Delhi High Court

Dr.V.B.Bhatia & Ors. vs State Of Haryana & Ors. on 6 May, 2014

Author: Sunita Gupta

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                 Date of Decision: 6th May, 2014

+                       W.P(Crl.)1771/2012

       DR.V.B.BHATIA & ORS.                           ..... Appellant
                     Through:          Petitioner No.1 in person

                        versus

       STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.            ..... Respondent
                    Through: Ms. Nupur Chaudhary,
                             Advocate for R-1, 3-6
                             Mr. Sidharth Mittal, Advocate
                             for R-2
                             Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, ASC for
                             R-7
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA

                        JUDGMENT

: SUNITA GUPTA, J.

1. This is a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 filed by Dr. V.B.Bhatia, Mrs. Rajni Bhatia, Mr.

Puneet Bhatia, Ms. Gaayatri Malhotra, Mr. Arush Malhotra, who are

the father-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, sister-in-law and husband

of sister-in-law respectively of complainant respondent no.2, Ms.

Karishma Bhatia seeking following reliefs:-

(i) Issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate

writ, order or direction seeking quashing of FIR

No.855/2012 dated 16.11.2012, P.S. City Rohtak,

Rohtak, Haryana;

(ii) Transfer of the aforesaid FIR and the investigation to be

conducted under the same to Delhi.

(iii) Grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners.

2. Petitioner No.1, arguing in person on behalf of all the

petitioners, submitted that the complainant initially made a complaint

dated 7th September, 2012 where there was no reference to any

allegation of harassment or cruelty committed by the petitioners at

Rohtak. However, after the petitioner received summons on 25th

September, 2012 in pursuance to the complaint made by the

complainant, he sent an e mail along with a hard copy to the Director

General of Police, Panchkula that complaint need not be pursued at

Panchkula as the marriage took place at Delhi. The complainant lived

with the petitioner and other family members at Delhi. Neither the

petitioner nor his son or any of his relatives ever visited the girl‟s

house in Rohtak. The alleged demand of dowry and cruelty took

place in Delhi and no part of cause of action arose in Rohtak, as such,

complaint initiated at Rohtak be closed. Subsequently, he also went

to Rohtak and raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAW cell,

Rohtak. Thereupon, opinion was sought from SHO, CAW Cell for

further action in the matter. Opinion was given by Deputy District

Attorney on 23rd October, 2012 that no cause of action has arisen

within the jurisdiction of District Rohtak, the offence has been

committed in the jurisdiction of Delhi. Thereupon, a letter was sent by

the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, to Commissioner of Police,

Delhi, stating therein that the territorial jurisdiction to deal with the

complaint of Karishma Bhatia is at Delhi and as such complaint along

with investigation report are being forwarded for further necessary

action. The petitioner was also informed about the transfer of

investigation to Commissioner of Police, Delhi. However, on coming

to know about this fact that the investigation has been transferred to

Delhi, complainant approached the Inspector General of Police,

Rohtak on 16th November, 2012 thereupon a noting was made by the

Inspector General of Police "why don‟t they register a case in this

matter and investigate, please send your report immediately". Instead

of informing the Inspector General of Police that the investigation has

already been transferred to Delhi Police, complaint was marked to

SHO who on 16th November, 2012 registered FIR No. 855/2012

under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC. The petitioner was informed by the

SHO regarding registration of FIR. Thereupon petitioner again met

Deputy Superintendent of Police as to how the FIR has been

registered. Then the file was called back from Delhi police. He also

sought information under Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking

copy of statement of the complaint on the basis of which FIR No.

855/2012 dated 16th November, 2012 was registered. Surprisingly,

there was no fresh statement and the FIR was registered on the earlier

complaint, on the basis of which investigation was sent to Delhi

police, as such, there was gross misuse of power by the police. It was

further submitted that no cause of action has arisen at Rohtak, hence

Court at Rohtak has no jurisdiction to try the complaint. Reliance was

placed on Y .Abrahim Ajiyh v Inspector of Police,Chennai, (2004) 8

SCC 100; Bhura Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 11 SCC 103;

Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. UOI, 181 (2011) DLT 658;

Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 11 SCC 335 & Niraj

Trivedi v. State of Bihar, 2008 (3) JCC 154

3. It was further submitted that averments made in the FIR

contain vague allegations. There are absolutely no allegations

attracting the provisions of Section 406 IPC. Moreover, although in

the FIR there is a reference to three earlier complaints dated 7 th

September, 2012, 28th September, 2012 and 17th October, 2012, but

the same does not form part of the charge sheet. Reliance was placed

on Neelu Chopra v Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184, Lakhwinder Singh v.

State of Punjab, AIR 2002 P&H2 and Ajay Mitra v. State of MP,

(2003) 3 SCC 11, where on the basis of vague allegations FIR was

quashed. It was further submitted that when the complainant did not

return to her matrimonial home after 9th July, 2012 then the petitioner

moved an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act)

to the Principal of Jat College, Rohtak seeking various information in

order to ascertain as to whether the complainant was attending college

or not, however, certain information was given but the material

information was not given on the ground that the same was personal

and was exempted under RTI Act. On coming to know about this

application moved by the petitioner, complainant wrote a letter to the

Chief Minister of Haryana alleging that her husband and father-in-law

are mentally harassing and defaming her in her college by inquiring

her college time, exam date, etc. This allegation has no nexus to the

lis to confer jurisdiction upon the Court.

4. Petitioner further submitted that the High Court of Delhi has

jurisdiction to issue the appropriate directions, orders, writs to protect

the life and liberty of the Petitioners who are permanent residents of

Delhi and since the cause of action has arisen within the territories in

relation to which it exercises jurisdiction despite the fact that the

charge sheet has now been submitted in the Court at Rohtak, the

power to quash the FIR still vest in this Court. Reliance was placed

on Navinchandra N Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR

2000 SC 2966 and S.N. Sharma v. BK Tiwari & Ors., AIR 1970 SC

786.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents

submitted that part of cause of action arose at Rohtak and the offence

is continuing one. Hence, Court at Rohtak has jurisdiction to try the

matter. Respondent/complainant in her complaints made to the police

has made specific allegation as regard cruelty and demand of dowry

against the Petitioners and some of the instances are also at Rohtak

and further the offence is a continuing offence. Therefore, it cannot be

said that no cause of action has arisen at Rohtak as Resp.2 has been

harassed at the hands of the petitioners both at Delhi and Rohtak and

the said harassment is still continuing. Reliance was placed on Sunita

Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2011) 11 SCC 301. It

was further submitted that issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be

determined in proceedings for quashing of FIR and has to be

determined by the Trial Court. Reliance was placed on Geeta

Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC

741. Next, it was submitted that High Court‟s approach in exercise of

its power under Section 482 should be cautious, careful and

circumspect. Court should not go into the merits of the allegation.

Reliance was placed on Sanapareddy & State of MP, (2007) 13 SCC

165.

6. Let us first look at the complaint filed by Respondent No.2.

The FIR in question has a reference to all the three complaints made

by the complainant/respondent No.2 dated 7th September 2012, 28th

September, 2012 and 18th October 2012.

7. Respondent No.2 in her first complaint stated that her marriage

with Petitioner No.3 was solemnized on 18th January, 2012. She had

already started pursuing M.Sc in Chemistry from a college in Rohtak

before her marriage and as her in-laws wished that she complete her

studies, she continued her studies in Rohtak after marriage and used

to come to Delhi during her holidays. On 19th April, 2012, her father-

in-law and mother-law taunted her for not giving a car in the

marriage. Her mother-in-law, father-in-law and sister-in-law used to

taunt her and curse each member of her family that they did not have

any sense. She used to be confined within the four walls of the house

and was made to do all the house-hold work. She was not considered

as a member of their family. She was not allowed to talk to her

parents on telephone. In the first week of June, her father-in-law told

her that he will teach her how to use the laptop and used to try to go

very near to her due to which she used to get very frightened. He also

used to go to her room without knocking on some pretext or the other.

In June, her brother and maternal uncle invited her in-laws for dinner

but they avoided the same by saying that they are busy with

construction work. On 5th June, 2012, when her husband came, she

asked him if they could go and visit her brother‟s house on which her

father-in-law told her that she is having some disease on her face and

that she also did not have a job, therefore, she was of no use to them

and she should go away from there. When she tried to speak, her

husband twisted her arm and after putting his hand on her mouth sent

her to her room. Even prior to this, her husband had asked her to

leave the house many times. Thereafter the sequence of cruel

treatment aggravated further. She was tortured mentally and was

blamed for the things she didn‟t do. Her father-in-law told her that he

did not accept her as her daughter-in-law because her qualification is

not good enough for getting a job in Delhi; she did not have a job; his

son had a government job; his post was also higher and so he could

get many girls with government jobs. Her parents had not given

dowry according to their wishes and a car has not been given in

marriage. When she informed her husband, then he asked her to

comply with whatever his father said, otherwise she would have to

leave the house. On 7th July, 2012 her husband and in-laws remained

away from home for the whole day after locking her inside the house

and kept on doing meetings among themselves and on asking her

husband about it many times, he pressed her neck. On 8th July, 2012,

her father-in-law narrated to her a list of faults from a diary he had

been maintaining: "you have put POP on your face, neither do you

earn anything nor can you get a Govt job in Delhi, nor have your

parents given dowry according to our expectations". Thereafter she

was asked to leave the house along with her belongings and told her

to first get a laser treatment done, get a job, learn driving and then

they would think of letting her come back. Her father-in-law also

threatened her that if she told anyone about this, he was a Ph.D in law

and has turned lies into truth and truth into lies and will use all means

to harass her. When she reached her house in Rohtak, her mother

spoke to her mother-in-law over the phone and her mother-in-law

asked her mother not to worry and to do as her father-in-law says.

8. In her second complaint dated 28th September 2012, she stated

that after her marriage, whenever she visited her house in Rohtak with

her husband, petitioner No.3, he always harassed her to ask her

parents for a luxurious car and when her parents told him that they

were not in a position to give a car, especially a luxury car, he along

with his parents threw her out of the matrimonial house. On 25th

September, 2012 when petitioner No. 1 came to Women Cell, he

shouted and threatened her and her family members saying "Na

Gaddi di, Na Paisa diya, phir bhi kehte hai hamari ladki ko basa lo"

and again on 27th September, 2012 when he came to Women Cell

along with his wife, he threatened her saying "Ab tu hamare ghar

ghusne ka khwab chod de, hum teri zindagi barbad kardenge".

9. In the third complaint dated 18th October, 2012, she reiterated

the incident stated in first complaint that on 19.08.2012, her father-in-

law and mother-in-law came to her maternal uncle‟s residence at

Greater Kailash where her father, mother, brothers, maternal uncles

were also present. At that time her father-in-law admitted that he had

given a list of dowry items to her in which they demanded a luxurious

car for Puneet, 5 lakhs cash to give gifts to her sister-in-law Gaayatri

Malhotra and her husband Arush Malhotra on account of promotion

of her husband, gold bangles for her mother-in-law, fridge, LCD TV,

microwave, air conditioner for Puneet‟s government allotted house at

Chandigarh. They again and again pressurised her family members

for giving these items if she wanted to enter her in-laws‟ house. On

23rd August, 2012 her father-in-law, mother-in-law along with her

sister-in-law and her husband came to Rohtak on the pretext of

wishing her on her birthday but at the same time, they all pressurised

and mentally tortured her and her parents that she must bring all the

dowry articles if she wanted to live in her in-laws‟ house. On 27th

August, 2012, when she went to Chandigarh to meet her husband, he

again shouted at her that if she was unable to bring the items as

demanded, then he will not accept her as his wife.

10. Since the thrust of the argument of the petitioner is regarding

the territorial jurisdiction about the criminal proceedings initiated by

respondent No.2 - wife, it is desirable to refer the relevant provisions

of law.

11. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short

„the Code‟) deals with jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries

and trials. Section 177 to 179 are relevant which are as follows:-

177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.--Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of inquiry or trial.--(a) when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."

12. From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is

that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by the

Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However,

when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was

committed or where the offence is committed partly in one local area

and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, and

continuous to be committed in more than one local areas and takes

place in different local areas as per Section 178, the Court having

jurisdiction on any of such local area is competent to inquire into and

try the offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happens as

a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired into or tried

by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done

or such consequence has ensued.

13. Keeping the above provisions in mind, let us examine the

judgments cited by the parties for the purpose to find out as to

whether the Court of Rohtak has territorial jurisdiction to take

cognizance and proceed with the matter.

14. Petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Y. Abrahim Ajith (supra). The fact which arose

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the respondent had filed a

complaint in the Court of the Magistrate alleging commission of

offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal

Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court examined the matter in the context of cause of action

and part thereof, and considered any cause of action within the

jurisdiction of the court concerned which may authorize him to take

cognizance in the matter. The complaint petition itself disclosed that

after 15th April, 1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to

Chennai, where she settled. All the allegations which was per se

without any dispute took place, according to the complainant petition

at Nagercoil and, therefore, the courts at Chennai did not have the

jurisdiction to take cognizance and it was alleged that no cause of

action had taken place within the limit of Chennai Court and as such

there is no justification for taking cognizance by Chennai Court. In

that context the court examined the provisions of Sections 177 and

178 of the Code and also examined meaning of cause of action. The

court also considered that ordinarily when the offence is limited to a

particular place and when there is no allegation of continuation of

offence, in that circumstances the real test will be cause of action and

part thereof and the court gave its view that wherever the offence has

been committed in context of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,

the Court in whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed or

part thereof will have jurisdiction and no complaint petition by the

complainant will be entertained where she was ordinarily residing

subject to the condition that no part of cause of action has taken place

in the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance. In this connection,

the following paragraphs of the said judgment will be relevant for the

proper consideration:-

"12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In

essence, it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

13. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action".

The court after applying the legal principles concluded that no part of

cause of action arose in Chennai and directed to return the complaint

petition and to file the same before the appropriate court to be dealt

with in accordance with law.

15. In another judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of

Bhura Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the

authority of taking cognizance by the Court where the cause of action

and part thereof has taken place. In this case also the jurisdiction of

the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was challenged on the

ground that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the offence as the

cause of action has not accrued within the jurisdiction of Court. The

matter travelled up-to Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was argued before

the court that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code being a

continuing offence the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground

that the court has no jurisdiction. It was argued that offence of cruelty

being continuing offence will travel along with the complainant and

where she was residing. The court followed the earlier judgment in

the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and held that the facts mentioned in the

complaint petition disclosed that all cause of action has taken place

outside the jurisdiction of Court of Ganganagar and it was found that

all cause of action has taken place in the State of Punjab and no part

of cause of action arose in the State of Rajasthan and following the

earlier judgment, allowed the appeal with a direction to return the

complaint petition to the complainant and if so desire she may file the

same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

16. It is pertinent to note that the concept of continuing offence and

fall out that has taken place in another place was not under

consideration in the above cases. In Manish Ratan & Ors. v. State of

M.P. and Anr., (2007) 1 SCC 262 also, it was found that the cause of

action has arisen at Datia Court, hence complaint was ordered to be

transferred to competent Court of jurisdiction.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relied

upon Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2011) 11

SCC 301, wherein the wife had filed the complaint at Gaya alleging

ill treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband and relatives at

matrimonial home in Ranchi and that she was forcibly taken to her

parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire

consequences in case their dowry demands were not met. It was held

that as the offence was a continuing one and episode at Gaya was

only consequence of continuing offence of harassment and ill-

treatment meted out to the complainant, Magistrate at Gaya has the

jurisdiction to proceed with criminal case instituted therein.

18. Hon‟ble Supreme Court also referred to an earlier decision

rendered in Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee,

(1997) 5 SCC 30 in which similar issue was considered by Hon‟ble

Supreme Court and found that Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code

is attracted and the Magistrate at wife's parents' place has also

jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the said decision, wife was

the Appellant and the Respondents were the husband, parents-in-law

and two sisters-in-law of the Appellant Sujata Mukherjee. The gist of

the allegation of the Appellant, Sujata Mukherjee was that on account

of dowry demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated not only

in the house of her in-laws at Raigarh but as a consequence of such

events, the husband of the Appellant had also come to the house of

her parents at Raipur and assaulted her. On behalf of the Respondents

therein, it was contended before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Raipur that the criminal case was not maintainable before the said

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because the cause of action took

place only at Raigarh which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of

the learned Magistrate at Raipur. A prayer was also made to quash the

summons issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while

entertaining the said complaint of Smt Mukherjee. As the Chief

Judicial Magistrate was not inclined either to quash the summons or

to transfer the criminal case to the competent court at Raigarh, the

criminal revision petitions were filed before the High Court, one by

all the five Respondents and another by four of the Respondents

excluding the husband presumably because there was specific

allegation against the husband that the husband had also gone to

Raipur and had assaulted the Appellant and as such the husband could

not plead want of territorial jurisdiction. Both the said criminal

revision cases were disposed of by a common order dated 31.08.1989

by the High Court holding that the case against the husband of the

Appellant alone is maintainable and in respect of other Respondents

related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh, hence, the criminal

case on the basis of complaint made by the Appellant is not

maintainable at Raipur. The said order of the High Court was

challenged by the Appellant-Sujata Mukherjee before Hon‟ble

Supreme Court. It was submitted that it will be evident from the

complaint that the Appellant has alleged that she had been subjected

to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and

incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but

consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh.

Therefore, it was contended that the High Court was wrong in

appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing

that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one

isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hon‟ble Supreme Court

basing reliance on Section 178 of the Code, in particular Clauses (b)

and (c), found that in view of allegations in the complaint that the

offence was a continuing one having been committed in more local

areas and one of the local areas being Raipur, the learned Magistrate

at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted

in such court.

Ultimately, accepting the stand of the Appellant, this Hon‟ble

Supreme Court held as under:

"7.....We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the Appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the Appellant in the hands of all the accused Respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the Respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the Respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted."

19. In Y. Abrahim (supra) itself reference was made to this

authority and was distinguished as in that case there was no allegation

of continuing offence.

20. In State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal and Anr., (2003) 11 SCC

126, again in a similar circumstance, considering the provisions of

Section 179 with reference to the complaint relating to the offences

under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, it was held as under:

"6. The above Section contemplates two courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take place in any one of those two courts. One is the court within whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. When the allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the accused took place at Indore."

21. In Rajesh Kumar Pandey (supra) relied upon by the petitioner,

reference was made to the case of Arun Khanna v. The State of

Bihar and Another, 1994(1) PLJR 513 where the challenge was

made that Dhanbad Court has no territorial jurisdiction to take

cognizance of an offence which had taken place at Amritsar. The

Court has considered the definition of cruelty which has been

embodied in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and the Court

also considered the consequences of the act committed by the accused

persons which led to mental agony at Dhanbad. In other words,

offence was treated to be continuing, considering the definition of

cruelty in context of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and was

given an extended meaning. The Court has held that if the woman

continues to suffer the mental agony or torture as a result of the acts

done to her by the husband or his relatives forcing her to leave the

matrimonial home, it must be said that the cruelty is continuing.

While construing the question of jurisdiction with respect to offence

under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court has held that

social background and the object for which the said offence has been

created has to be taken into consideration. If victim lady would be

compelled to file a complaint only at the place where the act was

committed, that is, at the place where the husband/in-laws reside, she

might not be able to prosecute the complaint properly which will not

serve the desired object and on consideration of the aforesaid aspect

of the matter it was held that Dhanbad Court has rightly taken

cognizance as the consequences of torture which was perpetrated to

her in the State of Punjab continues to operate or it would have a fall-

out at the place where the complainant was residing.

22. We have already adverted to the details made by respondent

No.2 in the complaint. The complainant has levelled allegations of

cruelty and ill-treatment at the hands of the petitioners and stated facts

and incidents with respect to the same. Hence cause of action is

evident from the complaints. Admittedly in view of the above, part of

cause of action also arose in the territorial jurisdiction of Haryana.

The complainant in her second and third complaint has clearly

specified her husband's (petitioner No.3) visit to Rohtak and the ill-

treatment meted out to her and her parents at the behest of the

petitioner and also the threats given by Petitioner No.1 during his

visits to the Women Cell. These incidents constitute a part of the FIR.

Moreover, in view of Section 178 and Section 179 of the Cr.P.C., the

offence in this case was a continuing one, having been committed in

more local areas and one of the local areas being Rohtak, the FIR was

registered at Haryana. Therefore, the act of cruelty meted by the

petitioners is a continuing offence and continues both in Delhi and

Rohtak and therefore, the offence is triable by both the Courts in

whose territorial jurisdiction the act of continuing offence of cruelty

and ill-treatment has been committed.

23. The petitioner has also relied upon Sterling Agro Industries

Ltd. (supra) and Alchemist Ltd. (supra) for submitting that for the

purpose of deciding whether the facts averred by the petitioner would

or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider

whether such facts constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of

the cause of action. Even if a small fraction of cause of action arises

within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Nevertheless, it must be a "part

of cause of action", nothing less than that. However, these authorities

have no application to the present case as the facts stated by the

complainant in the complaints refers to the incidents alleged to have

taken place at Rohtak and constitute an essential and integral "part of

cause of action" and are not irrelevant as submitted by the petitioner.

24. In Niraj Trivedi (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, it was

found that the concerned Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the

case. The complainant wife had either lived at Delhi or U.S.A. where

the alleged atrocities took place as such, it was held that the Court at

Patna (where her parents were living) had no jurisdiction but things

are entirely different in the instant case as seen above. In Neelu

Chopra (supra) and Lakhwinder Singh (supra), FIR was quashed

since the allegations were vague. In Shipra Raj (supra) and Ajay

Mishra (supra), FIR was quashed as it did not disclose any cause of

action.

25. As regards the submission that there is misuse of police power

since the complaint was initially sent to the Commissioner of Police,

Delhi due to lack of territorial jurisdiction but subsequently on the

same complaint, FIR was registered at Rohtak. As held in Lalita

Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2014) 2 SCC 1, it is

mandatory to register FIR on receipt of information disclosing a

cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is required in such a

situation.

26. Learned counsel for the respondent has also advanced the

argument that jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the

question of inquiry or trial would arise. It is, therefore, a fallacious

thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has

the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of

the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not

impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance, the

Magistrate may have to decide as to whether the Court has

jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would

reach only during the post cognizance stage and not earlier. In

Rajesh Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2013(1)PLJR34, relied

upon by the petitioner himself, reliance was made to Trisuns

Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Others, AIR 1999 SC

3499, where Hon‟ble Supreme Court has considered Section 177, 178

and 179 of the Code and while considering Section 179 of the Code,

the Court has tested the jurisdiction on the touch stone of cause of

action and part thereof and also the consequences which have been

ensued to the other place. There Hon'ble Supreme Court further held

that there is nothing in Chapter-XIV which prohibits the Magistrate to

take cognizance with regard to the allegation that has taken place

outside the territorial jurisdiction and the Court has further held that

the jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of

enquiry or trial would arise. In that connection, it will be relevant to

quote the following portion of the said judgment:-

"13. ........Therefore, when there is nothing in Chapter-XIV of the Code to impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class taking cognizance of the offence on the strength of any territorial reason, it is impermissible to deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognizance of an offence of course, in certain special enactments special provisions are incorporated for restricting the power of taking cognizance of offences falling under such acts. But such provisions are protected by non obstante clauses. Anyway that is a different matter."

27. During the course of arguments, it has come to our knowledge

that the charge sheet has already been submitted before the learned

Magistrate at Rohtak and an application for transfer has already been

moved therein. Under the circumstances, it will be open to the

Magistrate concerned to decide the application uninfluenced by any

observation made in this order.

28. It was further submitted by petitioner that in the charge sheet

filed by the police at Rohtak three complaints made by respondent

Nos. 2 dated 7th September, 2012, 28th September, 2012 and 18th

October, 2012 does not form part thereof. It goes without saying that

court has ample power to call for the three complaints reference of

which was made in complaint dated 16th November, 2012. In any

case, this aspect of the matter is required to be considered by the

concerned Magistrate.

29. With respect to the powers of High Court under Article 226 or

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing of an FIR, learned counsel for

respondent No. 2 relied upon Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri v.

State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2007) 13 SCC 165, where Hon'ble

Supreme Court referred to number of judgments rendered earlier and

observed:-

"26. At this stage, we may also notice the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C to give effect to any order made under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In R.P. Kapur v. of Punjab, 1960CriLJ1239 this Court considered the question whether in exercise of its power under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482 Cr.P.C. is pari materia to Section 561A of the 1898 Code), the High Court could quash criminal case registered against the appellant who along with his mother-in-law was accused of committing offences under Section 420, 109, 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition in the Punjab High Court for quashing the investigation of the First Information Report (FIR) registered against him and then filed appeal before this Court. While confirming the High Court's order this Court laid down the following proposition:

"The inherent power of High Court under Section 561A, Criminal P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction."

30. This Court then carved out some exceptions to the above stated rule. These are:

"(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offences alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category;

(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of

looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not;

(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.

31. In State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 Cri LJ 527 this Court considered the scope of the High Court's power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR registered against the respondent, referred to several judicial precedents including those of R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab (supra), State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha 1980 Cri LJ 98 and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, 1982 Cri LJ 819 and held that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the merits and demerits of the allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating agency to complete its task. At the same time, the Court identified the following cases in which the FIR or complaint can be quashed:

"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

32. The ratio of Bhajan Lal's case has been consistently followed in the subsequent judgments. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (supra), this Court referred to a large number of precedents on the subject and observed:

"11. ......the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be

seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. It if appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that even there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings."

It was further held as under:-

"31. A careful reading of the above noted judgments makes it clear that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of any offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is

barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The people and the society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial. The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

33. Learned Counsel for the respondent also relied on Satvinder

Kaur v. State, (1999) 8 SCC 728, where it was observed as under:

"14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the Court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. It is also settled by a long course of decision of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482, Cr.

P.C. to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations"

34. Reliance was also placed on State of MP v. Awadh Kishore

Gupta & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 691, where it was held that when an

information is lodged at the police station and an offence is

registered, then the mala fides of the Informant would be of

secondary importance. It is the material collected during the

investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the

accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant

are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing

the proceedings.

35. In view of the legal proposition enunciated above, so far as the

first relief sought by the petitioner regarding quashing of FIR

registered at Police Station Citi Rohtak, Rohtak, Haryana on the

ground that no cause of action arose at Rohtak, charge sheet has

already been submitted and the concerned Magistrate is seized of the

matter before whom the application for transfer has already been

moved. Under the circumstances, it will be open to the Magistrate to

dispose of the application uninfluenced by any observations made in

this matter.

36. As regards the plea taken in the petition that the allegations

made in the complaint are false, that goes to the merits of the case and

cannot be decided in this petition.