Delhi High Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Surender Singh And Ors. on 4 May, 2016
$~R-62
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 04.05.2016
+ MAC.APP. 495/2007
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Advocate
versus
SURENDER SINGH AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
JUDGMENT
R.K.GAUBA, J (ORAL):
1. The first respondent, employed as a driver in Delhi Police, was riding
on the pillion of a two wheeler scooter bearing no.DL-3S-AA-7274
(scooter), driven by one Surender (PW-2) on 23.06.2003, when it was
involved in a collision with a car bearing no.DL-9CB-4963 (car) in the area
of Narela, Bawana Road, resulting in he suffering injuries. He filed an
accident claim case for compensation under Sections 166 and 140 of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act) which was registered as petition no.216/2006
on 23.03.2005, impleading the second and third respondents, they being the
driver and owner respectively of the car, in addition to the appellant, New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. (insurer), it admittedly having issued an insurance
policy against third party risk for the period in question, as respondents. The
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) held inquiry and, by judgment
dated 06.11.2006, upheld the case of the claimant about accident having
occurred, resulting in injuries due to negligent driving of the car by the
second respondent. The tribunal assessed compensation in the sum of
Rs.1,88,881/- and directed the appellant to pay with interest at the rate of 9%
p.a. from the date of filing of the petition till realization. The said amount
includes Rs.1,28,881/- towards medical expenses, Rs.25,000/- towards pain
and suffering, Rs.5,000/- towards special diet and conveyance and
Rs.30,000/- as compensation for the leave of absence availed from the office
for about six months.
2. The present appeal was filed by the insurance company to challenge
the finding of negligent driving of the car being the cause of the accident,
also raising issues about the computation of compensation.
3. The appeal was admitted by order dated 03.03.2009. When it is taken
up for hearing no one appears for either side. This was the state of affairs
even on the last date of hearing. There is no good reason to defer the
hearing of this old appeal yet again.
4. The record has been perused. It is found that the appeal is unmerited
and liable to be dismissed.
5. In the course of the judgment, while discussing the evidence adduced
by the claimant mainly through his own statement (as PW-1) and that of the
scooter driver (PW-2), the tribunal made a stray reference to the provision
contained in Section 163-A of the M.V.A Act to observe that there would be
no effect to the case even if the fact of rash or negligent driving was not
proved. The reference to Section 163-A of the M.V. Act by the tribunal in
the impugned judgment was wholly unnecessary. The claimant had
examined himself and the scooter driver to prove the necessary facts. The
evidence of both the said witnesses brings out the sequence of events
leading to the conclusions from which inference of negligent driving of the
car can be properly inferred. Noticeably, the car driver did not offer own
evidence. In these circumstances, the finding about negligent driving of the
car should have been clearly recorded. It must be so held now.
6. Coming to the question of compensation, exception has been taken in
appeal to the proof of medical expenditure. It does appear that photocopies
of receipts for procurement of medicines and diagnostic procedures were
placed on record but then no objection was taken to the mode of proof
during inquiry. The evidence shows that the claimant had suffered fracture
in the leg which necessitated surgical procedure to be undergone twice, once
to plant a steel rod, which not having worked to the satisfaction of the
medical doctor, was replaced by a steel plate. In these circumstances, the
expenditure incurred may have been much more than what has been granted.
7. Similarly, the award under the head of loss of pay on account of leave
of absence from office for six months granted lumpsum cannot be grudged.
The claimant does not appear to have come with a clear record in such
context. Be that as it may, in the over all facts and circumstances, the
compensation awarded by the tribunal cannot be described as inflated or
unjustly high.
8. Thus, no interference is called for. The appeal is dismissed.
9. The compensation deposited by the insurance company shall now be
released to the claimant.
10. The statutory amount, if deposited, shall be refunded only upon
satisfaction that the award has been complied with.
R.K. GAUBA
(JUDGE)
MAY 04, 2016
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