Ms. Ritu Taneja vs Ganga International School & Ors.
2016 Latest Caselaw 7482 Del

*            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                         W.P.(C) No.11887/2016

%                                                      20th December, 2016

MS. RITU TANEJA                                            ..... Petitioner
                          Through:       Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Advocate.
                          versus

GANGA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL & ORS.          ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, ASC with Mr. Deboshree Mukherjee, Advocate for respondent No.3.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. By this writ petition under Article 226 and Article 227 of the

Constitution of India the petitioner impugns the order of the Delhi School

Tribunal (DST) dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner herein against

the order/letter of the respondent no.1/school dated 28.6.2013 relieving the

petitioner of her duties with the respondent no.1/school.

2. Petitioner filed an appeal before the DST pleading that she was

appointed by the respondent no.1/school as PGT (Biology) on 3.2.2010 and

she had continuously worked thereafter with the respondent no.1/school till

28.6.2013, and therefore, petitioner cannot be terminated from her services

by the impugned letter dated 28.6.2013. Petitioner effectively pleads and

argues that the petitioner had worked continuously for over three years with

the respondent no.1/school, hence petitioner should be granted the benefits

of the judgments passed by this Court in the cases of Hamdard Public

School Vs. Directorate of Education and Anr. 202 (2013) DLT 111 and

three other connected cases with the lead case being Army Public School

and Anr. Vs. Narendra Singh Nain and Anr. in W.P.(C) No.1439/2013

decided on 30.8.2013. The judgments in the cases of Hamdard Public

School (supra) and Army Public School and Anr. (supra) have been

followed in the case of Sonia Mehta Vs. Dayanand Model School and Ors.

in W.P.(C) No.3061/2011 decided on 6.9.2013 and which judgment was

filed by the petitioner before the DST.

3. No doubt, if an employee works with a school in Delhi

continuously for three years, then, such an employee will be entitled to the

benefit of ratios of the judgments passed by this Court in the cases of

Hamdard Public School (supra) and Army Public School (supra),

however, it is seen that the petitioner has not worked continuously with the

respondent no.1/school in Delhi for over three years. This is because

petitioner no doubt got employment with the respondent no.1/school as a

PGT(Biology) as per the respondent no.1's letter dated 3.2.2010, however,

petitioner thereafter had resigned from her services with the respondent

no.1/school by submitting her handwritten resignation letter dated 23.7.2011

to the respondent no.1/school. This resignation of the petitioner from the

respondent no.1/school was approved by the Directorate of Education vide

its letter dated 22.9.2011. Petitioner thereafter worked with a school no

doubt under the same management of the respondent no.1/school, however,

the said subsequent school where the petitioner got employment was not a

school in Delhi governed by the Delhi School Education Act & Rules, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') but the said subsequent school was a

school which was situated in Haryana at Kablana, District Jhajjar.

Petitioner worked in this school in Haryana from 24.7.2011 to 31.5.2012

from where she received her pay by cheques and had also in fact applied for

maternity leave from this school in Haryana. These aspects with respect to

petitioner getting her pay by cheques in Haryana as also getting maternity

leave from school are noted by the DST in paras 14 and 19 of the impugned

judgment. A school in Haryana is not governed by the Delhi School

Education Act. It is therefore clear from the records that the petitioner

undoubtedly did not continue to work for three years with the respondent

no.1/school which is governed by the Act, but, her services continued after

her resignation from the respondent no.1/school with the school in Haryana

which is not governed by the Act. Petitioner's services therefore are not

continuous for three years under the school governed by the Act, and hence

petitioner cannot get benefit of the ratios of the judgments of this Court in

the cases of Hamdard Public School (supra) and Army Public School

(supra).

4. Petitioner claims that petitioner was made to forcibly resign by

the respondent no.1/school, however, it is seen that the letter of resignation

was admittedly in the handwriting of the petitioner and with respect to

which the Directorate of Education had in fact given its approval by its letter

dated 22.9.2011. Once petitioner never challenged the factum of resignation

being forcibly obtained from her or that the Directorate of Education had

wrongly given the approval to her resignation, and which are events of

July/September, 2011, then the petitioner cannot suddenly wake up in the

year 2013 by writing her letter dated 28.6.2013 that the petitioner was

forced to give her resignation by the respondent no.1/school.

5.(i) In the impugned judgment, the DST notes that the petitioner

has concealed the fact that petitioner has during the pendency of the appeal

before the DST obtained a job as a teacher at the same post of PGT

(Biology) with another school in Delhi namely Mamta Modern Sr. Sec.

School, Vikaspuri, New Delhi and which aspect has also led the DST to

deny the reliefs claimed in the appeal.

(ii) Learned counsel for the petitioner however argues that the petitioner

obtained her job with Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School only during the

pendency of the appeal, and therefore, that would not prevent the petitioner

from claiming relief of continuous employment and reinstatement with the

respondent no.1/school, however, I cannot agree, inasmuch as, I put a

specific query to the counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner only has an

ad hoc job or a contractual job or a non-permanent job with the Mamta

Modern Sr. Sec. School and to this query counsel for the petitioner states

that he does not have any knowledge with respect to the nature of job of the

petitioner with the said school. I cannot accept such an answer because

petitioner is deemed to know the status of her employment with the Mamta

Modern Sr. Sec. School, and which she had concealed, and therefore, once

petitioner has obtained a job with Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School and which

job under the Act would have a statutory and permanent flavor in view of

the observations of the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of

Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh.

Vijay Kumar and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 472 there cannot exist two

mutually destructive relationships i.e one permanent relationship of the

petitioner with Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School and another permanent

relationship of the petitioner with the respondent no.1/school. Once there is

a permanent employment of the petitioner with the Mamta Modern Sr. Sec.

School and which this Court is forced to presume in the absence of any

appropriate response on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner then cannot

claim/seek relief of permanent employment with the respondent

no.1/school. Once the permanent employment is obtained by an employee

of the school with another school, the umbilical cord of employment with

the earlier employer gets snapped. This is all the more so because nothing

has been shown to this Court on behalf of the petitioner that when petitioner

took the job with Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School she had informed either

Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School or the respondent no.1/school that this

appointment of the petitioner with Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School will be

temporary or non-permanent in nature and such relationship would be

terminated in case petitioner succeeds in her appeal before the DST

whereby she would get the relief of continuation of her services with the

respondent no.1/school. Accordingly, for both the reasons i.e concealment

of facts by the petitioner and the fact that the petitioner has already obtained

employment with another school namely Mamta Modern Sr. Sec. School the

DST has rightly dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment.

6. Finally, counsel for the petitioner argues that the termination of

the employment of the petitioner by the letter dated 28.6.2013 is not correct

because the letter is issued by the respondent no.2/society and not by the

respondent no.1/school, however, I find this argument only a technical

argument of desperation inasmuch as the management of the school and

which is run by the respondent no.2/society, can be said to have written the

letter for and on behalf of the respondent no.1/school, and in the facts of this

case, in my opinion, this technical argument should not entitle the petitioner

for setting aside the impugned judgment of the DST.

7. Ordinarily, I would have dismissed this petition with costs

inasmuch as the petitioner has been found guilty of concealment of fact of

already having obtained alternative employment and which was concealed

from the DST as also from the respondent no.1/school, but, only because

petitioner is a teacher no costs are imposed, but, these observations will be

noted in case any further litigations will be filed on behalf of the petitioner.

8. Dismissed.

DECEMBER 20, 2016                                  VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
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