabaw

Devaswom Board;

(viii) 2006(5) SCC 517 State of Tamilnadu and Anr. v. P. Krishnamurthy and others;

(ix) W.P.(C) 202/2014, Forum for Promotion of Quality Education for All v. The Lt.

Governor of Delhi and Ors decided on November 28, 2014.

15. Mr. G.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 616/2013 would reiterate and adopt the submissions as made by Mr. Manu Seshadri.

He has also filed short synopsis.

16. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, learned Senior Counsel for the Delhi

University would state that the petitioners being a Societies and not being a citizens of India

cannot allege infringement of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Rather, the University is

a statutory body and amongst other activities it is empowered to grant affiliation to colleges,

which may be admitted to such privileges as the University seeks to grant. No college has a

right, legal or fundamental, to affiliation or admission to the privileges of the University.

He would state, the grant of affiliation to a college and the admission to the privileges of the

University is subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the University. One of

such conditions is the constitution of the Governing Body of the College in accordance with

the guidelines of the University. He would state, the petitioners have not impleaded the

College, the affiliation of which has been regulated by the resolution of the Executive

Council. The Society cannot have a grievance in that regard and cannot espouse the cause

for any other institution particularly when there is no interference with the right of

management of the Society. The governance and administration of a college is distinct

from the management of the society which may have set up the College. The impugned

resolutions of the University do not in any manner interfere with the management of the

societies i.e the petitioners but only prescribe for the conditions to be fulfilled for the

Constitution of the Governing Body of the College. The Society and the College are

distinct and separate bodies and cannot be equated as alter egos of one another. Though the

citizen of the country have a fundamental right to form a society, the said fundamental right

does not extend to the attainment of the object for which the society has been formed. The

right to form and manage the parent society may be the fundamental right of its Members.

The society has also the right to pursue any activities that it may so desire, including the

setting up of an educational institution. However, there is no right whatsoever that the

College/educational institution set up by the society be granted affiliation to the University.

Establishing an educational institution is distinct from affiliation to the University.

17. He would state, the law of land is that the associations or unions of citizens cannot

further claim as a fundamental right that it must also be able to achieve the purpose for

which it has come into existence so that any interference with such achievement by law

shall be unconstitutional. A right to form association guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c)

does not imply the fulfillment of every object of an association as it would be contradictory

to the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental rights

guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It is further his submission, since the College has

no fundamental right to be granted affiliation to the University, the College must comply

with the requirements of the University to be granted continued affiliation. In case the

College has any grievance with the Rules, Regulations and Guidelines of the University,

nothing prevents the College from seeking affiliation from any other University and in case

the College seeks to do so, it will have to comply with the provisions of affiliation as may

be prescribed by any other University. He would state that the entire basis of the arguments

addressed by the petitioners primarily based on the plea that the impugned resolution

interferes in the autonomy of the Society and thus of the College is misplaced. He states,

Statute 30 of the University of Delhi Act more particularly Clause (C) reflects the supreme

power of the Executive Council which provides that "Colleges and other institutions within

the limits of State of Delhi, may be admitted to such privileges of the University as the

Executive Council may decide....". (Emphasis supplied). He states that Statute 30 (1)(C)

provides that the Governing Body of the college shall be approved by the Executive

Council. Further it is provided in the said Statute 30 (1)(C) that the Rule relating to

composition and personal of the Governing Body and those relating to other matters

affecting the management of the College will require the approval of the Executive Council.

Since admittedly there are no rules framed in this regard, therefore the need for the

resolution passed by the Executive Council which is impugned herein. He would state that

the impugned resolution of the Executive Council only supplements the Statutes and the

Ordinances. He would state, it is well laid down principle of law that even administrative

instructions are valid to fill up gaps and supplement the Statutory rules. Therefore, the

impugned Executive Council resolution cannot be held to be bad in the facts and

circumstances of the present case. The Executive Council is well within its power to pass

impugned resolution and there is no infirmity in passing such resolution by the Executive

Council in the light of said Statute 30 of the University of Delhi Act.

18. It is his submission that the present writ petition suffers from inherent

inconsistencies. He would state, admittedly the petitioners have been complying with the

major part of the impugned resolution dated November 3, 2012 passed by the Executive

Council of the respondent University. The petitioner has grievance only with respect to

Clause B 2(a) and Clause B 4(e) only. All other clauses have been duly accepted except for

the above two part of the clause 2 & 4. That in one case, the petitioner Society on one hand

has averred that earlier two resolutions dated August 21, 1975 (Executive Council

resolution No.239) and February 11, 2003 (Executive Council resolution No.138) have been

superseded by the resolution passed by the Executive Council on November 3, 2012

(Executive Council Resolution No.51) but at the same time the petitioner society is seeking

quashing of only one of earlier resolutions dated August 21, 1975 and the impugned

resolution dated November 3, 2012. The said impugned resolution is applicable to 20

colleges affiliated to the University of Delhi and only the Trust/Societies of the three

colleges have only impugned the said resolutions. In these circumstances the relief as

sought by the petitioners cannot be granted. The petitioners cannot accept a part of the

resolution and claim benefits under it and at the same time repudiate the remaining part of

the resolution and refuse to comply with the same. He would state, the petitioners admit

categorically that the University has the power to approve the names of the nominees

forwarded by the petitioners for appointment as Members of the Governing Body, total 10

in number. The power to approve inhere the power to disapprove any of the names of the

nominees forwarded by the petitioner Society. He would state, if the petitioner Society

sends only 10 names then it does not leave any power to approve, choose or select the

names by the University. Hence, the resolution of the Executive Council seeking 50% more

names than the required number i.e 15 names of nominees out of which the University shall

select 10 names to be Members of the Governing Body of the College concerned is valid

and proper. Moreover, admittedly the term of trust Members of Governing Body is only

one year w.e.f the date of appointment of such trust Member. If only 10 names are

forwarded by the petitioners and out of which few are not approved by the University then

fresh names shall be required to be submitted by the petitioner leading to undue delay and

laches which shall be detrimental to the affairs of the College and students. Hence calling

for 50% more names is therefore just and proper. He states, the Supreme Court in the

matter reported as AIR 1996 SC 149 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood

Products has held, "..now, it cannot be denied that the power to approve includes the power

to decline approval and the power to disapprove..".

19. He would deny that the University has converted, vide the impugned Executive

Council resolution, the power to approve into a power to appoint. It is admitted fact that the

University does not select the names of the nominees. This power vests only with the

petitioner Society. Hence, the names of the nominees proposed to be Members of the

Governing Body of the College concerned are all selected by the petitioner Society. None

of the names is provided by the University. The Ordinance XVIII has to be read

harmoniously along with Statute 30 and other provisions of the University of Delhi Act.

The petitioner Society is free to bring any new person of its choice in the Governing Body

of the College. The choice of forwarding the names as nominees wrests entirely in the

hands of the petitioner Society. He would state the University is only having the power to

approve such names forwarded by the petitioner Society then such provision has to be given

full effect. By impugning the subject Executive Council resolution, the petitioner Society

malafidely and mischievously is seeking abridgment of this power vesting in the University

of approval rather than to merely act as rubber stamp which is not the legal position at all.

Thus there is no alleged violation of fundamental right or colourable exercise of power by

the University. He would state, Section 17 of the University of Delhi Act lists the

authorities of University. The Executive Council is one such authority. Section 21 of the

said Act provides that, "the Executive Council shall be the executive body of the

University....". He would state, from the reading of Section 29 of the University of Delhi

Act, it is clear that the University is also empowered to deal even with the issue concerning

the extent of the autonomy of the College and the matters in relation to which such

autonomy may be exercised. The petitioners by filing the present writ petition in fact wants

to achieve fiefdom, which shall be detrimental to the interest of the educational institution

and students as a whole. Thus the cap of tenure of maximum five terms is not arbitrary or

illegal. However, to strike a balance, the Executive Council resolution dated November 3,

2012 does provide for appointment of two Members even after completion of five terms so

as not to deprive the petitioners to exceptional individuals to be on the Governing Body of

the College for more than five terms. He would state, that the College receives 95% grants

from the Government through UGC, primarily due to the fact that the College is affiliated to

University of Delhi. He would state, the Executive Council being the highest authority in

the University has a well-marked role in the working of the college and the resolution

passed by the Executive Council more particularly the impugned resolution is required to be

given full play and there is no illegality in the same. He would state, Statute 30 read with

Ordinance XVIII of the University of Delhi Act cannot be used by the petitioner Societies

to fulfil their mischievous object of creating a fiefdom for its 10 nominees on the Governing

Body of the College by pressing for the mechanical approval by the University of names of

the same 10 nominees every year infinitum. Such a reading militates against the very object

of bringing fresh talent from diverse fields and hence the need to put a cap of five terms on

a particular nominee of the petitioner‟s Society to be on the Governing Body of the College.

Though an exception has been carved out in the impugned resolution itself for two

nominees of the petitioner‟s Society. Such a provision in the impugned resolution

supplements Ordinance XVIII and does not contravene the same. He would state that this

Court in the case of Narinder Batra v. Union of India (supra) considered the validity of an

administrative guidelines and in para 239 has held that, "by the guidelines the Government

has not prohibited formation of an association, society or federation with regard to any

sport. It has only mandated that in order to be entitled to financial assistance or

recognition as a national level body by the Union Government, it would require to be a

society or an association or federation which enforces democracy by fixing the tenure of the

office bearers....". In para 241 of the said judgment, the Cout also noted that, "..if such a

tenure clause was not enforced, the office bearers could be repeatedly elected form the

particular region and continue to dominate the affairs of the association/federation after

having created a monopoly over the sport.". In para 242 of the said judgment, it has been

held that, "..a limited office tenure, certainly would have the impact of minimizing, if not

eliminating allegations, criticism and elements of nepotism, favouritism and bias of any

kind. In a country having a federal structure of the nature that India possesses, the office

bearers being in circulation and there being change in the representation on the executive

of a national level body would go a long way in promoting the diversity and expertise in the

sport". He would state, that the same ethos shall be applicable in the constitution and

composition of Governing Body of a College.

20. He would state, the petitioner Society has relied upon the judgment of the

Constitution Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), more particularly paras 50, 53 and

72. A bare perusal of these paras will show that in the present case these have no

application. In Brahmo Samaj Education Society (supra), the main question for

consideration was "whether the appointment of teachers through the selection of the

College Service Commission is permissible or not. In other words to decipher the role of

the State in the matter of appointment of teachers", which is not the case herein. The last

judgment cited by the petitioners is in the matter of Forum for Promotion of Quality

Education for All (supra). The para 1 of the said judgment itself shows that the same was

concerned "private unaided schools". The same is also apparent from the bare reading of

paras 114, 115 and 124 of the said judgment and hence has no application.

21. He states, the College is funded by the University Grants Commission to the extent of

95% of its expenditure. Even the remaining contribution of 5% is not entirely forthcoming

from the Society. Thus, the college in question cannot be equated with an unaided

educational institution. He state, 95% grant from the University Grants Commission is

primarily based upon the affiliation of the College to a recognized University, which

affiliation, as stated above, is subject to compliance with the requisite provisions as

stipulated by the University. He seeks the dismissal of the writ petitions. He would rely

upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:-

(i)      (2004) 1 SCC 712, Dharam Dutt v. Union of India;
(ii)     212 (2014) DLT 389 (DB) Indian Olympics Association v. Union of India;
(iii)    AIR 1967 SC 1910 Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan;
(iv)     ILR (2009) IV Delhi 280 Narinder Batra v. Union of India.

22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the written

submissions/synopsis filed by them insofar as the submissions made by Mr. Seshadri and

Mr. Mishra are concerned, they are the following:-

(i) The resolution No.51 dated November 3, 2012 stipulating (a) the trust will forward a

panel of names to the University containing not less than 50% more names than required

and (b) no Member shall serve on the Governing Body of trust College for more than five

terms, are in violation of fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) of the

Constitution of India to establish, administer educational institution and carry occupation.

(ii) That no such conditions could be imposed unless such conditions are imposed by law

within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

(iii) That both the stipulations are in violation of second proviso to Section 29 of the Act

of 1922, as it restricts(second proviso) the power of the Executive Council expressly

interfering with the extent of autonomy which a College may have and the matters in

relation to which such autonomy may be exercised and further under Statute 6, the power

and functions enumerated does not comprise the power to issue the said notification or take

any action that would have a direct impact on the autonomy vested in the petitioners to

govern the College.

(iv) The Executive Council has the power of approval and not power of selection of the

personnel of the Governing Body. The impugned stipulations are ultra-vires to Statute 30

and Ordinance XVIII.

23. Insofar as the first submission of Mr. Seshadri and Mr. Mishra that the stipulations in

the impugned resolution are in violation of Article 19(1)(g) is concerned, first I shall deal

with the objection of Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog that Society being not a "Citizen" of India,

cannot allege infringement of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. No doubt, the

Supreme Court, as far back as in 1963, in the case reported as AIR 1963 SC 811 State

Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and ors v. The Commercial Tax Officder

Vishakapatnam and ors, has held the freedoms contained under Article 19(1)(a) to 19(1)(g)

are available to the Citizens only and not to artificial persons, like a corporation. On the

same analogy, a Society being a separate legal entity, being not a Citizen cannot plead

violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and the aforesaid position has been

reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case reported as 2011 (3) SCC 193 Shree Sidhbali

Steels Ltd and ors v. State of U.P. and ors, wherein the Court held, that a company cannot

maintain a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of

the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, being not a Citizen

but this cannot be a ground to dismiss these petitions as the petitioners would be entitled to

claim right under Article 14 of the Constitution, that the stipulations in the impugned

resolution are arbitrary. Be that as it may, this Court is also of the view, the petitioners

cannot plead the stipulations in the impugned resolution violate Article 19(1)(g) of the

Constitution in view of the dicta of the Supreme Court in the case reported as AIR 1962 SC

171 All India Bank Employees Association v. National Tribunal. In the said judgment,

the question before the Court was the regulations of Union to go on strike. The petitioners

had urged that such regulations were impermissible, given the limited nature of restrictions

which could be imposed under Article 19(4). It was contended that the right to protest or

strike was one such concomitant right intrinsically protected under Article 19(1)(c). The

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the contention by observing as under:-

"the argument of the learned Counsel, viz., that the right guaranteed to form "an union" carries with it a concomitant right that the achievement of the object for which the union is formed shall not be restricted by legislation unless such restriction were imposed in the interest of public order or morality, that calls for critical examination. We shall be referring a little later to the authorities on which learned Counsel rested his arguments under this head, but before doing so we consider it would be proper to discuss the matter on principle and on the construction of the constitutional provision and then examine how far the authorities support or contradict the conclusion reached. The point for discussion could be formulated thus : When sub-clause (c) of cl.(1) of Art.19 guarantees the right to form associations, is a guarantee also implied that the fulfilment of every object of an association so formed is also a protected right with the result that there is a constitutional guarantee that every association shall effectively achieve the purpose for which it was formed without interference by law except on grounds relevant to the preservation of public order or morality set out in clause (4) of Article.19? Putting aside for the moment the case of Labour Unions to which we shall refer later, if an association were formed, let us say for carrying on a lawful business such as a joint stock company or a partnership, does the guarantee by sub-cl.(c) of the freedom to form the association, carry with it a further guaranteed right to the company or the partnership to pursue its trade and

achieve its profit-making object and that the only limitations which the law could impose on the activity of the association or in the way of regulating its business activity would be those based on public order and morality under clauses (4) of Article 19? We are clearly of the opinion that this has to be answered in the negative. An affirmative answer would be contradictory of the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental rights which are guaranteed by Part III and particularly by the scheme of the seven freedoms or groups of freedoms guaranteed by sub- clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1) of Art. 19. The acceptance of any such argument would mean that while in the case of an individual citizen to whom a right to carry on a trade or business or pursue an occupation is guaranteed by sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19, the validity of a law which imposes any restriction on this guaranteed right would have to be tested by the, criteria laid down by clause (6) of Article 19. if however he associated with another and carried on the same activity-say as a partnership, or as a company etc., he obtains larger rights of a different content and with different characteristics which include the right to have the validity of legislation restricting his activities tested by different standards, viz., those laid down in clause (4) of Art. 19. This would itself be sufficient to demonstrate that the construction which the learned Counsel for the appellant contends is incorrect, but this position is rendered clearer by the fact that Art. 19-as contrasted with certain other Articles like Articles 26, 29 and 30-grants rights to the citizen as such, and associations can lay claim to the fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article solely on the basis of their being an aggregation of citizens, i.e., in right of the citizens composing the body. As the stream can rise no higher than the source, associations of citizens cannot lay claim to rights not open to citizens,

or claim freedom from restrictions to which the citizens: composing it are subject.

The resulting position way, be illustrated thus If an association were formed' for' the purpose of arriving on business, the right to form it would be Guaranteed by sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 subject to any law restricting that right conforming to clause (4) of Article 19. As regards its business activities, however, and the achievement of the objects for which it was brought into existence, its rights would be those guaranteed by sub- clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 subject to any relevant law on the matter conforming to clause (6) of Article 19; while the property which the association acquires or possesses would be protected by sub-el. (f) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 subject to legislation within the limits laid down by cl. (5) of Art.

19. We consider it unnecessary to multiply examples to further illustrate the point. Applying what we have stated earlier to the case of a labour union the position would be this: while the right to form an union is guaranteed by sub-clause (c), the right of the members of the association to meet would be guaranteed by sub-el. (b), their right to move from place to place within India by sub-cl.(d), their right to discuss their problems and to propagate their views by sub- cl. (a), their right to hold property would be that guaranteed by sub-clause (f) and so on each of these freedoms being subject to such restrictions as might properly be imposed by clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 as might be appropriate in the context. It is one thing to interpret each of the freedoms guaranteed by the several Articles in Part III a fair and liberal sense, it is quite another to read which guaranteed right as involving or including 'Concomitant rights necessary to achieve the object which might be supposed to under lie the grant of each of those rights, for that construction

would, by a series of ever expanding concentric circles in the shape of rights. concomitant to concomitant rights and so on, lead to an almost grotesque result."

24. The Supreme Court in the case reported as AIR 1988 SC 1136 L.N. Mishra Institute

of Economic Development and Social Change v. State of Bihar, wherein the challenge

was to Ordinance XV promulgated by the State Government of Bihar whereby the

possession of the Institute started by the Society was taken over by the State Government,

the Supreme Court in para 29 of the judgment has inter-alia held that no doubt the institute

has been taken over in terms of Ordinance and the Act and it is true with the taking over of

the Institute the Society has lost its right of management and control of the Institute but that

is the consequence of all acquisitions. When a property is acquired, the owner loses all

control, interest and ownership of the property. The Supreme Court also held that it may be

equally true that the Institute was the only activity of the Society but observed that it was

only concerned with the right of the Society to form association. So long as there is no

interference with the Society, its constitution or composition it is difficult to say that

because of the taking over or acquisition of the Institute, which was only the property or

activity of the Society the fundamental right of the Society to form association has been

infringed. This Court also in Indian Olympic Association (supra), dealing with stipulations

in the sports code spelling out tenure restrictions for various office bearers and concurrent

operation held they do not violate the petitioner‟s right under Article 19(1)(c) of the

Constitution. It was also observed by this Court by referring to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in All India Bank Employees Association (supra) that it is an authority for

the proposition that the right to form an association does not entitle the Citizen or individual

or group forming the association a concomitant right to claim that the objects for which the

association is formed too is part of the larger fundamental right to form association.

25. In the present case, the said stipulations do not relate to/have a bearing/effect the

petitioners‟ existence as Societies or their right to carry any profession or carry on any

occupation, trade or business, rather they relate to the procedure for nomination to the

Governing Body and the tenure of the Membership of the Governing Body of the

Institutions run by the petitioners. The stipulations in the impugned resolution are relatable

to the conditions to be fulfilled by the affiliating Colleges. It is not the case of the

petitioners that in terms of the stipulations in the impugned resolution, the petitioners have

lost the right of management and control of the Colleges. Be that as it may, the stipulations

which are in the nature of conditions to be fulfilled by the affiliating Colleges owe their

origin to Act of 1929/Statute/Ordinances. So, the plea, that the right of the petitioners to

practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business has been violated

under Article 19(1)(g) is not sustainable.

26. The plea of Mr. Nandrajog that if the privileges are not to the liking of the College or

Institution, such College/Institution is within its right to seek affiliation elsewhere, is

appealing. In fact, it is noted, one of the petitioners in this batch of petitions was earlier

affiliated to Punjab University. In other words, the right to establish and administer an

educational institution and carry occupation is not affected by the stipulations, as referred

above, of the impugned resolution.

27. In view of the above conclusion, the second plea that such conditions could be

imposed by law and not through resolution, which are in the nature of guidelines is also

unsustainable. The reliance placed by Mr. Seshadri on the judgments of the Supreme Court

in the cases of Bijoe Emmanuel (supra), Sukdev Singh and others (supra),Kharak Singh

(supra) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh (supra), wherein the

Courts have held that executive orders and fiats cannot restrict fundamental rights and that

such measures would require enactment of a valid law by the competent legislature, have no

applicability.

28. The third submission of Mr. Seshadri and Mr. Mishra that both the stipulations are

violative of second proviso to Section 29 as it restricts the power of Executive Council

expressly interfering with the extent of autonomy, which a College may have and the

matters in relation to which such autonomy may be exercised and further under Statute 6,

the power and functions enumerated does not comprise the power to issue the said

notification or take any action that would have a direct impact on the autonomy vested in

the petitioners to govern the College, is concerned such a plea is also not sustainable at the

behest of a Society. To appreciate the submission, it is necessary to reproduce, clause (vii)

of second proviso to Section 29 and clause (xiii) of Statute 6(2). They read as under:-

Act of 1929 "29(1) On the commencement of the Delhi University (Amendment) Act, 1943, Statutes of the University shall be those set out in the Schedule*. (2) The Executive Council may, from time to time, make new or additional Statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes:

Provided that the Executive Council shall not make, amend or repeal any Statute affecting the status, powers or constitution of any authority of the University until such authority has been given an opportunity of expressing an opinion in writing on the proposed changes, and any opinion so expressed shall be considered by the Executive Council.

Provided further that except with the prior concurrence of the Academic Council, the Executive Council shall not make, amend or repeal any Statute affecting all or any of the following matters, namely:

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(vii) the extent of the autonomy which a College may have and the matters in relation to which such autonomy may be exercised."

STATUTES 6(1) The Executive Council shall, subject to the control of the Court, have the management and administration of the revenue and property of the University and the conduct of all administrative affairs of the University not otherwise provided for. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, the Executive Council shall in addition to all other powers vested in it, have the following powers, namely:

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(xiii) to exercise such other powers and to perform such other duties as may be conferred or imposed on it by the Act or the Statutes."

29. The aforesaid would reveal Clause (vii) of the Second proviso to Section 29 inter-alia

stipulates with the prior concurrence of the Academic Council, the Executive Council shall

make, amend or repeal any Statute effecting all or any of the matters stipulated therein,

which includes the extent of the autonomy which a College may have and the matters in

relation to which such autonomy may be exercised reveals that it relates to the autonomy of

the College and not of a Society. The issue of a Society nominating Members on the

Governing Body of the College is different from the issue of autonomy of a College

founded by such a Society. In these petitions, the issue is the former. Even otherwise, the

Societies (the petitioners) cannot urge such an issue without colleges as petitioners in these

proceedings.

30. Even otherwise, it needs to be seen whether the stipulations as referred above in the

impugned resolution affects the autonomy/rights of the petitioners. The plea of Mr.

Seshadri and Mr. Mishra, is that the conditions could be valid if they pertain to academic

and educational character of the Institution but not if they lead to Government control of

Administration or interference in the Constitution of Governing Bodies, by relying upon the

judgment in T.M.A. Pai (supra) and Brahmo Samaj (supra).

31. On the stipulation prescribing 50% additional names is concerned, there is nothing in

the provisions of the Act/Statute/Ordinances that a Member of a Governing Body of a

College or Institution has to be a Member of a Society which is running the College. All

that Statute 30 (1)(C)(i) stipulates is that the Governing Body shall consist of not more than

20 persons approved by the Executive Council among others at least two representatives of

the University and three representatives of teaching staff. The Memorandum of Association

of the three petitioner Colleges stipulates, the College shall have a regularly constituted

Governing Body consisting not more than 20 approved by the Executive Council including

two representatives of the University and at least three representatives of the teaching staff.

Clause A II(1) of the impugned resolution limits the total number of nominees by the Trust

to ten only. Even otherwise, the practice has been to send ten names. The same were

approved by the Executive Council. The plea that the resolution prescribing sending 50%

additional names result in selection by the Executive Council, which is impermissible, is

not appealing for more than one reason, firstly the additional names shall also be proposed

by the Society itself. It is from amongst the names proposed by the Society, the names shall

be approved by the Executive Council. No prejudice is caused to the Society. Secondly, it

is not a case where the name(s) not proposed is sought to be thrusted on the Society. There

is nothing in the stipulation, which suggest any attempt of the University to wrest the

control of the Governing Bodies of the petitioners by putting its own nominees. Further, it

is conceded position that the names of the nominees need to be approved by the Executive

Council. The presence of the words „approval by the Executive Council' in the provision is

for a purpose, which includes the satisfaction of the Executive Council, that the nominee‟s

presence in the Governing Body is in the interest of

University/College/Students/Teachers/Standards of Education. In other words,

administration shall be efficient and shall serve the academic needs of the Institution. If it is

otherwise, the nomination can be disapproved. So the power of approval shall include the

power to decline approval.

32. The power of disapproval being there in Statute 30(1)(c)(i), even before the issuance

of the impugned resolution dated November 3, 2012, it must be held the stipulation that the

Society shall forward additional 50% names, is in conformity with Statute 30 (1)(C)(i). The

object behind the decision as stated/canvassed by the University being if only ten names are

forwarded by the Society and out of which few are not approved by the Executive Council

then fresh names shall be required to be submitted by the petitioner leading to undue delay

and laches, which shall be detrimental to the College and Students, is appealing.

33. Mr.Sudhir Nandrajog is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court

in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Ganesh Wood Products and others

(supra), wherein the Supreme Court in para 24, has held that the power to approve includes

the power to decline approval and the power to disapprove. In the said case, the Supreme

Court negated the submissions made on behalf of respondents that every application for

establishment of new Industry must be necessarily approved by the Government and the

Government has no power to refuse approval nor it can disapprove any provisional approval

granted earlier. The judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Parakkad Sree

Bhagavath Devaswom (supra), on which Mr. Seshadri has relied upon in support of his

contention that there is a distinction between the power of approval and power of

appointment is concerned, the same has no applicability in the facts of this case, inasmuch

as in the said case the Court was concerned with facts related to the administration of the

petitioner Devaswom , an autonomous body administered in terms of a Scheme framed by

the District Court. One T.P. Murukan was the Manager of the Devaswom. When he

attained the age of superannuation, he did not hand over charge to any person but continued

to hold office. Ultimately, the Assistant Commissioner of the administration issued an

order on November 20, 2007 acting on a letter of the Commissioner and also of the

Manager‟s application for annual increment ordering that Shri Murukan shall forthwith

surrender charge and custody of all affairs and movable and immovable properties of the

temple and the charge to be taken over by Shri V. Ramanathan. Thereafter, the Devaswom

proceeded to make appointment of a Manager against a vacancy that arose on

superannuation of Shri Murukan. Their request for permission to do so was to be

considered by the Competent Authority. An order was issued by Devaswom Commissioner

refusing permission on the premise that Shri Ramanathan is a competent officer and that he

will be well versed in managing temples and his management can continue for Devaswom.

It was held that the Devaswom is an autonomous body, and is governed by the Scheme

approved by the District Court. The Scheme provides for appointment of officers and staff

including Manager for the temple. The power of appointment is with Devaswom. The

Competent Authority under the Act is only to supervise the affairs of the temple. The

power to supervise does not include the power to appoint. The Court held even assuming

that the appointment has to be approved, the power to approve or the power to refuse

approval does not confer the power to appoint. Suffice to state, it has been held by the

Kerala High Court that the power to approve includes the power to refuse approval. It may

be a different issue, the power to approve may not include power to appoint, which is not

the issue in the case in hand. It is reiterated the judgment has no applicability.

34. Further, Mr. Nandrajog‟s submission that the resolution of the Executive Council

only supplements the Statute, is also appealing as the power to make Statute exists with the

and Executive Council is within its right to pass resolution to fill gaps in the provisions of

Statute in exercise of its executive power. The reliance placed by Mr. Nadrajog on the

judgment of the Supreme Court Sant Ram Sharma (supra) and this Court in Narendra

Batra, in support of his contention that if the statutory rules are silent, the University can

fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules

already framed is justified. So, it must be held, that the stipulation, that the Trust will

forward a panel of names to the University containing less than 50% more names than the

required number, does not effect the autonomy of the petitioners and is valid.

35. Now insofar as that provision of impugned resolution, which prescribes no Member

shall serve on the Governing Body of Trust/College for more than five terms is concerned,

the reasoning given by the University to incorporate such a stipulation is, inter-alia that

permitting Members on the Governing Body beyond a period of five years would lead to the

Societies (the petitioners herein) achieving fiefdom, which shall be detrimental to the

interest of educational institutions and the students. That apart, the further justification

given by the respondent University is, that, to strike a balance the impugned resolution does

provide for appointment of two Members, even after completion of five years, so as not to

deprive the Trust/College to exceptional individual to be on the Governing Body of the

College for more than five years. But before I consider the justification given by the

University for putting up a stipulation as referred above, it needs to be considered whether

such a stipulation could have been put by the University vide a resolution moreso, in view

of Clause 3(1) of the Ordinance XVIII. The Clause 3(1) reads as under:-

"3(1) The Members of the Governing Body, other than the Principal, shall hold office for a period of one year and shall be eligible for re-appointment or re-election, provided that in respect of teachers' representatives provisions of Sub-Clause (2) of this Clause shall apply."

36. A reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that a Member of the Governing Body

other than Principal shall hold office for one year and shall be eligible for re-appointment.

Whereas the stipulation in impugned resolution limits the appointment to five terms. It is

clear that the impugned stipulation is at variance with Clause 3(1) of Ordinance XVIII,

inasmuch as, the said Clause, as reproduced above, even though states, that the term shall be

for one year, but does not restrict, the renomination of a Member(s) in subsequent years,

which suggest, such Member(s) can be renominated for any number of years, without

restriction, whereas, the impugned stipulation restricts the period to five years. If that be

so, till such time a necessary amendment is effected in the Clause 3(1) of Ordinance XVIII,

the stipulation in the impugned resolution could not have been issued by way of an

instruction/guideline through a resolution. The procedure for amendment to the Ordinance

has been stipulated in the Act, which concedingly not followed. The amendment can be

effected by the Executive Council (Section 31(4) of the Act). Mere issuance of resolution,

without amending the Ordinance, would not suffice the requirement. It is noted under

Section 31(4), all Ordinances made by the Council, shall be submitted to the Visitor and the

Court, and the Court shall have the power with two third majority of Members voting to

cancel any Ordinance made by the Executive Council and such Ordinance shall from the

date of such resolution cease to have effect. Further, Sections 31(5) and 31(6) of the Act,

stipulates the power of the Visitor with regard to an Ordinance made by the Executive

Council. On the issue, whether, the stipulation, effects the autonomy of the Society (the

petitioners) is concerned, I refrain from saying anything, for the reason, it is for the

authorities i.e Executive Council, Visitor and Court to consider appropriateness/relevance

of incorporating such a stipulation in the Ordinance, as per the procedure laid down in the

Act/Statute. Further, this Court cannot restrain an Authority/Authorities, from exercising

power so vested by the Act/Statute.

37. As I have on a different ground held, that for restricting the nomination/appointment

to the Governing Body to five years, Clause 3(1) of Ordinance XVIII has to be amended, I

reiterate, this stipulation of impugned resolution is invalid. The plea of Mr. Nandrajog that

the stipulation is supplementary to the Ordinance and could have been prescribed would not

hold good, insofar as this stipulation of the resolution is concerned, in view of my

discussion above.

38. As the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1174/2013 has challenged the resolution No.289

dated August 21, 1975 and resolution No.138 dated February 11, 2003, the aforesaid

conclusion of mine, shall govern similar stipulations in the said resolutions. The writ

petitions are disposed of on the aforesaid terms. No costs.

CM No. 19213/2014 in W.P.(C) No. 1174/2013

Insofar as this application is concerned, the same has been filed by the respondent

No.1 University for substitution of Principal and two teacher‟s representatives on the

Governing Body of Daulat Ram College and for modification of the order dated February

05, 2014 inconsequence thereof. The order dated February 05, 2014 was passed in CM No.

1676/2014, which was an application filed by the petitioners seeking direction to the

respondents to grant approval without delay in the extension of the term of eight nominees

on the Governing Body, already approved by the respondent University for three months

with effect from January 24, 2014. The operative portion of the order dated February 05,

2014 reads as under:-

"As no reasons have been provided for not extending the term of Governing Body and respondents had previously approved the names of the nominees without insisting upon the compliance of the impugned Executive Council

Resolution, the Governing Body of the petitioner College, as existing, is directed to continue to function till the next date of hearing."

Suffice to state, on January 30, 2017, the learned counsel for the petitioner has

withdrawn CM No. 1676/2014. In view of the withdrawal of the application No.

1676/2014, this application being CM No. 19213/2014 has become infructuous and the

same is dismissed.

CM No. 28932/2016 in W.P.(C) No. 1174/2013

This application has been filed by the respondent No.1 University under Section

151 CPC seeking recall of order dated May 6, 2016. The order dated May 6, 2016 has been

passed by this Court on an application being CM No. 11463/2016 filed by the petitioners

whereby this Court has directed the University to approve the names of two nominees i.e

Mr. Ashok Pratap Singh and Mr. T.P. Gadodia to fill the vacancies amongst the trust

nominees. It is stated that subsequently on Jun 1, 2016 on an CM No. 21297/2016 filed by

the petitioner alleging that no action has been taken by the respondent in pursuance of the

order dated May 6, 2016, the Court clarified that order dated May 6, 2016 shall be

implemented by the respondent University within two weeks.

Aggrieved by the orders dated May 6, 2016 and June 1, 2016, the respondent

University filed an Intra-Court appeal before the Division Bench. The said LPA was listed

on July 25, 2016 when after some hearing, the University was allowed to withdraw the said

LPA with liberty to file an application. It is pursuant to the order in LPA, the present

application has been filed.

It is the case of the University in the application that the order dated May 6, 2016 is

unwarranted as the matter was ripe for final hearing. Further the order dated May 6, 2016 is

not in consonance with the impugned resolution No.51 dated November 3, 2012. It is also

stated that the petitioner Society has misrepresented and mislead this Court by alleging in

the CM No.11463/2016 that vacancies have arisen due to death of Professor R.C. Malhan

and alleged refusal of extension of term to Mr. Abhiram Seth. It is stated that the said two

persons were not even serving in the Governing Body of the College when the order of

status quo was passed on February 5, 2014.

In reply to the said application, it is averred by the petitioner that the order dated May

6, 2016 has not been implemented, which is affecting the working of the Governing Body.

As this Court has decided the issue, which arose for consideration in the writ

petitions, the application filed by the respondent No.1 University for recall of order dated

May 6, 2016 has become infructuous. The application is dismissed as such.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J MAY 30, 2017/ak