Darshana Devi & Anr vs State ( Nct ) Of Delhi & Anr
2016 Latest Caselaw 510 Del

*   IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+   CRL.M.C. 3870/2015
                                   Date of Decision : January 22nd, 2016
    DARSHANA DEVI & ANR                                 ..... Petitioners
                Through            Mr.S.P. Paul, Adv.

                         versus

    STATE ( NCT ) OF DELHI & ANR              ..... Respondents
                   Through   Mr.G.M. Farooqui, APP for the State.
                             Mr.C.M. Thapliyal, Adv. with R-2 in
                             person.



           CORAM:
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

    P.S.TEJI, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed

by the petitioners, namely, Smt. Darshana Devi and Mukesh for

quashing of FIR No.332/2011 dated 12.12.2011, under Sections

448/380/411/120B/34 IPC registered at Police Station Adarsh Nagar

on the basis of mediation report of the Delhi Mediation Centre, Rohini

Courts, Delhi arrived at between the petitioners and respondent no. 2,

namely, Smt. Geeta on 14.02.2013.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State

submitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has been

identified to be the complainant/first-informant in the FIR in question

by SI Sukhbir Singh.

3. Respondent No.2, present in the Court, submitted that the

dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the

mediation report, it has been agreed between the parties that the

property bearing No. A-24, Majlis Park, Azadpur, Delhi which is

worth Rs. 1,50,00,000/- may be sold if consented by all the parties

concerned and if the said property will be sold, the proceeds of Rs. 5

lacs will be deposited in the name of the child Master Jayant in the

form of FDR. It has further been agreed that the parents of the said

child will be at a liberty to withdraw the interest for the educational

and other necessary expenses of the child. Further it has been agreed

that out of the remaining proceeds, one share will go in favour of Ms.

Pinki and the second share will go to the petitioner no.1 and the third

share will go to the respondent no.2 and petitioner no.2 and if the

property is purchased out of the sale proceeds of the third share then

the same will be in the name of both the respondent no.2 and

petitioner no.2 and the said property will not be sold without the

consent of respondent no.2. It has also been agreed between the

parties that in light of the present settlement, the present case as well

as all the connected cases pending between the parties shall be

withdrawn/disposed of by the parties concerned on their dates of

hearing and now there is no claim or dispute of any nature whatsoever

pending between them. Respondent No.2 affirms the contents of the

aforesaid compromise and of her affidavit dated 26.06.2015

supporting this petition. In the affidavit, the respondent no.2 has

stated that she has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed. All

the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual

consent. Now no dispute with petitioners survives and so, the

proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end.

Statement of the respondent No.2 has been recorded in this regard in

which she stated that she has entered into a compromise with the

petitioners and has settled all the disputes with them. She further

stated that she has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed.

4. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex

Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in

cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings

or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."

5. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a

recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC

466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh

(Supra) are as under:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

6. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to

prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent no.2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question and

has stated that the matter has been settled out of her own free will. As

the matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there

would be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legal

proceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is of

the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law and

to secure the ends of justice.

7. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision

of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is

abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;

where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to

avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision

of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of

justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to

circumvent the express provisions of law.

8. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram

Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of

Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009

has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the

Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice

or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is

not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

9. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced

that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not

affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of

such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace

and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.

In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and

energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in

entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is

compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.

Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675

the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of

Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not

compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,

section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of

quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts

and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-

compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that

notwithstanding the fact the offence under Section 380 IPC is non-

compoundable offence, there should be no impediment in quashing

the FIR under this section, if the Court is otherwise satisfied that the

facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.

10. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of

statement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrants

to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to be

quashed.

11. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.332/2011

dated 12.12.2011, under Sections 448/380/411/120B/34 IPC

registered at Police Station Adarsh Nagar and the proceedings

emanating therefrom are quashed against the petitioners.

12. This petition is accordingly disposed of.

(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE JANUARY 22, 2016 dd