Delhi High Court
Sh.Ved Prakash vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors. on 28 November, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C) No.6766/2016
% 28th November, 2016
SH.VED PRAKASH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sudhanshu Tomar, Adv.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Anupam Srivastava, ASC with
Niharika, Adv. for GNCTD/R-1 to 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, petitioner seeks the relief of quashing of the order dated 25.7.2016
passed by the Directorate of Education and for seeking the benefit of re-
employment to the petitioner/Yoga Teacher up to the age of 62 years.
2. Petitioner is admittedly in employment as a Yoga Teacher with
Commercial Senior Secondary School/respondent no.4, and which school is
not a government school but only a government aided school.
3. The issue is that whether the petitioner can get benefit of re-
employment up to the age of 62 years on the application of Section 10 of the
Delhi School Education Act, 1973.
4. A Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.592/2013 titled as
M.I.Hussain and Anr. Vs. Director of Education & Anr., decided on
21.3.2014 holds that re-employment to an employee of a private school,
whether aided or unaided, would not be monetary benefits falling under the
expression "prescribed benefits" under Section 10 of the Delhi School
Education Act. The relevant observations of the Division Bench are
contained in paras 13 to 16 of the said judgment and which paras read as
under:-
"13. A perusal of Section 10 would evidence that it embraces scales of pay
and allowances, medical facilities, pension, gratuity, provident fund and other
prescribed benefits of the employees of a recognized school and prescribes that
the same shall not be less than those of the employees of the corresponding
status in school run by the appropriate authority. The appropriate authority
would be as defined by Section 2(e), the authority which grants recognition.
14. The rule of „ejusdem generis' guides us that where two or more words
which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, a noscitur a
sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it
were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being
restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. The true scope of the
rule of ejusdem generis is that words of general nature following specific and
particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same
nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be applied with
caution and not pushed too far. It is a rule which must be confined to narrow
bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive
words. If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no
warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it
need not be. To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule there must be a
distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to the different
objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a
class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply. Unless
there is a category, there is no room for application of the ejusdem generis
doctrine and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning, they ought not
to be qualified on the ground of their association. Noscitur a sociis - is merely a
rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider
words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined
word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in
associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or is
otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.
It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is
doubtful; but where the object of legislature in using wider words is clear and
free of ambiguity, the rule of construction cannot be pressed into service.
15. The learned Single Judge has overlooked the applicability of the Rule
of ejusdem generis which embodies the Rule of noscitur a sociis. A broad genus
clearly discernable in Section 10 is of benefits having character of money : (i)
pay and allowance - money; (ii) medical facilities - money; (iii) pension -
money; (iv) gratuity - money; and (v) provident fund - money. The five terms
having common character of money are followed by the general expression
other prescribed benefits. The said wide expression other prescribed benefits
must take colour from the genus of the previous i.e. such benefits which are
capable of being converted into money, to wit : bonus, leave encashment etc.
16. The impugned decision cannot stand on its logic because it has
overlooked a principle of law as aforenoted."
5. Since the ratio of a Division Bench judgment of this Court is
binding upon me and which holds that benefits of employment up to 62
years cannot be granted because re-employment up to 62 years of age does
not fall in the expression "prescribed benefits" under Section 10 of the Delhi
School Education Act, and therefore, the reliefs prayed in this writ petition
cannot be granted.
6. Being bound by the law of precedents I have to follow the ratio
of the judgment in the case of M.I.Hussain (supra), but I still would like to
observe for an appropriate Bench of this Court to consider that if the age of
an employee is increased from 60 to 62 years or an employee is given
benefit of re-employment up to the age of 62 years, obviously, such an
employee will receive monetary benefits for the two years period of
additional employment. Therefore, two years period of additional
employment surely is a monetary benefit because for the two years period
the employee will get monetary benefits as an employee of the school and
that it is not that the employee will work for free in the school for the
additional period of two years. Also, there would be consequential effect in
the increase of age upon the monetary retirement benefits, and which aspect
also an appropriate Bench can, in my respectful submission, consider.
7. Dismissed.
NOVEMBER 28, 2016 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
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