Delhi High Court
Pepsico Inc & Ors. vs Dugar Spices & Eatables (P) Ltd. & ... on 17 July, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Decided on: 17th July , 2017
+ CS(COMM) 1585/2016
PEPSICO INC & ORS. ..... Plaintiffs
Represented by: Mr. Kunal Mimani and Mr.
Dheeraj Nair, Advocates
versus
DUGAR SPICES & EATABLES (P) LTD. & ORS. .....Defendants
Represented by: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
MUKTA GUPTA, J. (ORAL)
1. By the present suit, the plaintiffs prays for the following reliefs:
A) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the
defendants, their principal officers, family members, servants,
agents, dealers, distributors, retailers and anyone acting for and
on their behalf from manufacturing, selling, exporting or
importing, offering for sale or advertising using the impugned
products under the marks/ logos/ labels/ packagings under the
marks KURKURE, KURMURE and/or CRACKURE or any other
mark/ logo/ label/ packaging which is in violation of the
Plaintiffs' rights in the marks/logos/labels/ packagings of the
KURKURE series of products, in any manner whatsoever
including through representation/promotion/sale of the
infringing marks/logos/packagings on their website.
B) An order of Directions to the custom departments at all
ports in India not to allow the import of the Defendants'
impugned product in India in view of the order of injunction of
this Hon'ble Court.
C) An order of Rendition of Account of profits/ Decree of
Damages illegally earned by the Defendants by use of the
infringing marks/logos/labels/packagings KURKURE,
KURMURE and/or CRACKURE and from selling the impugned
products and a decree for the amount so found due be passed in
favour of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs undertake to pay further
court fees once the sum is ascertained on the Defendants'
rendering true and correct accounts.
D) A decree of delivery up of all the material bearing the
impugned marks/logos/packagings under the marks KURKURE/
KURMURE/ CRACKURE or any other deceptively similar
mark/logo/device to that of the Plaintiffs' KURKURE series of
products namely, printed material, labels, packaging, invoices,
moulds, dyes, plates, bottles, publicity materials, labels, sign
boards, stationery etc., for the purpose of destruction/erasure.
E) Costs be awarded in favour of the plaintiffs; and
F) Any such further and other order(s) as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of
the present case.
2. Summons in the suit were issued to the defendants vide order dated
22nd December, 2010 and an ad interim ex parte order was also passed in
favour of the plaintiffs and against defendant Nos. 1, 6 and 7 restraining
them from selling or offering for sale any products with the mark similar to
the plaintiffs' mark "KURKURE". Since defendant Nos. 2 to 5 could not be
served, they were directed to be served through designated officer of the
Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India. Vide order dated 19 th April,
2011 an ad interim injunction was granted restraining defendant Nos. 2 to 5
from selling or offering for sale any product with the mark similar to the
plaintiffs' mark "KURKURE". None entered appearance on behalf of
defendant Nos. 2 to 5 and consequently they were proceeded ex parte vide
order dated 4th September, 2015.
3. The plaintiffs gave up their claim for damages, rendition of accounts
and costs against defendant Nos. 1, 6 and 7 as the disputes between plaintiffs
and defendant Nos. 1, 6 and 7 were resolved and the same was recorded vide
order dated 19th November, 2015. Thus the suit was disposed of qua
defendant Nos. 1, 6 and 7.
4. As per the plaint, plaintiff No. 1, PepsiCo Inc, is a Corporation
incorporated under the laws of North Carolina, United States of America
having its principal office at 700, Anderson Hill Road, Purchase New York,
USA. Plaintiff No. 2, PepsiCo India Holdings Ltd. and Plaintiff No. 3, Pepsi
Foods Private Limited are fully owned subsidiary companies of plaintiff
No.1. The plaintiffs are the largest sellers of savoury snack foods, world's
leading snack food manufacturers and one of the largest manufacturers and
sellers of snacks in India. The plaintiffs' net sales of its products, including
snack food business exceeds USD 43.2 billion.
5. The present suit relates to illegal manufacturing, marketing and sale of
counterfeit and look alike products by defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in India and
Nepal. It is stated that the defendants are using the trade mark, logo,
packaging, color combination of the plaintiffs' products "KURKURE",
"KURMURE" and "CRACKURE" and violating the rights of the plaintiffs
by doing the following acts:
a. Use of the identical trade mark KURKURE or deceptively similar
marks like KURMURE, CRACKURE;
b. Use of an identical Blue Ribbon Logo in some of the packaging.
c. Use of the style of the letter "K" and "M" in the trade mark
KURMURE which are similar to the earlier style of the Plaintiffs
of KURKURE mark/logo.
d. Use of an identical packaging with an orange/red, green and
blue get-up, lay out and colour combination.
e. Use of Masti Bhara Swad, Chai-Time Masti and the concept of
Family Masti.
f. Passing off of their products and business as that of the
Plaintiffs;
g. Dilution of the brand equity of the product and mark/label/logo
KURKURE.
6. Defendant No. 2 initially appears to have originated from Nepal and
obtained trademark registrations for the mark/label/ KURKURE in Nepal.
The plaintiffs have taken action against the registrations of the said mark by
Defendant No. 2 in Nepal by way of filing cancellation petitions.
7. The trademark KURKURE and its style/label/logo/packaging is the
exclusive property of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs hold the trademark
registration of "KURKURE" mark and "KURKURE CHAI BITES". The
original artistic works in the plaintiffs' "KURKURE" packaging is also
subject matter of protection as contemplated under Section 2 (c) of the
Copyright Act, 1957 and the copyright therein is exclusively owned by the
plaintiffs herein. The packaging of the plaintiffs has instant recognition
attracting the purchaser. The conceptualization, arrangements and depiction
of the pictorial and artistic design of the plaintiffs pack is an original art
work created for and on behalf of the plaintiffs.
8. It is the case of the plaintiffs that defendants No. 2 to 5 are the
manufacturers and sellers of various counterfeit and look alike products
under the marks/logos/labels/packaging of "KURKURE", "KURMURE"
and "CRACKURE". The defendants have, in an illegal and unlawful
manner, deliberately copied the essential features of the plaintiffs products.
Upon seeing the defendants packaging the first impression of visual impact
is that of the plaintiffs packaging.
9. The plaintiff led ex parte evidence and examined Lokesh Pandey,
General Manager- Legal, PepsiCo (India) holdings Private Ltd. (Plaintiff No.
2) as PW-1 who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit and exhibited the
copy of the resolution (Ex. PW-1/1) dated 15th January, 2015 authorizing
him to swear the affidavit on behalf of the company which is duly
incorporated under the provision of the Companies Act, 1956. It is deposed
that plaintiffs are world renowned manufacturers and sellers of beverages
under the trademarks PEPSI, MIRINDA, 7UP, AQUAFINA and
MOUNTAIN DEW. The plaintiffs through their various divisions all over
the world are also the largest manufacturers and sellers of snack food
products under the brands LAY'S, CHEETOS, TOSTITOS, DORITOS,
LEHAR and KURKURE. One of the leading business of the plaintiffs is
manufacture and sale of snack food under the trade mark/name/logo/label
"KURKURE".
10. Plaintiffs had launched the snack product with distinctive look and
packaging under the mark "KURKURE" in India in the year 1999. An online
print of an article published in the Financial Times dated 14 th October, 1999
about the launch of the product under the mark "KURKURE" is exhibited as
Ex. PW-1/10. The original Legal Proceedings Certificates for registration
No. 1091168 for the "KURKURE" (stylized) mark; registration No.
1354757 for the mark "KURKURE CHAI BITES" and registration No.
1462492 for the KURKURE (wordmark) are exhibited as Ex. PW-1/12 to
Ex. PW-1/14 respectively. The list of foreign registrations of the mark/logo
"KURKURE" is exhibited as Ex. PW-1/15. The annuals sales of plaintiffs
"KURKURE" range of products for the period between 2007 to 2009 in
India are as under:
Year Volume(Numbers)
2007 29660 Tons
2008 32055 Tons
2009 36261 Tons
11. Plaintiffs' expenditure on market research and advertising of its
products under the "KURKURE" for the period 2001 to 2006 has been in
excess of ₹100 crores. For the period between 2007-2009, the plaintiffs
expended the following amounts towards advertising and marketing for their
product under the "KURKURE" trademark in India.
Year Amount
2007 43 Crores
2008 44 Crores
2009 64 Crores
12. Plaintiff No. 1 has also obtained domain name registrations in the
'co.in' and '.in' categories, specific to India. The plaintiffs also operate the
website www.kurkure.co.in which is accessible by innumerable internet
users. The mark "KURKURE" is a "well-known mark" within the meaning
of Section 11(8) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
13. Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are based in Nepal and have obtained trade
mark registrations for the defendants mark there. The said registrations have
been granted in error, accordingly the plaintiffs, under the prevalent laws of
Nepal, have filed rectifications petition against the registrations of the
defendants. Copies of the rectification petitions filed by the plaintiffs are
exhibited as Ex. PW-1/23. Defendant No. 2 to 5 also market and sell their
products in India which is evident from the website of defendant No. 2-
www.dugarspices.com.
14. The conduct of the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 cannot be called as a bona-
fide conduct as the defendants are in the same trade and must be aware about
the packaging of the plaintiffs at the time of its adoption because the
plaintiff's packaging is in vogue since long.
15. As per the evidence led, the packaging of the plaintiffs and the
defendants as well as contents of website of the defendants showing the
labels/packaging of the defendants are as under-
Plaintiffs' Packaging
Defendants' Packaging
16. As per the evidence led by the plaintiffs, contents of website of the
defendant are as under-
17. From the perusal of the aforesaid packaging as well as contents on the
website of defendant No.2, packaging of the defendants is deceptively
similar to that of the plaintiffs' trademark, logo, lebels/packaging of
KURKURE series of products thereby infringing the trademark of the
plaintiffs and passing of their goods as that of the plaintiffs'.
18. It is trite law that a decree can be passed against the foreign
defendants if part cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this
Court. This Court in the decision reported as 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3131
Super Cassetes Industries Ltd. Vs. Myspace Inc held-
"55. Now I shall deal with other submissions of the parties point
wise including the issue relating to jurisdiction. At the threshold, I
would like to state that I have held that this court has the
jurisdiction and therefore proceeded to decide the aspect of
copyright infringement first. I shall now discuss the reasons for
arriving at the conclusion that this Court has necessary territorial
jurisdiction which are as under:
55.1 Firstly, the present case relates to infringement of copyright
wherein the remedies are conferred under the special statute. The
said suit for infringement of copyright can be filed and initiated at
the place wherein the plaintiff carries on business, or personally
works for gain etc. This is by virtue of non obstante clause
provided under Section 62(2) of the Act which reads as under:
"62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this
Chapter. (1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising
under this Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright
in any work or the infringement of any other right conferred
by this Act shall be instituted in the district court having
jurisdiction.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a "district court
having jurisdiction" shall notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
or any other law for the time being in force, include a district
court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time
of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person
instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are
more than one such persons, any of them actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personal works
for gain."
55.2 By mere reading of the provision of Section 62(2) of the Act,
it becomes amply clear that the suit for infringement can be filed
at the forum where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. The
opening words of the provision provides "Notwithstanding
anything contained in the code of civil procedure" which means
that the said provision will operate in addition to what has be
provided in the Code of Civil procedure. Thus, the said provision
enables the suit to be filed at the place of the plaintiff which is the
additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of the court.
55.3 This question is no longer res integra and put to rest by the
Supreme Court while examining the said provision in the case
of Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC
688 wherein the Hon'ble Court observed.
"It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for the
introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62 was not to
restrict the owners of the copyright to exercise their rights but
to remove any impediment from their doing so. Section 62(2)
cannot be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the District
Court only to cases where the person instituting the suit or
other proceeding, or where there are more than one such
persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or presently works for gain. It prescribes
an additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of a Court
over and above the 'normal' grounds as laid down in Section
20 of the Code."
Therefore, the plaintiff while it has initiated the said suit at the
forum where it is carrying on business has rightly initiated the suit
in compliance of the provision of Section 62(2) of the Act which is
the additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction. In these
circumstances, by operation of non-obstance clause, the principles
relating to defendants carrying on business or part of cause of
action or subject matter becomes irrelevant as the present case
falls under the special provisions prescribed in the special statute.
The said provisions under Section 62 are in addition to and not in
derogation or conflict with the general law as envisaged in the
Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, the recourse of the defendants'
counsel in relation to the principles of general law is misplaced.
55.4 The personal amenability of the defendants are therefore, not
relevant in case of suit for infringement wherein the jurisdiction is
sought to be invoked by way of provisions of the special enactment
when it provides for non obstante clause. The said non obstante
clause thus operate to its full extent and it cannot be said that
there is a separate question of personal amenability of the
defendants to be in the forum state which is still to be considered.
55.5 It is true that that to sue a foreign defendant in this country,
the foreigner either must be resident and or carry on business
within the jurisdiction of forum court. These are the principles
applicable in private International law. The only exception is if
such party submits to the jurisdiction. However the operation of
this rule is not absolute but is subject to the municipal law.
55.6 It is now well settled that when the municipal law provides
otherwise or overrides the private international law, then the
municipal law prevails over and above the principles of private
international law. The said principle has been comprehensively
decided by Karnataka High Court in Airbus Industries v. Laura
Howell Linton, ILR 1994 KAR 1370 wherein the Court has stated
that even the provisions of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides cause of action wholly or in part
overrides the private international law.
The Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Somasundaram AIR
1938 Mad 731 in considering whether the Indian Courts have
jurisdiction over non-resident foreigners, it was held that even
with respect to non-resident foreigners, the Courts in British India
have jurisdiction in personam in suits based upon a cause of
action arising in British India.)
55.7 Thus, in the present case also even assuming that the rules of
private international law may have any role to play, the same
stands overridden by the express provision of the special act which
is Copyright Act, 1957 which speaks otherwise and entitles the
plaintiff to sue at the place of its own forum.
55.8 Secondly, the argument was advanced by the defendants
about the commission of torts outside India. The said argument is
also rejected as meritless. The commission of tort in the present
case is in India. The website of the defendants is one which is
engaged in the online business of providing and exhibiting the
songs and cinematograph films worldwide including India. The
said website is usually accessed by Indians for downloading the
songs of upcoming movies from the website of the defendants. The
plaintiff has substantiated the cause of action by showing some
instances of infringements which has been caused in relation to the
specific works. Thus, the said commission of the tort has occurred
or occurs in India wherein the Indian user goes to the website, the
defendants through its search engine exhibits the said works and
the work is communicated to the public by sending the work to him
and facilitating downloading or reaching to the computer of
Indian user. Similarly, conversely, when the Indian user shares the
infringing work with the defendants' website which goes into the
servers of the defendants and saved there after the uploading. The
said actions are sufficient to constitute part of cause of action
under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
55.9 In the first case, the tort or civil wrong is caused in India as
the aspect of downloading to the computer has been occurred in
India when the said work is communicated to Indian users without
the permission of the plaintiff. In the second case too, the initiation
of the tort or part of the same has occurred in India as the
infringing work without the authority of the plaintiff is
communicated to the defendants with a limited licence to further
modify and communicate further. The said commission of the acts
or the part of the overt acts constitutes the part of cause of action
within the meaning of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
55.10 Section 20(c) of the Code confers jurisdiction where the
cause of action wholly or in part arises. Thus, the court where the
part of cause of action will arise would have the jurisdiction to
entertain and try the proceeding like in the present case. So seeing
from any standpoint be from special act or general code of civil
procedure, this court has necessary territorial jurisdiction to
entertain and try the proceedings. However, the discussion to
Section 20(c) of the Code becomes merely academic as the special
act itself confers jurisdiction on this court by operation of non
obstante clause. Still, I have deemed it fit to discuss the same in
view of the categorical objections raised by the defendants on
jurisdiction.
55.11 Thirdly, the reliance of the judgment of the Division Bench
in Banyan Tree (Supra) is equally misplaced by the defendants and
thus does not aid the case of the defendants at all.
55.12 It is a well settled principles the judgment is an authority of
what it decides and not for the proposition which can be logically
deduced therefrom. [The said proposition has been laid down by
the Supreme Court in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Utam Manohar
Nakate (2005) I LLJ 738 SC; M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of
Kerala: AIR 2005 SC 2053]
55.13. In Banyan Tree (Supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench has
rightly reframed the issue in the following manner:
"For the purposes of a passing-off action, or an infringement
action where the plaintiff is not carrying on business within
the jurisdiction of a court, in what circumstances can it be
said that the hosting of a universally accessible web-site by
the defendants lends jurisdiction to such court where such
suit is filed ("the forum state")?
56. By mere reading of the question answered by the Hon'ble
Division Bench, it becomes patently clear that the Hon'ble
Division Bench was concerned with the question wherein a
passing off action, whether the jurisdiction of the court can be
conferred by way of website operation of the defendants or not, or
the case of infringement where the plaintiff is not carrying on
business within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The
apparent distinguishing features which make Banyan treecase
inapposite to the present case are outlined as under:
a) Firstly, the case of Banyan Tree (Supra) was a case of
passing off, however, the present case is a case of
infringement wherein plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction on the
basis of carrying on his business at the forum court. It needs
no further mention that it is now well settled that the tests of
conferring jurisdiction on the court in the case of the passing
off and the infringement are totally different. Whereas, the
jurisdiction in infringement cases is governed by the
provisions of special act like Section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act. On the other hand, in the passing off cases, it is governed
by the ordinary law of civil procedure. Thus, the case of
plaintiff carrying on business or working for gain which is a
relevant and significant consideration in the present case in
view of operation of special statute was absent in the case
of Banyan Tree (Supra) and that was the sole reason the
court had difficulty in assuming the jurisdiction in Banyan
Tree (Supra) which lead to referral to division Bench for the
question to be answered.
b) Secondly, The Division Bench in Banyan Tree (Supra) also
observed that if the case of Banyan Tree(Supra) would have
been of infringement, then the court would have had
jurisdiction and the special provisions of Section 62(2) of
Copyright Act, 1957 as well as Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act are those of the kinds of the long arm provisions in
the limited sense. The relevant excerpt from the Banyan
Tree (Supra) dicta is reproduced hereinafter:
"8. At the outset it needs to be noted that the present suit is
not one for infringement by the defendants of the Plaintiff's
trademark and the Plaintiff carries on business within the
jurisdiction of the court. If it were, then in terms of Section
134(2) of the Trademarks Act 1999 (TM Act) this court
would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit although the
defendants do not reside or carry on business within its
jurisdiction. Section 134(2) of the TM Act (like and Section
62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957) is therefore a 'long arm'
provision in a limited sense, confined to infringement
actions by Plaintiffs carrying on business within the
jurisdiction of the forum court. The present suit is an action
for passing off in which neither the Plaintiff nor any of the
defendants voluntarily resides or carries on business within
the local limits of Delhi. Consequently, neither Section
20(a) nor Section 20(b) CPC applies. The Plaintiff seeks to
find the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in terms of
Section 20(c) CPC. In other words, according to the
Plaintiff the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within
the jurisdiction of this Court. This, according to the
Plaintiff is on account of two factors. One, that the website
of the defendants is accessible in Delhi; it is not a passive
website but used for soliciting business in Delhi. Second,
that there was at least one instance of the defendants'
brochure being sent to a Delhi resident for the purposes of
sale of property."
Thus, the said distinction and the caveat expressed by the
Division Bench itself is sufficient to exclude the present case
from that of the operation of Banyan Tree Judgment as it
stands a good law which it decides and cannot be extended to
infringement cases which are governed by special provisions.
c) Thirdly, assuming that the judgment of Banyan
Tree (Supra) may be applied to the present case, even then
the difference in the factual matrix further takes out the
present case from the application of the said dicta. This is due
to the reason in Banyan Tree's case (supra), the court was
concerned with the hotel services wherein there was tendency
of booking online in the hotel from every place and thus the
mere act of booking cannot be held to clothe jurisdiction on
this court unless it forms a part of cause of action in the case
whereas in the present case concerns with the activities of the
defendants which are primarily web based which are
interactive due to media presence, downloading, uploading
and nothing else. The court propounded doctrine of
purposeful availment in Banyan Tree's case (supra) to show
the nexus of the transaction with cause of action in the suit. In
the sharp contradistinction to the same, the defendants in the
present case are offering to show and communicating the
Indian works to the Indian public with the interactive media
inside and the user is able to view the same online, download
it and use it and further communicate to public. The plaintiff
has also substantiated the same by providing download of the
sample infringement which are also forming part of cause of
action. Thus, there is sufficient interactivity in the website
which is aiming at the Indian users and shows nexus with the
complaint with the suit where the plaintiff is directly
aggrieved. The present case would be therefore, different
from the case of Trade Mark infringement wherein some
online transaction or a trap order is shown to clothe cause of
action for the purposes of invoking jurisdiction.
The present case relates to complaints arising directly out of the
online acts and thus cannot be rejected on the counts of
unconnected cause of action. Therefore, the Banyan Tree's case
(supra) is inapplicable in the present case and rather if the tests
laid down in the same are applied, the present case sufficiently
qualifies the tests of Banyan Tree (Supra).
57. Hence, for all these aforesaid reasons, this court will have
jurisdiction to entertain and try the proceeding.
58. The related argument as to jurisdiction was also raised by the
learned counsel for the defendants that this Court cannot exercise
the extra territorial jurisdiction as assuming jurisdiction would in
this case would mean exercising extra territorial jurisdiction. The
said argument is rejected as baseless and the reasons for variance
are outlined as under:
a) Firstly, this Court has already arrived at the finding that
the court has assumed the jurisdiction on the basis of the part
of cause of action which has arisen in India and the
infringement is being caused in India. Thus, this court would
have jurisdiction to entertain and try the proceedings for
infringements which has been caused in India.
b) Secondly it is merely the apprehension of the defendants
that there will be some effect of extra territorial for which this
court is not concerned, it is neither the case of the plaintiff to
give this as an extra territorial effect and nor this court is
giving any such effect as contended by the defendants.
Rather, the court is exercising the jurisdiction on the basis of
the law of the land which is Copyright Act of India, 1957.
c) Thirdly, it has already been observed that the commission
of tort of infringement has occurred in India which is prima
facie infringing in nature, the said acts are prohibited under
the Copyright Act and thus this court is proceeding to do
what is permissible under the law. This court is not
concerned with any incidental effects which the defendants
are apprehensive of due to the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the Court and that cannot come in the way of exercise of
jurisdiction of this Court.
d) There are lots of cases cited on Article 245 of the Indian
Constitution wherein it has been observed about the
parliamentary power to enact the extra territorial laws. The
said reliance of judgments is equally misplaced as in the
present case, this court is not concerned with the legislative
competence of the any extra territorial laws. The said
judgments are not applicable to the present case as the court
is exercising the jurisdiction on the basis of Indian law
having force in India and thus the concerns are mere
apprehensions of the defendants which this court cannot take
care of."
19. Evidence of the plaintiffs has gone unrebutted. Since the plaintiffs
have neither led evidence with respect to cost nor legal cost, prayer-E cannot
be allowed. The plaintiffs urged that the cost in terms of appointment of
Local Commissioner be awarded. However, since the two Local
Commissioners were appointed to inspect the premises of defendant Nos. 1,
6 and 7 only and the matter has been settled by the plaintiffs with the
aforesaid defendants, no decree can be passed for cost of execution of Local
Commission.
20. Consequently, the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in terms of prayer A, B and D. The suit is
accordingly disposed of.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
JULY 17, 2017
'v mittal'
