Delhi High Court
Faridabad Manufacturing ... vs Sh. Yashpal Arora & Anr. on 22 July, 2014
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC REV No. 195/2011
% 22nd July , 2014
FARIDABAD MANUFACTURING (ENGINEERING PRODUCTS) PVT.
LTD. ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rajiv Bahl, Advocate.
VERSUS
SH. YASHPAL ARORA & ANR. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Kirti Uppal, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Aman Bhalla, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
+ RC. REV. No.195/2011 and C.M. Nos.10434/2011
1. The challenge by means of this petition under Section 25B(8)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is
to the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 4.1.2011 by
which the Additional Rent Controller has refused to condone the delay in
filing the application for leave to defend and has decreed the petition.
RC REV No.195/2011 Page 1 of 5
2. Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Prithipal Singh
Vs. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15 has now laid down
the law that the statutory period of 15 days which is provided under Section
25B read with relevant form for service and the schedule is a period in
which leave to defend has positively to be filed, and if leave to defend is
filed after 15 days the same cannot be looked into because delay of even one
day cannot be condoned. Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh
(supra) has held that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
or the provision of CPC do not apply to the exhaustive procedure of
bonafide necessity provided under Section 25B of the Act.
3. In the present case, admittedly the application for leave to
defend has been filed beyond time because the petitioner/tenant was served
on 12.8.2010 and the leave to defend application was filed on 9.9.2010.
Once that is so, there is no application for leave to defend which is to be
considered, and in view of Section 25B(4) the statements in the eviction
petition are deemed to be admitted and the landlord is entitled to an eviction
order.
4. I note that the impugned order deals with the aspect that an
affidavit which is filed in support of the eviction petition is defective
RC REV No.195/2011 Page 2 of 5
because the verification is not proper but that defect can be remedied,
however, the discussion in this regard by the Additional Rent Controller is
superfluous because there is no procedure under Section 25B of the Act of
having to file an affidavit in support of the eviction petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner first sought to take
adjournment on the ground that compromise talks were going on and this
case was fixed today only to report the compromise proceedings, however,
the adjournment was very vehemently opposed by the respondent/landlord
because it was stated that no compromise talks are going on and respondent
is prejudiced because there is an interim order staying the operation of the
eviction order passed way back on 4.1.2011 i.e over four and half years
back. After adjournment was refused, counsel for the petitioner argued that
he was not prepared and the matter be passed over to which it was put to him
that the limited issue of condonation of delay in filing of leave to defend
application has already been pronounced upon by the Supreme Court in the
case of Prithipal Singh (supra) and this Court surely cannot in any manner
question the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Prithipal Singh (supra), arguments commenced.
6. In the opinion of this Court, totally frivolous arguments are
RC REV No.195/2011 Page 3 of 5
sought to be raised by petitioner by arguing that there is no automatic
entitlement to decreeing of the eviction petition allegedly because there is no
such provision, however this argument flies in the face of Section 25B(4) of
the Act which specifically provides that once there is no leave to defend
application, contents of the eviction petition are deemed to be admitted and
an eviction order has to follow. Thereafter, counsel for the petitioner argued
that period of 15 days is directory and not mandatory and that no period of
15 days is provided under the Act. I would like to note that there should be
a limit to frivolous arguments because the specific period of 15 days is
provided under the Act i.e as per Section 25B alongwith the prescribed form
for service, and which aspect of there existing a 15 days period has now
been adjudicated, if I can say so in thousands of cases, including in the case
of Prithipal Singh (supra) wherein Supreme Court has said that period of 15
days is sacrosanct, and I hence cannot look any further.
7. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed with costs of
Rs.50,000/- and which costs shall be paid within four weeks from today.
Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors.
Vs Nirmala Devi & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 249 has observed that it is high time
that in certain litigations, proper costs must be imposed. I am also
empowered to impose costs in terms of Volume V of the Punjab High
RC REV No.195/2011 Page 4 of 5
Court Rules and Orders (as applicable to Delhi) Chapter VI Part I Rule
15. In the present case, I have already noted above that eviction order has
been passed about four and half years back and the present petitioner is
enjoying benefit of the interim stay against eviction in spite of the
categorical ratio of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh
(supra).
JULY 22, 2014 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
Ne
