M/S Maa Jagdamba Tempo Services vs M/S Sharda Motor Industries Ltd ...
2014 Latest Caselaw 4563 Del

*            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+
            CM(M) No.564/2014 & C.M.No.9796/2014 (Exemption)

%                                                   17th September, 2014

M/S MAA JAGDAMBA TEMPO SERVICES                 ......Petitioner
                 Through: Mr.Sudhir Tewatia, Advocate.

                          VERSUS

M/S SHARDA MOTOR INDUSTRIES LTD THR ITS DIRECTOR/
PRINCIPAL OFFICER                          ...... Respondent

Through: None.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. Challenge by means of this petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India is to the concurrent orders of the courts below; of the

first appellate court dated 13.1.2014 and the trial court dated 08.10.2013; by

which the injunction application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff claiming the

relief that the contract for providing of tempo services/commercial vehicle

services by the petitioner/plaintiff to the respondent/defendant be not

cancelled by the respondent/defendant, has been dismissed.

2. The sum and substance of the case which has been put forth by the

petitioner is that he has invested heavily in purchase of the commercial

vehicles for providing tempo services to the respondent/defendant, and that

since the contract is valid till 31.3.2017, consequently, the

respondent/defendant cannot terminate such a contract and the

respondent/defendant should continue to take commercial vehicles on hire

from the petitioner/plaintiff.

3. Both the courts below have dismissed the injunction application by

arriving at two conclusions. Firstly, it is observed that the suit itself is not

maintainable as the petitioner is a partnership firm which is not registered,

and therefore Section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act, 1932 bars the suit.

Second reason for declining the relief was by reference to Section 41(e) of

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short 'the Act') which provides that injunction

cannot be granted which will amount to specifically enforcing a contract

which otherwise cannot be specifically enforced. We are concerned in the

present petition with the second conclusion.

4. Section 14 of the Act provides that certain contracts cannot be

specifically enforced. Such contracts include contracts where on account of

non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief.

Section 41(e) of the Act states that no injunction can be granted to prevent

the breach of a contract which cannot be specifically enforced.

5. In commercial contracts such as the present, surely the best

entitlement of the petitioner/plaintiff would be to net profits on account of

providing tempo/commercial vehicle services. Clearly, therefore money as

compensation is an adequate relief, and consequently in view of the

provisions of Sections 14 and 41(e) of the Act, the suit was clearly barred as

has been held by the courts below.

6. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition, and the

courts below have rightly dismissed the injunction application because grant

of the relief of injunction would have amounted to directing specific

performance of the contract, and which was not permissible in view of

Sections 14 and 41(e) of the Act.

7. Dismissed.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 KA