Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 3232 Del
Judgement Date : 4 May, 2016
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 4th May, 2016
+ CM(M) No.635/2008
UOI & ANR. ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Soni, CGSC
Versus
MOHINDER PRATAP SONI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Shekhar, Adv. for LR of R-1 along with Rajender Pratap Soni, LR of R-1.
AND
+ CM(M) No. 636/2008
UOI & NAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Soni, CGSC
Versus
RANA PRATAP SONI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. M.M. Kumar, Adv.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. These petitions, both under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
impugn the common order dated 14th February, 2007 of the Court of
Additional District Judge (ADJ), Delhi exercising jurisdiction as an
Appellate Authority under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act) allowing PPA No.188/2005
and PPA No.189/2005, filed by the respondent in CM(M) No.635/2008 and
CM (M) No.636/2008 respectively, thereby setting aside the order dated 3rd
October, 2005 of the Estate Officer of the petitioner Land & Development
Officer (L&DO) of eviction of the respondent in both the petitions from the
premises measuring 3255 sq. ft. situated at Plot No.1, Block No.124, known
as 12 Partap Singh Building, Janpath Lane, Janpath, New Delhi.
2. Notice of both the petitions was issued and vide orders dated 8 th April,
2009, the petitions admitted for hearing. The petitions are being listed
together since entail the same facts and emanate from the common order of
the Estate Officer and of the ADJ. The respondent in both petitions died
during the pendency of the petitions and their legal heirs were substituted.
On 28th August, 2015, when the petitions came up before this Court, the
counsels stated that they were not ready to address arguments and as such
the petitions were adjourned to 29th October, 2015 and the petitioner L&DO
was directed to produce the record of the Estate Officer before this Court.
On 29th October, 2015 the counsel for the petitioner L&DO was heard;
however the counsels for both the respondents again expressed inability to
argue and sought adjournment. Finding the conduct of the respondents to be
dilatory and vexatious orders were reserved in the petitions and liberty given
to the counsels for the respondents to file written arguments. The petitioner
having not produced the record of the Estate Officer, fresh directions for
production thereof were issued. The counsels for respondents in both the
petitions have filed their written arguments. The counsel for the petitioner
L&DO has also produced the record of the Estate Officer. I have perused
the records and considered the contentions of the counsel for the petitioner
L&DO and the written arguments of the counsels for the respondent in both
the petitions.
3. As per the order dated 3rd October, 2005 of the Estate Officer,
(i) Plot No.1, Block No.124 known as 12 Janpath Lane, New Delhi
was leased out to Sh. Rana Partap and Sh. Mohinder Partap i.e.
the respondent in each of the petitions;
(ii) the premises were inspected on 12th May, 1971 and 30th July,
1971 when breach of the terms and conditions of the perpetual
lease of the land in the form of misuse of whole of the ground
floor as a lodging place for hippies on commercial basis and
unauthorized construction of a pucca kitchen measuring about 9
ft.-¾‟ x 10 ft.-½‟ and unauthorized pucca bathroom constructed
in the back open courtyard measuring 5ft. x 6ft.-3‟ were found;
(iii) the breaches aforesaid were in violation of Clauses (v) and (vi)
of the lease deed;
(iv) a breach notice was issued on 7th July, 1972;
(v) the respondent in each of the petitions requested for charges
recoverable in respect of the breaches;
(vi) the charges were conveyed to the respondent in each of the
petitions on 5th March, 1973;
(vii) the respondent in each of the petitions requested to allow to
make payment in installments;
(viii) the respondent in each of the petitions failed to get the breaches
removed / regularized;
(ix) the premises were re-entered upon by the petitioner L&DO on
14th November, 1973;
(x) upon the request of the respondent in each of the petitions, the
petitioner L&DO on 25th April, 1974 intimated fresh terms of
compromise;
(xi) however the respondent in each of the petitions failed to
comply with the terms of the compromise;
(xii) the petitioner L&DO approached the Estate Officer under the
PP Act and the Estate Officer initiated the proceedings after
issue of show cause notice dated 21st July, 1975 under Section
4(1) of the PP Act;
(xiii) the respondent in CM(M) No.635/2008 vide his letter dated 6 th
October, 1975 again asked the petitioner L&DO to re-calculate
the charges payable and vide letter dated 29 th October, 1990
intimated that he had closed the business of guest house and
requested for easy installment for payment;
(xiv) the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008 filed a detailed written
objection dated 9th August, 1991 a) denying having raised any
construction or having misused any portion of the property and
hence being not liable for payment of any charges; b)
contending that the misuse as well as unauthorized construction
was with respect to the ground floor only which was in
exclusive possession of the respondent in CM(M) No.635/2008
and who had also stopped the misuse after the letter dated 18 th
January, 1975; c) relying on the judgment of this Court in
Savitri Devi Amar Vs. A.M. Bose 1972 RCJ 815 to contend
that residential use includes hostels and boarding houses;
(xv) the respondent in CM (M) No.636/2008 also filed a reply dated
25th May, 2000 pleading that he had filed original suit
No.761/1993 titled Rana Partap Soni Vs. Mohinder Partap
Soni in this Court and in which suit the Ministry of Urban
Development and L&DO i.e. the petitioner herein were also
impleaded as defendants no.2&3 and in pursuance to the
interim order dated 18th October, 1995 in the said suit, he had
submitted bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.50,000/-;
(xvi) the Estate Officer vide order dated 1st September, 2003
enquired from the parties the status of the suit aforesaid before
this Court and whether the factum of pendency of proceedings
under the PP Act has been disclosed in the said suit;
(xvii) the aforesaid direction was reiterated by the Estate Office vide
order dated 23rd December, 2003;
(xviii) the Estate Officer on 29th March, 2004 was informed that the
suit aforesaid filed in the High Court had been transferred to the
lower Court but status thereof was not disclosed;
(xix) it was also the contention of the respondent in CM (M)
No.635/2008 that the area of the guest house was less than 500
sq. ft. and the breach of the lease condition was thus
condonable and clarification in this regard was sought from the
petitioner L&DO;
(xx) the petitioner L&DO on the next date clarified that the
condonation of breach was applicable only in the case of State
Guest House and there was no case pending in the Court;
(xxi) though the respondent in each of the petitions was given an
opportunity to file additional submissions if any but both stated
that no further submissions were required to be made;
(xxii) it was thus on record that the respondents admitted having
committed breaches and were very much prepared to pay the
charges; the respondents however thereafter changed their mind
and started challenging the breaches on account of misuse etc.;
(xxiii) the respondents had also not got regularized the unauthorized
construction / misuse nor paid the damages on account thereof;
(xxiv) thus the logical conclusion was that the respondents had
violated the terms of the lease deed and having failed to remedy
the same had become liable to be evicted under the provisions
of the PP Act; and,
(xxv) accordingly the respondents and all other occupants were
ordered to be evicted from the said premises.
4. Though there was one proceeding against the respondent in each of
the petitions before the Estate Officer but the respondent in each of the
petitions preferred separate appeal as aforesaid against the order of eviction
of the Estate Officer and which appeals were allowed as aforesaid by the
learned ADJ with a common order, finding/observing/holding:
(a) that the Secretary of State for India in Council had leased out a
plot measuring 0.81 mtrs. in favour of one Sh. Lakhbir Singh
on perpetual basis vide perpetual lease deed dated 13 th May,
1922;
(b) that on the death of Sh. Lakhbir Singh his widow Smt. Jamna
Devi and his son Sardar Mehraj Singh transferred the right, title
and interest in the said land to Sardar Partap Singh vide sale
deed registered on 28th September, 1930;
(c) that the said Partap Singh constructed a superstructure on the
plot of land;
(d) that one of the superstructure bearing Municipal Nos.6210-1
and 8393-12 known as flat No.1 and flat No.12, Pratap Singh
Mansion, Queensway Lane was sold to one Sh. Shiv Nath vide
sale deed dated 25th May, 1937;
(e) that thereafter the said flats No.1 and 12 changed number of
hands and were lastly purchased by the respondent in each of
the petitions vide sale deed dated 28th October, 1957;
(f) that the property comprising of flat No.1 on the ground floor
and flat No.12 above it along with leasehold rights in the land
underneath the flat No.1 was mutated in the joint names of the
respondent in each of the petitions in the records of the
petitioner L&DO;
(g) that it was the case of the respondent Rana Partap Soni in CM
(M) No.636/2008 that after purchase, he occupied the first floor
only i.e. flat No.12 in or about 1960 and which was in his
exclusive use and occupation and that his younger brother i.e.
the respondent in CM(M) No.635/2008 Mohinder Partap Soni
came into exclusive possession of the ground floor;
(h) that the two flats had separate entrances, separate water and
electricity meters and owing to which had nothing in common
as far as their use and occupation was concerned; property tax
payable in respect of the two flats had also been bifurcated by
the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) by common
assessment order;
(i) that it was further the case of the respondent in CM(M)
No.636/2008 that since the alleged misuse and unauthorized
construction pertained to the ground floor flat no.1 only which
was in exclusive use and occupation of respondent in CM(M)
No.635/2008, the said respondent only sought regularization of
the breaches of the lease term;
(j) On the contrary, the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008
represented that there was no misuse or unauthorized
construction in his flat no.12 and that thus he could not be
burdened with the regularization / damage charges and could
not be evicted on account of non-payment thereof;
(k) that the respondent in CM (M) No.635/2008 also intimated the
Estate Officer of the filing of the suit and the interim order
therein;
(l) that it was the contention of the respondent in CM(M)
No.636/2008 that notwithstanding the same, the Estate Officer
had passed the eviction order against him also - he could not be
penalized for the violations committed by his brother i.e. the
respondent in CM (M) No.635/2008 in his portion of the
property;
(m) that it was the contention of the respondent in CM(M)
No.635/2008 that besides the ground floor, he was also in use
of the second floor and no partition existed between the two
respondents and that he had not violated any term of the
perpetual lease and that the order of the Estate Officer was
violative of the interim order dated 18th October, 1995 in the
Civil Suit No. 861/1993 titled Rana Partap Soni Vs. Mahinder
Partap Soni filed by the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008;
(n) that though the Estate Officer in his order has made reference to
the contentions of respondent in CM (M) No.636/2008 but
failed to consider the same and give findings thereon;
(o) that in view of the peculiar facts of the case, particularly as to
the quantum of damages and whose liability it was to pay,
which was under challenge and the same required leading of
evidence; it was also to be considered whether the respondent
in CM (M) No.636/2008 who was in occupation of the first
floor where there was no misuse / unauthorized construction,
could be evicted for violation of terms of the lease deed on the
ground floor, resorting to summary procedure under the PP Act;
(p) Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of
India AIR 1986 SC 872 had held that a leasehold property
cannot be termed as public premises within the meaning of
Section 2(e) of the PP Act by virtue of cancellation of perpetual
lease deed and re-entry of the property - for this reason also the
petitioner L&DO could not have been resorted to eviction
proceedings under the PP Act.
Accordingly, the appeals were allowed.
5. It would thus be seen that the learned ADJ has set aside the order of
the Estate Officer of eviction,
(i) relying upon Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra and holding
that PP Act could not be invoked for eviction from premises
lease whereof was granted by the public authority and even if
the lease had been terminated and the ex-lessee was in
unauthorized occupation thereof; and,
(ii) reasoning that invocation of proceedings under PP Act was not
appropriate because quantum of damages for regularization of
breaches, who i.e. which of the respondent was liable for
payment thereof and whether for breaches on the ground floor
eviction from the first floor also could be ordered, required
determination.
6. Else, it was not disputed by the learned ADJ also that there were
breaches of the lease deed of the land underneath and on account whereof
the petitioner L&DO was entitled to terminate the lease and that the said
breaches though could have been got regularized had not been got
regularized.
7. Being of the view that the aforesaid reasoning of the learned ADJ was
not in consonance with the current law particularly in view of the judgment
of the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Punjab National
Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406, attention of the counsels during the hearing was
drawn thereto as well as to the judgment dated 21st February, 2006 of the
Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.976/2004 titled Delhi Development
Authority Vs. Ambitious Gold Nib Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. dealt by
me in Ocean Plastics & Fibres (P) Limited Vs. Delhi Development
Authority 187 (2012) DLT 359 (against which LPA No.415/2012 was
dismissed as withdrawn).
8. The counsel for the petitioner L&DO during the hearing however
referred to Escorts Heart Institute and Research Centre Ltd. Vs. Delhi
Development Authority AIR 2008 Del 70 where the Division Bench of this
Court referring to Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Ambitious Gold Nib
Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. supra held that Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd.
supra does not lay down that the proceedings before the Estate Officer are
not maintainable for recovery of possession of the premises lease whereof
was earlier granted and had been terminated and all that was held therein
was that in the facts of that case PP Act could not be invoked.
9. The counsel for the respondent in CM(M) No.635/2008 in his written
submissions has contended:
(i) that the Estate Officer has not afforded opportunity and violated
the principles of natural justice;
(ii) that this Court also has not given opportunity of hearing to the
legal heirs of the respondent who had been brought on record
on the previous date only;
(iii) that the premises of which lease had been granted earlier and
had been terminated are not public premises within the ambit of
the PP Act and again relying on Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd.
supra inspite of what had transpired in the hearing;
(iv) that breach of condition of lease is compoundable and as such
stringent order of eviction should not have been passed and
further efforts should have been made for regularization and
compounding of the breaches and for which the legal heirs of
the respondents are still willing;
(v) that no show cause notice was issued before cancellation of the
lease deed; and,
(vi) invocation of Article 227 of the Constitution of India in filing
this petition against the order of the learned ADJ is not proper.
10. The counsel for the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008 in his written
argument has contended:
(a) that for breaches with respect to ground floor, eviction from the
first floor cannot be ordered;
(b) that the Division Bench of this Court in Ambitious Gold Nib
Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. supra has only distinguished
Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra and could not possibly have
overruled the Supreme Court and the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra which is
in favour of the respondent would prevail;
(c) that since at the time of mutation by the petitioner L&DO in the
joint names of the respondent in each of the petitions, the land
had already been built upon, the liability with respect to the
ground floor could not be of the first floor;
(d) that the respondent in each of the petitions were in exclusive
possession of their respective floors;
(e) that the suit for partition which was filed in this Court and was
transferred to the District Court had been decided vide order
dated 13th August, 2010 by which the property had been
horizontally partitioned i.e. flat No.1 on the ground floor had
fallen to the share of Sh. Mohinder Partap Soni respondent in
CM(M) No.635/2008 and the flat no.12 above that had fallen to
the share of Sh. Rana Partap Soni respondent in CM(M)
No.636/2008 and the said judgment had attained finality and
the NDMC had also so mutated the flats;
(f) thus for all practical purposes the said two flats were
independent with no interconnection;
(g) that the re-entry of flat no.12 on the first floor was thus not
justified;
(h) that the respondent in CM (M) No.635/2008 only had admitted
to the breaches and the said admission was not binding on the
respondent in CM (M) No.636/2008;
(i) that the action of the petitioner L&DO was belated; the
unauthorized construction was noted in 1971 and demand was
raised with respect thereto in 1972 and 1973 and could not be
enforced in the year 2015;
(j) that the terms of the lease also do not provide for recovery of
damages;
(k) that according to Section 40 read with Section 11 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 also no restriction could be put
by the transferor on the transferee;
(l) that thus the eviction order can only be with respect to flat no.1
on the ground floor and cannot be with respect to flat no.12 on
the first floor;
(m) that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the
facts of Ambitious Gold Nib Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd.
supra.
11. It is unfortunate that inspite of the Constitution Bench in Ashoka
Marketing Ltd. supra and the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court
in Ambitious Gold Nib Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Escorts Heart
Institute and Research Centre Ltd. supra and inspite of the attention of the
counsels for the respondents having been drawn thereto, the counsel for the
respondents in their respective written submissions continue to harp upon
the Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra.
12. It is now settled law:
(i) that the correctness or otherwise of the allegations of public
authorities such as the petitioner L&DO or the Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) on the basis of which
determination of lease is effected is to be decided by the Estate
Officer under the PP Act.
(ii) that whether the lessee has committed breach of the terms of the
lease deed or not and whether the determination of the lease
was legal or not are matters to be adjudicated by the concerned
authority under the PP Act i.e. the Estate Officer and cannot be
gone into in exercise of writ jurisdiction and the public
authorities as the L&DO or the DDA cannot be asked to resort
to the civil suit instead of the PP Act for eviction of the
occupants even if an ex-lessee after the lease has been
determined;
(iii) that the observations of the Supreme Court in Express
Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra that the public authority as the
L&DO and the DDA is required to file a civil suit and the
proceedings under the PP Act are not maintainable is not good
law;
(iv) that merely because the Estate Officer under the PP Act is not
required to be a person well versed in law cannot be a ground
for excluding from the ambit of PP Act the premises in
unauthorized occupation of persons who had obtained
possession as lessee;
(v) that a combined reading of Sections 4,5,8 and 9 of the PP Act
shows that final order that is passed in the proceedings under
the PP Act is by the judicial officer of the rank of a District
Judge; the same also suggests that questions as to justification
for determination of lease fall within the jurisdiction of the
Estate Officer.
13. Though I am in the facts of the present petitions concerned only with
the question whether the adjudication of the validity of the grounds for
determination of lease is within the domain of the Estate Officer and in
which respect the law as aforesaid is well settled but I will be failing in my
duty if do not refer to another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in DCM Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority (2013) 136 DRJ 688
holding that bona fide title disputes cannot be gone into under the PP Act. I
have recently in Dr. Shekhar Shah Vs. Government of Maharashtra
MANU/DE/0924/2016 dealt with the said aspect and in the light thereof
need to say anything more is not felt especially as I am here not concerned
with any title dispute but with a dispute as to validity of determination of
lease and on which the judgments in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. supra applied
by the Division Benches of this Court are final.
14. Thus the main reason given by the learned ADJ for allowing the
appeals of the respondents i.e. of the order of the Estate Officer being
contrary to Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. supra was in ignorance of the
subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. supra
and cannot be sustained and has to be set aside and the petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable on this ground alone.
15. As far as the other reason given by the learned ADJ, of invocation of
PP Act by the petitioner L&DO being not appropriate for the reason of the
questions involved i.e. of computation of damages, which of the respondent
is liable therefor and whether for breach of lease conditions by the
occupant/owner of the ground floor, eviction from first floor can also be
ordered is concerned, in my view once it is law that the PP Act constitutes
Estate Officer as the exclusive fora to adjudicate whether a person is in
unauthorized occupation and what charges for unauthorized occupation
he/she is liable for and provides a complete machinery, including of appeal
therefor, the question of whether it was "appropriate" for the petitioner
L&DO to invoke PP Act does not and ought not to arise. Rather, the said
reason is fully covered by the judgments aforesaid of the Supreme Court and
this court and does not constitute a separate reason given by the learned ADJ
but is adjunct of the reason given, of the proceedings before the Estate
Officer being not maintainable for the reason of Express Newspaper Pvt.
Ltd.
16. Once the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. supra has
held that all questions as to the validity of determination of lease are in the
domain of the Estate Officer, axiomatically, the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court to adjudicate the same would be excluded. Interestingly, though the
respondents relied upon the interim order in the suit which was filed before
this Court and by which interim order it appears that the petitioner L&DO
was restrained from recovering damages (for breach of lease conditions)
from the respondents subject to the respondents furnishing bank guarantee
but though claim the suit to have been finally decided have not placed the
copy of the said judgment and have merely informed that a decree for
partition has been passed. It has not even been stated that any relief against
the petitioner L&DO has been granted in the said suit. The obvious
inference is that the claim even if any of the respondents in the said suit
against the petitioner L&DO has not been allowed. The interim order in the
suit relied upon, after the suit has been finally decided, would be of no avail.
17. I may even otherwise clarify that the Estate Officer had not been
called upon by the petitioner L&DO to determine the damages payable by
the respondents for breach of conditions of the lease of the land underneath.
It was the case of the petitioner L&DO before the Estate Officer that the
respondents, i) being the lessees of the land underneath the two flats had
breached the terms of the lease; ii) had failed to have the said breach
compounded and to remove the breach inspite of opportunity given; iii) for
this reason their lease had been determined; iv) after determination of lease
the respondents were unauthorized occupants and liable to be evicted. The
said claim of the petitioner L&DO, the Estate Officer was definitively
empowered to adjudicate. The respondent in CM(M) 636/2008 however it
appears in the partition suit filed by him against the respondent in
CM(M)635/2008 also impleaded petitioner L&DO as defendant and also
disputed the damages claimed by the petitioner L&DO for compounding the
breaches and in which respect an interim order was made. I may add that
neither on the record of Estate Officer nor of these petitions I find any
pleadings of the suit. Though the suit is claimed to have been decided but it
is not the case that there is any decision qua the quantum of the said
damages. The fact thus remains that there is no adjudication in the suit
thereon. The respondents, in the last over 40 years have not got the breaches
compounded and the determination of the lease of land underneath the flats
stands. Axiomatically the respondents are unauthorized occupants.
18. The argument of the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008, that no
order of eviction from flat no.12 on the first floor could be passed for
breaches of the perpetual lease conditions on the ground floor is also without
any merit. It is not in dispute that both, the ground floor and the first floor
are constructed over land of which perpetual lease was mutated in the joint
names of the respondent in each of the petitions. As far as the petitioner
L&DO is concerned, the liability of the respondent in each of the petitions
under the perpetual lease deed is joint and several and the lease is one. I fail
to see as to how it can be urged that the eviction from the first floor
constructed over the same leasehold land of which admittedly breach of
lease terms has been committed can be saved for the reason of the breaches
being on the ground floor. The division / partition even if any between joint
lessees, it is the settled position in law, is of the superstructure only and not
of the lease deed. Reference in this regard can be made to Madan Lal Vs.
Kuldeep Kumar MANU/DE/4039/2013, M/s Pragun Buildtech (P) Ltd Vs.
Sarla Aggarwal 2014 SCC Online Del 34 [SLP(C)1967/2014 whereagainst
was dismissed on 23rd January, 2014], Surendra Pal Singh Vs. Ravindra
Pal Singh (2014) 210 DLT 386 (DB) and Satish Kumar Chojar Vs.
Subhashni Chopra (2014) 213 DLT 24. Thus, notwithstanding the partition
of superstructure the lease of the land on which superstructure is constructed
remains joint and the consequences of breach of conditions thereof, even if
in one portion of the superstructure exclusively belonging to one of such
joint lessees invites determination of lease and eviction also from partitioned
portions of superstructure of other joint lessees who may not have
committed breach of lease condition vis-à-vis their portion. If the contention
as raised by the respondent in CM(M) No.636/2008 were to be accepted
then it would lead to an anomalous situation where the public authorities as
the L&DO and DDA would never be able to re-enter the land and would
only be able to re-enter portions of construction over the said land in which
breach has been committed and would tantamount to partition/division of
lease which also is not permissible under the terms thereof. The petitioner
L&DO is concerned with the land only and not with the superstructure.
19. Else, having perused the record of the Estate Officer, I am of the view
that there is no error in the order passed of eviction and I am constrained to
say that the interference by the learned ADJ therein was on the basis of law
which was no longer valid and in ignorance of the latest law.
20. As far as the contention of the respondents having not been given
opportunity of hearing by the Estate Officer or by this Court is concerned,
all that can be said and which would be a complete answer thereto, is that
more than 40 years have passed since the initiation of the proceedings before
the Estate Officer vide show cause notice dated 21 st July, 1975 and it does
not lie in the mouth of the respondents to contend that the said time was not
sufficient opportunity. The successive generations of the respondents cannot
ask fresh opportunities. It may also be mentioned that this was not even the
ground before the learned ADJ. The petitions before this Court also have
remained pending for eight years and the respondents vide order dated 28th
August, 2015 were sufficiently cautioned that the matter will be heard on
29th October, 2015 and even after respondents failed to argue on that date
opportunity was given to them to file written arguments and which have
been filed and have been considered by me hereinabove.
21. The other arguments vaguely urged and not even substantiated of, a)
the land, at the time of mutation in the names of respondents being already
built upon; b) the actions of petitioner L&DO being belated; c) of there
being no provision in the lease for recovery of damages; and, d)
determination of lease being contrary to the provisions of Transfer of
Property Act, also have no merit. It matters not that the land was built upon
at the time of mutation in the name of respondents; the respondents, by
becoming lessees of the land underneath the flats, are bound by the terms
and conditions of the lease. There was also no delay on the part of petitioner
L&DO. The breaches were detected in the inspections on 12th May, 1971
and 30th July, 1971, breach notice was issued on 7th July, 1972, charges for
compounding of breaches were conveyed on 5th March, 1973, the premises
were re-entered on 14th November, 1973 and notice by Estate Officer under
Section 4(1) of PP Act issued on 21st July, 1975. As far as the contention of
there being no provision in lease for compounding of breaches on payment
of damages is concerned, I fail to see how the same helps the respondents.
That means, that once the breach is committed and on account thereof lease
terminated, the ex-lessee has no recourse. I may also mention that though a
Single Judge of this Court in Jor Bagh Association (Regd.) Vs. Union of
India 112 (2004) DLT 690 held that L&DO cannot recover damages for
compounding the breaches but the said view was overruled in Union of
India Vs. Jor Bagh Association Regd. 188 (2012) DLT 25 (DB). The
argument, on the basis of provisions of Transfer of Property Act is also
misconceived. The lease is a government grant and as per Section 2 of the
Government Grants Act, 1895, the provisions of Transfer of Property Act
are not applicable thereto.
22. The petitions are thus allowed.
23. The common order dated 14th February, 2007 of the learned ADJ
impugned in these petitions is set aside. Resultantly, the order dated 3 rd
October, 2005 of the Estate Officer is restored.
24. Each of the respondents is also burdened with costs of Rs.50,000/- of
these proceedings payable to the petitioner L&DO within four weeks hereof.
25. The record of the Estate Officer requisitioned in this Court be returned
to the Estate Officer.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
MAY 4, 2016 „gsr‟..
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!