Delhi High Court
Rampal Singh & Ors vs Nct Of Delhi & Ors on 28 April, 2017
$~38
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 28th April, 2017
+ W.P.(CRL) 1237/2017
RAMPAL SINGH & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Javed Ali , Advocate with
Mr. Anish Roy, Adv.
versus
NCT OF DELHI & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Avi Singh, ASC for the
State with Ms. Anya Singh,
Advocate
SI Anil Kumar, PS Civil Lines
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
ORDER (ORAL)
Crl.M.A. 6948/2017 (exemption)
Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
W.P.(CRL) 1237/2017
1. By this writ petition (criminal) invoking Article 226 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), the petitioners pray for quashing of First
Information Report (FIR) No.251/2016 of Police Station Civil Lines
involving offences punishable under Sections 323/307/506/34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section 25/27/54/59 of the
Arms Act, 1959, primarily on the grounds that the dispute has been
resolved with the complainant and the case is still under investigation.
2. The respondent/State, through learned Additional Standing
Counsel, has resisted the prayer made in the petition on the ground
that the offences involved here include such serious ones as of attempt
to murder (Section 307 IPC) and use of firearm in the commission of
the attempt to murder (Section 27 of the Arms Act). It has been
argued that the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on this court by
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the provision contained in
Section 482 Cr.P.C., ought not be used to put an end to crimes of such
gravity and import.
3. The learned counsel on both sides have been heard and the case
diary maintained by the investigating officer, as made available by
him, at the hearing has been perused.
4. In order to appreciate the argument of gravity of the offences
involved, the contents of the FIR itself should suffice. It was
registered on 29.09.2016 at 11:55 p.m. on the basis of statement of
Suraj son of Ramesh (the second respondent) respecting an incident
that had occurred at about 7:30 p.m. on the same date at a place on
road in front of property no.79/16, Old Chandrawal Road, Delhi.
According to the first informant, his sister Seema (the fifth
respondent) had been married to Rampal son of Jagbir (the first
petitioner), a native of Baghpat, U.P. and that there had been a
matrimonial dispute simmering for the last four years. Seema had been
brought back to the parental house about twenty days prior to the
incident. It is alleged that on 29.09.2016, the first petitioner with his
cousin Sanjeev (the second petitioner) came visiting the house of the
first informant and insisted on taking away the fifth respondent with
them to which the latter raised objection. It is alleged that the first
petitioner tried to forcibly take away the fifth respondent but when her
family tried to intervene, the first petitioner used a brick piece and hit
at the face of his mother Manju (the fourth respondent). It was at this
stage that the first petitioner whipped out a pistol and threatened to
kill, followed by he pulling the trigger, the bullet discharged from the
firearm hitting Savitri (the third respondent), the paternal aunt (bua) of
the first informant. It is further alleged that one another person of
well-built physique came on the scene and took away the pistol that
had been used by the first petitioner and ran away. The first and the
second petitioners are stated to have been apprehended at the spot and
eventually handed over to the police.
5. In State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149,
quashing by the High Court of a criminal case also involving offences
punishable under Sections 307/34 IPC, on basis of a similar
settlement, was disapproved by the Supreme Court, inter alia, by the
following observations:-
"15. We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged
to have been committed by the accused persons was a
crime against an individual, on the other hand it was a
crime against the society at large. Criminal law is
designed as a mechanism for achieving social control and
its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities
within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be
non-compoundable, is because the Code has identified
which conduct should be brought within the ambit of non-
compoundable offences. Such provisions are not meant
just to protect the individual but the society as a whole.
The High Court was not right in thinking that it was only
an injury to the person and since the accused persons (sic
victims) had received the monetary compensation and
settled the matter, the crime as against them was wiped
off. Criminal justice system has a larger objective to
achieve, that is, safety and protection of the people at
large and it would be a lesson not only to the offender,
but to the individuals at large so that such crimes would
not be committed by anyone and money would not be a
substitute for the crime committed against the society.
Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the
present, will leave a wrong impression about the criminal
justice system and will encourage further criminal acts,
which will endanger the peaceful coexistence and welfare
of the society at large."
(emphasis supplied)
6. The petitioners rely on Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of
Punjab & Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 466 as a precedent where the Supreme
Court allowed the settlement to result in the criminal case involving,
inter alia, attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC) to be quashed. It has
to be borne in mind that each case has to be subjected to scrutiny on
its own merits and in the light of its own peculiar facts and
circumstances. It is noted that after tracing the development of
jurisprudence on the subject, in (para 29 of) the judgment in the case
of Narinder Singh (supra), while drawing a distinction between the
power conferred on this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the
power of the criminal court to allow compounding of the offence
under Section 320 Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court held that the guiding
factor in the former jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C) would be as to
whether the quashing of the criminal proceedings would secure the
ends of justice or prevent the abuse of process of court. On the
specific issue of exercise of such power in cases of grave crimes such
as one punishable under Section 307 IPC, the following observations
(in para 29.6) are of import:-
"29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
are to be generally treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate (sic) parts of the body,
nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of
injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis,
the High Court can examine as to whether there is a
strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it
can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would
be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties
is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship".
(emphasis supplied)
7. In State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, a
bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court re-examined the
issue concerning the width and scope of the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 Cr. PC for bringing to an end a criminal
action by quashing the case and observed that this provision does not
confer any new power on the High Court but only saves its inherent
power and explained its exercise as under :-
"6. ... It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by
law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognises and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,
as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the section, the court does
not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of
process of the court to allow any action which would result
in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of
the powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice...."
(emphasis supplied)
8. In Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC
303, while dealing with identical issues, another bench of three
Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed thus :-
"55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial
obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice or to prevent continuation of
unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine
qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is
whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter
of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do
that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms
be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be
supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt
in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and
substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by
the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide
amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and
circumspection.
(emphasis supplied)
9. The case of State of M.P. vs. Manish & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 307,
is yet another precedent against the prayer made in the petition at hand
to be entertained. The factual matrix of the said case also involved
offence punishable under Section 307/34 IPC and Sections 25 and 27
of the Arms Act. On the basis of position taken by the complaint of
the said case informing the court that she did not wish to prosecute the
accused persons as the dispute had been amicably settled, the High
Court had proceeded to quash the FIR. Observing that the offences
involved were against the society at large, the order of the High Court
was set aside and directions were given for the criminal trial to
proceed further in accordance with law, referring, in this context, to
the following observations of a bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the
Supreme Court in Gian Singh (supra) as under:-
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitudewith no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where
the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim's family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;
cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute.
In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put the accused
to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount toabuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer
and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if
the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding..................."
(emphasis supplied)
10. The above view applies on all fours to the facts and
circumstances of the case at hand. The fact that fire arm was used and
it actually caused injury to a woman who had no apparent quarrel with
the assailants itself shows not only that the offence of attempt to
murder (S.307 IPC) was not added "for the sake of it" but also the
gravity of the crime. Thus, this not being a case where continuance of
the criminal action would be abuse of judicial process so as to deserve
invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the petition
seeking quashing of case FIR No.251/2016, under Sections
323/307/506/34 IPC and 25/27/54/59 of the Arms Act of Police
Station Civil Lines, Delhi is hereby dismissed.
R.K.GAUBA, J.
APRIL 28, 2017
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