Pran Nath Katyal vs K.C.Verma
2017 Latest Caselaw 2992 Del

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*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


%                                           Pronounced on : 04.07.2016

+     RC REV.480/2013
      PRAN NATH KATYAL              ....Petitioner
                       Through Mr.M.R.Chawla, Adv.
                versus
      K.C.VERMA                     ...Respondent
                       Through Mr.R.S.Kela, Adv.
      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH

JAYANT NATH, J. (JUDGMENT)
1.    The present Revision Petition is filed under section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the DRC Act) seeking to
impugn the order dated 14.10.2013 passed by the Additional Rent Controller
(hereinafter referred to as the ARC) whereby the eviction petition filed by
the petitioner/landlord under Section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act was
dismissed.
2.    The petitioner/landlord filed the Eviction Petition seeking eviction of
the respondent/tenant under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act of property
being 17/17, Ground Floor (back portion) Mall Road, Tilak Nagar, New
Delhi. The entire property measures 61 sq.yards comprising of two and half
floors. The respondent/tenant has in his possession one shop measuring 9"x
13". As per the eviction petition the case of the petitioner was that the
premises are required by the petitioner for himself/other members of the
family. The petitioner retired from the Central Government in May 2000. His
family consists of his wife, one married son, Shri Surinder Katyal, daughter



RC.REV. 480/2013                                                Page 1 of 11
 in law, two grandsons, namely, Utkarsh and Namit. He has two married
daughters. It is stated that the eldest grandson Shri Utkarsh is the son of Shri
Surinder Katyal from his first wife. His stepmother it is stated is not taking
care of him because of which Shri Utkarsh is left far behind in his studies.
Hence, the petitioner seeks to open a shop for him but is not having
sufficient space. Further, his son Shri Surinder Katyal i.e. father of Shri
Utkarsh has recently been served with a job termination notice from his
private job and hence the entire family is dependent upon the petitioner. It
was further stated that on the first floor the petitioner has one room, one
drawing room, one kitchen, one bathroom and one toilet and on the second
floor he has two rooms. Further, it is stated that the petitioner is also having
a small space of 5"x 14" which is insufficient to carry on the desired
business on the ground floor. The front of the said shop is further shortened
by a 2" pillar. Another shop is said to be under the ownership and occupation
of Ms.Ritu Kapoor.
3.    The respondent filed his application for leave to defend. However, the
said application was dismissed vide order dated 12.4.2012. The respondent
had impugned the said order of the ARC dated 12.4.2012 before this court in
RC Rev.438/2013. By consent order dated 23.5.2013 the order of the ARC
dated 12.4.2012 was set aside and leave was granted to the respondents. The
ARC was directed to dispose of the matter within one year.
4.    The respondents thereafter filed their written statement where they
have taken various pleas. Parties led their evidence. The petitioner appeared
as PW-1 whereas respondent as RW-1.
5.    On the issue of landlord-tenant relationship the impugned order noted
that the ownership of the petitioner or relationship of landlord and tenant are



RC.REV. 480/2013                                                   Page 2 of 11
 not denied by the respondent. The impugned order notes that the only
dispute is regarding the bona fide need of the petitioner as well as the
alternative accommodation. The impugned order notes that the respondent in
the written statement has taken the following pleas:-
      "(a) The petitioner had sold one shop in the suit property on
      09/07/2010 i.e. just 5 months prior to filing of present eviction
      petition;
      (b) The petitioner has let out one another shop measuring 5x14
      feet on 09/08/2010 i.e. just 4 months prior to filing of the
      present petition to Sh.Daman Singh Pal on the rent @
      Rs.6,000/- per month;
      (c) The petitioner's son Surinder Katyal is running an electrical
      shop from shop No.100, Lajpat Rai Market, New Delhi;
      (d) The petitioner's grandson Utkarsh has taken admission in
      graduation course in Delhi University."

6.    Regarding the first contention of the respondent that the petitioner had
sold one shop on 9.7.2010 i.e. five months prior to filing of the Eviction
Petition the impugned order notes the plea of the petitioner that he had to sell
the shop since he wanted to financially assist his daughter who had engaged
her daughter (granddaughter of the petitioner). The impugned order does not
believe the version of the petitioner as this plea about the grand daughter's
marriage and the need to sell the shop was revealed only for the first time in
the replication. In the eviction petition there was no whisper that the shop
has been sold to Ms.Ritu Kapoor in compelling circumstances just prior to
filing of the eviction petition. Even in his cross-examination the petitioner
could not answer the question whether the shop was sold prior to getting his
grand daughter engaged or thereafter.




RC.REV. 480/2013                                                   Page 3 of 11
       The impugned order further notes that the petitioner accepts that there
is one additional shop available measuring about 5"x 14"but the shop is
insufficient to carry on business as the front of the shop is shortened by a 2"
pillar. The petitioner, however, did not mention that the shop was let out on
9.8.2010 i.e. just four months' prior to filing of the eviction petition at a rent
of Rs.6,000/- per month. In the replication the petitioner stated that the shop
had been vacated by Shri Daman Pal Singh in December 2012. The
impugned order also does not believe the contention of the petitioner,
namely, that the front of the shop is shortened by 2" due to a pillar as nothing
about the pillar is mentioned in the Rent Agreement with the tenant. The
impugned order further notes the conduct of the petitioner that at the time of
filing of the petition he concealed about letting out of the shop to Shri
Daman Pal Singh which has been admitted only after the fact was revealed in
the leave to defend application.
      The impugned order also does not believe the contention of the
petitioner that his son Shri Surinder Katyal has been served with one month
termination notice by his employer of the private job. The order notes that in
his affidavit by way of evidence the petitioner states that his son is not doing
any job since March 2013 when he was expelled from his private job. The
order notes that when the matter was fixed for final arguments the petitioner
has moved an application for exhibiting certain documents. One of the
documents is a letter dated 16.11.2010 issued by the office/employer of the
petitioner's son where it is mentioned that the petitioner's son is working
since 2010. Another letter is dated 31.12.2012 where one month's
termination notice is given to the son Shri Surinder Katyal for termination of
his job. The letters were not proved by the petitioner. The impugned order



RC.REV. 480/2013                                                    Page 4 of 11
 disbelieves these communications and the submission of the petitioner that
the service of his son has been terminated. It was noted that an averment was
made in the Eviction Petition in 2010 that his son has been served with one
month's notice of termination of his job. However, the termination letter
placed on record is dated 31.12.2012 showing that facts/events have been
manipulated.
      The impugned order also notes the submission of the respondent that
the petitioner's son is actually doing business of electronic items in shop
No.100, Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi. Photographs to the said effect have been
placed on record showing the presence of the son of the petitioner in the
shop. The petitioner accepts that the son is working in the said shop which is
said to be belonging to his brother-in-law where his son goes to learn
marketing skills. The impugned order does not believe the version of the
petitioner as at one place the petitioner states that he and his son and
grandson wants to start the business of readymade garments and on the other
hand his son is going to Lajpat Rai Market to learn the business of marketing
of electronic goods. The order also notes that the petitioner has not placed
anything on record to show that Shop No.100, Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi
belongs to his brother-in-law and not to the petitioner. Based on the above
findings of fact recorded by the ARC, the Eviction Petition has been
dismissed.
7.    I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has made detailed submissions in this regard. He has also filed
written synopsis. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
it is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner has any ulterior motive
in getting the shop vacated. The petitioner/landlord is the best judge of his



RC.REV. 480/2013                                                   Page 5 of 11
 requirements and the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord as to how he
is to use the premises. In case there is an abuse of powers of the court by the
landlord, the tenant can always apply for restitution of the premises under
section 19 of the Act. It is further stated that during pendency of the petition
the petitioner has died on 11.1.2015 and his legal representatives have been
brought on record. However, the death of the landlord does not eclipse his
needs. It is urged that it is the privilege of the landlord if he requires the
premises for his bona fide requirement for extension of business and there is
nothing to show that the petitioner does not intend to use the premises for his
own bona fide requirement. Learned counsel for the respondent has
reiterated the contentions as stated before the ARC.
8.    I may first see the scope of the present petition. The Supreme Court in
Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC
222/(MANU/SC/0132/1999) described the revisional powers of this court as
follows:-
      "11....... The phraseology of the provision as reproduced
      hereinbefore provides an interesting reading placed in
      juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the
      Legislature in drafting Section 115 of the CPC. Under the
      latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the
      High Court is circumscribed by the subordinate court
      having committed one of the three errors, namely (i)
      having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii)
      having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii)
      having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material
      irregularity. Under the proviso to Sub-section (8) of
      Section 25B, the expression governing the exercise of
      revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is 'for the purpose
      of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is
      according to law'. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable
      by the High Court under Section 25B(8) is not so limited



RC.REV. 480/2013                                                    Page 6 of 11
       as is under Section 115 C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an
      Appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into
      appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because
      it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it
      were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged
      to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of
      "whether it is according to law'. For that limited purpose it
      may enter into re-appraisal of evidence, that is, for the
      purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at
      by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one
      that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could
      have reached that conclusion on the material available..."

9.    Reference may also be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, 2014 9
SCC 78 where the Supreme Court in paragraphs 28 and 43 held as follows:-
       ".........
       ........

43. The observation in Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, (2000) 2 SCC 135] that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court/authority and it is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed Under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and Ors. : (1993) 1 SCC 499] and Dr. D.

Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675]. Its observation that the High Court can interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context where such finding is perverse, based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of justice. Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, (2000) 2 SCC 135] does not hold that the High Court may interfere with the findings of fact because on re-appreciation of the evidence its view is

different from that of the first Appellate Court or Authority."

10. Hence, this court is to test the order of the ARC to see whether it is according to law, and whether the conclusions are not wholly unreasonable.

11. Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act reads as follows:

"14.Protection of tenant against eviction.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by and court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-

xxxxx

(e) that the premises let for residential purpose are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation."

12. The essential ingredients which a landlord/respondent is required to show for the purpose of getting an eviction order for bona fide needs are (i) the respondent is the owner/landlord of the suit premises (ii) the suit premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself and any of his family members dependant upon him. (iii) the landlord or such other family members has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.

13. A perusal of the facts as stated above and the impugned order passed by the ARC will show that there are particularly three aspects which have persuaded the ARC to come to a conclusion that the petition of the petitioner lacks bona fide. The first aspect is the non-disclosure of the sale of a shop located in the suit property 4-5 months prior to filing of the eviction petition. The petitioner in his cross-examination admits that the shop was sold on 9.7.2010. The present eviction petition was filed in December 2010. He further avers that he received a total consideration of Rs.2,75,000/- from sale of the shop out of which he spent Rs.75,000/- in the marriage of his grand daughter. To a question posed by the counsel for the respondent he submits that he does not remember the date when his granddaughter got engaged or the month when he sold the shop. He states that he cannot say whether the shop was sold prior to the grand daughter getting engaged or thereafter. There is no explanation as to why the sale of the shop was not revealed when the eviction petition was filed.

14. The second aspect pertains to the second shop located in the suit property. As per the eviction petition the shop is not of much use as it has a frontage of only 5" which includes a pillar which consumes 2" of space. What was not revealed in the eviction petition was that the said shop was let out by the petitioner in August 2010 i.e. just prior to filing of the eviction petition. It is also on record that the shop remained under the new tenant till December 2012. Further, the plea of the petitioner that the frontage is obstructed by 2" pillar is also not sought to be proved by the petitioner. The petitioner has filed a site plan Ex.PW1/1. There is no proper depiction of the pillar in the site plan. No evidence was led of any qualified Architect to show existence of the pillar. The entire story about the said shop being not suitable

for use by the petitioner and his son or grandson does not inspire any confidence whatsoever.

15. The third leg of the argument centers around the claim of the petitioner that his son's service is about to be terminated. In the Eviction Petition filed in December 2010 the petitioner states that his son Shri Surinder Katyal has recently been served with a termination notice of his private job which he has been carrying on and thus the whole family has become dependent upon the petitioner. Subsequently as already noted in the impugned order when the matter was at the stage of final arguments the petitioner has in July 2013 filed a letter from JSD Infotech dated 31.12.2012 stating that the performance of Shri Surinder Katyal is not very appreciable and that he had been allowed to continue only till the end of 2012 and he has not met the sales target. He was hence told to treat the communication as one month's notice and that he would be released from his assignment w.e.f. 1.2.2013. The Eviction petition was filed in December 2010 where it is pleaded that Shri Surinder Katyal has already lost his job. However, in July 2013 the petitioner filed some communication where it is stated that his job is discontinued from 1.2.2013. In this context reference may also be had to the contention of the respondents that the said Shri Surinder Katyal is actually running his own shop from 100, Lajpat Rai Market, New Delhi. The petitioner does not deny this fact but states that Shri Surinder Katyal is working in a relative's shop only to gain marketing experience. The impugned order disbelieves the version of the petitioner regarding unemployment of Shri Surinder Katyal.

16. It is clear that the petitioner does not appear to have given correct facts in the eviction petition. The facts have been distorted.

17. The Supreme Court in the case of Charan Dass Duggal vs. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301 held as follows:-

"5. ...... when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively."

18. In view of the above three aspects and the nature of averments and evidence led by the parties, in my opinion, the ARC has in the impugned order come to a plausible conclusion that the pleaded requirement in the Eviction Petition lacks bona fide. The conclusions arrived at by the impugned order are reasonable and plausible conclusions based on the facts and material on record. Accordingly in my opinion there are no reasons to interfere in the impugned order. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

(JAYANT NATH) JUDGE

JULY 04, 2017 N