Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 6439 Del
Judgement Date : 31 August, 2015
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC. Revision No.410/2014
Decided on : 31st August, 2015
SHARDA DEVI ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mohit Khanna, Advocate.
Versus
AKSHAY KHANDELWAL ...... Respondent
Through: Ms. Kamini Sirivastava, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI, J. (ORAL)
1. This is a revision petition filed under Section 115 CPC read with
Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by virtue of which
the petitioner has challenged the order dated 13.10.2014 passed by the
learned Additional Rent Controller, Central, granting leave to defend to
the respondent/tenant.
2. The reason for grant of leave to defend to the respondent/tenant by
the learned Additional Rent Controller is on account of the fact that it has
been admitted by the petitioner/landlord that the son of the petitioner, for
whose benefit the accommodation has been claimed, is running an
independent business of tents from the first floor of property No.3677 in
the same locality. The said business in the nature of partnership firm is
being carried out by the two sons of the petitioner namely Sh. Deepak
Mehra and Sh. Nitin Mehra. The business has extended to such an extent
that not only the son of the petitioner has purchased a shop bearing No.5
in property No.2287/42, Kouria Pul but even the daughter-in-law has also
purchased two shops in property bearing No.2287/41, Kouria Pul, Delhi.
It has been stated that all the aforesaid shops are being put to use by the
petitioner's son for his partnership business. It is averred that the premise
presently being used for the business is insufficient to meet the
requirements therefore an additional accommodation being the tenanted
premise is required for use as godown. In such a contingency, the case of
the petitioner for bona fide requirement to seek eviction of the
respondent/tenant from a place in the suit premises for the purpose of
storing of goods was held to be a triable issue by the learned Additional
Rent Controller.
3. The aforesaid reasoning has been assailed by the learned counsel
for the petitioner before this court on the ground that the Ld. ARC on an
erroneous interpretation of law has wrongly held that a financially
independent person will not be dependent for the purpose of
accommodation on the petitioner/landlord. The petitioner in support of
his contention has relied upon judgments of this court in Major General
A.K. Verma AVSM (Retd.) & Another vs. Narinder Singh; 110 (2004)
DLT 226, Labhu Lal vs. Sandhya Gupta; 173 (2010) DLT 318, Agya Ram
Arora vs. Surjeet Mech. Tools; 2015 (220) DLT 245 and Vinod Arora vs.
Deepak Aggarwal; 172 (2010) DLT 112.
4. I have perused and analyzed the aforesaid judgments and find them
of no help to the case of the petitioner as each of the aforesaid judgment
are distinguishable on account of completely different factual matrix.
Agya Ram Arora (supra) was a case where the business was originally
started by the landlord/ Agya Ram Arora himself and his wife and later
their two sons joined the said business and the same was run like a joint-
family business. Further it was recorded that the sons were residing with
the landlord Agya Ram Arora as no evidence to the contrary was
adduced. It was in the light of these circumstances that the court held that
two sons although financially settled were dependent on the landlord/
father for their earning and accommodation and the landlord/father was
inter dependent on the sons for the running of their business.
5. The findings rendered in Maj Gen. A.K. Verma AVSM (Retd.)
And Anr. (supra) is also distinguishable as the question of law before the
court in the said matter was whether a married sister who was living with
the landlord/brother could be said to be dependent on him for the purpose
of accommodation. It was a case where the married sister was residing
with her mother in her paternal home for last 20-25 years and had
relinquished her share in favor of her brother only to facilitate the
securing of a government loan required for renovation of the residence
the ground floor of which formed the tenanted premise.
6. Vinod Arora's case (supra) was a case where the tenanted premise
was categorically required for the use of the landlord himself and
therefore has no application to the present case.
7. Reliance placed on Labhu Lal's case (supra) also seems to be
misplaced as in the said case the possession of the tenanted premise was
sought by the landlord for the use of his son and daughter in law who
were both doctors and residing with the landlord. The tenanted premise
being the ground floor of property No. 81-A, Kamla Nagar was to be
used for the expansion of the clinic run by the son and daughter-in-law
which was located at a corner in the rear portion of the ground floor. It is
pertinent to note here that the son and daughter in law of the landlord
were both dependent on him not only for their residential accommodation
but also for running their clinic as the same was being run in a corner
shop in premise no. 81-A, Kamla Nagar which as is recorded above was
owned by the landlord/father. In the instant case the sons of the
petitioner/ landlady are running their own independent business and are
not dependent on the landlady either for accommodation or finances.
Therefore none of the aforesaid judgments have any bearing on the
instant matter and are of no assistance to the petitioner.
8. It is well settled position that in a case of bona fide requirement,
four ingredients have to be satisfied by the landlord before a decree for
eviction is passed. These four requirements being (i) that the
petitioner/landlord must not only be the landlord but the owner, (ii) that
the purpose of letting should not be in dispute, (iii) that the premises are
required bona fide for the purpose of himself or his dependent family
members and (iv) that the existing accommodation is not sufficient
enough to meet his requirement. In the event, all these four conditions
are satisfied then only the petitioner is entitled to a decree of eviction. On
the same note it has also been laid down in a catena of judgments that
where a tenant prima facie makes out a triable issue which, being an issue
if permitted to be proved would disentitle the petitioner/landlord from
claiming eviction of such a tenant then in such an event the leave to
defend of the tenant ought to be allowed and he be permitted to contest
the matter on merits.
9. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the petitioner has
challenged the order only on the ground that the son of the petitioner is
dependent on the petitioner herself for the purpose of additional
accommodation in the form of a godown, which happens to be under the
tenancy of the respondent/tenant.
10. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and have also gone through the impugned order.
I am of the considered opinion that analysis of the evidence done by the
Ld. ARC is perfectly justified and is done with great deal of objectivity.
The question which has been decided by the learned Additional Rent
Controller is holding that a person who is financially not dependent on
the petitioner and has admittedly created 2-3 shops during the normal
course of running of his business and therefore cannot be said to be
dependent for the purpose of additional accommodation on the petitioner,
his father. If the petitioner's son and his wife, namely, daughter-in-law of
the petitioner have been generating sufficient finances which have
resulted in creation of immovable assets, where from the business of the
petitioner's son is being run now, then it is very well possible that they
can create additional accommodation for the purpose of godown also and
they cannot be termed to be dependent on the petitioner for the purpose of
the same. Moreover, this is not the case of the petitioner that her son
despite being financially well off and in a position to create additional
accommodation is dependent on the petitioner for the purpose of
additional accommodation. If that be so, there is perfectly no illegality,
impropriety or unreasonability in the leave to defend granted by the
learned Additional Rent Controller to the respondent/tenant.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, I feel that the revision petition filed by
the petitioner is totally misconceived. The impugned order does not
suffer from any jurisdictional error, impropriety or illegality which would
warrant any interference on the part of the court. Accordingly, the
petition is without any merits and the same is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
AUGUST 31, 2015 'AA' AD
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