Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 4811 Del
Judgement Date : 25 September, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 25th September, 2014
+ CRL.A. 1479/2011
STATE ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. M.N. Dudeja, Additional
Public Prosecutor for the State
along with ASI Tejram, PS
Nazafgarh.
versus
RAJPAL @ RAJU & ORS. ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. T.R. Kashyap, Advocate
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA
JUDGMENT
: SUNITA GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the petitioner/State
challenging the judgment dated 5th April 2010 in sessions case
No.11/09 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka
Courts, New Delhi whereby all the accused/respondents were
acquitted of the charges under Section 395/363/323/506/34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1806 (hereinafter referred to as IPC).
2. To appreciate the contention raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner/State, a brief summary of the prosecution case is given
below:-
On 9th August 2003 on receipt of DDno. 20/A SI V.P.Kochhar
along with HC Mahipal reached Khatu Shyam Temple, Shyam Vihar
where they found household articles including bed, TV, Fridge,
Almiraha, kitchen articles, clothes etc lying scattered on the side of
the road. No eye witness was found there and it transpired that the
injured had been already removed to RTRM Hospital. HC Mahipal
was left at the spot and V.P.Kochhar reached the hospital where he
met Smt. Sheela Bhagat alongwith her children. MLC of the injured
Sheela was collected and the Doctor opined injuries to be simple
blunt injuries and declared her fit for statement.
3. Sheela gave her statement to the effect that three and a half
years back, she purchased plot No.16/A Dharampura, Najafgarh,
Delhi from a property dealer named Bijender for a sum of
Rs2,33,000(Two Lakhs thirty three thousand only). Two shops, one
room, one bathroom and a toilet were built on the plot. About two
years ago, a shop adjacent to the house of Mahender was sold to the
son of Bhagwan. Thereafter, when they were in need of more money,
they borrowed a sum of Rs.1,50,000 (One Lakh fifty thousand only)
from Ramesh and as security of the loan amount, papers of house
were prepared in the name of Indrawati(one of the accused), wife of
Ramesh with the assurance that on the return of the loan amount, they
shall hand over the papers back in the name of complainant i.e.
Sheela Bhagat. At that time, rent agreement for eleven months was
also executed in favour of Ramesh. However, they could not return
the money and therefore, Ramesh, his wife Indrawati, Bhagwan and
his wife Bharpai used to come to ask for return of the loan amount to
which they sought a year's time. On 9.8.2003 at about 2 PM, she was
present at home along with her children while her husband had gone
to his clinic in Gurgaon. A tempo no. HR 38-DS-743 came in front of
her house. In that Tempo, Ramesh, his wife Indrawati(accused No.6),
sister in law Naresh(accused no.5), two sons of Bhagwan (accused
No.1 &2) came and entered her house. On asking why they had
entered the house, accused Indrawati caught hold of the complainant
Sheela. Her daughter Priya (PW-2) was caught hold by accused
Naresh. Accused Bharpai came and caught hold of her sons Ankit and
Chetan(PW-3). Thereafter, accused persons Krishan, Satpal and
Rajpal started beating them. In the meantime, Tempo driver Rohtash
alonwith 3-4 musclemen entered their house and started loading the
household articles in the tempo and extended threats to her and her
children to kill them and asked them to quietly sit in the tempo
otherwise they will bury them. The complainant and her children
were all frightened and accused persons took them and loaded them in
the tempo. Three ladies were left in the house. They were kidnapped
and reached Khatu Shyam Temple, Shyam Vihar where Complainant
started making noise. On hearing the noise, public persons came there
and accused persons pushed the complainant and her children from
the tempo and left. Her articles like bed, TV, almirah, utensils,
clothes, gas were also left there which came under the tempo and
accused persons fled away in the tempo. Some articles were however
left in the tempo. Somebody informed the police who came to the
spot and removed the complainant to RTRM Hospital.
4. Charge under Section 395/363/323/506/34 IPC was framed
against the accused to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution examined 10
witnesses. All the incriminating evidence was put to the accused
persons while recording their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
wherein they denied the allegations levelled against them and claimed
innocence and alleged false implication in the case. Accused persons
did not lead any defence evidence.
6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge after scrutinizing the
evidence on record observed and came to the following conclusions:
- The Tempo in which the goods and the family of the
complainant were allegedly taken and thrown could not be seized
despite the fact that number of the Tempo had been mentioned in the
FIR. The explanation given in the chargesheet is that the record of the
Tempo was destroyed in the office of RTO. Learned Judge held that
such an averment cannot be accepted as the tempo is a commercial
vehicle and fitness certificate of a commercial vehicle has to be taken
at least once in a year and as such even if earlier record is destroyed,
still the name of the owner of the tempo could have been ascertained
and then the tempo could have been seized.
- The Investigating Officer of the case has not been examined.
- The complainant also has not been examined as she had
expired by the time chargesheet was filed and as such her statement
cannot be read in evidence.
- As per the prosecution, stones were hurled at the tempo as a
result of which the tempo was made to come to a halt but such stones
have also not been taken into possession.
- It is a case where only two children of the complainant in the
shape of PW2 Priya and PW3 Chetan have been examined and the
third child Ankit who was present at the time of incident was not
examined.
7. Learned Judge also pointed out the material contradictions in
the testimonies of PW2 and PW3, some of which are extracted below:
- PW2 stated that initially accused Satpal, Rajpal and Bharpai
entered the house and thereafter Inderawati, Naresh and Krishan also
entered but as per PW3 only Naresh and Krishan entered the house.
- PW2 had stated that a cloth was placed in the mouth of her
mother Sheela but as per PW3, hands were placed in the mouth of all
the family members excluding his father who was not present at the
house.
- As per PW2, two or three musclemen who had accompanied
the accused persons were placing the goods in the tempo but as per
PW3, it is the accused persons who had placed the goods in the
tempo.
- As per PW2, after the tempo travelled a certain distance, public
persons intervened and accused persons threw away goods and them
from the tempo, the place according to her was near a Mandir.
However, PW3 had stated that after travelling 2-3 km when they
reached near a ganda nala, there was a dead end and the tempo could
not move any further and being placed in such a situation, the accused
persons finding no option, threw away their goods and also them near
the ganda nala. Learned Judge further held that not only was there a
contradiction but it is a vast one and even the IO had stated that there
was no dead end near the house of the complainant.
- As per PW2, she and her mother were sitting on the front seat
of the tempo but as per PW3, all four of them were on the front seat.
Also, as per the case of the prosecution, only complainant i.e. Sheela
was on the front seat while her children were at the back side of the
tempo.
- As per PW2, all the accused persons ran away in a tempo and
all of them were in the tempo which is again contrary to the
prosecution case as the case of the prosecution was that the lady
accused persons remained in the house while the male accused
persons went in the tempo.
- PW2 had stated that it was her brother who opened the gate
when Satpal, Rajpal and Bharpai entered the house, however,
according to PW3, the accused persons entered the house on their
own.
- As per PW2, they were caught hold by all the accused persons
and were given beatings but there is no injury on their person as
reflected in their MLC.
- As per the case of prosecution, statement of PW3 was recorded
at the hospital but PW3 stated that his statement was recorded in the
Police Station.
8. Learned Judge also pointed out other inconsistencies in the
prosecution case:
- PW2 had stated that she heard a noise and she was confronted
in this regard from her statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C.
(Ex.PW2/DA) as such the same was an improvement. As per PW2
Priya, Naresh caught hold of her and Bharpai caught hold of Ankit
and Chetan and she was again confronted in this regard from her
statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C.
- PW4 Kanwar Lal and others who had been made witnesses by
the prosecution to the panchnama whereby the goods of the accused
persons were seized, had stated that no incident happened in their
presence and it is actually the goods of the complainant which were
placed in the house and they signed the panchnama on such
representation being made to them by the IO. So, the prosecution
witnesses have also contradicted the version of PW3 that their goods
were taken to the Police Station.
- PW7 HC Mahipal who was associated in the investigation has
demolished the case of prosecution in its entirety and the fact remains
that the IO has not been examined as he has not come forth to depose.
In his cross examination, PW7 had stated that he had left the police
station at 1 PM and it was because of receiving a call regarding a
quarrel near Khatu Shyam Mandir. This statement is incorrect as it is
the case of the prosecution that the incident happened at 2 PM. As per
him, when they reached the Mandir, none of the persons present there
made any statement. It gains significance as it is the case of the
prosecution that the tempo was made to halt near a Mandir by public
persons and the good were thrown near a Mandir. Even if the family
members had gone to the hospital, other persons who were witness to
the incident must have been present near the goods but not only no
such person has been examined by the prosecution, the fact remains
that no such person has been cited as a witness i.e. to say that no
independent persons has been cited as an eye witness though
available in plenty. PW7 has further stated that tehrir was handed
over to him at 2 PM and he reached the Police Station within fifteen
minutes and reached back the spot with the copy of the FIR at 2:45
PM. The same is incorrect and is contrary to the case of the
prosecution as FIR has been lodged ar 4:05 PM. He has further stated
that accused persons were arrested from the house at 4 PM though in
the arrest memo (Ex. PW7/B), the time shown is 10:50 PM.
9. Learned Additional Sessions judge after critically analyzing the
material on record held that because of inconsistencies in statements
of PW2 and PW3 regarding the incident and the manner in which it
took place, not only amongst themselves but even from the
prosecution case and because there are improvements in their
statements and even the investigation does not inspire confidence, the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove any of the charges against
any of the accused persons. Hence, all the accused are acquitted.
10. Feeling aggrieved, present appeal has been preferred by the
State.
11. Assailing the findings of learned Trial Court, it was submitted
by learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State that
discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses does not go to the root of
the matter and occurred due to lapse of time. Court ignored the
injuries on the person of complainant and the fact that when police
reached the spot, household goods were found lying at the spot.
Complainant could not be examined as she expired but prosecution
case stands proved from the testimony of PW2 and PW3. Hence
impugned judgment acquitting the respondent/accused deserves to be
set aside.
12. Per contra, it was submitted by learned counsel for the
respondent/accused that it was basically a civil dispute between the
landlord and tenant. Property was sold by husband of the complainant
to respondent No. 6, however, possession was not handed over on the
ground that their own house was under construction. As such, a rent
agreement was entered into but complainant neither paid rent nor
vacated the premises but in collusion with Investigating Officer of the
case got this false case planted upon the accused. It was handiwork
of Investigating Officer of the case who intentionally even failed to
appear in the witness box. Independent witnesses did not support the
case of prosecution. Entire case based on testimony of PW2 and PW3
who made material improvements and their testimony do not inspire
confidence. Hence respondents were rightly acquitted by learned
Additional Sessions Judge and no interference is called for.
13. I have given my considerable thoughts to the respective
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the record.
14. Since this is an appeal against acquittal where parameters for
evaluating the evidence is different from an appeal against conviction,
it will be appropriate first to have a glance at the legal proposition
enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Mrinal Das vs. The State
of Tripura, AIR 2011 SC 3753, it was held as under:
6. In State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. , (2007) 3 SCC 755, this Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under:
"16 ...while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with."
7. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, while considering the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate court to reappreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the order of acquittal, this Court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above decisions and further held that:
42...The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The same principles have been reiterated in several recent decisions of this Court vide State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jagram and Ors. (2009) 17 SCC 405, Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1, Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189, Ganpat v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 59, Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh and Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 324, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh and Anr. (2011) 4 SCC 786.
8. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court
is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed."
15. What can be culled out from the aforesaid decision is that while
exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court
of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal
unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by
the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review
the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court
below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law
and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the
appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence
to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to
find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of
the crime he is charged with.
16. Similar view was taken in Govindraju @ Govinda v. State by
Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr., 2012 III AD (SC) 453, Murlidhar @
Gidda & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, 2014 IV AD (SC) 557 and
Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2014 IV AD (SC)
565, Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2014 V AD (SC) 1.
17. In the light of the aforesaid principles laid down, we shall
consider the evidence placed on record to find out whether the courts
below have committed any error in dealing with the evidence, which
can be said to be patently illegal, or that the conclusion arrived at is
wholly untenable, calling for interference by this Court.
18. In the instant case, the complainant Sheela Bhagat could not be
examined by the prosecution since she had expired before the filing of
the charge sheet. Consequently, the statement made by her to the
police which resulted in registration of FIR cannot be read in
evidence as it did not pertain to cause of her death or having been
made in connection or in relation of her death. The Investigating
Officer SI V.P. Kochar who might have recorded this statement had
also not appeared in the witness box to prove the statement and in fact
although the entire investigation was conducted by him but he failed
to appear in the witness box for reasons best known to him. The
submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the entire case
was the handiwork of the Investigating Officer of the case against
whom departmental inquiry was initiated and ultimately action was
also taken against him cannot be brushed aside. As such, non-
examination of the complainant and the Investigating Officer came as
a severe blow to the prosecution case. Not only that, PW4 Kanwar
Lal and PW5 Rajender Prasad are alleged to be independent witnesses
but even they have not supported the case of prosecution. The entire
case hinges upon the testimony of PW2 and PW3 who are none else
but the daughter and son of the complainant and, as such, are her
close relatives and, therefore, their testimony requires to be
scrutinized with great care. They have not only made material
improvements in their statements but also contradicted each other on
various aspects. Moreover, the submission of learned counsel for the
respondent that it was basically a civil dispute between the landlord
and the tenant. The property was sold by husband of the complainant
to respondent No. 6 and he neither handed over the possession nor
paid rent nor vacated the premises but instead planted a false case
upon the respondent also cannot be lost sight of, in as much as, in the
initial complaint made by Ms. Sheela, she had admitted that a sum
of Rs.1,50,000/- was borrowed from Ramesh and papers of the house
were prepared in the name of Indrawati with the assurance that on
return of loan amount, they shall hand over the papers back in the
name of complainant. She also admitted execution of rent agreement
for eleven months and that she could not repay the loan amount which
was being demanded time and again by Ramesh, Indrawati, Bhagwan
and his wife Bharpai. PW2 also admitted in her cross-examination
that her father had taken a sum of Rs.1 lac or 1½ lacs from accused
Ramesh and had given the documents pertaining to the house to
Indrawati. She also admitted that civil case regarding eviction and
use and occupation charges has been filed by Indrawati against her
and her brothers. Filing of the civil suit by Indrawati has not been
denied even by PW3. However, according to him the civil suit has
been filed only against him and his brother and not against his sister.
The fact remains that the civil litigation between the parties has not
been disputed by even these two witnesses.
19. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances, the
mere fact that MLC of Sheela Ex.PW1/A was prepared or according
to PW7 Head Constable Mahipal, on reaching the spot, certain goods
were found lying on the road are not sufficient to return a finding of
guilt against the respondent in as much as, as held in Ramesh
Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225:
"....the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions....
20. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the view taken by the
learned Trial Court was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it
were wholly untenable.
21. That being so, there is no merit in the appeal. The same is
accordingly dismissed.
Copy of the judgment along with Trial Court Record be sent
back.
(SUNITA GUPTA) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 25, 2014 nk/rs
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