Delhi High Court
Aakansha Monga vs The Honble High Court Of Delhi & Ors on 24 March, 2014
Author: Sanjiv Khanna
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*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24th March, 2014
+ W.P.(C) 1848/2014
AAKANSHA MONGA ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Joy Dip Bhattacharya, Advocate.
versus
THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI & ORS..Respondent
Through Mr. Karan Mehta, Advocate for Mr.
Viraj R. Datar, Advocate for R-1.
Ms. Zubeda Begum, Standing Counsel
GNCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P. MITTAL
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
In view of decision dated 21st March, 2014 in W.P.(C)
1869/2014, Preetesh Raman Singh Vs. Delhi High Court
through Registrar General, the present writ petition has to be
dismissed. On the last date of submission of the application
form, i.e. 24th March, 2014, the petitioner herein admittedly does
not meet the eligibility educational requirements stipulated in
clause „b‟ of Rule 14 of Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970. The
petitioner is still a student of LL.B, studying in the 10th semester
(final year).
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
aforesaid decision requires reconsideration in view of decision
of five Judges Bench of this Court in Geetika Panwar and Delhi
High Court Bar Association and Another Vs. Government of
NCT of Delhi and Others, AIR 2003 Delhi 317 wherein Entry
11A of List-III inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment)
Act, 1976 was interpreted and it was observed that inspite of the
semi colon, the said entry has to be read as one complete and
comprehensive sentence. In other words, the contention is that
the requirement stipulated in clause „c‟ of Rule 14 that a
candidate should not be more than 32 years of age as on the first
day of January following the commencement of the examination
would equally apply to the requirement of educational
qualification stipulated in clause „b‟ of Rule 14 of the aforesaid
Rules.
3. Entry 11A of List-III inserted by the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 reads:-
"Administration of justice; constitution and
organisation of all courts, except Supreme
Court and the High Court."
4. Five Judges Bench of this Court in Geetika Panwar and
Another (supra) interpreting the said Article had observed:-
"28. In Entry 11-A of List III there is a semi
colon after the phrase "administration of
justice" followed by the phrase "constitution
and organisation of all courts". There is also a
comma appearing after the phrase "Constitution
and Organisation of all Courts" and before the
exclusion clause i.e. "except the Supreme Court
and the High Courts". Semicolon in Webster's
New World Dictionary (Third Edition) has
been defined to mean a mark of punctuation
indicating a degree of separation greater than
that marked by the comma and less than that
marked by the period: used chiefly to separate
units that contain elements separated by
commas, and to separate closely related
coordinate clauses. Comma is another mark of
punctuation used to indicate slight separation of
sentence elements as in setting off
nonrestrictive or parenthetical elements, items
in a series. Making use of the two punctuation
marks, on plain and literal interpretation of
Entry 11-A of list III, the Parliament as well as
the State Legislatures are competent to enact
laws relating to the "administration of justice"
as well as "constitution and organisation" of all
courts, excluding the Supreme Court and High
Courts. It is not permissible under this entry for
the State Legislature to enact any law on the
subject of "Administration of justice" and/or
"constitution and organisation" relating to the
High courts or the Supreme Court. The Delhi
Legislative Assembly, as such, has no
competence since neither the "administration of
justice", nor "constitution and organisation" of
High Court is within the competence of the
State Legislature.
29. The matter does not rest here. Much
emphasis was laid by Mr. Gopal Subramaniam
on the use of "semicolon" in Entry 11-A urging
that it signifies both a statement of independent
generality under "administration of justice" and
an illustrative principle in respect of
'constitution and organisation' of Courts. The
Entry read as a whole excludes excessive
reliance on the exception contained in the
Entry. It was urged that there is a semi colon
after the phrase "administration of justice" and
before the second phrase "constitution of
organisation of all courts", which is further
separated by comma before the exclusion
clause, Therefore, the administration of justice
has to be treated as an independent expression
capable of wide liberal and expansive meaning.
In other words, in Entry 11-A, according to the
submissions made by Mr. Shali appearing for
the National Capital Territory of Delhi and by
Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate, on
behalf of the Delhi Bar Association,
"administration of justice" is a subject in the
concurrent list and it pertain to all courts
including the High Court. In support of this
submission, reliance is placed on the decision
of Supreme Court in Narottam Das's case
(supra) saying that the said decision still hold
good and is an authoritative pronouncement on
the meaning and context of expression
"administration of justice", which itself is
sufficient to clothe the Legislative Assembly
the power to legislative on the jurisdiction of all
courts including that of High Court. It was
urged that constitution and organisation of a
High Court is the subject matter of Entry 78 in
List-I and constitution and organisation of
Supreme Court is subject matter of Entry 77 in
List-I. By virtue of Entry 11-A of List III State
Legislature are competent to enact laws on the
subject of Administration of justice for all
Courts which will include High Court, since
"semi colon" separates the earlier phrase.
30. On the effect and scope of the semicolon in
Entry 11-A, learned Attorney General
submitted that punctuation is relevant in some
cases but in any event is not controlling.
According to him, the Constitutional Scheme is
that the High Courts, in respect of their
jurisdiction and powers are not to be subject to
the vagaries of State Legislations except in the
administration relating to the internal domestic
and procedural matters. In respect of the others
matters, Parliament alone is competent.
Therefore, the constitutional scheme would
prevail over the punctuation mark; semi colon
and the exception clause would apply to the
entire Entry 11-A in List III.
31. x x x x x
32. x x x x x
33. x x x x x
34. x x x x x
35. In case that much importance, as is sought
to be given to "semi colon" it would mean that
the last phrase "constitution and organisation of
all courts, except the Supreme Court and High
Courts" is separate from the earlier phrase. The
result of putting such an interpretation would
be that by virtue of Entry 11-A of List II it
would be competent for the State Legislature to
legislate on the subject of "administration of
justice" not only for the High Court but also for
the Supreme Court, which is contrary to the
very basic fundamental of the Constitutional
Scheme. The reason being that Entries 77 & 78
of List-I admittedly gives exclusive power to
the Parliament to legislate on this subject.
Supreme Court and High Courts stand
expressly excluded from the subject matter of
entry 11-A of List III. Having regard to the
substance of the matter, as it emerges from the
Constitutional Scheme, a plain meaning will
have to be given to Entry 11-A of List III and
the said Entry will have to be read and
interpreted as one complete and comprehensive
sentence i.e. "administration of justice and
constitution and organisation of all courts
except Supreme Court and the High Courts". In
other words, the subject matter of Entry 11-A
of List III is the "administration of justice" and
"constitution and organisation" of all courts
other than Supreme Court and the High
Courts."
5. The aforesaid paragraphs would indicate that the reason and
ratio given in the said decision, was keeping in light, the substance of
the matter, the Constitutional scheme and to give effect to Entry 11A
of List-III. It was observed that the entry has to be read and interpreted
as one complete and comprehensive sentence. The aforesaid decision
also refers to the contextual scheme of Entry 11A. At the same time, it
is observed that punctuations might have been used as interpretation
tools in some cases, but they cannot be regarded as a controlling and
cannot be allowed to control the main meaning of the text. Reference
was made to Aswini Kumar Chose and Anr Vs. Arabinda Bose and
Anr [1953] 4 SCR 1 and State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. Swapan
Kumar Guha and Ors, 1982 CriLJ 819.
6. For the sake of convenience, we would like to reproduce Rule
14 of Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970, which is as under:-
"14. A candidate shall be eligible to
appear at the examination, if he is:-
a) a citizen of India;
b) a person practicing as an Advocate in
India or a person qualified to be admitted as
an Advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961;
and
c) not more than **32 years of age on the 1 st
day of January following the date of
commencement of the examination."
7. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is
apparent that three independent conditions are stipulated. Condition
(a) states that a candidate should be a citizen of India. Condition (b)
states that a candidate should be a person practicing as an Advocate in
India or a person qualified to be admitted as an Advocate under the
Advocates Act, 1961. Condition (c) is with regard to the age on a
particular date i.e. on the first day of January following the date of
commencement of examination. The three clauses are separate and we
do not think that the date stipulated to compute the maximum eligible
age can be read as part and parcel or in continuation of clause „b‟
which relates to the educational qualification.
8. The writ petition accordingly has no merit and is
dismissed.
Dasti.
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
G.P. MITTAL, J.
MARCH 24, 2014
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