Delhi High Court
Phool Chand Gupta vs Ram Kishan Grover on 12 May, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 12.05.2014
+ RC.REV. 160/2012, CM No.6759/2012
PHOOL CHAND GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. O.P. Verma, Adv.
versus
RAM KISHAN GROVER ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. S.D. Dixit, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
% MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI (Open Court)
This petition is against the judgment dated 9.12.2010 whereby the
eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25 B of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) was allowed and the petitioner
herein has been directed to be evicted from the tenanted premises i.e.
Shop No.J-III, 208, J.J. Colony, Wazirpur, Delhi-52. The leave to defend
was not granted since the Trial Court did not find any triable issue. The
objections raised against the eviction proceedings were: i) that there was
no bonafide requirement ii) the person for whose benefit the eviction
petition has been filed had yet to attain majority iii) that the tenant-
landlord relationship was in dispute iv) the landlord had other three
properties available with him, each of which would disentitle him from an
eviction order under Section 14 (1)(e) i.e. in summary proceedings under
Section 25 B of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that accordingly, leave to defend ought to have been granted and matter
ought to have been tried.
It is not in dispute that the landlord had filed a petition for the
intended beneficiary i.e. his son who was 17 years, 9 months and 20 days
old at the time of filing of the petition. The father was preparing for the
property to be made available to the son when the latter would attain
majority in a couple months' time. The learned counsel for the respondent
submits that every prudent father would want to settle his son as far as
and as soon as possible. He submits that in the present case i) landlord's
son was to attain majority in the very imminent future and, ii) that
property No.208 was the suit property whereas property Nos. 209 and
210 were owned by the brother and wife of the landlord. Therefore,
neither of the latter two properties could be considered as being available
to the landlord, nor could be they considered as triable issues.
Consequently, neither of the said properties could be considered as an
alternate accommodation available to the landlord.
However, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that a distinction has to be drawn between desire and need. He
submits that it was only the landlord's desire to settle his son immediately
upon attainment of latter's majority and that event was to occur much
later. This Court is not persuaded by the said argument. As recorded
earlier, the attainment of majority was to occur in the very near future
merely two months and 28 days later. Therefore, the need for
accommodation for the son was imminent and a prudent father would
logically seek vacation of the tenanted premises. Furthermore, the two
properties belonging to the landlord's brother and wife could not be taken
into consideration as being available to him as alternate accommodation.
It is also settled law that the tenant is the best judge about the suitability
of the tenanted property for his bonafide need (Sarla Ahuja vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 CSS 119). No tenant or Court can
substitute its opinion with respect to the suitability of the property for the
bonafide need which the landlord may make out (Shamshed Ahmad &
Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (deceased) 152 (2008) DLT 301 SC). In so far
as the landlord deemed property no.208 to be suitable for his purposes,
the issue became final. The Court would accordingly not substitute its
opinion instead. The Trial Court's reasons for and conclusion arrived at
are just.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment. The petition is dismissed as being
without merit.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J
MAY 12, 2014/ak
