Jagpreet Kaur Gandhi vs Union Of India & Ors
2015 Latest Caselaw 743 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                   W.P.(C) 7906/2013

                                         Reserved on : 03.12.2014
                                         Pronounced on : 28.01.2015

IN THE MATTER OF:
JAGPREET KAUR GANDHI                           ..... Petitioner
                   Through : Mr. Ankur Chibber, Advocate

                       versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS                           ..... Respondents
                    Through :Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate
                    for R-3 & 4.

CORAM
HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI


HIMA KOHLI, J.

1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 9.11.2013 and

letter dated 21.11.2013 issued to the respondent No.3/Company,

terminating her services to the post of Assistant Manager-BD w.e.f.

9.11.2013, on "business grounds" and informing her that the amounts

due and payable to her had been transferred to her account towards

full and final settlement. The petitioner also prays for issuance of a

writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to reinstate her with all

the consequential benefits and consider her case for regularization in

terms of the Resolution dated 3.9.2013, passed by the Board of

Directors of the respondent No.3/Company. Lastly, the petitioner has

sought directions to the respondents to grant her relief as granted to

the similarly placed contractual employees of the respondent

No.3/Company, in terms of the Memorandum dated 12.7.2013.

2. At the outset, counsel for the petitioner had sought leave to

confine the relief in the present petition to prayers (a) & (b). So the

last relief mentioned above has not been pressed by the petitioner.

3. The facts of the case in a nutshell, are that on 24.7.2009, the

petitioner was employed by the respondent No.1/Company, as an

Executive Grade-II on a salary of Rs.17,000/- per month, vide

Employment Agreement dated 24.7.2009 (in short 'the

Agreement'). The said Agreement was valid for a period of two

years commencing from 24.7.2009 and was extendable by mutual

consent. Clause 4 of the said Agreement laid down the grounds on

which the petitioner‟s contracts could be terminated.

4. As per the petitioner, she was working to the satisfaction of her

superiors in the respondent No.3/Company and accordingly, w.e.f.

1.4.2010, her salary was revised from Rs.17,000/- per month to

Rs.25,000/- per month, in terms of the letter dated 14.5.2010. Vide

letter dated 1.7.2011, the petitioner was designated as an Assistant

Manager w.e.f. 1.4.2011 and her salary was revised from Rs.25,000/-

per month to Rs.27,500/- per month. It was however clarified that all

the other terms and conditions of her employment/contract would

remain unchanged. On 7.7.2011, the petitioner‟s salary was revised

to Rs.30,000/- per month w.e.f. 1.4.2011.

5. On 26.7.2011, the respondent No.3/Company had informed the

petitioner that it had decided to extend her service agreement for a

period of two years, w.e.f. 24.7.2011, on the earlier terms and

conditions. The period of two years reckoned from 24.7.2011, would

have expired on 23.7.2013. However, prior thereto, vide letter dated

9.7.2013, the respondent No.3/Company had informed the petitioner

that they had decided to extend her service agreement for a further

period of six months w.e.f. 24.7.2013. But, before the expiry of the

period of six months, all of a sudden, on 9.11.2013, the respondent

No.3/Company informed the petitioner in writing that her services as

Assistant Manager-BD would cease with immediate effect on

"business grounds" and she would be paid one month‟s salary in lieu

of the notice period.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the petitioner had

submitted a representation dated 11.11.2013 to the respondent

No.3/Company stating inter alia that the termination letter being

contrary to the terms of Clause 4.1 of the Agreement, was invalid.

The said letter was duly replied to by the respondent No.3/Company

on 21.11.2013, wherein it was asserted that the cessation had taken

place within the framework of the Agreement executed between the

parties and that an amount of Rs.1,41,009/- had been transferred to

the petitioner‟s account towards full and final settlement. Aggrieved

by the aforesaid decision, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

7. Mr.Ankur Chibber, learned counsel for the petitioner had argued

that the termination of the petitioner‟s service could have taken place

only in accordance with the terms of Clause 4 of the Agreement that

had laid down the grounds available for termination. However, the

ground invoked by the respondent No.3/Company for terminating the

services of the petitioner, i.e., "business grounds" is not one of the

grounds spelt out in the said clause and they cannot be permitted to

improve their case subsequently and contend that there were other

grounds available for terminating the petitioner‟s contract. It was

therefore stated that the impugned termination order cannot

withstand judicial scrutiny and ought to be quashed and set aside, as

being arbitrary and illegal. In support of this submission, learned

counsel for the petitioner had relied on the decision of the

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder

Singh Gill & Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi &

Ors., reported as (1978) 1 SCC 405.

8. Secondly, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that vide

Resolution dated 3.9.2013, the Board of Directors of the respondent

No.3/Company had taken a decision to regularize the services of the

contractual employees of the Company and for the said purpose, a

committee had been constituted to scrutinize the performance of each

and every candidate and place its Report before the Managing

Director for final orders. However, instead of regularizing the

petitioner‟s services, the same were terminated without any

justification, which had resulted in depriving her of a valuable right of

being considered for regularization.

9. Per contra, Mr.Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents

No.3 & 4 had sought to justify the impugned order by submitting that

the petitioner was a contractual employee and was governed by the

Employment Agreement dated 24.7.2009, which entitled the

respondent No.3/Company to terminate her services by giving an

advance notice of one month. He submitted that the respondent

No.3/Company had the option to terminate the petitioner‟s

employment in terms of Clause 4.1 of the Agreement, which option

was duly exercised by the employer on the ground of misconduct.

He particularly referred to Clauses 1.1 and 4.1 of the Agreement to

justify the action of the respondent No.3/Company in terminating the

petitioner‟s services.

10. Learned counsel argued that apart from the various reasons

mentioned in Clause 4.1 of the Agreement that entitled the

respondent No.3/Company to terminate the petitioner‟s contract, one

of the grounds mentioned therein is of misconduct, a word that has

been defined in clause 8 of Annexure-I, enclosed with the Agreement

and titled as "Work Policies" He contended there were sufficient

reasons available with the respondent No.3/Company to have

exercised its right to terminate the petitioner‟s contract, that included

her being frequently late in attending office, leaving office before the

stipulated time, without prior permission, in spite of repeated

warnings given by her superiors, wasting the office time by browsing

the internet/browsing unwanted sites and playing games on the

computer during office hours.

11. Learned counsel for the respondents No.3 & 4 elaborated that

the petitioner was not serious about the work that was assigned to

her, was not performing her duties well and there were lot of

complaints about her behavior at work. Further, the petitioner used

to spend long hours in making personal calls from the office landline

phone during office hours and it was noted that she was in touch with

her ex-head of the department and was passing sensitive information

of the respondent No.3/Company to him for which, she had been

severely reprimanded. He alluded to the Memorandum dated

14.12.2012 addressed by the Manager HR of the respondent

No.3/Company to the petitioner wherein she was informed that she

had been repeatedly coming late to office and was advised to be

punctual, failing which she was warned that appropriate action would

be initiated against her, which could include termination of her

services.

12. On the issue of regularization of services, learned counsel for

the respondents No.3 & 4 had stated that when filing the present

petition, the petitioner had concealed material information from the

Court. He submitted that she has deliberately failed to state in the

petition that her case was duly considered for regularization along

with other candidates and she was called by the committee

constituted by the Board of Directors of the Company on 20.9.2013,

for the purpose of regularization of the contractual employees on the

basis of their experience, performance and merit. However, after

interaction, the said committee had not found the petitioner fit for

regularization and resultantly, her case had not been recommended to

the competent authority for regularization. Though no such

averment has been made in the counter affidavit, learned counsel for

the respondents No.3 & 4 had orally submitted that till date, the

competent authority has not acted upon the recommendations

received from the committee and none of the contractual employees

have been regularized so far.

13. The Court has heard the arguments advanced by learned

counsels for the parties in the light of the pleadings in the writ

petition and the documents placed on record.

14. The limited question that arises for consideration in the present

case is as to whether the impugned termination order dated

9.11.2013, passed by the respondent No.3/Company was in

accordance with the conditions stipulated in Clause 4.1 of the

Agreement and if not, the effect thereof. In this regard, the relevant

clauses of the Agreement and of Annexure-I, (Work Policies), referred

to by the parties, are reproduced herein below for ready reference :

"1. EMPLOYMENT :

1.1 The employment of the contract employees to the above position shall commence from 24th day of July, 2009. His term of employment shall be for a period of two years ("the Term") only from the date of this agreement and shall be extendable by mutual consent only. During the term, either the Company or the contract employee has the right to terminate this Agreement by giving a prior written notice of one month except that the Company also reserve the right to terminate this Agreement in terms of Clause 4 of this Agreement.

             1.2    xxxx

             1.3    xxxx

      2.     xxxx

      3.     xxxx

      4.     TERMINATION :

4.1 Notwithstanding anything contained in clause 1.1 of this Agreement the services of the contract employee may be terminated any time with immediate effect if he/she is found guilty of misconduct, misrepresentation, fraud, cheating, misappropriate of funds of the Company, causing sexual harassment to the employees, abuse of duties and powers, performing duties in manner which is not in the interest of the Company and also if he/she is in contravention of any of the clauses of this Agreement."

Annexure -I Work Policies

8. Misconduct :

            i.      The term "misconduct", would mean:

            ii.     xxxx

            iii.    xxxx

            iv.     xxxx

            v.      xxxx

            vi.     xxxx

            vii.    xxxx

viii. Habitually late or irregular in attendance.

ix. Neglect of work or negligence in performance of duty.

            x.      Damage to property of IIDL.

            xi.     xxxx

            xii     xxxx

            xiii.   xxxx

            xiv.    xxxx





             xv      xxxx

            xvi.    xxxx

            xvii. xxxx

            xviii. xxxx

            xix.    xxxx

xx. Commission of any act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour.

xxxx

Note : The above list of instances of „misconduct‟ is illustrative in nature, and not exhaustive."

15. The termination clause contained in the petitioner‟s Employment

Agreement specified the grounds that were available to the

respondent No.3/Company for terminating her employment at any

time and they included situations where she was found guilty of

misconduct, misrepresentation, fraud, cheating, misappropriation of

funds of the Company, causing sexual harassment to the employees,

found abusing her duties and powers, performing her duties in

manner which were not in the Company‟s interest and if she was in

contravention of any of the remaining clauses of the Agreement.

However, the said clause does not include the ground invoked by the

respondent No.3/Company for terminating the petitioner‟s services,

namely "business grounds". On scanning the examples of

"misconduct" included by the respondent No.3/Company in

Annexure-I to the Employment Agreement (Works Policies), it is again

noticed that the term "business grounds" does not find mention in

the twenty clauses laid down as examples that describe acts of

omission/commission on the part of an employee, which would have

to be treated as "misconduct".

16. In the above context, it is also relevant to examine the

terminology used by the respondent No.1/Company in the impugned

termination letter dated 9.11.2013, which is reproduced hereinbelow:

"No.IIDL/HRD/JK/PF/28/2013/575 November, 2013

To, Smt. Jagpreet Kaur, Assistant Manager-BD IFCI Infrastructure Development Ltd. New Delhi-19

Re: Cessation of Agreement

Dear Smt. Jagpreet Kaur

With reference to the above subject, this is to inform you that your services as Assistant Manager-BD are hereby ceased w.e.f. November 9, 2013 on business grounds.

2. This is also in accordance with the cause no.4.1 as stated in the employment agreement entered between you and IIDL on July 24, 2009 and subsequent extensions thereto.

3. You are hereby advised to return company property to HR and handover your duties to Shri Mohit Bhatnagar, AVP-BD by close of business hours today.

4. Please note that you will be paid one month salary in lieu of notice period.

5. Once the exit formalities are completed by you today, the company shall settle your dues within seven working days.

Yours sincerely

Sd/-

(Neha Malik) Sr. Manager-HR & Administration"

17. A bare perusal of the aforesaid document would reveal that the

respondent No.3/Company had sought to justify terminating the

petitioner‟s contract prematurely by resorting to the term, "business

grounds", and had gone on to state that the same was in accordance

with Clause 4.1 of the Agreement. Having failed to elaborate as to

what the respondents No.3 & 4 meant by the term, "business

grounds" as was used in the termination order, either by referring to

any of the definitions of misconduct contained in Annexure-I(Work

Policies) or to the grounds laid down in Clause 4.1 of the Agreement,

the submission made by the counsel for the respondents No.3 & 4

that the second para of the termination order clarifies that the

petitioner‟s termination was in accordance with Clause 4.1 of the

Agreement and this would in itself be sufficient to explain the grounds

of termination, is found to be unsustainable.

18. It cannot be urged by the counsel for the respondents No.3 & 4

that apart from the "business grounds" invoked by the Company to

terminate the petitioner‟s contract, it can also rely on the grounds

mentioned in Clause 4.1 of the Agreement to justify terminating her

services. Merely because the second para of the impugned

termination letter has adverted to clause 4.1 of the Agreement does

not mean that the respondents No.3 & 4 can rely on the said clause

as a whole, without specifying the exact nature of misconduct alleged

against the petitioner. This is all the more so when the termination

letter referred to "business grounds" in the first para of the letter.

Nor can para 2 of the impugned letter be read in isolation. The entire

letter has to read as a whole to understand the context in which the

respondents No.3 & 4 had decided to abruptly discontinue the

petitioner‟s services.

19. In the facts of this case, the principles enunciated by the

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder

Singh Gill (supra) would come to the aid of the petitioner. In the said

judgment, the Supreme Court had observed that while passing an

order, an authority must not only act in a bona fide manner, but it

must also operate subject to the rules of natural justice. It was held

that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain

grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and

cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or

otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time

it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by

additional grounds later brought out. To bring home its point, the

Supreme Court had remarked that "Orders are not like old wine,

becoming better as they grow older." To substantiate the above

conclusion, the Supreme Court had referred to the following pertinent

observations made by Bose, J. in the case of Commissioner of Police,

Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, reported as AIR 1952 SC 16:

"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself."

20. Similarly in the case of Dipak Babaria v State of Gujarat

reported as AIR 2014 SC 1792, while referring to the decision in the

case of Mohinder Singh Gill‟s case (supra), the Supreme Court had

quashed the order passed by the Government of Gujarat and the

Collector of Kutch as bad in law and arbitrary, as the said order was

found to be devoid of any factors/reasons that were referred to in the

subsequent affidavits filed by the respondents in court. The Supreme

Court had gone on to add that such factors were being pressed into

service as an after-thought and the Government could not be allowed

to improve its stand subsequent to the passing of the order.

21. In the instant case, the respondent No.3/Company has filed a

counter affidavit, wherein a number of grounds have been taken by it

to justify its decision of terminating the petitioner‟s services

prematurely but quite apparently, none of them find mention in the

impugned termination letter. As per the settled legal position noted

above, the respondent No.3/Company cannot be permitted to improve

upon its case by pressing into service new grounds for dispensing with

the petitioner‟s services when they were not invoked or referred to in

the termination order. The only ground that was invoked by the

respondent No.3/Company for cessation of the petitioner‟s services

was "business grounds", a term that was not elaborated in the said

letter and has not been referred to either in Clause 4.1 of the

Agreement, or in Annexure-I (Work Policies) enclosed therewith.

22. In view of the above position, it does not lie in the mouth of the

respondent No.3/Company to justify the impugned termination order

by claiming that the petitioner had been indulging in misconduct as

she used to frequently come late to the office and leave early or she

used to waste office time by browsing the internet/browsing

unwanted site or playing games etc., or that she did not perform her

duties well and spent long hours in making personal calls from the

office landline phone, so on and so forth. All the above grounds are

clearly an afterthought. Nor would the Memorandum dated

14.12.2012, issued by the management to the petitioner a year

earlier and informing her that she was frequently coming late to the

office, be of any assistance to the respondent No.3/Company for the

simple reason that after issuing the said Memorandum, when the

petitioner‟s contractual employment was due to expire on 24.7.2013,

the same was extended, for a period of six months ending on

23.1.2014, by issuing a letter dated 9.7.2013, thereby waiving the

misdemeanour, if any, on the part of the petitioner.

23. In view of the aforesaid observations, this Court is of the

opinion that the impugned termination order dated 9.11.2013 issued

to the petitioner is unsustainable as the ground pressed by the

respondent No.3/Company/management for terminating her services,

namely, "business grounds", has not been elaborated and in the

absence of any such definition of "misconduct" mentioned in Clause

4.1 of the Agreement and in Annexure-I (Work Policies) enclosed

therewith that explain the circumstances wherein the petitioner‟s

services could have been terminated, the impugned order is

unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. As a result, the order

dated 9.11.2013 is set aside and quashed and as a sequitor thereto, it

is held that the contractual employment of the petitioner that was

extended for a period of six months, vide order dated 9.7.2013,

remained in operation till 23.1.2014, the date on which the said

period would have exhausted itself in due course.

24. Before coming to the next relief prayed for by the petitioner,

which is for issuance of directions to the respondents to consider her

case for regularization in terms of the Resolution dated 3.9.2013,

passed by the Board of Directors of the respondent No.3/Company, it

is necessary to peruse the said Resolution. It was recorded in the said

Resolution that a committee of three Directors would be formed to

consider individual cases, based on their performance and track

record for regularization of contractual staff and the final list of

candidates, to be absorbed in the respondent No.3/Company, would

be prepared by the said committee and presented to the Managing

Director for final ratification/issuance of orders.

25. Counsel for the respondents No.3 & 4 had argued that the

petitioner had deliberately withheld material information from the

Court and concealed the fact that in furtherance to the aforecited

Resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the respondent

No.3/Company, the petitioner and other similarly placed contractual

employees were called by the committee constituted for the purpose

of regularization and she had appeared before the said committee on

20.9.2013 for interaction. In this regard, he had highlighted the

averments made by the respondent No.3/Company in para 3 of the

preliminary objections and paras 13 to 16 of the reply on merits in the

counter affidavit and submitted that there was not a whisper in the

writ petition to indicate that the petitioner‟s case had been duly

considered by the Management for regularization, an event that had

taken place much before the date of issuance of the termination

letter.

26. When confronted with the aforesaid position, learned counsel for

the petitioner had referred to para 14 of the writ petition, wherein the

petitioner has stated that the Board had taken a decision to regularize

the staff, but instead of regularizing her, her services had been

terminated. It was however not denied by learned counsel that no

specific averment was made in the petition that after the decision

taken by the Board of Directors to regularize the services of the

contractual employees, the petitioner was called for an interview by

the committee on 20.9.2013. Rather, while filing her rejoinder to the

counter affidavit filed by the respondent No.3/Company, instead of

admitting the correct factual position, the petitioner has tried to evade

the said issue. For the first time, she has stated in para 3 of the reply

to the preliminary objections taken by the respondent No.3/Company

that she had been interviewed on 20.09.2013 by a three member

committee comprising of the Managing Director and two Directors of

the Company.

27. It may be emphasized here that petitioners, who approach the

Court for seeking equitous relief under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India are expected to reveal all the material and relevant facts.

When dealing with a somewhat similar situation that had arisen in the

case of Shri Krishna Jaanmotsav Samiti Punjabi Bagh (Regd.) vs. MCD

and Anr. reported as 182 (2011) DLT 155, this Court had observed

that when a party approaches the High Court and wishes to invoke its

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it must

place on record all the relevant facts, without any reservation. In

exercising its discretionary powers and the extraordinary jurisdiction

vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

the said Court not only acts as a court of law, but also as a court of

equity. Therefore, in case there is a deliberate concealment or

suppression of material facts on the part of the petitioner or it

transpires in the course of the proceedings that the facts have been

so twisted and placed before the Court, that would be tantamount to

concealment, the writ court is well entitled to refuse to entertain the

petition and dismiss it without entering into the merits of the matter.

The aforesaid view was buttressed by relying on the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of

India reported as (2007) 8 SCC 449 and the judgment in the case of

R. vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner reported as (1917) 1

KB 486 wherein the importance of making full and fair disclosure of

all the material facts to the Court was stressed. In the case of

Prestige Lights (supra), the Supreme Court had expressed its views in

the following manner:-

"35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible."(emphasis added)

28. In the case of K.D. Sharma vs. SAIL reported as (2008) 12

SCC 481, the Supreme Court had observed that its jurisdiction under

Article 32 and that of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and

it is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching

the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts

without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate

relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or

the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, the petition may be

dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the

claim.

29. In the case of Kishore Samrite v State of UP, reported as

(2013) 2 SCC 398, the Supreme Court had once again frowned upon

litigants, who approach the Court with unclean hands and had

deprecated the conduct of those litigants who conceal material

information from the Court. While laying down the general principles

that apply uniformly to a variety of cases, the Supreme Court had

held that the obligation to approach the court with clean hands is an

absolute obligation.

30. In the given facts of the case, for the counsel for the petitioner

to urge that the decision of the committee constituted by the Board of

Directors of the respondent No.3/Company had not been

communicated to the petitioner cannot justify her attempt to

deliberately withhold material information from the Court that her

case was duly considered for regularization by the committee

constituted by the Board of Directors and turned down. It was only

after the respondent No.3/Company had filed the counter affidavit

that it transpired that when filing the present petition, the petitioner

had failed to state therein that she was called for an interview by the

committee in terms of the Resolution dated 3.9.2013 passed by the

Board of Directors.

31. It is a different matter that the aforesaid committee did not find

the petitioner fit for regularization, but the necessary factual

averments for laying the foundation of the relief sought by the

petitioner for seeking regularization are found to be completely

missing from the averments made by her in the writ petition. This

conduct is unacceptable and can only be treated as a deliberate

attempt on the part of the petitioner of suppressing material

information from the Court. This in itself is found to be sufficient

ground for this Court to decline to exercise its discretion in favour of

the petitioner in so far as the relief of regularization is concerned. In

any event, learned counsel for the respondents No.3 & 4 had stated

during the course of arguments that after the committee had

submitted its report to the competent authority, no further steps have

been taken for regularizing the services of any of the contractual

employees mentioned in the said list.

32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present

petition is partly allowed by quashing the impugned termination order

dated 9.11.2013, issued by the respondent No.3/Company. Directions

are issued to the respondent No.3/Company to release the

emoluments payable to the petitioner for the balance period of her

contractual employment, in terms of the Service Agreement read with

the letter of extension dated 09.07.2013 issued to her, whereunder

her services were extended till 23.01.2014.

33. Perusal of the contents of the letter dated 21.11.2013, issued

by the respondent No.3/Company to the petitioner reveal that the

employer had paid her a sum of Rs.1,41,009/- towards the amount

allegedly due and payable to her, including one month‟s salary in lieu

of the notice period. After adjusting the said amount, the respondent

No.3/Company shall pay further amounts to the petitioner for the

balance period of the contract till 23.1.2014, in terms of the

Agreement dated 24.7.2009, renewed thereafter from time to time,

till it was abruptly terminated on 9.11.2013. The said amount shall

be paid by the respondents No.3 & 4 within four weeks from today

along with interest calculated @ 9% per annum, on a recurring basis,

from the date the said amounts had become due and payable, till

realization. If the payment is not released within the stipulated time,

then the interest payable to the petitioner shall be enhanced from 9%

per annum to 12% per annum.

34. The writ petition is disposed of. In view of the order passed

above, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

                                                       (HIMA KOHLI)
JANUARY 28, 2015/sk/mk                                    JUDGE