Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 1310 Del
Judgement Date : 19 February, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 143/2012
Date of Decision : February 19th, 2016
ANIL THAPPAR & ORS ..... Petitioner
Through Ms.Bansuri Swaraj & Mr.Annirudh
Sharma, Advs.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through Mr.Vinod Diwakar, APP with Insp.
Afsar Raza, PS EOW.
Mr.Subhash Bansal, Mr.Shaswat
Bansal, Advs. for PNB with
Mr.Vimal Jain, Chief Manager &
Mr.Harish Batra, Sr. Manager (PNB).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI
P.S.TEJI, J.
1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed
by the petitioners, namely, Sh. Anil Thappar, Sh. Ashok Thappar, Sh.
Shyam Sunder Thappar and M/s Thappar Oils & Fats Ltd. for
quashing of FIR No.349/2000 dated 22.05.2000, under Sections
406/420/206/120-B IPC registered at Police Station Connaught Place
on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the petitioners and
Sh. K.K.Sinha, Sr. Manager, B.O. ARM Branch on behalf of the
respondent no. 2, namely, Punjab National Bank, Assets Recovery
Management Branch, Atma Ram House, Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi.
2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
submitted that the Mr. Vimal Kumar Jain, present in the Court has
been identified to be the Chief Manager, PNB, Rajendra Place,
ARMB Branch, New Delhi in the FIR in question by his counsel.
3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the FIR in question
was lodged on the allegation that Anil Thapar, Ashok Thapar and
Shyam Thapar being the directors of M/s Thapar Oils and Fats Ltd.
approached the complainant Bank-respondent no.2 for financial
assistance. The respondent no.2 sanctioned them various facilities
totaling to Rs. 360 lacs. During routine inspection, the respondent
no.2 discovered that the above mentioned persons have conspired
with each other and have fraudulently removed, concealed etc. stocks,
finished/semi-finished goods with the respondent no.2 and thereby
they have prevented the said properties from being taken in execution
of the decree or order which they knew is likely to be passed by the
Court of law if a civil suit were to be filed against them by respondent
no.2.
Thereafter, the FIR in question was lodged and the charge sheet
was filed by the IO. Thereafter, the matter got compromised between
the parties.
4. Mr. Vimal Kumar Jain, the Chief Manager of the respondent
No.2 present in the Court, submitted that the dispute between the
parties has been amicably resolved. The terms of the compromise are
as per the order/statement of the parties recorded before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal-II, Delhi on 15.10.2010 in IA No.880/10. It has
been stated that during the pendency of the OA No. 445/2000 there
has been a compromise between the complainant-bank and the
petitioners and it has been settled that the complainant-bank is ready
to accept a sum of Rs. 32 lacs in full and final settlement towards the
total dues as claimed in the said OA, if and only if the said sum of Rs.
32 lacs is paid by the petitioners within a period on one year from
03.03.2010. Out of the said amount the petitioners have deposited a
sum of Rs. 2 lacs with the complainant-bank as upfront money at the
time of submitting their compromise proposal. The balance amount of
Rs. 30 lacs shall be paid to the complainant-bank in the manner as
enunciated in the said order. The petitioners agreed that they have no
claim left outstanding against the complainant-bank and that they
withdraw their counter claim filed by them against the complainant-
bank. Mr. Vimal Kumar Jain, the Chief Manager of the respondent
No.2 affirmed the contents of the aforesaid settlement. All the
disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual consent.
Now no dispute with petitioner survives and so, the proceedings
arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end. Statement of
the Sh. Vimal Kumar Jain has been recorded in this regard in which
stated that the respondent no.2 has entered into a compromise with the
petitioners and has settled all the disputes with the petitioners. He
further stated that respondent no.2 has no objection if the FIR in
question is quashed.
5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex
Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in
cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-
"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."
6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a
recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh
(Supra) are as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
7. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to
prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
The respondent no.2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question. As
the matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there
would be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legal
proceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is of
the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law and
to secure the ends of justice.
8. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision
of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is
abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;
where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to
avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision
of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of
justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to
circumvent the express provisions of law.
9. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram
Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of
Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009
has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the
Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice
or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is
not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.
10. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced
that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not
affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of
such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace
and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.
In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in
entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is
compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.
Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675
the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not
compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of
securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,
section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the
proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts
and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-
compoundable.
In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that
notwithstanding the fact that the offences under Sections 206/120B
IPC are non-compoundable offences, there should be no impediment
in quashing the FIR under these sections, if the Court is otherwise
satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.
11. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of
statement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrants
to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to be
quashed.
12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.349/2000
dated 22.05.2000, under Sections 406/420/206/120-B IPC registered
at Police Station Connaught Place and the proceedings emanating
therefrom are quashed against the petitioners.
13. This petition is accordingly disposed of.
(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE FEBRUARY 19, 2016 dd
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