Delhi High Court
Smt. Vijay Sharma (Through Lrs) vs Raj Kumar Ahuja on 4 July, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 4th July, 2017.
+ RC.REV. 298/2017
SMT. VIJAY SHARMA (THROUGH LRS) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ashok Gurnani, Adv.
Versus
RAJ KUMAR AHUJA ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
CM No.22812/2017 (for exemption)
1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. The application is disposed of.
RC.REV. 298/2017
3. This Revision Petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 preferred by a landlady impugns grant to the
respondent/tenant of leave to defend a petition for eviction under Section
14(1)(e) of the Act.
4. The requirement pleaded of the premises in the tenancy of the
respondent/tenant was for the husband and sons of the petitioner/ landlady to
commence their business. The learned Additional Rent Controller (ARC)
has granted leave to defend inter alia on the ground of suppression by the
petitioner/ landlady of property No.641-D/2, Loni Road, Shahdara, Delhi
belonging to the husband of the petitioner/landlady and sale of a portion of
the said property by the husband of the petitioner/landlady during the
pendency of the petition for eviction.
RC. Rev.298/2017 Page 1 of 5
5. I have at the outset only enquired from the counsel for the
petitioner/landlady as to how fault can be found with the reasoning given by
the learned ARC for granting leave to defend. This Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the Act cannot substitute its own
opinion in place of the order of the learned ARC, when the same opinion is
supported with sound cogent reasoning in law.
6. The counsel for the petitioner/landlady however contends that the
respondent/tenant in his application for leave to defend did not even take the
plea of any other property available to the husband of the petitioner/landlady
and took such a plea by way of application filed after the expiry of the period
stipulated in law for applying for leave to defend and which plea could not
have been taken into consideration and form the basis for grant of leave to
defend.
7. I have however drawn the attention of the counsel for the
petitioner/landlord to para 4(g) of the affidavit of the respondent/tenant
accompanying the application for leave to defend in which it was pleaded
that the petitioner/landlady was the owner in possession of property bearing
Municipal No.641-D/2 covering an area of about 1000 sq. yds. at Loni Road,
Shahdara, Delhi comprising of 8 shops and one tin shed and ample vacant
open space and in one of which shops and tin shed the petitioner/landlady
was carrying on business in the name and style of Rama Ara Machine and
which accommodation was more than sufficient to meet the requirement
pleaded in the petition for eviction of commercial premises for the husband
and sons of the petitioner/landlady.
8. I have further drawn attention of the counsel for the
petitioner/landlady to the affidavit of the husband of the petitioner/landlady
RC. Rev.298/2017 Page 2 of 5
(the petitioner/landlady died soon after the filing of the petition for eviction
and was substituted by her husband and sons) accompanying the reply to the
application for leave to defend and in which, in reply to para 4(g) supra, it
was denied that property bearing Municipal No.641-D/2, Loni Road,
Shahdara, Delhi was in possession of the petitioner/landlady or that the
petitioner/landlady was carrying on any business therein.
9. It is thus not as if the respondent/tenant in the leave to defend filed
within the prescribed time did not take the plea of the said alternative
premises bearing Municipal No.641-D/2, Loni Road, Shahdara, Delhi being
available to the petitioner/landlady and her husband and which premises had
been suppressed from the petition for eviction. Only the deed of sale
effected of a portion of the said premises during the pendency of the petition
for eviction was sought to be brought on record by filing an application after
the expiry of the time prescribed for filing leave to defend and which
application has also been allowed vide the same impugned order and which
factum of sale has been taken into consideration.
10. The counsel for the petitioner/landlady agrees.
11. I have again enquired from the counsel for the petitioner/landlady the
fault if any in granting leave to defend for the reason of the
petitioner/landlady while invoking Section 14(1)(e) of the Act indulging in
suppression of premises available to the persons pleading whose requirement
the petition for eviction is filed. It has further been put to the counsel for the
petitioner/landlady whether not the only inference possible from such
suppression is that the premises suppressed are sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of premises pleading which the tenant is sought to be evicted.
RC. Rev.298/2017 Page 3 of 5
12. The counsel for the petitioner/landlady instead of replying to the
aforesaid query contends that the commercial requirement of the premises
pleaded in the petition for eviction was not only of the husband but also of
the sons of the petitioner/landlady and that the premises bearing Municipal
No.641-D/2, Loni Road, Shahdara, Delhi could only satisfy the requirement
of the husband of the deceased petitioner/landlady and not of the sons of the
deceased petitioner/landlady.
13. There is no merit in the said contention also. The requirement of
premises in the tenancy of the respondent/tenant pleaded in the petition for
eviction is of the husband and sons of the petitioner/landlady to carry on
business jointly. Once the premises for carrying on business are available to
the husband of the deceased petitioner/landlady, the same would satisfy the
requirement of the sons as well, inasmuch as no case of the sons of the
deceased petitioner/landlady requiring separate accommodation from their
father for carrying on their business was pleaded.
14. I have further enquired from the counsel for the petitioner/landlady,
whether only the mother i.e. the deceased petitioner/landlady was
responsible for providing accommodation to her sons to carry on business
and the father has no such responsibility.
15. The counsel for the petitioner/landlady, to be fair to him, does not
contend so and states that the responsibility is of both mother and father.
16. The requirement (within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act)
of a landlord of a premises in occupation of a tenant is statutorily required to
be "bona fide". It is further the stipulation in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act that
for the same to be invoked, the landlord should have no other reasonably
suitable accommodation. Once the plea in the application for leave to defend
RC. Rev.298/2017 Page 4 of 5
of reasonably suitable accommodation being available to the family
members of the landlord pleading whose requirement petition for eviction
was filed was supported by sale deed executed by the husband of the
petitioner/landlady of the said accommodation, the reasoning of the learned
ARC for grant of leave to defend cannot be said to be not in accordance with
law. Suppression practiced by a landlord of reasonably suitable
accommodation capable of satisfying the requirement pleading which the
tenant is sought to be evicted is antithesis to the statutory stipulation of bona
fide and once serious doubts are cast on the bona fides of the landlord in
filing a petition for eviction, no error can be found in the order of grant of
leave to defend. Suppression of an accommodation available to the landlord
or to the family members pleading whose requirement petition for eviction is
filed leads to only one inference i.e. that the landlord is unable to satisfy the
Court as to how the other accommodation available is incapable of satisfying
the requirement of landlord.
17. There is no merit in the petition.
18. Dismissed.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JULY 04, 2017
bs
