Ireo Pvt. Ltd. vs Genesis Infratech Pvt. Ltd
2014 Latest Caselaw 1375 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                     Reserved on :16.09.2013
                                                     Decided on :14.03.2014

+     IA No.19531/2012 in CS(OS)3156/2012
      IREO PVT. LTD.                               .....Plaintiff
                          Through       Mr.Ajay Sahni, Ms.Kanika Bajaj and
                                        Ms.Shivangi Amrit, Advocates

                     Versus

      GENESIS INFRATECH PVT. LTD.       .....Defendant
                    Through  Mr.Chetan Sharma, Senior Advocate
                             with Mr.Pramod Kumar Singh and
                             Mr.Abhishek Ghai, Advocates

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH

JAYANT NATH, J.

IA No.19531/2012

1. The Suit is filed seeking a decree of permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from offering for sale or dealing in real estate business under the impugned trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ or any other trade mark which may be deceptively similar to the plaintiff‟s trade mark „IREO SKYON‟. Other connected reliefs are also sought. The present application is filed for seeking an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from offering for sale, advertising or dealing in real estate business under the said impugned trade mark or using any trade mark which is deceptively similar to the plaintiff‟s trade mark till pendency of the Suit.

2. This suit came up for hearing on 19.10.2012 when this Court by an ex parte ad interim injunction restrained the defendant, its directors, proprietors

etc. from constructing, selling, offering for sale, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in the real estate business under the trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ or any other trade mark which is deceptively similar to the trade mark of the plaintiff‟s IREO SKYON.

3. The plaintiff pleads in the plaint/application that the trade mark IREO SKYON was adopted by the plaintiff in the year 2010. The plaintiff states to be a registered proprietor of the said trade mark IREO SKYON under class 35 and 37 w.e.f. 27.12.2010. There are several applications for the trade mark IREO SKYON of the plaintiff stated to be pending under different classes. It is stated that the said trade mark is a coined design adopted and used by the plaintiff when there was no other identical/similar mark in existence. It is urged that the said product/projects under the said trade mark have become immensely popular as the plaintiff‟s advertisements routinely appear in national newspapers. It is further urged that the plaintiff has expended advertising and promotion expenditure on its product/project and trade mark IREO SKYON which roughly comes to `9.424/- crores and has achieved sales of `869/- crores.

4. It is further stated that in October 2012 the plaintiff came to know from publications in a newspaper about use of the trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ by the defendant. It is urged that the plaintiff is the owner and prior user of the trade mark IREO SKYON and the defendant has blatantly copied the plaintiff‟s trade mark and has tried to pass off their goods as that of the plaintiff. It is urged that the impugned trade mark Genesis SKYON is phonetically, visually and structurally similar to the plaintiff‟s trade mark. It is further urged that the action of the defendant is to merely to cash upon the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff‟s mark and that there is no honesty in the action of the defendant.

5. It is further urged that the use of the trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ by the defendant constitutes a violation of the plaintiff‟s statutory right under the Trade marks Act, 1999. It is further urged that the use of the said impugned trade mark by the defendant constitutes acts of misrepresentation, misappropriation and passing off of the defendant‟s goods/business as that of the plaintiff. Hence, the present Suit is filed.

6. The defendant has filed the written statement/reply. In the written statement/reply it is urged that the registration of the plaintiff is for the trade mark "IREO SKYON, Space Age Living" and hence the plaintiff cannot claim exclusive registration of the trade mark IREO SKYON. It is urged that the use of the word SKY is common and prevalent in real estate industry. It is urged that sky being common is used by the defendant in accordance with honest practices in the real estate industry. It is urged that the words SKY AND SKYON are publici juris and the use of the said words does not amount to infringement of the registered trade mark of the plaintiff. It is further stated that the official website of the Government of India would show that several trade marks with the word/label with prefix SKY are registered under Class 37 of the Trade mark Rules, 2002 or are pending registration. Reliance is also placed on Section 17 of the Trade marks Act to claim that the plaintiff cannot claim proprietary rights over part of trade mark SKY or SKYON.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. It is strenuously urged by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the impugned trade mark being used by the defendant is deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff and the defendant is liable to be restrained from using the impugned trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ or any other trade mark which is deceptively similar to the plaintiff‟s trade mark. Learned counsel has relied on Sections 28 (iii) and

Section 29 of the Trade marks Act to claim that there is infringement of the rights of the plaintiff by the act of the defendant. Reliance is also placed on Section 2(i)(h) which defines the word deceptively similar. Learned counsel has also stressed that the conduct of the defendant shows malafide acts. It is pointed out that after interim orders passed by this Court on 19 th October, 2010 by which this Court restrained the defendant from using the impugned trade mark Genesis SKYON the defendant has now adopted the trade mark "Genesis SKY-EON". It is urged that by only adding an „-E‟ to the trade mark whose use this Court had already restrained the defendant the defendant is blatantly and deliberately violating the interim order passed by this Court. It is also urged that defendant has applied for registration of the said trade mark after service of stay.

8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon various judgments to support his submissions. A compilation of 21 judgments has been placed on record. However, it may not be necessary to refer each and every such judgment.

9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant has strenuously urged that there is no similarity in the trade mark used by the plaintiff and impugned trade mark being used by the defendant. The trade mark of the defendant prominently uses the word Genesis which is materially distinguishable and different in all regards from the word IREO used by the plaintiff. It is further urged that as the defendant is prominently disclosing the name „Genesis‟ which is a part of the name of the company and it cannot be confused with projects belonging to the plaintiff. Hence, there can be no passing off.

10. Stress is laid on various features of the two trade marks, namely, the impugned trade mark of the defendant and the registered trade mark of the

plaintiff to submit that there are material differences between the two trademarks and it cannot be said that the trade mark of the defendant is similar or deceptively similar to the trade mark of the plaintiff. Stress is laid on the following features which the learned senior counsel submits would distinguish the two trade marks: (i) there are coloured dots in the trade mark of the plaintiff on the left side which is not there in the impugned trade mark

(ii) further the font in which the trade mark of the plaintiff is written and the trade mark of the defendant is written is entirely different (iii) it is further urged that in the impugned trade mark of the defendant the word „K‟ has a small tower on the top which is not there in the trade mark of the plaintiff

(iv) lastly, it is urged that the get up of the two trade marks is entirely different.

11. Based on these distinguishing features it is urged that the trade marks are not similar and there can be no cause for any confusion whatsoever.

12. It is further urged that even assuming that there is some phonetic similarity, the category of customers which are dealing with the products of the defendant and that of the plaintiff are entirely different. It is the contention of the defendant that the project with the brand name Genesis SKYON is said to have been started in the month of October 2012 and is located at Alwar-Bhiwani Highway. The average cost of the flat is stated to be Rs.11.47 lacs. It is hence urged that the class of persons who would buy the flat of the plaintiff would be persons well versed with the facts and would be unlikely to get deceived by the alleged similarities of the trade marks. It is further urged that the registration of the plaintiff is for the trade mark „IREO SKYON Space Age Living‟ and the mark has to be seen as a whole. The only similar word SKYON cannot be the basis for the present Suit. The contentions of the written statement are reiterated.

13. Learned counsel for the defendant relies upon the judgment of this Court in Marico Ltd v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd. 174 (2010) DLT 279 to contend that a descriptive expression if used as a trade mark does not entitle such person to preclude others from using the said expression. Reliance is also placed upon Aravind Laboratories v.s Modicare MANU/TN/2708/2011 and to the judgment of this High Court in J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd. (2010) 115 DRJ 685 to contend that registration of a trade mark does not confer an exclusive right in respect of a matter which constitutes a part of the trade mark. Hence, it is argued that the plaintiff cannot claim any protection for the word SKYON as it is only a part of the registered trade mark of the plaintiff.

14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has in rejoinder relied on the judgment of this Court in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. Versus Aureate Healthcare Pvt.Ltd. & Anr, 2012(51)PTC585(Del) to submit that the contention of the defendant that SKY is common to the trade and hence has no protection is a misconceived argument. He further submits that the next argument of the defendant that Sky is a common descriptive word is incorrect and has no application to the facts as the word SKY is not being used. The word in question is SKYON. SKYON has no dictionary meaning. It is an invented word and an invented trade mark. It is further urged that the defendant himself has applied for registration of the trade mark GENESIS SKY-EON after this Suit was filed. Learned counsel also relies upon the said judgment to contend that the submission of the defendant that the website of the Government of India shows various trade marks with the word/label SKY as registered under Class 37, is of no consequences. This Court in the said judgment held that it is not permissible to draw an inference as to the use of marks from the presence of the marks on the

register. Reliance is also placed upon judgment of this Court in the case of P.M. Diesel v. S.M. Diesel AIR 1994 Del 264 which was a matter pertaining to a dispute of registered trade mark Field Marshal and the defendant was using the trade mark Sonamarshal. An argument that the word Marshal is common to the trade of diesel engines and hence the plaintiff could not claim the mark to be distinctive, was rejected by this Court.

15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also relies upon judgment of this High Court in the case of United Biotech Pvt Ltd v. Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (2012) ILR 5 Del 325 to contend that the submission of the defendant regarding application under section 17 of the Trade Marks Act to the facts of this case is misplaced.

16. Reliance is also placed on the judgement of this Court in the case of Globe Super Part Vs Blue Super Flame Industries AIR 1986Delhi 245. That was a case where defendant contended that words Superflame is a combination of two words super and flame which are words of ordinary English language and hence cannot be exclusive property. This contention was rejected by this court.

17. In my view, for the purpose of disposal of the present stay application the crux of the issue is whether the trade mark of the plaintiff "IREO SKYON Space Age Living" (as is apparent from the registration certificate is the registered trade mark of the plaintiff) is being violated by the defendant by use of trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟. To answer the above question, reference may be had to the judgement of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing and Agencies Pvt Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill 2010 (44) PTC 293 (Del), where in para 6, the Court held as follows:

"6.That copying of a prominent part of a trade mark of a person is prohibited, more so, when the same is a registered trade mark, is clear from the following observations of a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported as Goenka Institute of Education and Research v. Anjani Kumar Goenka AIR 2009 Del. 139.

17. The question which follows now is that whether 'Goenka' being only a part of the trade mark/trade name 'G.D. Goenka Public School' whether even such part of larger trade mark is entitled to protection. Putting it differently, if there is prior use of a larger trade mark will there be a prior use also for a part of the trade mark?

18. The law in this regard is stated in para 34 to 39 of the impugned judgment. Some of the paras are reproduced below:

34. A trade mark is infringed if a person other than the registered proprietor or authorized user uses, in relation to goods covered by the registration, one or more of the trade mark's essential particulars. The identification of an essential feature depends partly upon the Court's own judgment and partly upon the burden of the evidence that is placed before the Court."

18. Similarly, this Court in the case of Bihar Tubes Ltd v. Garg Ispat Ltd. 166 (2010) DLT 109, in para 14.2 held as follows:

"14.2 Therefore, in order to discern whether the mark is confusingly or deceptively similar with respect to which rights are claimed by the registered owner; the apposite test is that, in which, the broad essential features are to be construed-when one compares the infringing mark with the registered mark. In doing so, the stress ought to be on the "overall similarity" and not on the differences in the marks. The "overall similarity" test ought to be one, which should lead to a conclusion that it would mislead a person usually dealing with the goods in issue, to accept the goods of the infringer, as those manufactured by the proprietor of the registered mark. The "ordinary purchaser is not expected to be gifted with the powers of observations of Sherlock

Homes". See Parle Products (P) Ltd v. J.P. and Co., Mysore 1972(1) SCC 618."

19. The marks which are the subject matter of the proceedings of the suit are "IREO SKYON Space Age Living" and "Genesis SKYON".

20. SKYON is the prominent feature of the trade mark of the plaintiff. The entire trade mark centres around this word. This is apparent from the registration certificate. This is also apparent from the various advertisements placed on record by the plaintiff. This essential feature has been slavishly copied by the defendant. A mere look at the trade mark will show that essential features are akin. The trade mark of the defendant is deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff

21. There is no merit in the various submissions raised of the defendant.

22. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendant had firstly urged that „Sky‟ is a common descriptive word and everyone in the trade of real estate is using the word sky. Reliance is also placed by the defendant on a list of trade marks which it obtained from the website of Government of India which contain the word/label „Sky‟ as a prefix to trade marks which are registered under class 37 of the Trade Marks rules. Hence, it is urged that the plaintiff cannot claim any protection for the word SKYON. In my opinion the said contention has no merit. The word in question used by the plaintiff as part of its trade mark is „SKYON‟ and not „sky‟. The defendant is not using the word sky in its trade mark but have used the exact words as used by the plaintiff in its mark SKYON‟ as part of its mark. SKYON is not a descriptive word and cannot be confused with the word SKY.

23. Further the judgement of this Court in the case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd v. Aureate Healthcare Pvt Ltd. & Anr. (supra) is a complete answer to the above argument of the learned senior counsel for the defendant. That

was a case in which the defence taken by the defendant was about non-use of prefix PANTO with or without combination. This Court stated that law in this regard was quite settled and relied upon several judgments. Relevant portion of the same reads as follows:

"b. In 1989 (7) PTC 14, Express Bottlers Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pepsi Inc. & Others, it was held as under:

...To establish the plea of common use, the use by other persons should be shown to be substantial. In the present case, there is no evidence regarding the extent of the trade carried on by the alleged infringers or their respective position in the trade. If the proprietor of the mark is expected to pursue each and every insignificant infringer to save his mark, the business will come to a standstill. Because there may be occasion when the malicious persons, just to harass the proprietor may use his mark by way of pinpricks... The mere use of the name is irrelevant because a registered proprietor is not expected to go on filing suits or proceedings against infringers who are of no consequence... Mere delay in taking action against the infringers is not sufficient to hold that the registered proprietor has lost the mark intentionally unless it is positively proved that delay was due to intentional abandonment of the right over the registered mark. This Court is inclined to accept the submissions of the respondent No. 1 on this point... The respondent No. 1 did not lose its mark by not proceeding against insignificant infringers...

c. In 2004 (29) PTC 435, Dr. Reddy Laboratories v. Reddy Pharmaceuticals, it was held as under:

...the owners of trade marks or copyrights are not expected to run after every infringer and thereby remain involved in litigation at the cost of their business time. If the impugned infringement is too trivial or insignificant and is not capable of harming their business interests, they may overlook and ignore petty violations till they assume alarming proportions. If a road side Dhaba puts up a board of "Taj Hotel", the owners of Taj Group are not expected to swing into action and raise objections forthwith. They can wait till the time the user of their name starts harming their business interest and starts

misleading and confusing their customers."

24. Reference may also be had to the judgement of this Court in the case of P.M. Diesels v. S.M. Diesels (supra) where in para 8, this Court held as follows:

"(8) Next contention raised by learned counsel for the defendant is that the word Marshal has become common to the trade of diesel engines in Rajkot and various other persons are using the trade mark in one form or other as inasmuch as some are using Airmarshal, Perfect Marshal, Powermarshal etc. and the defendant is not the only person who is using the trade mark Sonamarshal only. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot claim its trade mark to be distinctive of its goods or business and no customer is likely to be confused or deceived on account of this trade mark. This contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is also without force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and the court has not to examine the right of other parties. If some other manufacturers are using or suffixing the word Marshal on their diesel engines, it is of no consequence. Furthermore, if the plaintiff has not taken any action against several other infringements, this does not mean that the plaintiff has abandoned its trade mark and cannot challenge the action of the defendant."

25. In view of the above legal position and the facts clearly the said submission of the defendant that the word „Sky‟ is a common mark used in the trade in question and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to exclusive protection of the mark, is without merit and hence is rejected.

26. The second submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant relates to section 17 of the Trade Marks Act. It is urged that under section 17 where a Trade Mark consists of several matters, its registration confers exclusive right to use the mark as a whole and the registration does

not confer a right on the matter being a part of the trade mark.

27. On the basis of the same it is urged that the registered trade mark of the plaintiff is „IREO SKYON Space Age Living‟. It is urged that what the plaintiff is complaining of is that the defendant has, as part of its mark, copied the word „SKYON‟. Hence the present suit has been filed. It is urged that SKYON being only part of the full registered trade mark of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to no protection for a part of the trade mark namely SKYON.

28. Section 17 reads as follows:

"Section 17 - Effect of registration of parts of a mark (1) When a trade mark consists of several matters, its registration shall confer on the proprietor exclusive right to the use of the trade mark taken as a whole.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), when a trade mark--

(a) contains any part--

(i) which is not the subject of a separate application by the proprietor for registration as a trade mark; or

(ii) which is not separately registered by the proprietor as a trade mark; or

(b) contains any matter which is common to the trade or is otherwise of a non-distinctive character, the registration thereof shall not confer any exclusive right in the matter forming only a part of the whole of the trade mark so registered."

29. In my view the judgment of this High Court in the case of Jagan Nath Prem Nath vs. Bhartiya Dhoop Karyalaya, AIR 1975 Delhi 149 would be a complete answer to the above submissions of the learned senior counsel for the defendant. The court held as follows:

"7. This being the law, it cannot be disputed that in an action for infringement the plaintiff can succeed not only when he proves that the whole of his registered trade mark has been copied but can also succeed if he shows that the defendant's mark is similar to the plaintiff's mark as it would be remembered by persons possessed of an average memory with its usual imperfections or that its essential particular or the distinguishing or essential feature has been copied

....

15. Shri P. C. Khanna, learned counsel for the respondent, argued that where a distinct label is registered as a whole such a registration does not confer any exclusive statutory right on the proprietor to use any particular word or name contained therein, apart from the mark as a whole. Reliance in support of this proposition was placed on the observations in the Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Lid. (1955) 2 S-C-R. These observations in the cited case were made in the context of exercise of powers conferred on the Registrar by Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. This aspect is not at all relevant for the present controversy because the plaintiff can succeed in an action for 'infringement' if he proves that an essential particular of his trade mark has been copied: See Taw Manufacturer Coy. Ltd. v. Notek Engineering Coy. Ltd. and another'. (1951) 68 Reports of Patent Cases 271(2)."

30. Reference may also be had to the case of United Biotech Private Limited v. Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors. (supra). In para 21 of the said judgment this Court held as follows:-

"21. The argument was that as per sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, the exclusive right of the registered proprietor is to use the trade mark "taken as a whole" and not "in part" which the respondent was trying to claim. It was argued that from the reading of the latter part of sub-Section (2) of the aforesaid provision. It was made abundantly clear that the registration would not confer any right in the matter forming only part of the whole of the trade mark registered and the IPAB had ignored the words "not" and "in" occurring in this petition

thereby committing a grave error. Relying upon the judgment in the case of Aravind Laboratories Vs. Modicare (decided on 05.07.2011), which is a Single Bench judgment of the Madras High Court, it was argued that the objects & reasons behind insertion of Section of the Trade mark Act, 1999 were to omit the provision relating to requirement of disclaimer under Section 17 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and to explicitly state the general proposition that the registration of a trade mark confers exclusive right to the use of the trade mark taken as a whole and not separately to each of its constituent part. To buttress this submission, reference was made to Section 15 of the Act which permits a proprietor of a trade mark to apply for parts of a trade mark, if he claims to be entitled to the exclusive use of any part thereof separately. It was argued that since this was not done by the respondent in the instant case, it was permissible for the respondent to claim statutory right in the word "ORZID" (perse)."

31. The Court further held as follows:

"24. The entire arguments are on the wrong premise and it proceeds on the basis of common feature of the two marks suffix "ZID" and since the respondent has registration and trade mark "ORZID", it cannot bare a part of it, i.e., "ZID". What has been seen in a case like this is as to whether the mark "FORZID" is deceptively similar to "ORZID". That is the test which is to be applied and in a process, it is to be seen as to whether the two marks are structurally and phonetically similar and would cause deception in the minds of consumers. When we judge the matter from this angle, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by IPAB as well as the learned Single Judge. Although the mark "ORZID" is a label mark, the word mark "ORZID" is an essential feature which has been covered by the registration."

32. Reference may also be had to the judgment of this Court in the case of Keshav Kumar Aggarwal v. M/s. NIIT Ltd. 199 (2013) DLT 242, where this Court relying on the above judgment of the Division Bench in the case of United Biotech Private Limited (supra) rejected the argument based on

Section 17 of the Trade Mark Act and held that the plaintiff‟s trademark "TURNING POINT" being an essential feature of the label of the plaintiff "TP-TURNING POINT" deserves protection from any acts of infringement/passing off. The Court injuncted the defendant in that case from using the word "NIIT-THE TURNING POINT".

33. I have already held above that the mark which is being used by the defendant is deceptively similar to the mark of the plaintiff. The essential features have been copied. Merely because the word SKYON is the only word copied by the defendant, does not change the legal position. The contention of the defendant in this regard has no merits.

34. The learned senior counsel for the defendant has relied heavily for the above contention on the judgment of this High Court in the case of Marico Ltd v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd.(supra). However, the said judgment would have no application inasmuch as what the court held in that case is that the defendant could use the expression "with low absorb technology‟ because this is only a descriptive use by normal English words indicative of the kind, quality, intended purpose of the goods. Similarly, reliance of the learned senior counsel for the defendant on the judgment in the case of J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd.(supra) is also misplaced. In those facts of the case, the court noted that the basic question was as to whether the plaintiff‟s trade mark is identical or deceptively similar to that of the defendant. It came to a conclusion on facts and the court was not persuaded to hold at that stage that there is any infringement of the plaintiff‟s trade mark when taken as a whole i.e. in its entirety.

35. The third argument strenuously raised by the defendant was that the cost of the property being sold by the plaintiff is much higher than the cost of property being advertised by the defendant and there is likelihood of the

same being confused. In my opinion there is no merit in the said submission. The defendant has slavishly copied the mark of the plaintiff and cannot be permitted to continue to use the said deceptively similar trade mark.

36. Reference in this context may be had to the judgement of this High Court in the case of Aman Resorts Limited v. Mr. Deepak Narula and Anr 2011 (45) PTC 329 (Del). This Court in that case turned down a similar argument regarding cost of the product of the plaintiff. The Court in paragraph 18 noted as follows:

"18. The above discussion is however, not dispositive of the application. The plaintiff's claim for injunction also embraces a restraint order, to enjoin the Defendant from using the AMAN mark in respect of the hotel and hospitality business. The Defendant does not here deny that the plaintiff's marks are registered. However, the contention is that its hotel, has a lower tariff, and its location and appearance is such as to leave no one in doubt that it has no association with the plaintiff. The Court has to determine the likelihood of confusion and deceptive similarity in order to arrive at a prima facie finding of infringement keeping in mind the following considerations: the broad and essential features of the of competing marks will have to be viewed, the marks will have to be considered as a whole in their respective contexts, the similarities rather than dissimilarities will have to be taken note of and that the marks must be judged from the point of view of unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection."

This Court granted injunction in that case to the plaintiff.

37. In view of the above, there is no merit in the contention of learned Counsel for the defendant.

38. The plaintiffs have made out strong prima facie case. The balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. Irreparable injuries are likely to be caused in case injunction is not granted.

39. Accordingly, the defendants are restrained by injunction order from

using the trade mark „Genesis SKYON‟ or any other mark deceptively similar to that of the registered trade mark of the plaintiff „IREO SKYON Space Age Living‟ till the pendency of the present suit. The application is disposed of.

JAYANT NATH (JUDGE) MARCH 14, 2014 n/„raj‟