Sh. Tilakraj Taneja vs Sh. Navin Soni & Anr.
2014 Latest Caselaw 5139 Del

*            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+             RC.REV.No.262/2013 & C.M.No.11296/2013

%                                                     14th October, 2014

SH. TILAKRAJ TANEJA                                           ......Petitioner
                   Through:              Mr.Rajat Aneja with Mr.Vijay
                                         Kasana, Advocates.

                          VERSUS

SH. NAVIN SONI & ANR.                                     ...... Respondents

                   Through:              Ms.Manindra Acharya, Sr.Advocate
                                         with Mr.Om Prakash and Mr.Sidhant
                                         Kaushik, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?


VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. This petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,

1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') impugns the judgment of the

Additional Rent Controller dated 12.4.2013 by which the leave to defend

application filed by the petitioner/tenant has been dismissed and eviction

petition has been decreed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act with respect to

the suit/tenanted premises being one shop admeasuring 7' x 21' feet on the

front side of the property bearing no.3, DLF, Industrial Area, Moti Nagar,

New Delhi.

2. The case as set up by the respondents/landlords was that in the entire

ground floor of the premises where the tenanted shop is located, they are

carrying on an industrial unit of manufacturing of Cork Sheets, Rubberized

Cork Sheets, Gaskets Sheets for automobiles industries and electrical

industries in the name and style of M/s India Cork Industries. The

respondents/landlords claim that they have in the ground floor portion only

one small office of 6' X 10' feet, which is grossly insufficient with respect to

the requirement for installing of computers, account section etc etc. The

respondents/landlords also plead that there is no proper space for sitting of

the customers, senior officers of the buyers company, senior officials of

Govt. bodies etc who frequently visit the industrial unit of the

respondents/landlords. The respondents/landlords have expressed their

further difficulty that the office which they are presently having of 6' X 10'

feet is situated at the back of the property and all persons including the

customers have to reach the office by entering in the premises from the main

gate of the factory and they witness the entire work/manufacturing process

which causes gave prejudice to the clients whose goods are manufactured,

because there is some sort of confidentiality required with respect to the

manufacturing of different products. The first floor above the ground floor

portion which is with the respondents/landlords is said to be not suitable

because it is stated to be in a dilapidated condition. The

respondents/landlords also plead that his one of the sons, Shobit Soni has

passed his electronics engineering and he wants to extend the business

activities by modernizing the same by taking the suit/tenanted premises

which is situated within the factory premises.

3. In a bonafide necessity eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e)

of the Act, three aspects are required to be seen for decreeing the eviction

petition. The first aspect is that the eviction petition is filed by the

owner/landlord of the property. The second aspect is that the landlord needs

the premises for the bonafide use of himself and/or his family members.

The third requirement is that the landlord should not have an alternative

suitable accommodation.

4. In the present case, there is no dispute with respect to the respondents

being the owners/landlords of the premises. The dispute is with respect to

the bonafide necessity and availability of an alternative suitable

accommodation.

5. The basic stress laid on behalf of the petitioner/tenant by his counsel

was that the respondents/landlords can use the first floor of the property for

their office, and consequently once there is an alternative suitable

accommodation on the first floor, not only there is alternative suitable

accommodation, but the eviction petition is not bonafide. The

petitioner/tenant has also challenged the claim with respect to confidentiality

in the manufacturing process as is averred by the respondents/landlords.

6. In my opinion, the Additional Rent Controller has rightly dismissed

the leave to defend application because the petitioner/tenant cannot force the

respondents/landlords to incur expenditure for renovating and repairing the

first floor which is lying in a dilapidated condition, and which aspect is to be

taken with the fact that surely a ground floor portion and that too in the front

of the premises is more preferable as an office than any other portion on the

first floor. Therefore, in my opinion, the first floor portion above the

tenanted premises and the premises where the respondents/landlords are

carrying on business cannot be said to be a suitable alternative

accommodation.

7 (i) During the course of hearing, counsel for the petitioner/tenant sought

to argue that the respondents/landlords have not filed the site plan showing

the occupation of the different portions of the ground floor of the

suit/tenanted premises by the respondents/landlords and as to how some

space is not available on the ground floor itself, however, when I put a query

to the counsel for the petitioner/tenant to show that if any such ground is

raised in the leave to defend application that a particular specific portion on

the ground floor is available for office use by the respondents/landlords,

nothing could be pointed out in the leave to defend application urging such a

stand on behalf of the petitioner/tenant. I may note that the Supreme Court

in the case of Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs (2010)

2 SCC 15 has held that courts can only consider grounds urged in a leave to

defend application filed within the statutory period of 15 days, and which

period of 15 days is an inflexible and a mandatory period. Effectively the

Supreme Court has held that after the statutory period of 15 days, no

grounds can be urged or no additional affidavit and documents can be

considered with respect to the issue of grant of leave to defend. Therefore, I

refuse to look at a ground which does not form part of the leave to defend

application, especially because by the self-serving bald averment it cannot

be presumed that certain suitable portion of the ground floor is available

with the respondents/landlords.

(ii) I may note that a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of

Madhu Gupta Vs. Gardenia Estates (P) Ltd. 184 (2011) DLT 103 relying

upon the judgment of Prithipal Singh's case (supra) has held that after a

statutory period of 15 days, a leave to defend application cannot be amended

because this will destroy the sanctity of 15 days statutory period as held by

the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh (supra) i.e whatever

grounds which are urged within 15 days statutory period prescribed for filing

leave to defend can only be considered for the issue of leave to defend.

8. In view of the above, there is no merit in this petition, and the same is

therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J OCTOBER 14, 2014 KA